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This dissertation examines processes of nation and state formation in Colombia 
through an analysis of the context and debates surrounding the importation, 
production, and consumption of wheat. Traditionally, state formation in Colombia is 
studied through the lens of violence or partisan conflict, and generally emphasizes the 
power of private industrial and agricultural interests to co-opt the state, in the process 
subverting democratic processes. This dissertation argues, on the other hand, that 
conflict can be a constructive process of state formation. It examines, for example, the 
debates and discourse of various actors, many of whom, as they made demands on the 
state, articulated visions of the state as well as the relationship between a state and the 
citizenry. Although they may not have succeeded in achieving their immediate aims, 
they did demonstrate their adherence to the Colombian state and helped strengthen it 
through their discourse. Similarly, nation-building in Colombia is often described as a 
top-down process in which state actors articulate their vision of the nation through 
maps or economic atlases. The role of non-state actors, particularly popular ones, is 
sidelined. This dissertation examines how various groups articulated their visions of the 
nation as they worked to defend their economic interests. Finally, it opens new avenues 
for understanding the economic policy known as import substitution industrialization. 
 
 
Where other studies focus generally on abstract macro-economic indicators in an effort 
to explain why these policies “failed,” this dissertation presents detailed and nuanced 
analysis of the social and cultural aspects of import substitution in order to demonstrate 
that such policies had effects that extended beyond the economic sphere. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When wheat is exported from one country to another, it is a foreign commodity 
in the importing country – at least until it reaches millstones or grinding rollers. But 
after that grain has passed through those stones or rollers, does the resulting flour 
remain an imported product or does it become a national one?  In an era of free trade, 
multinational corporations, and stockyards stacked mile-high with shipping containers 
this question may seem silly. With so many products (and their constituent parts and 
raw materials) rapidly crossing borders, it might seem a waste of time to try to define 
what is and is not “national.” Nevertheless, despite free trade agreements – and more 
likely because of them – sorting out answers to such questions remains important. The 
existence of strict rules regarding labels and packaging and definitions of “made” 
versus “assembled” attests to the ongoing importance of differentiating between 
national and foreign goods.1  
Of course, in other, more protectionist eras and contexts, these questions were 
vital – and no less complicated. Such was the case in Colombia in 1936. Even before the 
Great Depression disrupted global trade, Colombia began moving away from a purely 
export-led model of economic development, toward a more state-led, inward-looking 
                                                 
1 Although strict, these rules are also somewhat subjective. Consider, for example, the criteria used to determine if a 
product can carry the label “Made in USA”: it must be made “all or virtually all” in the United States. How far back 
in the production process its component parts or raw materials were imported into the country, and how much of the 
finished product is comprised of those parts or materials are examined to decide if the “virtually all” designation is 
appropriate. See the Federal Trade Commission’s guide to “Made in USA” for an illustration of the complexity in 
making such determinations: Federal Trade Commission, “Complying with Made in USA Standards,” (1998) - 
http://business.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/bus03-complying-made-usa-standard.pdf. Of course, these 
standards are strictly monitored today not to control importation of goods, but rather to prevent false advertising 
claims, as this Small Business Administration discussion attests: 
http://community.sba.gov/community/blogs/expert-insight-and-news/business-law-advisor/made-usa-labels-
information-manufacturers-retailers-and-consumers-0. 
 2 
one.2 Supporting domestic industry became the goal of economic policy, and it was 
defined broadly to include both agriculture and manufacturing. Restrictions on 
imported food commodities and consumer goods were put in place. Wheat, in 
particular, was subject to strong protectionist measures. Although briefly repealed in 
1929, due to flour shortage and high bread prices, the restrictions were reinstated in the 
early 1930s.3 But in 1936, millers on the Caribbean coast asked for a reduction in 
customs duties for grain imports –transportation costs between the wheat producing 
regions in the central highlands and the coastal cities of Cartagena, Barranquilla, and 
Santa Marta were prohibitively high and threatened to repeat the flour and bread 
shortages of a few years earlier. The state agreed and lowered import tariffs for wheat, 
based on the presumption that those same high transport costs would keep flour 
produced from imported grain confined to the Caribbean coast.4  
Thus it is not surprising that the Colombian state objected when the coastal 
millers also asked for preferential internal shipping rates for their flour. At the time, 
items of prime necessity, such as some food products, enjoyed reduced rates on the 
nation’s railway system and millers on the Caribbean coast felt that their flour should 
                                                 
2 As José Antonio Ocampo noted, “the international crisis [the Depression] simply accelerated processes that were in 
already in place.” These included banking reforms, the development of social and labor movements, the expansion of 
the railroad and highway system, and increased tariffs on imported goods (which helped to pay for transport 
improvements). See, Ocampo, “Crisis mundial y cambio estructural (1929-1945),” in Historia económica de Colombia, 
ed., José Antonio Ocampo (Bogotá: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1987), 209. See also, Rosemary Thorp & Carlos Londoño, 
“The Effects of the Great Depression on the Economies of Peru and Colombia,” in An Economic History of Twentieth-
Century Latin America, Volume 2, Latin America in the 1930s: The Role of the Periphery in World Crisis, edited by Rosemary 
Thorp (New York: Palgrave, 2000).  
3 Salomón Kalmanovitz and Enrique López Enciso, La agricultura colombiana en el siglo XX (Bogotá: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 2006); Absalón Machado Camacho, Políticas agjrarias en Colombia, 1900-1960 (Bogotá: UNAL, Centro de 
Investigaciones para el Desarrollo, 1986).  
4 “De Francisco José Chaux a Administrador General Ferrocarriles Nacionales, Bogotá, November 23, 1936,” Archivo 
General de la Nación (AGN), Fondo Presidencia de la República, Secretaria General, Box 243, Folder 24, Ministerio de 
Industrias, folios 130-133. I’d like to thank Susana Romero Sánchez for enthusiastically sharing this source.  
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be one of them. Francisco José Chaux strongly disagreed. Previously the Minister of 
Industry, and in 1936 a member of the senate, he wrote to the General Administrator of 
the National Railway, urging the railroad to deny coastal millers preferential rates for 
the flour they milled from imported grain. It didn’t matter that they “nationalized” the 
wheat by paying customs duties, he argued – doing so did not eliminate its “intrinsic 
foreignness.” More importantly, those imports represented a serious threat to national 
wheat production.5   
For Chaúx, this was unacceptable, considering how much the national 
government had been promoting and protecting domestic production of both industrial 
and agricultural goods. Those efforts had been paying off, achieving “truly gratifying 
results.” Granting the preferential shipping rates the millers requested would threaten 
those achievements, he argued, because Colombia was still not in a position to compete 
with the world’s primary wheat producers.  Circulating their product throughout the 
country would flood the nation with cheaper flour of foreign origin, harm wheat 
growers and millers in the highlands, and make a mockery of the reasons the national 
government had relaxed customs duties for the coastal millers in the first place.6  
Perhaps even more important was the effect such a measure would have on 
public opinion. According to Chaúx, the Colombian people were very excited about the 
protectionist policies and what they had achieved. He claimed that they were “without 
a doubt, one of the principal bases of the faith that public opinion has in the current 
national government and of the absolute trust that workers have in it.” A follow-up 
                                                 
5 Ibid., f. 131. All translations, unless otherwise noted, are my own.  
6 Ibid., fs. 130, 132.  
 4 
statement expressed even more forcefully Chaux’ belief that Colombians were deeply 
committed to protectionism:  
The citizens resign themselves to the great sacrifices that the global crisis 
with its national repercussions imposes, in exchange for the programs to 
develop national production that this Government has been implementing 
and sustaining and which are an undeniable guarantee of future well-
being.7  
 
 With this statement Chaúx also subtly chided the coastal millers: they needed to 
make sacrifices like everyone else. He acknowledged that allowing them to supply the 
country with flour made of foreign grain would greatly benefit them. But, the negative 
effects were strong: it would hurt highland wheat growers and millers and ultimately, 
the economy as a whole. Noting that this was a “very visible struggle among 
commercial interests,” he regretted that “the prosperity of one means the development 
of Colombian wealth and the well-being of a great number of the country’s farmers and 
industrialists. The prosperity of the other can only come at the expense of national 
production, and thus, of the well-being of the great majority of the nation’s workers.”  
For Chaúx, the short-term profits of one sector could not take precedence over the entire 
nation’s long-term development.8  
Chaúx’s arguments for the denial of the millers’ request provide a good example 
of the embeddedness of economic discourses. While the former Minister of Industries 
clearly took into account the competing commercial interests of the actors involved as 
well as the overarching economic consequences of granting the millers preferential 
                                                 
7 Ibid., f. 130. It is notable that the Spanish original uses the term “well-being” (“bienestar”) – a term that supposedly 
did not come into vogue in development circles, at least those in the global North, until the 1960s. 
8 Ibid., fs. 132-133. 
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shipping rates, neither his opinion nor his justification of it were based solely on 
economic concerns. Equally, if not more important, were the associated political and 
moral issues. These are evident in his references to public opinion and Colombian 
citizens.  Public support for governmental policy mattered a great deal. This was during 
the administration of Alfonso López Pumarejo, the second Liberal president in power 
after thirty years of Conservative party rule. Where his predecessor, Enrique Olaya 
Herrera, had been a timid reformer of an entrenched political and economic system, 
López Pumarejo boldly introduced a variety of land, labor, educational, and 
administrative reforms. Known as the “Revolución en marcha” (Revolution on the 
March), these reforms won him the support of urban laborers and small-scale farmers 
alike.9 Thus, for Chaúx to evoke “public opinion” to justify denying the request was to 
make a statement about the administration’s political relationship with the citizenry. In 
other words, he was communicating a message about who the state represented and for 
whom it worked.  
The political issues were closely tied to moral ones. To speak of sacrifices for the 
nation and of the well-being of the working classes was to make a moral judgment 
about economics. For Chaúx, the morally correct position was for industrial profit-
seekers to understand that they could not earn those profits unfairly – benefiting only 
themselves while everyone else suffered. The discursive links between economics, 
politics, and morality was particularly strong at that moment in Colombia, and not 
                                                 
9 Alvaro Tirado Mejía, Aspectos políticos del primer gobierno de Alfonso López Pumarejo (1934-1938) (Bogotá: Planeta 
Editorial Colombiana, 1995). 
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solely because of López Pumarejo and the Revolución en marcha.10 This was also the era 
of Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, a more radical member of the Liberal Party and Mayor of 
Bogotá at the time of Chaux’s letter about the coastal millers. While Gaitán and López 
shared the goal of eliminating oligarchic rule in Colombia (whether Liberal or 
Conservative), the former articulated this vision far more forcefully.11 He strongly spoke 
out against the collusion between the United Fruit Company and the ruling elite, which 
resulted in a massacre of striking banana workers in 1928. His vehement denunciation 
strongly endeared him to the working classes. A brilliant orator and charismatic 
popular leader, he eloquently articulated the moral foundation of politics and 
economics, when he spoke of a Colombia divided into the “political country” and the 
“national country” – the first consisting of the oligarchic ruling elite and their political 
lackeys, and the second consisting of the noble and working class people who hoped to 
build a more economically just and politically democratic society. He is widely 
                                                 
10 Colombia is not the only Latin American country where political, economic, and moral issues have been entwined. 
One of the best articulated manifestations of that connection has been analyzed by Richard Weiner, in which he 
looked at the impact of Rerum Novarum, the Papal Encyclical on 1891 that addressed the condition of the working 
classes and criticized rapacious industrialists who exploited the workers. This document was widely discussed in 
Mexico at the end of the nineteenth century, and generated much debate among industrialists themselves about the 
nature of the market and capitalism. See, Richard Weiner, “Competing Market Discourses in Porfirian Mexico,” Latin 
American Perspectives, 26 (January 1999): 44-64; Weiner, Race, Nation, and Market: Economic Culture in Porfirian Mexico 
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004). 
11 Tirado Mejía, Aspectos políticos, 24. Both men understood that neither the Liberal nor the Conservative parties were 
free from connections to the oligarchy, but this was particularly important for Gaitán. As contemporary observers 
and later scholars have pointed out, Gaitán experienced prejudice and exclusion from the upper classes because of 
his lower middle-class origins and skin color. As Herbert Braun so ably discussed, the elites of both parties separated 
themselves from everyone else in society, and worked together (in an informal system called “convivencia” 
(“conviviality”) to maintain the status quo and societal hierarchy intact. See Herbert Braun, The Assassination of 
Gaitán: Public Life and Urban Violence in Colombia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).  
 7 
considered the important populist leader in Colombian history, a conception fueled by 
the mythmaking that followed his assassination in 1948.12  
Why do I stress the point that there was a connection between political, 
economic, and moral issues evident in Chaúx’s response to the coastal millers? After all, 
historians have long examined change over time using the framework of political 
economy – meaning the interaction of law, custom, politics, and economics.13 They have 
also incorporated conceptions of morality in the marketplace, inspired by E.P. 
Thompson’s notion of the moral economy – the idea that people’s ideas about the 
market incorporated considerations of fairness and justice, which he eloquently argued 
by pointing out that the lower classes in eighteenth century England organized riotous 
protests of bread shortages not simply because they were hungry or famine was 
                                                 
12 On Gaitán’s political impact, see Braun, The Assassination of Gaitán; W. John Green, “‘Vibrations of the Collective’: 
The Popular Ideology of Gaitanismo on Colombia’s Atlantic Coast, 1944-1948,” The Hispanic American Historical 
Review (HAHR) 76 (May 1996): 283-311; Green, Gaitanismo, Left Liberalism, and Popular Mobilization in Colombia 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2003). 
13 “Political economy” is, of course, both an analytical framework and an historical phenomenon in its own right. 
When historians speak of studying “the political economy,” they often follow that phrase with the preposition “of” – 
specifying that they will study the laws, politics, customs, and economics of a particular country, economic policy, or 
industrial or agricultural sector. Thus, an analysis of “the political economy of populist Argentina” examined efforts 
by Perón to balance the interests of workers and industrialists at a time when manufacturing was overtaking 
agriculture as the primary engine of the nation’s economy. Another study analyzing the “political economy of famine 
relief,” examined the relationship between local politics, taxation, and granaries in eighteenth century China. See, 
James P. Brennan,” Prolegomenon to Neoliberalism: The Political Economy of Populist Argentina, 1943-1976,” Latin 
American Perspectives 34 (May 2007): 49-66; Carol H. Shiue, “The Political Economy of Famine Relief in China, 1740-
1820,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 36 (Summer 2005): 33-55. “Political economy” (without the definite 
article) refers to an intellectual and political development in eighteenth century Europe (particularly Britain) in which 
moral philosophers conceptualized a new relationship between the rulers and the ruled, one in which individuals 
would be free of political and economic constraints imposed by the government in collusion with “traditional” 
institutions such as the church, guilds, or commercial entities. Of course, from this new philosophy eventually 
emerged a study of economics, which by the late nineteenth century became (supposedly) separated from questions 
of culture and tradition, and focused more on the workings of an abstract market, which itself eventually become an 
object of econometric study known as “the economy.” For analyses of the radical nature of eighteenth century 
political economists, see: Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Tatsuya Sakamoto & Hideo Tanaka, eds., The Rise of Political 
Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment (London: Routledge, 2003). On the emergence of “the economy” as an object of 
study, see Timothy Mitchell, “The Character of Calculability,” in Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 
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imminent, but rather because they perceived that unfair practices were at play to create 
or exacerbate those shortages (such as selling flour abroad).14  
Despite these powerful threads in historical scholarship, over the past two 
decades, the study of economic history has been relegated to remote corners of the 
academy. This is not to say that there have been no studies of economic history. 
Economic aspects play a central role in a variety of sub-fields, such labor, agricultural, 
and business history.15 A recent surge in interest in food history puts economic issues 
front and center, especially in studies focused on food systems, consumerism, or 
commodities.16 For Latin America, there has been a small boom in the economic history 
of the Porfiriato, the thirty-year period of rule by Porfirio Díaz in Mexico (1876-1910), 
characterized by dynamic industrial and export growth, infrastructural projects, and 
                                                 
14 E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” in Customs in Common: 
Studies in Traditional Popular Culture (New York: The New Press, 1993). Thompson’s essay was originally published as 
a journal article in 1971 and influenced James Scott, who expanded the framework from food riots to full-scale 
peasant rebellions, but argued essentially the same thing – that peasants rebelled after making estimations of what 
were fair and unfair demands on their labor and harvests. Intriguingly, they did not protest in years when they were 
required to turn over larger portions of their harvests – because those demands represented what seemed a fair 
proportion of their total harvest. They did object in years when they were required to hand over less, because those 
years it represented a higher proportion of their total harvest. This simple formula does not do justice to Scott’s full 
analysis of the cultural and religious aspects that factored into peasants estimation of fairness. See, James C. Scott, The 
Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).  
15 Some historians still give economic issues a central place in large-scale historical events. For example, Russell R. 
Menard argues that the rise of the British Empire and an “English North Atlantic” in the eighteenth century can only 
be understood by considering the role of plantation agriculture (tobacco and sugar) and, more specifically, how the 
rise in productivity gains fueled the imperial coffers and led to English dominance of the North Atlantic. Menard, 
“Plantation Empire: How Sugar and Tobacco Planters Built their Industries and Raised an Empire,” Agricultural 
History 81 (Summer 2007): 309-332.  
16 Many of these studies also focus on issues of science and technology. See, for example: Gabriella M. Petrick, “‘Like 
Ribbons of Green and Gold’: Industrializing Lettuce and the Quest for Quality in the Salinas Valley, 1920-1965,” 
Agricultural History 80 (Summer 2006): 269-295; John Soluri, Banana Cultures: Agriculture, Consumption, and 
Environmental Change in Honduras and the United States (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005). Others look at the 
connections between taste, the market, and labor. See, Jeffrey M. Pilcher, The Sausage Rebellion: Public Health, Private 
Enterprise, and Meat in Mexico City 1890-1917 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006); Michael Wise, 
“Colonial Beef and the Blackfeet Reservation Slaughterhouse, 1879-1895,” Radical History Review 2011 (Spring 2011): 
59-82. 
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concentration of land and wealth.17 Others have recently questioned the long-held 
assumption that Latin American dependence on external markets (economies based on 
the export of raw materials and agricultural commodities) prevented the growth of 
dynamic, diversified, and self-sustaining domestic economies.18 
Nevertheless, that the study of economic history has gone out of fashion is a 
commonplace notion. Economic history journals still exist, but their econometric 
approach to history dramatically differs from the dominant theoretical and 
methodological frameworks widely in use. At this point, it is not uncommon for 
scholars to lament the absence of economic analyses and examinations of the 
connections between materiality and cultural history.19 In a recent article, William 
Sewell described this divergence between economic history and other forms of 
historical analyses. He noted that in the middle of the twentieth century, a variety of 
                                                 
17 The Porfiriato has generally been studied through a teleological lens, with the Revolution the inevitable outcome of 
Porfirian economic policy and practice. More recent studies have begun to examine the Porfiriato on its own terms. 
Paolo Riguzzi offers a comprehensive overview of this literature in: “From Globalisation to Revolution? The Porfirian 
Political Economy: An Essay on Issues and Interpretations,” Journal of Latin American Studies 41 (May 2009): 347-368. 
Alan Knight, in his characteristically witty way (who else could proclaim NPR’s program Car Talk to be one of the 
U.S.’ most important cultural contributions to the world? (doing so to provide a metaphor about the kinds of 
questions historians ask) also discusses this growing body of literature: Knight, “Patterns and Prescriptions in 
Mexican Historiography,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 25 (July 2006): 340-366.  
18 Fernando Rocchi, for example, showed that there was no contradiction between export growth and domestic 
industrial development, and that, in fact, they worked in tandem. Rocchi, Chimneys in the Desert: Industrialization in 
Argentina during the Export Boom Years, 1870-1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). The narrative told by 
Marshall C. Eakin has a less positive outcome. He argues that the lack of local technological innovation hampered the 
development of a strong industrial base, capable of sustaining itself (although he doesn’t explain why local 
technological innovation did not happen). Nevertheless, he offers a detailed study of the development of an internal 
market in twentieth century Brazil. Eakin, Tropical Capitalism: The Industrialization of Belo Horizonte, Brazil (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002). 
19 In her presidential address at the American Historical Association’s annual meeting in January 2008, Barbara 
Weinstein praised the linguistic, cultural and postmodern turns for providing important critiques of the language 
used to describe poverty and inequality, critiques that show that the language itself constructs those categories rather 
than simply describing them, but wondered if it weren’t possible to find ways of writing and talking about material 
inequalities – of engaging in “historical discussion of the origins and causes of spatial inequalities.” In other words, 
she would like historians to be able to explain how global material inequalities came into being, and feels that the 
linguistic, cultural, and postmodern turns do not provide sufficient tools for doing so. Although she does not 
advocate a return to taking our sources at their word, rather than questioning why they choose those certain words 
and what they mean by them, she does hope that economics and materiality can be brought back into our historical 
work. See, Barbara Weinstein, “Developing Inequality,” American Historical Review 113 (February 2008): 1-18. 
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scholars engaged in what he termed “the study of forms of economic life” – analyses of 
the ways that economics intersected with politics, society, religion, and social class. 
Done well, these studies were embedded in their social contexts and offered insightful 
analyses of sweeping historical narratives. Their connection to the Annales School was 
strong; Sewell quoted a review of medieval economic history by Marc Bloch, who 
praised efforts to embed economic issues into their social and political contexts: 
“…[Bloch] stressed that ‘intimate links united economic activity to other forms of 
human life. To deny or to silence them under the pretext of specialization in research 
would be to falsify, by means of an unacceptable abstraction, the entire tableau of the 
past.’”20 Sewell recognized that sometimes such studies, while rich in contextual and 
specific detail, failed to offer explanations for broad historical changes over time, but 
were rather detailed descriptions of one group of individuals, their specific economic 
issues or problems, and how they attempted to address them.21  
In spite of such shortcomings, Sewell suggested that these studies still had 
advantages over the econometric forms of analyses that superseded them. Focused on 
an abstract market, rather than on the groups and individuals who created, gave 
meaning to, and interacted in that market, econometric studies, while often empirically 
                                                 
20 William H. Sewell, Jr. “A Strange Career: The Historical Study of Economic Life,” History and Theory 49 (December 
2010): 146-166: 149. 
21 As Sewell noted, “In the hands of a great historian like Bloch, the history of economic life opened out striking vistas 
onto the larger social and cultural structures of society. But, as Bloch would have been the first to admit, economic 
history as the study of forms of life also underwrote many banal or merely competent works as well, including most 
of those published in the Journal of Economic History. Indeed economic history as the history of economic life tended to 
be relatively vague about causal relations: a thorough description of the situation faced by the entrepreneur, the 
industry, or the policy-maker and of the actions to which this situation gave rise was the goal for most JEH articles in 
this period.” Ibid., 149. 
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rich, essentially took humans out of history, granting historical agency to those abstract 
market forces. As he pointed out:  
…the new economic history had a much more epistemological object than 
the old economic history: not persons, institutions, and social movements, 
but growth rates, economic aggregates, productivity, and investment. This 
was, precisely, a move from economic history as the study of forms of 
economic life to economic history as the historical study of the 
determinants of national economic growth.22 
 
Sewell lamented the unfortunate timing of the demise of economic history (as the 
study of forms of economic life). To begin with, econometrics was not the only new 
form of historical analysis. The cultural/linguistic/postmodern turn began to take hold 
as well. These new methodologies denied economic determinism, leading many of their 
practitioners to reject the study of materiality. This new trend became broadly 
dominant in the historical profession and thus exacerbated the split between 
econometric analyses of macroenconomic phenomena on one hand, and cultural history 
analyses of race, gender, and ethnicity, on the other. For Sewell, the timing of this split 
could not have been more unfortunate. Beginning approximately in the 1970s, global 
capitalism underwent a dramatic transformation. State-led economic development 
policies in place for several decades in a variety of countries went out of favor. Neo-
liberal economic policies became ascendant and globalization accelerated. Sewell points 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 151-152. Sewell pointed out that this new form of economic analysis was not completely negative; its 
practitioners were empirically-minded and uncovered data ignored by previous historians. But, the object of their 
analyses was still problematic. As he noted: “…economic historians were by no means uninterested in collecting 
empirical data. Quite the contrary, they greatly expanded the collection of data, often exploiting new and 
unsuspected sources of quantifiable evidence with tremendous ingenuity and assiduity. But the questions they were 
interested in answering ceased to be primarily about forms of economic life. Although one might study the cotton 
textile industry or railroads, what was important to economic historians about such topics was not, for example, how 
work experiences or clothing fashions were changed by the advent of mechanized cotton production, or how the 
development of street railroads enabled new forms of urban life, but rather what effects technological change, rising 
capital investment, decreased turnover time, and labor productivity in the cotton or railroad industry had on the 
growth of GDP per capita.” Ibid., 153. 
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out that these changes brought negative consequences for working classes around the 
world, and even eroded the position of middle classes. These are important processes 
that need to be studied, he argued: “This dramatic and difficult transition from one 
framework of world capitalism to another poses important issues for historical 
reflection and research.”23 Unfortunately, according to Sewell, economic issues have not 
yet seen a resurgence among historians, and while practitioners of a new analytical 
trend known as “economic sociology” put the idea of the “social embeddedness” of 
certain economic issues at the heart of their studies, he argues that they are simply 
replicating the mistakes of some earlier Annales historians: they often only examine 
“responses to economic stimuli…[and fail] to address the dynamics of the overall world 
capitalist system.”24 Moreover, he suggests that there is little interest in studying “the 
exploited” – peasants or industrial workers.25 Thus, some of the most dramatic impacts 
of the changes in global capitalism remain unstudied.  
While Sewell and other historians who lament the decline in economic history 
(and the interest in “the exploited”) do have a point, there is a part of the 
methodological turn toward postmodernism that they overlook. Over the past two 
decades, an interdisciplinary sub-field has emerged that is loosely labeled 
“postdevelopment theory.” Centered on the work of scholars using postcolonial forms 
of analysis to explain both the discursive construction of the globe into 
“developed/First World” and “underdeveloped/Third World” parts, as well as the 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 164. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 157. 
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discourses and practices used to maintain and perpetuate that construction, this small 
group of historians (and larger group of geographers and anthropologists) have 
primarily focused on the time period and people that seem to most concern Sewell: the 
post-World War II period of the twentieth century (particularly post-1970), and 
subsistence farmers and indigenous groups.  
In the early years of this new methodology and area of study, scholars focused 
on critiquing the way that development programs and thought tied discourses about 
economic policies to political ideologies and thinly veiled racial stereotypes. They also 
often approached development from a Foucaultian framework. Thus, James Ferguson 
examined the “instrument effects” of development programs in Lesotho – they failed to 
achieve any substantial increase in well-being or economic growth, but wildly 
succeeded in de-politicizing the development programs themselves, thus masking their 
more substantial effect of structuring an entire nation as a subordinate player on the 
global stage, dependent on the whims and largess of development agencies based in the 
global North while simultaneously subordinating citizens to a state organized by those 
foreign agencies.26 Similarly, Arturo Escobar’s examination of development programs in 
Colombia (considered a foundational text in the field), asserts that “First World 
economics” were imposed on “Third World” countries, despite the fact that the 
former’s precepts and principles were inappropriate for the latter’s social, political, and 
                                                 
26 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994). 
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economic conditions (Timothy Mitchell made a similar argument about the supposed 
universality of economics in a study of development in Egypt).27 
Gustavo Esteva, a less well-known early practitioner of postdevelopment theory, 
shared with Escobar, Mitchell, and Ferguson a criticism of the imposition of neoliberal 
economic policies and practices on subsistence farmers and indigenous groups. He also 
spoke eloquently of the corollary to these criticisms: the imposition of this outside 
“expertise” marginalized the knowledge and practices of those farmers and indigenous 
groups – knowledge that was much more deeply embedded in its social and political 
context, and thus, more likely to be a strong basis for devising development programs 
that would actually have a positive effect on the lives and livelihoods of those small-
scale producers.28 Escobar also focused on the issue of local knowledge and practices. 
But, his emphasis was on the top-down approach of development practitioners and the 
ways they marginalized the voices of the poor. Criticism of such emphasis generated a 
second trend in postdevelopment theory, which focused on the ways that local 
knowledge could often subvert the authority of the outside “experts,” and offer viable 
alternatives to development, if taken seriously into account. This approach questioned 
the Foucaultian frameworks that dominated previous studies, replacing it with 
                                                 
27 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995); Mitchell, Rule of Experts. Although not approaching the subject from the postcolonial 
perspective taken by Escobar and Mitchell, Sarah Babb discuss the transition in the Mexican economics from a focus 
on state-led development to neo-liberal policies, a transition that occurred through U-.S led efforts to reshape the 
academy in Mexico. Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth describe a similar process for the whole of Latin America, 
focusing on the elite struggle for hegemony over state policy. Sarah Babb, Managing Mexico: Economists from 
Nationalism to Neoliberalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, The 
Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American States (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002).  
28 Gustavo Esteva, The Struggle for Rural Mexico (South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey, 1983). Esteva’s championing of 
indigenous and local knowledge and practices came to be known as “la via campesina” (“the farmer’s path”).  
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something that could be called Gramscian (although they rarely frame their analyses 
this way): they acknowledged the power differentials at play, but gave local actors 
capacity to change the outcome. As one practitioner eloquently asserted:  
Critics have noted that these postdevelopment approaches share 
‘debilitating elements of the structuralist logic [they] wish to 
transcend’…and thus risk substituting neoliberal or Marxist economism 
with discursive determinism…Rather than seeing development as a 
universal ‘machine’…that acts in the same way everywhere, development 
is better conceived of as a set of specific projects with their own histories 
and characteristics. The insistence on the West as the privileged, originary 
source of development and its meanings can be sustained only ‘by holding 
at bay the immense evidence of the polyvocal, polylocal nature of 
development performances and appropriations.’29 
 
Scholars have attempted to break down the concept of development as a 
“machine” by looking, for example, at the ways that traditional practices of gift 
exchange transform “modern markets” and attempts by development planners to 
impose them, or how indigenous groups build networks that unite urban and rural 
areas and allow them to maintain their cultural identities.30 
                                                 
29 Emily T. Yeh, “Tropes of Indolence and the Cultural Politics of Development in Lhasa, Tibet,” Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 97 (September 2007): 593-612, 594. 
30 George N. Curry argues that development practices can be modified to accommodate other understandings of the 
market through an examining of indigenous palm producers in Papau New Guinea and how they fuse traditional 
gift-giving with “modern market” practices. Curry, “Moving Beyond Postdevelopment: Facilitating Indigenous 
Alternatives for ‘Development,” Economic Geography 79 (October 2003): 405-423. Anthony Bebbington questions the 
critiques of the state in both postdevelopment theory and neoliberal criticisms of development, both of which claim 
that the state is the major problem – it either dominates and imposes modernity or it prevents the market from 
operating freely and instituting the transformations that would alleviate poverty or would implement 
“development.” He shows that in Ecuador, indigenous groups have developed strong economic links between rural 
and urban areas that allow them to hold on to their cultural identities, and which have had success precisely because 
they have been supported by the state. Bebbington, “Reencountering Development: Livelihood Transitions and Place 
Transformations in the Andes,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 90 (September 2000): 495-520. David 
D. Gow also discusses the important role of the state in local development planning that worked to preserve 
indigenous traditions in Colombia, arguing that a crucial factor in the ability of a community to develop a truly 
viable plan depended on how well they were organized as a community before the attempt to draw up a local plan 
was tried. See, Gow, Countering Development: Indigenous Modernity and the Moral Imagination (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2008). See also, Jason Antrosio, “Inverting Development Discourse in Colombia: Transforming 
Andean Hearths,” American Anthropologist 104, (December 2002): 1110-1122; Julie Cupples, Kevin Glynn, and Irving 
Larios “Hybrid Cultures of Postdevelopment: The Struggle for Popular Hegemony in Rural Nicaragua,” Annals of the 
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The point here is to note that Sewell and others decrying the decline of economic 
history overlook an important area of scholarship which does address some of their 
primary concerns, particularly the critique that econometric analyses ignore social 
context. Examining local practices and how they interact and fuse with the abstract 
market seems to be precisely the kind of analyses historians such as Sewell call for. 
Moreover, they look at “the exploited” that he referred to, and cover the time period 
that interests him. Of course, on the other hand, these studies may suffer from the 
critique that he makes of economic sociology: while they take seriously the notion of 
“social embeddedness” of economic life, offering fine and detailed portraits of the 
interplay between economics, religion, politics, and society, they do not offer much in 
the way of causal explanations for large-scale historical processes. The danger is that 
they can remain “local” rather than shed any light on “global history.”31 
There is, however, another critique of the studies informed by postdevelopment 
theory, one that has not been widely made by scholars of any field – not even historians 
who should be the most interested. Most of the postdevelopment studies focus on the 
post-World War II period, particularly the period after 1970. Considering their strong 
connection to postcolonial studies, this makes sense. This is the period during and after 
                                                                                                                                                             
Association of American Geographers 97 (December 2007): 786-801; Katharine McKinnon, “Postdevelopment, 
Professionalism, and the Politics of Participation,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 97 (December 
2007): 772-785. 
31 Of course, this is always not necessarily the goal of many of these studies, which have at heart a concern with 
improving the living conditions of poor people around the world, but doing so in a way that respects their cultural 
and religious traditions. See, in particular, Katharine McKinnon, “Postdevelopment, Professionalism.” Nevertheless, 
it is possible to do an in-depth examination of local knowledge and practices and the communities in which the are 
embedded, while still telling a much larger narrative of national identity formation, economic development, and 
global history as Akhil Gupta does in his insightful study of agricultural practices among subsistence farmers in 
modern India. See Gupta, Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1998).  
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de-colonization, when neo-liberal policies replaced the state-led, inward-focused 
development programs of many newly independent countries. Thus, these studies seek 
to explain the neo-colonialism of the postcolonial period. This is certainly a worthwhile 
goal. 
But, the state-led, inward-looking development programs put in place in “Third 
World” countries constitute development regimes in their own right. They had their 
own logic, and they attempted to impose practices and policies that would create a 
“modern economy” in their national spaces. Nevertheless, these programs and policies 
are sidelined in academia, sometimes politely, sometimes much more dismissively. One 
notes, for example, in Timothy Mitchell’s fine study on techno-politics and modernity in 
Egypt, the chapters that focus most closely on politics, economics, and society in Egypt 
itself concern either the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries or the latter half of the 
twentieth century – the periods of colonial and (economic) neo-colonial rule. On the 
other hand, the chapters covering the early and mid-twentieth century – the latter being 
the period of state-led economic development programs – focus primarily on non-
Egyptian actors from the global North (John Maynard Keynes, John D. Rockefeller, and 
Richard Critchfield, for example).32  
Mitchell briefly mentions the Egyptian policy of state-led development, which 
restricted foreign investment and closely regulated the economy between 1950 and 
1970, approximately. But, he only mentions it when he begins a discussion of “infitah” – 
the “open door” economic policy instituted in 1970 that welcomed foreign and private 
                                                 
32 Mitchell, Rule of Experts. Colombia has its own version of this policy, beginning in the 1990s, known as “apertura” 
(“opening”).  
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sector initiatives (often working closely with state-run banks and agencies). He then 
quickly added that: “the significance of this change in policy should not be 
exaggerated.” Business ventures had been structured as public-private initiatives since 
the beginning of the twentieth century, he argued, and had undergone many 
adjustments over that same period. For Mitchell, infitah was clearly more of a discursive 
break than anything else: “The reforms of the last quarter of the twentieth century 
represented another series of adjustments, rather than any simple shift from ‘the state’ 
to ‘the private sector’ or, as it came to be known, ‘the market.’”33  
At least Mitchell was not completely dismissive of this apparently so-called 
“state-led” development policy. In one disparaging sentence, Escobar brushed aside 
similar policies in Latin America, known as Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). 
Although he did spend almost an briefly praise the economists associated with the 
U.N.-sponsored Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA), who most coherently 
developed the theoretical underpinnings on which ISI was based, he ultimately 
condemned their work as derivative of economic ideas originating in “the West.” Citing 
Fernando Cardoso, he criticized their definition of economic development – “the 
process of capital accumulation and technological progress” – as having “the originality 
of a copy.”34  
There is, of course, some validity to these criticisms. Mitchell is right to point out 
that “periods” in history are arbitrary and reductive. Moreover, they are very often 
invented in order to create narratives about the present rather than the past (“the Dark 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 211. 
34 Escobar, Encountering Development, 81. 
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Ages,” for example, in contrast to the “Renaissance,” in which the latter is celebrated as 
the beginning of our modern age, despite the fact that many of the concepts and 
precepts we associate with the latter period had their roots in the former).35 Many 
examples exist, revolutions being the most obvious: as both the current context of the 
Arab Spring and innumerable historical revolts tell us – regime change alone does not 
immediately transform political, ideological, social, or economic structures. Conditions 
both before and after a seemingly transformational event or, in this case, a major policy 
change, often resemble each other far more than they differ. And certainly, there are a 
number of ways that the economic policies before and after the “open-door” programs 
of Egypt and Colombia (and many other Latin American countries) resembled each 
other. As the contemporary critics of ISI indicated – inward-focused, state-led 
development often looked very similar to its “open-door” cousin: foreign loans 
financing public and private sector initiatives, reliance on imported machinery (paid for 
through those foreign loans), and neglect of agricultural industries focused on food 
production in favor of exportable cash-crops (if agriculture was even promoted at all). 
These policies and practices were described by one observer as “dependent 
development” – the achievement of economic growth in a way that perpetuated Latin 
American and other “Third World” nations’ dependent relations with the “First 
                                                 
35 Rogan Kersh describes how the history of the United States has been periodized over time by different groups with 
different political agendas, and that the vast majority of those periods reflect changes in political and economic 
conditions, and remain that way despite efforts by social historians to revise the periodization of U.S history based on 
social issues. Kersh, “Rethinking Periodization? APD and the Macro-History of the United States,” Polity 37 (October 
2005): 513-522. 
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World.”36 Dependency theorists’ critique that these policies only served to subordinate 
“developing nations’ to the whims and exigencies of international financial institutions 
seem prescient in the wake of the debt crisis of the 1980s.37   
It is also the case that ECLA’s economists did define economic development 
along lines that resembled the trajectory of industrialized nations in the global North. 
Although they did articulate a criticism of global capitalism and how it had unfairly 
structured the world into a “core” and “periphery,” their remedy (in broad outlines) 
was for the periphery to cut itself off and cultivate and protect its domestic industries, 
in order to achieve the levels of growth prevalent in the core.38 In other words, they did 
                                                 
36 Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979). 
37 The contemporary critics include some of the most well-known “dependency theorists” in Latin America: Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1979); Celso Furtado, Development and Underdevelopment (Berkeley: University of California, 1964). The 
increased dependence and subordination of developing countries on international financial institutions based in the 
global North evident in the debt crisis of the 1980s is widely acknowledged. See, for example, Veronica Montecinos 
and John Markoff, “From the Power of Economic Ideas to the Power of Economists,” in The Other Mirror: Grand 
Theory through the Lens of Latin America, eds. Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001): 124. See also, Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America since Independence 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 2nd edition); Victor Bulmer-Thomas, John H. Coatsworth, and 
Roberto Cortés Conde, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006); Rosemary Thorp, Progress, Poverty, and Exclusion: An Economic History of Latin America in the 20th Century 
(Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 1998). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the “structural 
reforms” imposed by the IMF to deal with the debt crisis were having their worst effects, various studies by 
economists and political scientists examined the origins of the crisis and the impact of the IMF’s prescriptions, noting 
that while the crisis had a variety of causes, including the oil crises of the 1970s, predatory lending practices on the 
part of international financial institutions, and the inefficiencies of some state-led economic development programs, 
the World Bank and the IMF focused almost solely on the latter as the cause of the debt crisis. See, for example: 
Trevor W. Parfitt and Stephen P. Riley, The African Debt Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1989); Rosemary Thorp and 
Laurence Whitehead, eds., Latin American Debt and the Adjustment Crisis (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1987).  
38 The most well-known of ECLA’s economists was Raúl Prebisch, an enigmatic figure, criticized by actors across the 
political spectrum. In his early years he tended toward conservative views, and worked with organizations 
representing large landowners and beef exporters. During his extensive travels in the 1920s and 1930s, however, he 
began questioning the dependent role Argentina created for itself by becoming Britain’s primary source of beef. 
While visiting countries of Eastern Europe, he began developing the idea of “unequal exchange.” He later served as 
an economic advisor in different capacities during various presidential administrations, but eventually fell out of 
favor with Perón. Ultimately, he began to question some of the ideas he had promoted – and certainly the ways that 
they had been implemented, and left Argentina in 1964. See, Edgar Dosman, The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch, 1901-
1986 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2008); Joseph L. Love, “Raúl Prebisch and the Origins of the 
Doctrine of Unequal Exchange,” Latin American Research Review (LARR) 15, no. 3 (1980): 45-72. Intriguingly, a 1988 
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not ultimately question the fundamental economic precepts, principles, and goals of 
“developed nations,” and simply promoted an alternate method of implementing or 
achieving them.39   
But the problems with periodization are not easily solved by simply suggesting 
that they have no real significance. Likewise, just as characterizing historical periods 
based on a limited number of events and phenomenon can serve specific purposes in 
constructing narratives about the present, dismissing periods in history also entails 
                                                                                                                                                             
debate about Prebisch’s influence on Argentine economic policy illustrates one of the main points of this introduction 
(and dissertation), namely, that economic ideas have life beyond the theorists who first outline them. Kathryn 
Sikkink argued that Prebisch had not had as significant impact on Argentine policy-making as was later claimed, 
because entrenched political interests, critical of his ideas, prevented them from being implemented. See, Sikkink, 
“The Influence of Raúl Prebisch on Economic Policy-Making in Argentina, 1950-1962,” LARR 23, no. 2 (1988): 91-114. 
Three economists responded: Adalbert Krieger Vasena, “Comments on the Influence of Raúl Prebisch on Economic 
Policy-Making in Argentina, 1950-1962,” LARR 23, no. 2 (1988): 115-119; Richard D. Mallon, “The Influence of Raúl 
Prebisch on Argentine Economic Policy-Making, 1950-1962: A Comment,” LARR 23, No. 2 (1988): 120-123; Hugh 
Schwartz, “Raúl Prebisch and Argentine Economic Policy-Making, 1950-1962: A Comment,” LARR 23, no. 2 (1988): 
124-127. Krieger Vasena was a former Minister of Finance, who claimed that many of Prebisch’s recommendations 
were in fact implemented, although perhaps not precisely in the form that he proposed them. Mallon, a Harvard 
economist, critiqued Sikkink’s assertion that Prebisch was unaware of the local political situation, and this is what 
made him so ineffective in Argentina, countering that “It is difficult to believe that Don Raúl did not become more 
deeply embroiled in local politics because he ‘misunderstood the context and debates of Argentine society.’ I find it 
much more plausible to believe that he thought that greater personal political involvement would have been 
inconsistent with his role as an outside technical advisor.” (p. 121). He also noted the “…difficulty of assessing the 
influence of an outside advisor on policy-making. Normally, an outside advisor is obliged to accept existing political 
constraints and the convictions of those in power; he or she is expected to play the role of a neutral technocrat.” (p. 
120) (His comments are reminiscent of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Colombian Agricultural Program, whose 
members and officers at various times noted the urgent need for land reform in Colombia, suggesting that 
agricultural “modernization” would never happen without it, but also indicating that this was a political problem 
that they “wouldn’t touch with a fifty foot pole.” (“Diary notes of Ulysses J. Grant, dated June 7, 1960,” Rockefeller 
Archive Center (RAC), Record Group 12.3, Box 21.) In other words, they were quite aware of both social inequities, 
and the political landmine into which they would have walked had they suggested doing anything about them, and 
instead chose to remain publicly silent on the issue. In regards to the influence of foreign economic advisors, 
Lauchlin Currie, the World Bank economist criticized at length by Arturo Escobar in Encountering Development, made 
a similar point, lamenting that most of his advice had never been taken. See, Currie, The Role of Economic Advisers in 
Developing Countries (Westport: Greenwood, 1981).  In her response, Sikkink noted that the connection between 
politics and economics, the ultimate point of her article: “The political context in which Prebisch operated colored the 
interpretations of his economic policy recommendations. The commentators, perhaps because they are economists, 
have deemphasized this central political argument of the article.” See, Sikkink, “The Influence of Raúl Prebisch on 
Economic Policy-Making in Argentina, 1950-1962: Response,” LARR 23, No. 2 (1988): 128-131. 
39 It is important to recognize that these policies were not implemented uniformly across Latin America. Some 
countries (Brazil, Chile) followed ECLA’s ideas closely, while others (Mexico, Argentina, Colombia) did so loosely. (It 
is unsurprising that Chile would have embraced ECLA, being that its Latin American offices were based in Santiago.) 
However, as the discussion in the previous footnote makes clear, programs and policies resembling ECLA’s were 
implemented everywhere across the region, even if they were known by other names or modified to fit local 
conditions. See, Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America; Bulmer-Thomas, Coatsworth, and Corteís Conde, 
Cambridge Economic History; Thorp, Progress, Poverty, and Exclusion. 
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attempts to construct an alternate narrative about the present, a process often resulting 
in a new periodization, instead of a breakdown of the entire concept. Consider the issue 
at hand – the postcolonial critiques of ISI and other statist development projects and the 
periodization that suggests that they were different from the economic policies that 
came before and after. The ultimate object of these analyses is to study colonialism, 
whether it is colonial, postcolonial, or neocolonial. The scholars involved are working to 
construct a new narrative about the present, one in which formal colonial structures 
came to an end, but colonialism itself did not. And, again, they do have a point – the 
policies of that supposedly statist, inward-looking period did indeed perpetuate (and 
possibly increase) developing nations dependence on and subordination to the financial 
institutions of the global North.  
Thus, these scholars dismiss a rigid division between “closed” and “open” 
economic periods. Unfortunately, in doing so, they offer the other side of the same coin 
presented by the neoliberal perspective on these policies. Both neo-liberal and 
postdevelopment/postcolonial economists, historians, geographers, and 
anthropologists criticize the period of state-led development, although they have 
different reasons for doing so and differing explanations for why those policies were 
unacceptable. The ultimate result, however, is to erase an important part of the history 
of the countries in question, or, as Marc Bloch would have put it, “‘…to falsify…the 
entire tableau of the past.’”40 
                                                 
40 Bloch, quoted in Sewell, “A Strange Career,” 149. 
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Indeed, ushering in a new period of neo-colonialism, instituting “dependent 
development,” or laying the foundation for a massive debt crisis was hardly the 
intention of those promoting or implementing state-led development programs. To 
reduce them to that is to ignore not only the historical agency of the specific economists 
and development planners involved, but also, the entire political, social, and economic 
conditions of those countries during this time period.  Returning to Sewell’s discussion 
about the embeddedness of economic ideas, discourses, and practices suggests that 
much could be learned about the countries that implemented such policies – if they are 
evaluated on their own terms, rather than viewed through a neoliberal or 
postdevelopment lens.  
Like all development programs, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) (and 
its less well-known cousin, Import Substitution Agriculture, or ISA), was a “project of 
hope.”41 Its proponents and practitioners imagined a “better world,” one improved in 
both material and intangible ways. The goal was a society in which there existed a 
better-fed, better-housed, and better-educated labor force and a pacific, culturally 
advanced, and democratically-inclined citizenry. The middle-class, in particular, would 
be strengthened, while the poor would escape poverty, depravation, and misery, 
especially in the countryside. These goals were to be achieved by focusing on macro-
economic indicators and large-scale industrialization projects, under the assumption 
that the material and intangible gains would automatically follow. 
                                                 
41 McKinnon, “Postdevelopment, Professionalism.” 
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In these programs, the hope and optimism were directed not at the economic 
indicators in and of themselves, but rather, at what they represented for the economists 
and state planners who implemented them. Ultimately, these were forms of envisioning 
a nation-state, based on moral judgments about what was politically, socially, and 
economically right and correct. This, of course, is not to deny that there were powerful 
actors who did not care at all about the larger development objectives import 
substitution hoped to achieve, and whose primary concern was increasing their bottom 
lines, even if it meant perpetuating, exacerbating, or creating new forms of socio-
economic inequalities. But, to reduce ISI to these actors is to overlook what it 
represented to a variety of other people. In other words, it is not good history. 
This is especially the case considering the way that ISI traveled through societies. 
While it was economists and development planners who conceived of these policies in 
their most elaborately abstract and theoretical forms (even when making specific policy 
recommendations), they were not the only actors who discussed, debated, or attempted 
to implement them. Workers, farmers, scientists, industrialists – these and many others 
also elaborated their own interpretations of ISI (perhaps calling it something different, 
such as “national self-sufficiency”), which also involved a vision of the nation-state 
containing moral judgments about what was politically, socially, and economically 
right and correct. When interpreted by popular actors, these moral judgments were 
often cast in terms of fairness and justice (harking back to E.P. Thompson’s English 
bread rioters who protested unjust market practices rather than the simple absence of 
bread). In other words, although ISI may not have been conceived as a participatory 
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development project (as such projects are today), a variety of citizens participated 
nonetheless. 
It is for this reason that Francisco José Chaúx’s invocation of political and moral 
issues in his letter about the coastal millers’ request for preferential shipping rates 
matters. Economic arguments about commercial interests are deeply intertwined with 
conceptions of the nation, the state, and social class.42 This is dramatically evident in 
Chaúx’s discussion of how much the Colombian people supported the government’s 
protectionist policies, despite the hardships it caused them and the sacrifices it forced 
them to make. Chaúx’s letter reminds us that economic ideas represent beliefs about the 
relationships among social classes and between citizens and the state – beliefs often 
based on moral values of fairness and justice. Originating as they do in the social realm, 
those economic ideas also have strong effects on that realm. Evoking ideas about the 
nation or the state is itself a constructive process. Thus, as the well-known volume on 
Everyday Forms of State Formation tells us, the process of building a state does not occur 
simply through violence and authoritarian imposition of power.43 It is also a bottom-up 
process in which people negotiate with local or individual representatives of the state, 
                                                 
42 The study of the social and political effects of economic policies during the post-World War II era has been done for 
the United States, for example. To return to the very beginning of this introduction, for example, part of the reason 
that the label “Made in USA” is so heavily regulated is precisely because the phrase “Buy American” has meanings 
that extend beyond purely economic ones. It is about national identity, a sense of belonging to the nation, and also, 
expressing certain beliefs about one’s place in the nation. Some works on economic nationalism in the United States, 
which emphasize the nationalistic part of the phrase include: Dana Frank, Buy American: The Untold Story of Economic 
Nationalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999); Meghan Warner Mettler, “Gimcracks, Dollar Blouses, and Transistors: 
American Reactions to Imported Japanese Products, 1945-1964,” Pacific Historical Review 79 (May 2010): 202-230. 
Frank argues that “Buy American” is a slogan often used by industrialists or merchants for a variety of purposes that 
do not serve the interests of workers, while Warner argues that in the immediate post-World War II period 
Americans generally viewed imported Japanese goods as inferior, but as the products improved, wartime racism 
returned, and fed the construction of a noble and heroic view of American industry – and the nation – by the 1960s. 
43 Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in 
Modern Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994). 
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and in the process become incorporated into it. Similarly, through the process of 
negotiating with state actors over differing interpretations of import substitution 
policies, a variety of actors in Colombia engaged in a constructive process of nation, 
state, and social class formation. Sadly, such negotiations remain understudied.  
This dissertation will examine a case of such interplay between economic ideas, 
and nation, state, and social class formation through an examination of “everyday 
forms of import substitution industrialization in Colombia,” focused on one particularly 
commodity. Wheat was at the nexus of a variety of regional, class-based, 
technoscientific, and transnational conflicts. Thus, this dissertation provides a series of 
interconnected narratives involving a wide array of actors, ultimately telling a story of 
hope and decline. Along the way, these actors constructed the nation, the state and 
social classes.  This is especially important in Colombian history, as the story of its 
nation-state formation has long been portrayed as incomplete or fragmented, despite 
evidence suggesting otherwise.  
 Chapter 1 will provide an overview of these issues. Relying primarily on 
secondary sources (along with a handful of scientific journal articles, ministerial reports, 
national and regional newspapers, and the Revista Nacional de Agricultura, the magazine 
of the Colombian Society of Agriculturalists), it accomplishes two things: 1) provides an 
overview of the historiographical issues related to Colombian nation, state, and class 
formation; and 2) introduces the regional, scientific, and economic conflicts over wheat 
between 1930 and 1945. This chapter lays the foundation for understanding how 
competing neocolonial discourses in the post-World War II era entered a rich context 
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that would ultimately structure how they interacted with each other and with 
autochthonous economic discourse. It also provides the background on Colombian 
nation, state, and class formation, which is often described as incomplete, partial, or 
weak. Most studies locate the beginnings of those processes in the 1930s, and the 
historiographical overview will explore the reasons why such assertions are made. 
 Drawing primarily on The Wheat Situation, a quarterly USDA report, and the 
master’s theses on wheat written in Colombia between 1946 and 1955, chapter 2 shows 
how agronomists countered insinuations from U.S. wheat exporters that poor climatic 
conditions precluded national self-sufficiency. Domestic U.S. policy during and 
immediately after World War II encouraged overproduction of wheat; as post-war 
cultivation resumed in Western Europe, the USDA sought to build export markets by 
discouraging efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in other parts of the world. Colombian 
agronomists responded in several ways: repeated references to the diverse geographic 
origins of wheat varieties, careful discussion of research and analytical methods to 
demonstrate their scientific credibility (and hence, ability to develop wheat seeds apt for 
Colombia’s growing conditions), modifications in methods of statistical analysis to 
reflect national self-sufficiency goals, and research projects focused on national varieties 
and problems. The chapter argues that discourses of ISI and the Green Revolution 
merged in the work of these scientists as they struggled to counter a neoliberal, 
neocolonial discourse attempting to shape Colombian economic development policy, 
ultimately resulting in a form of nation-building, as the agronomists articulated a vision 
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of national development and inscribed it on a national territory they defined as apt for 
wheat growing. 
 Chapter 3 utilizes the extensive material in El Panadero Colombiano, the trade 
journal of the National Bakers’ Association (ADEPAN), to demonstrate how ISI 
inflected associational and class conflicts between 1955 and 1961. Bakers complained 
that millers speculated with nationally produced flour, driving up prices for a poor 
quality product. Viewing imported flour as an essential raw material, they lobbied for 
its inclusion in a special class of permitted imports; millers considered it a finished 
product competing with their own and strove to ensure continued import restrictions. 
To justify their claims, ADEPAN, positioned bread-baking as a large-scale industrial 
sector, through numerous articles on management and labor relations and references to 
the industry’s “100,000 employees.” This chapter argues that development discourse is 
not simply wielded by economists or government planners to control marginalized 
groups, but rather, diffused throughout society, and adapted by a variety of actors in 
order to make claims on the state and its policies. It also has the effect of creating and 
sharpening existing class divisions and constructing new ones.  
 Records from Colombia’s National Archives and the Rockefeller Archive Center 
inform chapter 4, which examines the conflicts between barley and wheat promoters 
from 1954 to 1959. The Bavaria Beer Consortium, one of Colombia’s largest industrial 
entities, was fully committed to import substitution, striving to produce beer entirely 
from national materials. After funding research on an improved barley seed, Bavaria 
promoted cultivation of its new seed variety by providing technical assistance to 
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farmers and helping them secure credit. It also stabilized the market by guaranteeing 
prices and purchasing entire harvests. Wheat farmers operated under opposite 
conditions. Millers offered no assistance with technical or credit issues and often 
refused to purchase harvests or offered excessively low prices. Meanwhile, Colombia’s 
largest manufacturers of plant-derived consumer goods (textiles, cigarettes, and beer) 
worked with the national government to secure U.S. P.L. 480 funding to expand the 
country’s fertilizer industry and thereby increase self-sufficiency. Substitution applied 
only to certain products, however, as this funding was contingent on continued 
importation of U.S. wheat. Thus the goals of wheat and barley promoters collided. This 
came to a head in 1959, when the Ministry of Agriculture’s much-touted improved 
wheat variety succumbed to a virus for which it had no resistance. Disparaging 
insinuations of shoddy scientific work by the Ministry’s agronomists were reported at 
the Agricultural Fair that August, resulting in a two-months’ long public relations 
battle. Bavaria-affiliated agronomists downplayed the role of credit and a stable market 
in ensuring the success of their barley variety, arguing that the substitution program 
was successful because it was built on a solid scientific foundation (implying that the 
wheat improvement program was not). Ministry of Agriculture and Rockefeller 
Foundation agronomists countered by arguing that economic and social issues, not 
scientific ones, explained both barley’s success and the failing wheat substitution 
efforts. This chapter demonstrates that as development discourse diffuses through 
society and acquires different interpretations, it can mask the very inequities it is 
purportedly attempting to overcome. Moreover, it argues that both moral and political 
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issues evident in the interpretation of inequities in state economic development policies 
constitute “everyday forms of state formation.”  
 Chapter 5 returns to El Panadero Colombiano and the continuing struggle of the 
bakers of ADEPAN between 1960-1962. After its efforts failed to alter import policies 
favoring grain over flour, a rift emerged. A small group of highly mechanized bakers 
split from the predominantly artisan bakers who constituted the vast majority of 
ADEPAN’s membership. From then on, ADEPAN emphasized the small-scale nature of 
Colombian bread production and aligned with wheat farmers to protest grain imports, 
claiming that flour produced by combining a small amount of imported brands with 
flour milled from national grain was more suitable for their less mechanized production 
methods. ADEPAN also sharpened its class rhetoric, drawing on and entering the class-
based conflicts prevalent in Colombia at the time.  
 Chapter 6 examines the heightened efforts to both achieve self-sufficiency in 
wheat and discourage such substitution between 1960 and 1964. Relying on a variety of 
archival and published sources, including records from the Rockefeller Archive Center 
and the Colombian National Archives, El Panadero Colombiano, Agricultura Tropical (the 
scientific journal of Colombia’s agronomists), masters’ theses, and technical reports 
from the Colombian Institute for Technological Research, among others, the chapter 
initially discusses a 1960 report on Colombian demand for wheat, which concluded that 
domestic production would never meet the needs of the industrializing nation. 
Disparaging efforts to achieve self-sufficiency, it recommended that Colombia focus 
instead on crops more suited to its climate, such as bananas, sugar cane, or palm oil. 
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The report was co-authored by an official at the USDA and an advisor to the Great 
Plains Wheat Development Association. Reaction in Colombia was strong. A variety of 
agricultural organizations, such as the rice-growers’ association, came out strongly in 
defense of the nation’s wheat growers, relying on familiar arguments about the diverse 
origins of wheat varieties, and claiming that the report’s erroneous information was 
supplied by the agricultural attaché at the U.S. embassy in Bogotá. The Rockefeller 
Foundation also strongly condemned the report’s methods and conclusions. Shortly 
afterward the Federation of Cereal Growers was established to defend the interests of 
the nation’s wheat growers. Meanwhile, the Institute for Technological Research (IIT), 
originally established to provide technical support to the nation’s small- and medium-
sized businesses, began publishing reports based on research at its farinology lab 
claiming that domestic flour had poor bread-making capacity. Their conclusions were 
based on definitions of “quality” in wheat and flour that pre-supposed large-scale, 
highly mechanized industrial production, which characterized only a small percentage 
of Colombia’s baking operations at the time. Agronomists at the Ministry of 
Agriculture, supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, refuted the IIT’s conclusions 
through research at its own farinology laboratory. Masters’ theses completed at this 
time lent additional support. This chapter argues that competing neocolonial and 
Colombian-based economic development discourses complicate the notion of empire 
and the idea that local actors merely respond to discourses rather than actively 
participate in their creation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Fluffier Bread and Injustices against the Coast: Wheat, Nation, State, and Class in 
Twentieth Century Colombia – An Introduction 
 
From the first page of the inaugural issue in 1939, the students in charge of the 
Revista Facultad Nacional de Agronomía forcefully expressed their belief that their 
scientific studies of agriculture were meaningless if Colombia did not go boldly forward 
with the land reform that had been enacted three years earlier.1 Based in Medellín, the 
National Faculty of Agronomy had recently been incorporated into the National 
University of Colombia, and the dean was busy re-organizing the curriculum and 
administrative structure. This included providing support for a publication that 
disseminated the results of scientific studies conducted by the students and faculty, as 
well as other researchers in Colombia. Such work was indeed published in the Revista 
during its first year of operation: among others, the Chair of the Faculty’s Chemistry 
Section presented work he and his team had been doing to develop a portable tool to 
quickly assess the chemical composition of soils, Aycardo Orozoco R. published his 
Masters’ thesis on rocks and soil chemistry, and the taxonomist at the Forestry Section 
of the Ministry of National Economy wrote about his work classifying Colombian palm 
                                                 
1 Although enrollment lists for these years seem to be unavailable, it is clear that Lafaurie and Atehortúa were 
students at the time, evident by the editorial note in 1941 when two new students took over as directors. In the note, 
the two new students praised Lafaurie and Atehortúa for both ably leading the journal and passing to the practicum 
stage of their studies – a stage that would send them away from Medellín to do field work in Colombia’s other 
experimental stations at different altitudes. See, “Nueva dirección,” Revista Facultad Nacional de Agronomía (hereafter 
RFNA) 3 (January-February 1941): 897-898. 
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trees.2 The Revista also featured a lengthy two-part series on the origins of modern 
genetics, focused primarily on the work of Mendel.3  
 The Revista also included various articles discussing the professionalization of 
agronomy, or more specifically, how to enhance its standards, practices and reputation 
in Colombia. Thus, it published Eduardo Chavarriaga Misas’ thesis on organizing 
national agricultural services and Franciso Navarro Ospina’s report of a trip he took to 
California and Mexico to observe agricultural industries and research programs.4 It also 
published a list of the country’s “Agronomic Engineers,” their locations around the 
country, and the positions they held.5  
But, equally represented in the Revista’s pages were articles and editorials 
focused on some of the primary social, economic, and political issues of the day, 
particularly those related to agriculture. Although the articles addressed a variety of 
topics, several overall themes were prevalent: national self-sufficiency in agriculture, 
                                                 
2 J. M. Duque Jaramillo, “Contribución al estudio de las palmetas de Colombia,” RFNA 2 (July-August 1940): 709-720; 
G. Jaramillo Madariaga, “Nefelómetro para la dosificación aproximada de potasio en soluciones muy dilúidas,” 
RFNA 1 (August 1939): 20-26; Aycardo Orozco R., “Generalidades sobre rocas y análisis químico de suelos,” RFNA 2 
(January-April 1940): 486-529. Jaramillo Madariaga’s article offers an intriguing case study on science in the global 
South. Early in the article, he anticipated a potential criticism of his work – why, some might ask, didn’t he just 
purchase the tools he needed from abroad? He preemptively responded to those critiques with three points. The first 
was that, while there were a variety of nephelometers available, most were of only marginal quality, and the Faculty 
could not afford to purchase the high-quality ones that would ensure consistent and accurate measurements. The 
second reason was that buying the equipment from abroad meant being “continually dependent” on the external 
market for repair and maintenance parts. The third was far less concrete, and much more nationalistic: “It seems that 
now is the time for us to put some stamp of originality on our scientific work and that we adopt, as much as possible, 
our own methods, especially if it can be shown that they are not inferior to those that we slavishly copy from foreign 
texts. We have an example in Caldas’ hypsometer, which the majority of foreign texts describe as Humboldt’s 
invention.” Jaramillo Madariaga, 20-21.  
3 Emilio Robledo, trans., “Origenes de Mendelismo (1),” RFNA 2 (January-April 1940); 334-367; “Origenes de 
Mendelismo (Conclusión)” RFNA 2 (May-June 1940): 560-588. 
4 Eduardo Chavarriaga Misas, “Plan de organización de los servicios de fomento agricola en Colombia,” RFNA 4 
(February 1941): 899-961; Francisco Navarro Ospina, “Informe sobre cuestiones agrícolas de un viaje a California y a 
Méjico,” RFNA 1 (October 1939): 239-254. Modeled on the USDA, Chavarriaga’s plan would combine research and 
extension and integrate the Faculty of Agronomy, the experiment stations, and the Ministry of Agriculture. 
5 “Ing. Agr. Colombianos,” RFNA 1 (October 1939): 213-214. 
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land reform, rural credit and technical assistance, and the need for enhanced 
agricultural extension services, with the nation’s agronomists mediating between the 
state and farmers. For example, an article on the coffee economy praised coffee for 
being a positive force in the countryside, offering numerous small farmers the 
opportunity to live well off their own land: it was a “home-grown national industry… 
sustain[ing] the private patrimony of 50,000 families in Caldas.”6 Gold, on the other 
hand, enriched only a few families and oil benefited no one in Colombia at all (aside 
from some road-building in Santander), since the industry was in foreign hands. 
Nevertheless, even though coffee offered an example of how a mountainous country 
could organize its economy on agricultural production, there were problems. Coffee 
trees were not producing as they used to, and the problem was that farmers had not 
taken proper care of their lands. Moreover, the article claimed that they had been given 
loans, but didn’t use them to invest in the land, but rather to buy radios and clothes and 
other personal items. Thus, some degree of supervision needed to accompany loans, to 
ensure that farmers used them wisely. This was especially important the article argued 
contradictorily, because farmers didn’t have easy access to credit. Without the necessary 
                                                 
6 Hernán Jaramillo Ocampo, “Economía cafetera,” RFNA 2 (May-June 1940): 553-559. Jaramillo repeatedly 
emphasized the democratizing and socially just nature of coffee production. He later noted lyrically that, “The 
hardworking laborer and pastoral impetuousness of our people are both at work in our coffee industry, as well as 
their intellectual agility and thirst for possession. A permanent, long-term industry, it ties man to the plow and a plot 
of land, making him forget his condition of migrant laborer, converting him into a proprietor with a title and 
property lines. More than the law, our race or our customs – coffee has distributed land in Caldas. [Coffee] is an 
industry in which labor means more than capital.” See, Jaramillo, 554. The notion that coffee production created 
democratic communities in the areas it was produced has become national myth in Colombia, but scholars have 
called this notion into question, noting that there was an equal amount of social stratification and political cronyism 
in coffee zones as in other parts of the country. On the myth of coffee and democracy, see James J. Parsons, 
Antioqueño Colonization in Western Colombia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949). For opposing views, see 
Keith H. Christie, Oligarcas, campesinos, y política en Colombia: Aspectos de la historia socio-política de la frontera antioqueña 
(Bogotá: UNAL, 1986); Marco Palacios, El café en Colombia, 1850-1970: Una historia económica, social, y política (Bogotá: 
Planeta, 2002 (3rd edition).  
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capital to purchase required tools and supplies, they could not continue to produce 
Colombia’s primary export crop. And that represented the loss of an industrious 
member of society: “Give a citizen capital and tools and you will have a farmer. Deny a 
farmer credit, capital, and tools and you will have a bureaucrat, an unemployed 
person.”7 
The primary concerns of this group of agronomy students were all evident in this 
short article: inequitable land distribution, lack of credit and technical assistance in the 
countryside as well as a professional class of highly-trained agronomists to ensure that 
land was properly managed, and foreign ownership of national wealth or its 
concentration into the hands of a few, both of which reflected a weak domestic 
economy dependent on foreign markets and large capitalists. Numerous other articles 
during that first year of publication of the Revista approached these questions from a 
variety of perspectives.8 Almost invariably, the students called on the national 
government to increase funding and programs for farmers, agronomists, rural credit 
institutions, and extension agencies, arguing that it was in the state’s interest to promote 
national well-being. 
Agronomy students were not the only ones to raise such issues in Colombia at 
the time. On the contrary, “the social question” was being widely discussed and 
debated. As the next section will describe, it was a key moment in Colombian nation-
                                                 
7 Ibid., 557-558. 
8 Among others, examples include: “Editorial,” RFNA 1 (December 1939): 215-222; “Editorial,” RFNA 2 (January-
April 1940): 304-306; L. J. Carvajalino Jácome, “Reflexiones sobre la economía nacional,” RFNA 1 (December 1939): 
223-226; Guillermo Escobar Restrepo, “El contrato de aparcería,” RFNA 3 (September-October 1940): 763-772; Jorge 
Gutiérrez E., “Crédito y técnica,” RFNA 1 (October 1939): 132-134; Hernán Jaramillo Ocampo, “La ciudad contra el 
campo,” RFNA 2 (January-April 1940): 307-311; Luís B. Ortíz C., “Política de población,” RFNA 2 (January-April 
1940): 312-333.  
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state formation, one in which important questions about the nature of the state and who 
it was meant to represent were being upended. Moreover, it was a time when the 
economy was rapidly diversifying after several decades of “coffee hegemony.” 
Economic interests were lobbying hard for a growing state to defend their particular 
industries. The Asociación Nacional de Industriales (ANDI), Colombia’s most 
important industrial association would soon be established and come to challenge and 
eventually eclipse the primary agricultural association – the Colombian Society of 
Agriculturalists (SAC). Over the subsequent decades, a variety of single-crop 
associations would further erode the power of the SAC. 
But, the story was not that simple. Industrial and agricultural interests were not 
always inimical, and some of the most important single-crop associations were industry 
sponsored. Moreover, many smaller industrial associations existed. Some of them were 
aligned with ANDI; others were not. As these various associations and the industries 
and individuals they represented jockeyed for position vis a vis the national state, they 
adopted and adapted discourses of the nation, the state, the social question, and the 
social classes. Uncovering the ways that economic interests underlay the discursive 
constructions of these actors is one goal of this dissertation. 
One of the richest examples of the adoption and adaptation of nationalist, class-
based, and state-focused discourses lies with a commodity that does not usually come 
to mind when one thinks of Colombia: wheat. Despite efforts on the part of the 
Colombian national state, the Rockefeller Foundation, and a variety of Colombian 
agronomists to promote the production and consumption of nationally grown wheat, 
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there was tremendous debate and constant conflict over a number of questions 
regarding this staple crop. These debates centered on land use, technological 
investment, foreign exchange, rural credit and technical assistance, industrialized bread 
production, transport costs, speculation, and the consumption of less expensive imports 
from the United States. But, when the various interests involved in these conflicts 
discussed them among themselves and with the general public, they framed them as 
arguments about neo-imperialism, the universality of science, social injustice, and 
civility. They evoked dramatic imagery of drunken states, hungry children, shoddy 
science, flour incapable of making either bread or cookies, and the irrationality of 
believing that wheat – an apparently temperate crop – could be successfully grown in 
the tropics. To better understand and frame these conflicts, this chapter offers an 
overview of two crucial issues: Colombian state formation and the trajectory of its 
wheat production in the twentieth century.    
 
Peace and Violence and the State in Colombia 
 
Historical processes of state formation in Colombia are poorly understood, in 
general. This is paradoxical, considering that a sizeable portion of the country’s 
historiography focuses on the state. Much of this scholarship, however, examines its 
connection to violence and exclusionary forms of democratic representation, the latter 
alternately termed at various times as “oligarchical democracy,” “consociational 
democracy,” or “convivencia.”9 Despite their different names, all three terms essentially 
                                                 
9 Braun, The Assassination of Gaitán; Jonathan Hartlyn, The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988); Alexander W. Wilde, “Conversations among Gentlemen: Oligarchical Democracy in 
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describe the same phenomenon: the tendency of “elite” members of the Conservative 
and Liberal parties in Colombia to put aside their political differences and work 
together to ensure constancy in economic policies and overall economic stability. 
Facilitating this process was a sense of shared identity as “gentlemen,” which helped 
unite them in opposition to popular sectors, and thereby ensured the latter’s exclusion 
from decision-making and guaranteed that popular concerns were marginalized by the 
national state. 
Such studies seek to address one of the primary – and problematic – questions of 
Colombian historiography: how can we explain the paradox of a country with strong 
democratic institutions but high levels of violent civil conflict and entrenched forms of 
political exclusion? Elite power-sharing arrangements emerging out of the intensity of 
nineteenth century political battles seemed to provide the answer. Like other Latin 
American countries, Colombia’s nineteenth century history was characterized by 
struggles over the centralization of power, the definitions of liberalism (both political 
and economic) and sporadic booms in export crops, which did not have long-term 
economic effects, but did occasionally disrupt regional balances of power. In Colombia, 
for example, short-lived booms in tobacco and quinine production in the Liberal 
                                                                                                                                                             
Colombia,” in The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, ed. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1978). All three of these analyses appeared following the formal end of the National Front – a 
power-sharing arrangement between the Liberal and Conservative parties that began in 1958, as a way of ending the 
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Braun and Wilde both discuss the informal period of “coalition rule” in Colombia from the beginning of the 
twentieth century, to the 1940s, when the system was disrupted by legislative changes that eroded the “power 
sharing” principles of the national government, while being strongly challenged by the eruption of significant social 
protest. On the electoral policies that facilitated and eroded power-sharing among elite actors, see also, Sebastián 
Mazzuca & James A. Robinson, “Political Conflict and Power Sharing in the Origins of Modern Colombia,” HAHR 89 
(May 2009): 285-321. 
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northeastern departments and in Tolima forged economic interests with the potential to 
challenge the southern Conservative sugar plantation owners with strong ties to 
Popayán, the Church’s most important ecclesiastical site in Colombia since the colonial 
era.10 Debates over church-state relations, trade and tariff policies, and federalism and 
centralism divided Liberals and Conservatives both along party lines and within parties 
themselves.11 Twenty-three years of Liberal rule (1863-1886), followed by fourteen years 
of Conservative power (1886-1899) saw repeated conflict, ultimately resulting in the 
War of a Thousand Days, a brutal, three-year civil war, which ended the lives of two 
percent of the adult male population. Scholars debate the precise origins of this conflict, 
with some emphasizing political differences, and others economic ones. Coffee is 
central for the proponents of economic origins, as its emergence in the late nineteenth 
century obviously had a much deeper impact on the Colombian economy than did 
earlier export crops.12  
What makes the War of a Thousand Days a defining moment in the 
consolidation of “oligarchic democracy” or “convivencia” is not, however, the sheer 
brutality of the conflict, although that brutality does play a role. Three factors are 
                                                 
10 Two classic works discussing these short-lived booms include: William Paul McGreevey, An Economic History of 
Colombia, 1845-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); José Antonio Ocampo, Historia económica de 
Colombia (Bogotá: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1987).  An inspired exploration of the politic conflicts and competing 
economic ideas and policies associated with the guano boom in Peru during the same period is: Paul Gootenberg, 
Imagining Development: Economic Ideas in Peru’s “Fictitious Prosperity” of Guano, 1840-1880 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993).  
11 Helen Delpar, Red against Blue: The Liberal Party in Colombian Politics, 1863-1899 (University: University of Alabama 
Press, 1981).  
12 Delpar, cited above, carefully analyzes intra-party conflict among Liberals, and argues that neither party had a 
monopoly on specific economic interests – in other words, traditional large landowners, new coffee growers and 
exporters, merchants, and traders could all be found in both parties. Charles Berquist, on the other hand, argues that, 
while there was some diversity within the parties, competing economic interests tended to align with different 
parties. Thus, in his view, fundamental partisan differences overshadowed any intra-party struggles, and meant that 
the partisan conflict that led to the War of a Thousand Days ultimately had economic origins. See Berquist, Coffee and 
Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1978). 
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considered important in the emergence of the first Liberal-Conservative elite power-
sharing arrangement. Coffee, again, is central. Marco Palacios, relying on statistics 
compiled by José Antonio Ocampo, notes that between 1834-1840, gold constituted 
72.1% of all Colombian exports, while coffee accounted for less than 1% and tobacco 
less than 3%. Tobacco experienced moderate growth until the early 1850s, when its 
boom began. Between 1864-1874, tobacco surpassed gold, accounting for 37% of 
Colombia’s exports in comparison to 30.1% for gold. Coffee exports also began to rise, 
but at a considerably more moderate pace. Eventually, tobacco exports bottomed out, 
replaced by quinine, which accounted for 30% of exports between 1881-1883. Gold 
exports amounted to only 18.7% during the same period, and coffee only 16.9%. By 
1898, the year before the War of a Thousand Days began, the picture was completely 
reversed. Quinine was no longer exported. Tobacco exports made up only 8.3% and 
gold 17.4%. On the other hand, forty-nine percent of Colombia’s exports consisted of 
coffee, the largest proportion any commodity had enjoyed since earlier in the century 
when gold predominated.13   
Unsurprisingly, the War of a Thousand Days dramatically disrupted commerce 
and trade. Three years after the war ended, the total value of all exports was $17,216 
pesos – still below the 1898 peak of $19,154 pesos. While all exports had declined, 
coffee’s percentage of total exports had dropped from 49% in 1898 to 39.5% in 1905. The 
percentage of all exports fell except for one – “Other Agricultural Items.” This category 
included a variety of commodities, such as rubber, cacao, Brazilwood, sugar, and 
                                                 
13 Palacios, Café en Colombia, 51. 
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bananas, and it had experienced dramatic growth during the War. The likeliest 
explanation was the establishment of banana production in the department of 
Magdalena in 1899, led by the United Fruit Company (UFCO).14 Tucked away in a 
northern corner of the country largely removed from the primary battlefronts, UFCO 
had been able to establish its first banana plantations and begin exporting despite the 
conflicts that raged in other parts of the country.15 Although this brought some income 
to the Colombian national treasury, this was a disturbing phenomenon for coffee 
growers and exporters. Successful, foreign-owned banana production would only bring 
marginal returns to Colombia, with the majority of profits going outside the country. 
Coffee, on the other hand, had been a growing export before the War impacted 
production – and it was in Colombian hands. Thus, it was deemed imperative by 
exporting elites that the political climate be stabilized and an economic order favorable 
to coffee production be prioritized.  
If this were the only factor, one might surmise that Delpar’s claim that 
agricultural and commercial interests were represented in both parties was the correct 
one (rather than Berquist’s claim that economic interests tended to align along partisan 
lines (see footnote #47). But, the War of a Thousand Days resulted not only in the loss of 
a significant amount of Colombian lives, but also the excision of seven percent of 
national territory. Panamá had long been a significant center of trade and commerce, 
from the colonial era all the way through the California Gold Rush of 1848, when it 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Marcelo Bucheli, Bananas and Business: The United Fruit Company in Colombia, 1899-2000 (New York: New York 
University Press, 2005). 
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became the quickest route for gold-seekers traveling from New York to San Francisco.16 
As Bogotá derived much more benefit from Panama’s commerce than Panama’s 
regional leaders derived from inclusion in the Colombian nation, there were several 
unsuccessful secession attempts during the nineteenth century. At the dawn of the 
twentieth century, the U.S. sought to sign a treaty with Colombia to build a canal. In 
1903, after these attempts failed, the U.S. took advantage of Colombia’s weakened post-
war condition and supported Panamanian independence, providing the additional 
firepower the secessionists needed to secure their objective. Such a devastating loss 
affected both national coffers and national pride, and provided additional incentive to 
end partisan conflict and ensure a stable economic climate.17   
The shock of losing Panama was matched by an unexpected turn of events in the 
War itself. Traditionally, scholars characterized the conflicts of the nineteenth century as 
“gentlemen’s wars,” in which wealthy landowners or merchants used 
clientilistic/patronage networks to raise private armies among a populace considered to 
be largely apolitical.18 The War of a Thousand Days did begin in such a fashion. Unlike 
previous conflicts, however, when a clear victor did not quickly emerge, popular actors 
broke away from elite-led armies and formed their own guerilla units, with competing 
                                                 
16 Aims McGuinness, Path of Empire: Panama and the California Gold Rush (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).  
17 Heraclio Bonilla & Gustavo Montañez, eds., Colombia y Panamá: La metamórfosis de la nación en el siglo XX (Bogotá: 
UNAL, 2004). 
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regional powers were never compelled to work together as a class, ultimately discouraging national unification. See 
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sympathies and conflicting aims. Berquist described them as violent marauders, who 
executed scores of their perceived enemies throughout the country, and threatened the 
social order and elite control.19 
With such devastating political, social, and economic consequences, it is easy to 
imagine why scholars point to the War as such a powerful impetus for elites to create 
the country’s first power-sharing arrangement. Mazzuca & Robinson assert that a 
significant change in electoral policy in 1905 facilitated a peaceful transition and 
guaranteed political stability. Previously, Colombia’s legislature operated under 
majoritarian rule – the party that won the most votes in an election was awarded all the 
congressional seats. Such dramatic power imbalances spurred losing parties to engage 
in violent opposition, Mazzuca & Robinson argue. After the War, Colombia adopted a 
proportional system. Regardless of the specific number of votes, the winning party was 
awarded two-thirds of the congressional seats, and the runner-up one-third. According 
to Mazzuca and Robinson, eliminating the “winner takes all” formula led Liberals to lay 
down their arms and work with Conservatives as a peaceful opposition party, 
ultimately ensuring economic, political, and social stability.20 Herbert Braun, on the 
other hand, focuses on cultural aspects of power-sharing during this period, examining 
how the social lives of Liberal and Conservative elites intersected in a wide variety of 
venues, particularly in exclusive social clubs and cultural events. They moved in the 
same circles, discussed the same poetry, attended the same tertulias (salons), and 
listened to the same classical symphonies. (Braun points out that they also bonded over 
                                                 
19 Berquist, Coffee and Conflict. 
20 Mazzuca & Robinson, “Political Conflict and Power Sharing.”  
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their perceived racial superiority – slightly lighter skin and less African or indigenous 
facial features than the majority of Colombia’s mestizo population.) More importantly, 
they saw themselves as defenders of civility, as honorable men who were working 
together civilly to protect the nation’s political institutions, by keeping violent political 
expression and caudillos in check. This image of themselves as civilistas contrasted with 
their view of everyone else in society – “the pueblo.” To promote political civility and 
stability, these elites supported efforts to educate the pueblo and instill noble values of 
pacific participation in politics.21  
However it was achieved, the first power-sharing arrangement in the twentieth 
century oversaw an important era of economic growth and political expansion in 
Colombia. Alternately termed the “Republic of Coffee” or the “Conservative 
Hegemony,” the legitimacy of the national state vis a vis regional power brokers grew 
exponentially.22 Increased revenues from coffee exports certainly played a crucial role. 
Equally important was the fact that coffee was truly a national industry. Unlike many 
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other agricultural exports in other parts of Latin America (or even Colombia itself, as 
the previous example of bananas attests), Colombians controlled their coffee trade. 
Thus, profits remained in the country. Moreover, numerous Colombians earned their 
livelihoods from it. Stevedores in the Pacific port of Buenaventura loaded it onto cargo 
ships while their counterparts in Atlantic ports unloaded the imports increased foreign 
revenues permitted; railroad operators carried it from the mountains where it was 
grown to the coast; transport workers on the Magdalena River brought imported goods 
to Bogotá, Medellín, and elsewhere; construction workers built and maintained the 
railroads and other freight transport systems; and innumerable small towns enjoyed 
increased commerce as coffee growers passed through on their way to the 
transportation hubs. But, most important of all was the dramatic increase in the number 
of growers. In the nineteenth century, large landowners dominated production. Coffee 
trees require several years after planting before they produce marketable beans, 
assuming there are no droughts, bad weather, or other natural disasters. To reduce their 
risks, large growers began encouraging smaller ones to produce it instead. They did so 
through contracts in which the large growers – now investors – provided seeds, some 
start-up capital, tools and pack animals, as well as pressure on the national government 
to make public lands available or to resolve land disputes between large landowners 
and small growers in favor of the latter. In exchange, small farmers settled new 
territories, planted coffee bushes and subsistence crops, and eventually returned a 
portion of their profits to the investors. The result was impressive: at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, there were approximately 750 coffee farms; thirty years later, in 
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1932, there were over 150,000. While some of these were large plantations, the vast 
majority were small farms of just a few acres.23   
This briefest of overviews only hints at the ways that the national state expanded 
because of coffee. For example, the geographic shift in coffee production from east to 
west in Colombia weakened Bogotá’s traditional rivals in the south, the east, and the 
Atlantic coast. Although Antioquia and Greater Caldas (where elite coffee interests 
were centered) had also been a rival to Bogotá – a strong one, in fact, because of 
Antioquia’s very lucrative gold trading in the nineteenth century (which ensured that 
regional state coffers often far exceeded those of the national state) – they did not 
continue the previous pattern of vigorously challenging Bogotá’s hegemony. Instead, 
although maintaining a strong regional identity, elite coffee interests increasingly 
accepted Bogotá’s legitimacy as the country’s central power, evident in their reliance on 
it as the distributor of national lands, and the ultimate arbiter of land disputes between 
small growers and large landowners. In other words, expanding coffee production 
partly depended on the regulating powers of the national state in Bogotá. Moreover, in 
1927, a group of elite coffee exporters formed the Coffee Growers’ Federation 
(FEDECAFE) to protect the interests of small growers, the quality of the product they 
sold, and the commodity’s position on the global market. FEDECAFE closely 
coordinated with the national state on a variety of matters, including trade policies, 
                                                 
23 On the large growers cum investors, and the different ports through which goods were imported and exported, see 
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dispersal of export revenues, and eventually, negotiation of international coffee 
agreements.24  
Coffee increased economic stability and Bogotá’s national hegemony in another 
important way. Some scholars assume that the Great Depression (and concomitant 
contraction of international trade) spurred Colombia to focus on industrialization, in 
order to ensure the availability of consumer goods. In reality, industrial production 
began long before the Depression. By the 1930s, in fact, Medellín’s textile mills were 
already very well established. The same was true for beer, cigarette, candy, matches, 
soap, and candle manufacturers throughout the country, as well as producers of cement 
and sulfuric acid.25 It was partly the massive economic growth stemming from the 
coffee trade that provided the financing for these industrial endeavors to begin.   
From the perspective at the top, things seemed to be going very well. Convivencia 
was serving the interests of industrialists and coffee exporters alike, there was economic 
and political stability, major public works and infrastructural development were 
humming along, and relations with the United States had been normalized (helped 
along by a $25 million dollar indemnity paid to Colombia for the loss of Panama).  
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From other perspectives, of course, things looked a bit different. The 1920s saw 
the flowering of a variety of popular protests and new political movements, particularly 
socialism. The labor movement gained strength and organized strikes demanding better 
wages and working conditions; urban residents protested the often-abysmal state of 
working-class neighborhoods, and public utilities and transportation; subsistence 
farmers and some small-scale coffee growers protested land tenure inequities or 
outright theft of their land and labor by large landowners hoping to expand banana or 
cattle production. This was the era of Maria Cano, a poet, labor organizer, editor of the 
magazine El rebelde, and co-founder of the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR). In 
1925, at a labor congress, she was named “la Flor del Trabajo” (“Labor’s Flower”).26  
Foment was also occurring at the top. Partisanship was not the primary issue, 
however. The conflict was generational. A mixed group of Liberal and Conservative 
politicians known as the “centenarios” – born in the late 1880s and early 1890s and 
emerging on the public stage around the time of Colombia’s centennial in 1910 – 
watched the popular uprisings around them and recognized that the dramatic economic 
changes of the previous decades had wrought significant social changes, changes with 
potential to upend the social order if nothing was done. Among themselves, they 
disagreed about the direction the country should go. Conservatives worried about the 
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secularizing impact of capitalist modernity and called for a return to Catholicism. 
Liberals celebrated the greater secularization and called instead for progressive types of 
reform to ameliorate some of the worst conditions under which popular classes labored 
and lived. Despite these different ideas, they were united in their criticisms of the older 
generation of civilistas, considering them out-of-touch and unaware. There was also 
growing discontent with what seemed to be too cozy of a relationship with the United 
States. Accepting the indemnity payment was criticized, as was the renewal and 
expansion of oil concessions. The burgeoning presence of U.S. business interests in 
different parts of the country (the banana and petroleum regions, specifically) sparked 
nationalist sentiment, which wildly ignited in 1928 after the Banana Massacre, in which 
President Miguel Abadia Méndez sent the Colombian army to put down a strike by 
United Fruit Company workers in Ciénaga, Santa Marta. An unknown number of 
workers were killed (estimates range from 47 to 2,000).27   
The combination of popular discontent, public outcry over the massacre, and the 
growing generational divide weakened the Conservative party’s hold on power. In the 
1930 election, the Conservative party could not agree on a candidate, and ultimately, 
two competing Conservatives ran in the election. Meanwhile, the Liberals named 
Enrique Olaya Herrera as their presidential candidate. He firmly believed in 
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partisanship and his politics were agreeable to the growing numbers of Conservatives 
dissatisfied with both of the other candidates. On February 9, 1930, he won a substantial 
majority of the vote, while the Conservative vote was split almost evenly.28 
Although the beginning of the “República Liberal” (1930-1946) starts with the 
election of Olaya Herrera, he was exceptionally moderate. His successor, on the other 
hand, was much more reformist and deeply partisan. Alfonso López Pumarejo came 
into office with strong popular support and immediately set about instituting his 
“Revolution en marcha” (Revolution on the March), which consisted a broad range of 
social, labor, agrarian, and constitutional reforms. Workers were guaranteed the right to 
strike. Personal income and domestic and foreign taxes were increased, which helped 
quadruple the national education budget. Property was declared to have a social 
function, which attacked the right of large landowners to hold enormous tracts of land 
without using them to produce either food or commercial crops, and opened the 
possibility for such unused lands to be redistributed among landless peasants. A variety 
of other reforms emboldened peasant and workers: during López’s adminstration the 
number of labor unions exploded and there were peasants and workers occupied the 
Congressional building demanding change.29 Unsurprisingly, such radical and rapid 
transformation generated significant opposition. Already by the end of his first term, he 
was meeting more obstacles to his reforms, including from more moderate members of 
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his own party. By the time he was re-elected in 1942 (at the time, presidents in 
Colombia could not stand for consecutive re-election) the Conservatives had re-focused, 
regained some unity, and sharpened their methods of attack and opposition. A series of 
scandals further demoralized López, and he ended up resigning before his term was 
up.30  
Despite López’s Revolución en marcha, he is not considered a populist leader. In 
Colombia, that title is reserved for his contemporary, Jorge Eliecer Gaitán. Twenty years 
younger than the centenarios, darker-skinned than the civilistas, born into poverty, and 
farther to the Left than even the most reformist of the Liberals (he briefly broke away in 
the early 1930s to form his own party, the National Leftist Revolutionary Union (UNIR) 
– Gaitán faced many obstacles to acceptance by party elites. But, he enjoyed the 
overwhelming support of popular groups – largely stemming from his “breakout” 
moment on the national stage in the wake of the Banana Massacre, when he riveted the 
nation with a powerful and moving speech calling for an investigation. Gaitán’s oratory 
skills eventually grew to be legendary. Despite the disdain with which some elite party 
members held him, his popular support fueled his political rise, and he served in a 
number of public offices during the years of the Liberal Republic, including mayor of 
Bogotá (1936-1937), Minister of National Education (1940-1941), and Minister of Labor, 
Health and Social Welfare (1943-1944). In the 1946 election, in an echo of the 
Conservative split sixteen years earlier, the Liberal Party divided its support between 
two candidates – Gaitán and more moderate Gabriel Turbay. As can be imagined, this 
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paved the way for a Conservative win. The following year, Gaitán became leader of the 
Liberal party and worked to shore up support for a more successful presidential run in 
1950. But, long before that, on April 9, 1948, he was assassinated while walking down 
the street, returning to the office after lunch. His death set off a massive riot, known as 
the bogotazo, which destroyed much of downtown Bogotá. His death is also often 
counted as the beginning of la Violencia.31  
But la Violencia began before his death, in 1946, and hence, an explanation of its 
origins and trajectory must be sought elsewhere. There are two primary schools of 
thought – one focused on socio-economic factors and the other on politics. Thus, for 
example, Keith Christie, in his examination of the origins of coffee production in 
Caldas, looks closely at the development of social classes and social stratification and 
comes to the conclusion that violence in the countryside was the result of the intrusion 
of capitalist modernization, but not because the campesinos were resisting 
modernization, but rather because capital was seeking ways to get them off the land.32 
Christopher Abel and Javier Guerrero, on the other hand, emphasize political factors, 
focusing in particular on the disruptions caused by the transfer of power from the 
Conservatives to the Liberals and the role the church played in maintaining social 
order. They both maintain that during the Conservative Hegemony, the Church acted 
as the mediator between the elites and the popular classes, ensuring social order in a 
devoutly Catholic country. With increased secularization, and the reforms of Liberal 
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Republic, especially the increased role of the state in public education, the Church’s 
power eroded and it lost the ability to ensure social control and prevent violence in the 
countryside.33 Abel and Guerrero fill in the blanks and better explain la Violencia than an 
earlier study that, unfortunately, introduced a lamentable and long-lasting term that 
obscures understanding of the process of state formation in Colombia. In 1980, Paul 
Oquist argued that a strong state developed in Colombia in the early twentieth century 
(although he only described that state in relation to the urban residents and workers, 
overlooking the countryside). He further claimed that this state challenged the 
traditional hegemony of landowning elites (which contradicts the work of other 
scholars such as Delpar, showing that neither party had a monopoly on economic 
alignments, and ignores the fact that coffee production bridged rural, urban, and class 
divides). He further claimed that the emergence of partisan and intra-class conflict 
overwhelmed the state, leading it to “partially collapse,” which created a power 
vacuum in the countryside, and allowed local conflicts, that the national state had been 
keeping in check, to erupt.34  
In contrast, Daniel Pecaut argued that the entire debate about whether a weak (or 
partially collapsed) state was the cause or the effect of la Violencia was ultimately a dead 
end. For Pecaut, violence and the state were one and the same, and could not be 
discussed separately. Moreover, he did not believe that one could study “the state” and 
“society” separately either; in his view, there was an essential relationship between 
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them and it was possible to understand the former only by examining the latter. To this 
end, Pecaut focused on culture. These points are all well-taken. Unfortunately, his 
discussion of “culture” focused on how Colombia was not “cohesive” in comparison to 
European states – he argued that there were deep cultural divisions that cohered 
around party affiliation, which led to deep disunity and conflict.35 
Pecuat’s study was published in 1987 and was one of the last analyses of the la 
Violencia that assumed it was a unitary phenomenon in Colombia. Beginning in the 
1980s, scholars recognized that there were tremendous regional and local variations in 
the course of la Violencia (and many places where there was no violence at all). After the 
publication of several regional studies, which looked at how national partisan conflicts 
interacted with local issues – social, cultural, economic, and political – scholars came to 
realize that it would be more accurate to speak of las Violencias.36  
In terms of state formation, two of those studies offer an intriguing contrast. 
Reinaldo Barbosa Estepa, in his analysis of la Violencia in the eastern Llanos, counters 
some of the most common ideas: that it was primarily about partisan politics or that it 
was a response to “capitalist penetration.” Instead, he recognizes the immanently local 
nature of forms of manifestations of violence. But, he makes it by relying on a notion of 
the state that does not allow for multiple interpretations or meaningful interaction 
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between national state agents and local residents – interaction which is usually 
mediated by regional or local representatives of the state:  
“Colombia is a country of regions, and each one of them has followed a 
unique process of socio-economic development; for that reason, elements of 
‘the national’ that organize, unify, and cohere them are lacking. In the orbit 
of the masses’ common sense there is no clear concept or category of either 
the Nation or the State: they both are confused with the organism that 
executes the function of government; thus, the words of the local parish 
priest or political boss are taken more seriously.”37  
 
“Confusing” the nation and the state with the organisms that “execute the 
government’s functions” is precisely how the process of state formation works, 
according to the well-known Joseph & Nugent volume previously mentioned.38 Carlos 
Miguel Ortiz Sarmiento, in contrast, prefigures the notion of state formation as a 
process of constant negotiation of rule in his analysis of violence in the Quíndio. He 
examines how the breakdown of existing social structures manifested itself as the loss of 
land by landowners with large plots, at the hands of “astute” local residents who took 
advantage of the chaos to enlarge their property holdings, and in the process further 
disrupting local patterns of social control. From this he concludes that the concept of 
collapse is not helpful for understanding violence or the state in Colombia. As he notes, 
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the state is “always in a state of collapse.”39 This, of course, is essentially the same thing 
as saying that it is always in a process of formation (depending on whether you see the 
glass as half-full or half-empty).  
As crucial as the connection between violence and the state may be, however, 
there is a major problem. Ultimately, the question of violence obscures processes of 
state formation. Explaining complex and diverse forms of violent conflict is the object of 
study, rather than the historical formation of the Colombian state. The presence of a 
variety of armed actors in contemporary Colombia – guerilla organizations, military 
and paramilitary forces, and drug traffickers and other criminal groups – and the 
tremendous rates of displacement resulting from their activities certainly make 
understanding violence and its causes a crucial historiographical and contemporary 
question. But, James Scott reminds us of why it is important to think about violence as 
one aspect of state formation in Colombia, but not the only one: peasants are not always 
in a state of rebellion, he informs us, and yet, scholars tend to focus on them precisely at 
the moment when they engage in violent resistance or attacks. And yet, even 
understanding why they decide to rebel cannot be done without first fully examining 
the social, economic, and political conditions during times when they were not 
rebelling. It is only then that we can understand how their conceptions of fairness, 
justice, and legitimate authority factor into a decision to take up arms.40  
Similarly, in Colombia, we can learn a great deal of state formation when we 
expand our focus to include more than violence. Such is the case in one of the most 
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insightful regional studies of la Violencia. Although Mary Roldán sets out to explain the 
origins of violence in the department of Antioquia, she uncovers a number of actors 
condemning acts of violence and striving for peaceful co-existence – actors who saw 
violence by the state not as necessary means to ensuring partisan spoils or social 
control, but rather as acts that de-legitimized the authority of the state.41 And they 
expressed these sentiments despite the fact that both the national and regional states 
had only a marginal presence in their lives and communities. How individuals who live 
in remote areas with an ephemeral state presence can nevertheless see themselves as 
citizens of that state and subject to its authority – prior to the outbreak of violence  - is a 
crucial question that remains poorly studied in Colombia.42   
 
 
Wheat Production in Mid-Twentieth Century Colombia: An Overview 
To understand the dynamics of wheat production in Colombia, one must first 
begin with geography. Colombia is broadly divided into four major zones – the central 
highlands of the Colombian Andes, the tropical regions of the Atlantic coast, the 
Amazon rainforest in the southeast, and the expansive plain east of the highlands, 
known simply as the llanos. These divisions are artificial, of course, as there are 
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significant climatic differences within each one. The “central highlands,” for example, 
consist of three separate mountain ranges separated by long, meandering rivers and 
flood basins. For most of the twentieth century, the central range (“cordillera central”) 
was the heart of coffee production in Colombia, while the eastern range (“cordillera 
oriental”) has seen its agricultural production evolve from coffee to wheat and barley 
and later to cattle, potatoes, and cut flowers. This is also the site of the country’s capital, 
Bogotá. Regional political units in Colombia are known as “departamentos” and two of 
three main 1950s-era wheat-producing departamentos – Cundinamarca and Boyacá – are 
located in the cordillera oriental. Much of the wheat production occurred there on a large 
high-altitude plateau known as the Bogotá Savannah (“Sabana de Bogotá). All three of 
Colombia’s Andean mountain ranges converge toward the southwestern part of the 
country and this is where the other wheat-producing departamento – Nariño – is located.  
Wheat had been produced in Colombia since colonial times. It was, in fact, 
shortly after the Conquest that wheat production began, and to this day, boyacenses and 
nariñenses (residents of Boyacá and Nariño, respectively), proudly claim that it was first 
introduced in their region. Production continued on a limited scale in some regions, 
such as the coast, and more widespread in others, particularly Boyacá and Santander 
until the independence era in the early 19th century, when, the story goes, a particularly 
virulent strain of wheat rust from Ecuador traveled north and dramatically diminished 
production for the next several decades. By the early 20th century, production had 
resumed in the central highlands, shifting from Santander to Cundinamarca, while 
Boyacá steadily regained its status as the top wheat-producing region. Complementing 
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domestic production was the growth of wheat imports from the United States. In fact, 
one of the earliest regional conflicts focused on wheat was related to those imports.43 
This conflict would echo later ones, in that it centered on transportation costs and 
production levels. The steep and broken slopes of Colombia’s central highlands had 
long been the cause of the country’s transportation difficulties. Only approximately 420 
miles separate Bogotá from the Atlantic coast, for example – a relatively short distance. 
But, during some seasons of the year, traveling from Bogotá to the coast could take up 
to 100 days. Road building had barely begun even by the 1920s and it wasn’t until the 
1950s before it truly became a national priority. Water transport was the more common 
method of transportation in the 19th and early 20th century and one of the most 
important stops on the Magdalena River that connected the interior of the country to 
the coast was a small town called Puerto Berrio. In 1911, a national legislative decree 
ordered that millers on the coast pay a “transit fee” of eight cents (payable only in gold 
coin) per kilo of wheat that was transported through Puerto Berrio on its way from the 
central highlands to the coast. While this was a burden for those millers, the ready 
availability of imported wheat from the United States softened the negative impact of 
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this decree. In face, it was cheaper for coastal millers to import wheat from the United 
States than to pay the transport costs from the interior of the country. Unfortunately for 
the millers, several months later the Colombian Society of Agriculturalists (Sociedad de 
Agricultores de Colombia – SAC), the most important agricultural lobby in the country 
at the time, approved a proposition at its annual Congress in Bogotá that called for 
Colombia’s national legislature to modify import duties. The proposed changes 
included increasing current import tariffs by four-cents (also payable only in gold coin) 
per kilo of imported wheat, as well as an additional 2% added onto the currency 
conversion rate.44 
Coastal millers organized to mount a defense, beginning with a forceful editorial 
in a local newspaper. Titled, “Injustices against the Coast; Malicious System; Our 
Import Tariffs – How They Protect the Residents of the Interior and Harm those on the 
Coast,” the millers emphatically stated that if such a measure were put into place, it 
would mean the “complete destruction of the Altantic Coast milling companies.” 
Warning that the patience of the people on the Coast was wearing out, they hinted at 
the flour shortages that would follow the implementation of such a measure:  
If what they hope to achieve is to oblige the milling companies on the 
Coast to utilize wheat grown in the interior, [well] – it’s an absurdity and 
proof that the members of the Agricultural Congress don’t know a thing 
about wheat consumption. Can Cundinamarca and Boyacá possibly 
provide the 25,000 tons [of wheat] that the mills of Barranquilla and 
Cartagena consume on an annual basis?45 These mills have a daily flour 
production of 2,500 arrobas. Can enough wheat be brought from the 
interior to satisfy such production levels? Of course not. And can the bags 
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required to move such quantities be made in the interior? And how much 
more will that add to the price per bushel in Barranquilla and Cartagena? 
As cheap as it might be, it will never be the same of that which we import 
from the United States.46 
 
Moreover, the millers complained, the large sums they had already paid in 
transport fees weren’t even being used for their intended purpose – maintain dredging 
operations to ensure better transport. Ultimate blame, however, if the proposal was 
enacted, lay not with the SAC, but with the national legislature; the millers bitterly 
lamented that if legislators “do not want to protect us, they should at least not be hostile 
to us and neither should they put up obstacles for the incipient industries established 
on the Coast.”47 
Patriotic language infused the millers complaints, which continued for the next 
several months. “We have always dreamed of seeing Colombia become a grand and 
progressive country,” they declared at one point, for example, and at another asked: 
“What is the patriotic or fiscal purpose that [the highland agriculturalists] pursue with 
this recommendation?” They derided the Puerto Berrio tariff, asking: “Has any Nation 
on earth ever established tariff duties between different regions of its territory?” Poor 
production methods and their effect on prices were also criticized:   
The wheat produced in the interior is insufficient to meet the consumption 
needs in those regions [Boyacá and Cundinamarca] and production there, 
according to data published by the Central Bank, instead of increasing, is 
decreasing; and if previously the harvests returned forty to one, now they 
only produce fourteen to one owing to the fact that the land is still 
cultivated using primitive methods and until today nobody has bothered 
to try to use modern machinery and equipment. [Thus,] being that wheat 
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production is so low and the price of flour in the interior so 
elevated…how high could the price reach on the Coast?48 
 
Despite their complaints, the wheat protectionist policies, first established in 
1905, remained in place. It was not until serious wheat scarcity in the 1920s spurred the 
Conservative government to institute the Emergency Law (“Ley de Emergencia”) 
eliminating import tariffs that millers were able to obtain wheat at what they 
considered to be reasonable prices.49  
And while the Ley de Emergencia ensured that bread was more widely available in 
the cities, it also had precisely the effect that Conservative protectionists had feared all 
along: imported wheat flooded the market and threatened to put domestic wheat 
producers out of business.50 This time it was the SAC’s turn to complain. Making their 
case in the pages of the Revista Nacional de Agricultura (RNA), the Society’s monthly 
magazine, they argued that the use of “extremely powerful machines” on tracts of land 
surpassing “100,000 acres,” made the cost to produce wheat twenty times cheaper in the 
United States. Moreover, the recent elimination of the prohibitive import tariffs …[had 
deluged] the market with cheaper imported wheat.51  
A hint that millers and bakers in Colombia had begun to change their productive 
processes, or at least the kinds of products they sold to Colombian consumers, is 
evident in the SAC’s acknowledgement that price was not the only reason that millers 
chose imported flour: 
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[Colombian] bakers preferred [American flour]…as it more easily produced 
fluffier bread, due to the potato starch it contained, even though this 
reduced the bread’s quality, and was less hygienic and nutritious, 
something which was not tolerated in other countries that sold bread by 
weight and not volume.”52  
 
This early salvo in the “quality wars” that occurred several decades later also 
demonstrates the fluidity of the term “quality” itself. 
 It was also at this time that the SAC began its own efforts to improve agricultural 
production in Colombia. The SAC had long promoted a variety of programs to increase 
technical knowledge, including cooperative efforts with national and departmental 
level agencies to establish agricultural schools and to disseminate information through 
the RNA and other regional newspapers and newsletters. But in January 1929, the SAC 
went a step further. That month, the SAC made an announcement in the RNA that new 
varieties of imported wheat, barley and grass seeds were available at the Society’s main 
office in Bogotá.53  Two months later the Revista reported that over 190 farmers had 
collected a free sample – over 90% of them from Cundinamarca.54 The Revista never 
reported on the ultimate fate of these new varieties, but it is noteworthy that they 
distributed them among farmers in Cundinamarca in the first place.55  
 Througout the 1930s and into the early 1940s, the SAC continued to promote the 
use of domestically produced grain (see figure 3). Of course, the decrease in global trade 
during World War II cut off many typical supply routes, and the post-War years saw 
the U.S. sending much of its grain to Europe to help with the reconstruction efforts. 
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While one might think that this would benefit wheat producers, millers continued to 
focus their efforts on increasing grain importation rather than promoting domestic 
production. By 1949, millers’ warned of impending shortages that could only be 
avoided if they were granted more generous terms on their import licenses. The SAC 
countered that such a request should be denied, arguing that the only sure way to avoid 
shortages in the future was for the government to invest in experiment stations devoted 
to wheat. Endeavoring to give more weight to their suggestion, the SAC outlined a 
comprehensive plan for developing these stations that included sections on genetics, 
soil science, climatology, entomology and statistics, among others. Such research was 
necessary, the SAC pointed out, because, while,  
“…in other areas of science, the experience obtained in other regions of the 
world can be imported without any modification whatsoever, this is not 
possible for agriculture.  A wheat variety that achieved magnificent results 
in the United States or Canada could fail completely in Colombia.”56  
 
 At the very time that the SAC was making its recommendations for improved 
research and experiment stations focused on wheat, the Colombian government was in 
the final stages of negotiating a cooperative agricultural research program with the 
Rockefeller Foundation. Negotiations for this program had begun in 1948 under the 
Conservative administration of President Mariano Ospina Pérez and was signed in 
December 1949. The program officially began in 1950 and continued until 1967, years of 
tremendous upheaval in Colombia – the continued Violencia in the countryside, the 
emergence of guerilla groups in some parts of the country, the political repression of the 
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Laureano Gómez presidency, the military dictatorship of General Rojas Pinilla, and the 
beginning of the National Front – a power-sharing arrangement agreed upon by the 
two major parties as a way to quell the partisan battle lines on which la Violencia had 
been drawn.  
The Colombian Agricultural Program (CAP), as the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) 
referred to it, was focused on the country’s staple crops: wheat, corn, rice, potatoes, and 
beans. The stated goals of this agreement were two-fold: 1) develop a group of highly 
trained agronomists who would be intellectually equipped to carry on the breeding 
work in Colombia after the Foundation had left; and 2) strengthen the existing 
agricultural institutions and help to create new ones to fully meet the growing nation’s 
needs. Fortunately, both of these goals meshed well with the distinct, but not 
conflicting, goals of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Colombian government. After 
more than two decades of work on public health in Latin America and other parts of the 
world, the Rockefeller Foundation shifted its focus to agricultural production, with the 
goal of eradicating global hunger by developing the “miracle seeds” that would 
dramatically increase the world’s overall food supply, and especially in the developing 
parts of the world where it was most needed. While feeding a growing urban 
population was clearly a goal of the Colombian government as well, its larger goal for 
the cooperative program was connected to the ISI policies of substituting imported 
agricultural products for domestically produced ones and thereby achieving greater 
self-sufficiency in meeting its food needs. Again, these goals are not necessarily 
contradictory, but they are distinct. Interestingly, as the years of the cooperative 
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program went by, the American agronomists, breeders and officers of the Rockefeller 
Foundation living in Colombia increasingly adopted self-sufficiency as a goal for 
themselves as well.57 Arriving in Colombia after several years of similar work in Mexico, 
the Foundation’s breeders brought with them 1,100 lines of wheat and could begin the 
crossing and breeding process much more quickly in Colombia than they had been able 
to do so in Mexico. This meant that within five years the CAP had already developed 
two new, improved varieties and had begun the process of multiplying and distributing 
them to Colombia’s wheat farmers. 
At the same time, millers and bakers were moving even further from the milling 
and baking techniques inherited from the colonial era. By the 1960s, industrialized mills 
in the both the “wheat producing zone” (Cundinamarca, Boyacá, and Nariño) and the 
“non-wheat producing zones” (Medellín, Cali, and the Atlantic Coast) were capable of 
grinding 371,712 tons of grain per year, while the more traditional mills were could 
only grind 73,184 tons.58  
Similarly, Colombia’s bakers had also undergone some degree of technification 
as well. A 1964 study on the baking industry conducted by the Institute for 
Technological Research, in conjunction with the Colombian Technical Assistance 
Program for Small- and Medium-Sized Businesses (a program supported by the Special 
Fund of the United Nations), noted that the largest problem bakeries faced was the 
                                                 
57 E.C. Stakman, Richard Bradfield & Paul C. Mangelsdorf, Campaigns against Hunger (Cambridge: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 1967). See also, Marcos Cueto, ed., Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation and 
Latin America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).  
58 “Estudio sobre los molinos del trigo del país,” Contribución del Instituto Nacional de Abastecimientos al Congreso 
Triguero, Bogotá, Diciembre de 1964. 
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“deficient and variable quality of the flours made from domestically-grown wheat.” 
Scarcity was also an issue, although apparently not as problematic as the poor quality of 
the flour. Why does this indicate that some degree of technification had occurred? Soft 
wheat varieties had difficulties withstanding the intense grinding processes of 
industrialized milling. In Colombia, all of the “traditional” wheat varieties were soft 
ones, and the first two “improved” ones developed in conjunction with the Rockefeller 
Foundation were also soft varieties. It wasn’t until 1959 when the first improved hard 
variety became available. Thus, the fact that in 1963, Colombia’s bakers were 
complaining about the quality of Colombian-produced flour is a strong indicator of 
technological change. This is especially so if one considers that the remaining pages of 
the IIT report devoted considerable space to arguing for increased imports. In previous 
years, millers’ and bakers’ arguments for increasing wheat imports centered on price 
and availability. But by 1963, they spoke of “quality” – a dramatic shift.59  
Of course, at this point, before discussing the specific criticisms lobbed at 
Colombian wheat, it’s necessary to go on one more detour and take a look at the role of 
the U.S. P.L. 480 program. As indicated earlier, the combination of the emergence of 
wheat breeders dedicated to developing ever-improved super-high-yield varieties, as 
well as the industrialization of flour production led to dramatic increases in U.S. wheat 
output by the late 1940s. Ultimately, this lead to the problem of surplus grain sitting 
and potentially rotting in U.S. silos. In the immediate post-War era, this was not a 
serious problem, as much of the grain was shipped to Europe as part of the Marshall 
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Plan’s reconstruction efforts. But, within a few years, wheat production was restored in 
Europe and such shipments were no longer necessary. To appease mid-West wheat 
growers, Congress passed Public Law 480 in 1954. From the beginning it was conceived 
of as a foreign assistance program and worked in the following manner: excess grain 
produced in the United States was made available to underdeveloped countries at a 
price set by the United States (determined through a complicated formula based on the 
theoretical price of the grain had it been sold in a free and open market). Countries who 
purchased this grain entered into a contract with the United States which obliged them 
to buy it at that set price. They purchased this grain using their local currencies, which 
would be held in special accounts by the U.S. Department of State.  These currencies 
were to then be dispersed back to the countries in question for development projects 
approved by the U.S. government, particularly projects designed to promote 
industrialization.  The core philanthropic idea behind the program was that the 
countries that purchased such grain saved money for important development projects 
in several ways: 1) they did not have to make the expenditures necessary to produce 
grain themselves, thus freeing up funds for other development goals; 2) they did not 
have to use limited foreign exchange in order to purchase grain, but could use their 
local currencies instead, again, freeing up the foreign currency for use in other projects; 
and 3) they ultimately did not actually “spend” anything at all for the imported grain, 
as the local currency used to “purchase” the grain would be held in a special account, to 
be dispersed for their development goals. 
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This rather benign description clearly belies a number of serious problems with 
this program.  The first problem, as Theodore Schultz pointed out in 1960, was with the 
fact that there was so much excess grain in the U.S. to begin with.  As Schultz indicated, 
the surpluses did not “…spring out of the vagaries of weather or out of fluctuations in 
demand, nor [were] they caused by the slow economic growth of poor countries. They 
[were] a conspicuous consequence of U.S. technological and price policies.”60  For 
Schultz, the real solution lay not in “rationalizing farm surpluses into international 
assets,” but in changes to policies regarding supply, including controls on the amount 
of grain produced every year. However, Schultz was also sage enough to realize that for 
a variety of reasons, mainly entrenched agricultural interests, this was unlikely to 
happen.  
Beyond the existence of surplus grain, there were other problems with this 
program.  One was that the U.S. government set the price of the grain based on an 
obscure formula that ensured it would be sold at a price higher than that of the global 
wheat market.  And unlike an open market, in which buyers could have bargained for 
better offers or shopped around for a better deal, participating countries were 
contractually obliged to purchase the grain at the set price.  In addition, much of the 
local currency held by the State Department was never dispersed back to the countries 
in question.  In some cases, several years worth of these currencies were held by the 
U.S. government.  As another contemporary analyst pointed out, “the reason our 
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(December 1960): 1019-1030, 1020. 
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foreign currencies are accumulating is that we cannot easily reach agreement with 
recipient countries on specific projects for which we will extend loans or grants.”61   
Finally, in addition to these more short-term problems there was a significant 
long-term one that was discussed at great length by a number of contemporary 
observers, as well as the some individuals at the Rockefeller Foundation and the 
Colombian Ministry of Agriculture.  The great fear of many economists and other 
analysts was that the recipient countries would come to view these sales as permanent 
and would therefore fail to invest in their agricultural industries, thus leaving them 
vulnerable to more severe food shortages in the future, when excess grain production in 
the U.S. may have leveled off and be less readily available.  Even worse was the thought 
that the introduction of imported grain would inhibit the sale of locally produced grain 
and depress local agricultural markets.   
And that begs an important question. Colombian millers, American wheat-
growers, USDA representatives, and U.S. agricultural attachés generally agreed that the 
quality of Colombian wheat was consistently bad. Colombian wheat growers, breeders, 
agricultural lobbies, and Ministry of Agriculture officials and American scientists 
working for the Rockefeller Foundation in Colombia consistently agreed that the 
quality of Colombian wheat was comparable to that of the U.S., and in some cases, 
superior. What is certain is that by the 1970s the use of domestically-grown wheat in 
Colombia diminished drastically, and by 1980, Colombia was importing almost 90% of 
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the wheat it consumed.62 Why? Was it that Colombian wheat varieties really weren’t 
that good? Or could it be that the availability of cheaper imported grain led to a 
negative publicity campaign against Colombian wheat? What would have happened if 
Colombia’s wheat breeders had had the opportunity to freely spend another thirty 
years developing a diverse array of wheat varieties adapted to Colombia’s growing 
conditions – the opportunity that U.S. wheat breeders had had in the United States in 
the early part of the twentieth century? Was Colombia a place where wheat really just 
couldn’t be grown? Or did P.L. 480 help to construct it as such? The following chapter 
will examine competing ideas about the quality of Colombian wheat varieties.  
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CHAPTER 2 
“As If They were Native Plants”: Agronomy and Empire in Colombia, 1945-1955 
 
 
René Hauzeur had an unusual idea for providing enough food for Colombia in 
1945: the country should grow rye. Arguing that it was one of the only two cereals 
suitable for making bread due to its gluten content, he lamented that it was practically 
unknown in Colombia. Although the Ministry of Industries had introduced rye seeds in 
1928 and two of Colombia’s most dedicated agronomists, Antonio Miranda and Manuel 
Flórez Umaña, had seen how important its cultivation was in Europe during a tour 
there, it had never taken off on either a large- or small-scale. The only person who had 
ever promoted its production was Hauzeur himself, when he had been in charge of 
Cundinamarca’s Office of Agriculture and Cattle-Raising. Insufficient seed supplies and 
financial resources precluded his success. By 1945, rye was only grown on a very small-
scale in Chocontá, a municipality of Cundinamarca, and on Flórez Umaña’s farm in 
Boyacá.1 
 But what was so special about rye? For Hauzeur, it was not solely that its gluten 
content was comparable to wheat. More importantly, it grew well in the sandy, alkaline 
soils characteristic of the Sabana de Bogotá. He argued that it was far better suited to 
Colombia’s soil conditions than wheat. Unfavorably comparing Colombia’s soil to that 
of the Western Hemisphere’s powerhouse wheat producers – the United States and 
                                                 
1 René Hauzeur, “El cultivo del centeno resolviera el problema de la harina,” Agricultura Tropical (hereafter AT), Vol. 
1 (March 1945): 11-15. Colombia’s political divisions are called “departments.” Cundinamarca is in the geographic 
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 73 
Argentina (oddly overlooking Canada) – he claimed that rye was “the cereal of poor 
soils” and it was precisely for that reason that the United States and Argentina had not 
developed any strong centers of rye production. Since they had excellent growing 
conditions for wheat, they naturally focused on that crop. The “ample fertility” of their 
soils, in fact, “sometimes led to an overproduction that was detrimental to the crop’s 
economy.” For Hauzeur, this contrasted sharply with Colombia, which did not have the 
rich soil, suitably flat topography, or sufficient availability of fertilizers to successfully 
provide the wheat its populace needed.2 
 Rye, on the other hand, was perfectly suited, and only required minimal 
conversion of milling equipment and moist (rather than dry) yeast, something the 
nation’s yeast manufacturers could easily produce, he claimed. Moreover, as 
Colombia’s soils were particularly suited for rye, farmers could plant more seeds per 
hectare than were normally planted in Europe, and achieve higher production while 
using less land. Hauzeur further bolstered his case by adding that rye was equally as 
nutritious as wheat, that it could be cultivated with already-available farm equipment, 
and that rye flour produced as much bread as wheat flour.3 Moreover, it would 
strengthen the national economy: if the country succeeded in growing rye, it could 
“avoid the migration of Colombian capital to foreign wheat markets and provide well-
paid jobs to Colombian workers and farmers.”4 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 11-12. 
3 Ibid., 12. 
4 Ibid., 13-15.  
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 Hauzeur acknowledged that the nation’s wheat promoters and its consumption 
habits might present serious obstacles to such a dramatic shift. As if to demonstrate that 
resistance, the editors of Agricultura Tropical, where Hauzeur’s article appeared, added a 
short note indicating that while they agreed in principle that rye was a “potential” crop 
for the sandy and acidic soils of Colombia’s cold highlands, they did not “believe it was 
appropriate for official or private entities to publicly promote rye cultivation on a 
commercial scale” until several issues were worked out first. These paralleled issues 
Colombia’s wheat farmers already faced, and included: 1) assurance that there would 
actually be a market where rye farmers could profitably sell their harvests; 2) 
establishment of mills designed to handle rye; 3) systematic experimentation to develop 
varieties for Colombia’s diverse growing conditions; and 4) evidence based on 
“scientific, systematic, and continuous research” that Colombia’s high-altitude regions 
could grow rye commercially. If those questions were ever resolved, the editors claimed 
that they would readily join a campaign to promote rye production.5 
 In the end, rye never became an important crop in Colombia. Yet this proposal, a 
chimera though it may have been, was more than simply a minor episode in the history 
of Colombia’s economic development. On the contrary, it sits at the center of a 
fundamental problem Colombia faced at mid-century: how does a country with limited 
financial resources successfully defend itself from predatory trade policies veiled 
behind scientific discourses designed to hinder the achievement of national agricultural 
self-sufficiency goals? More specifically, how does a Latin American country attempting 
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to balance a variety of voices divided over the question of whether wheat should be 
imported or grown nationally respond to discourse emanating from the United States 
attempting to rigidly construct the globe into two zones – the temperate, wheat-
producing (and exporting) countries, and the tropical, wheat-importing ones?  
In the wake of the market disruption caused by the Great Depression and World 
War II, the Colombian state turned away from its previous economic model based on 
export agriculture and instead protected the growing industrial sector through policies 
restricting imports on manufactured consumer goods and some agricultural 
commodities. Wheat was one of the food crops that many Colombians hoped to 
substitute with nationally grown grain.6 At the same time, in the United States, despite 
the Depression and the diversion of resources toward the war effort, wheat production 
had been steadily increasing, due to a combination of accelerated mechanization, use of 
genetically “improved” seeds, application of fertilizers, pesticides and other chemical 
inputs, increased land concentration, and various forms of governmental subsidies.7 By 
1945, although the world apparently faced a global wheat shortage, the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), already looking ahead to a near future when global 
production would increase, worried about maintaining markets for its looming wheat 
surplus. Discouraging countries such as Colombia from developing its own wheat 
production was one of the strategies employed to ensure a steady market.  
                                                 
6 Kalmanovitz and López Enciso, La agricultura colombiana. 
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(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). 
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In this project, scientific discourse readily intersected with economic policy. 
Particularly in the Colombian case, efforts to divide the globe into wheat-exporting and 
importing zones met with a welcome reception by groups opposed to increasing 
national production. Thus, economists combating protectionist policies in general and 
millers who preferred cheaper imported grain over the more expensive national 
product quickly adopted and espoused the idea that a country such as Colombia, 
located in the tropics, was unsuitable for growing wheat. Agronomists, on the other 
hand, tended to dismiss the argument that wheat was a temperate-climate crop and 
insisted that the nation could become self-sufficient in that grain – as long as the 
national government supported the research necessary to develop apt varieties and 
implemented trade and price policies beneficial to the nation’s wheat growers. Hauzeur 
was one of the few agronomists who believed that Colombia could not grow wheat. 
That his was a minority view among his colleagues was evident in the editorial note 
accompanying his article.  
Attempts to construct Colombia as either a wheat producing or non-producing 
country also lie at the center of a problem in the history of science. Currently, North 
American historiography on agronomy in twentieth century Latin America conceives of 
two time periods, with somewhat contradictory themes. The first is the period between 
1870-1930, during the golden age of Latin America’s export-focused economic 
development. Spurred by the desire to increase production, combat pests, and ensure 
standard quality in export crops such as coffee and sugar cane, large-scale landowners 
and planters supported agricultural research and the creation of schools of agronomy. 
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Although agronomists relied on imported scientific knowledge and techniques, they 
interpreted it within their own context, devising what one scholar termed “creole 
science,” focused on finding technical solutions to national agricultural problems 
through basic research on a handful of crops.8 In this period, politicians, planters, and 
agronomists are described as having very different ideas about the role and usefulness 
of science. Politicians believed that it could help solve potentially disastrous economic 
and social problems in the countryside. Planters believed that it could help increase 
production, but needed to be embedded in a variety of other measures such as 
beneficial trade policies and transportation improvements to achieve that goal. 
Scientists ignored rural social and economic problems, and focused, like planters, on 
increasing production, but unlike them, believed that it could be increased through 
science alone.9 Following the Depression-era collapse of the world market (and the 
consequent disruptions in Latin America’s export-led economies), support for 
agricultural research briefly waned and the state called on scientists to help implement 
technical solutions to pressing social problems.10  
The second time period begins roughly in the early 1940s and continues through 
the early 1970s. This era encapsulates the golden age of Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI), an inward-looking economic development policy, which, in some 
contexts, also included Import Substitution Agriculture (ISA). More importantly in this 
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historiography, this was also the era of the Rockefeller Foundation’s heaviest 
involvement in Latin American agronomy. In this period, Latin America’s agronomists 
are described as convinced that agricultural research was only one key to solving their 
nations’ rural problems. They did not see a rigid separation between social and 
scientific issues and battled with the Rockefeller Foundation’s plant breeders who did 
believe that they were separate, and worked hard to impose that rigid view. 
Nevertheless, despite emphasizing research on food crops designed to achieve national 
self-sufficiency, agronomists mostly succeeded in substituting agricultural imports for 
the crops that benefited industrialists or large landowners.11 Some recent work has 
begun to question some of these assumptions, arguing that Mexican agronomists, for 
example, did not differ from their Rockefeller Foundation counterparts in rejecting a 
connection between social and scientific problems in the countryside or that it was the 
Foundation’s agronomists, not Mexican ones, who initially supported open-pollinated 
corn, rather than vice versa, as is usually portrayed.12  
While these recent correctives to the historiography are important, they do not 
go far enough. There are broader problems spanning each of the two periods as they are 
currently defined. One is the assumption that the impulse to develop agricultural 
science in Latin America came in the late nineteenth century from the region’s 
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commodity exporters, who were focused solely on increasing production of their crops. 
This is contradicted by Colombian historiography, which readily demonstrates that, 
while large landowners may have been a driving force in professionalizing agronomy, 
their interest began in the late eighteenth century and was equally as concerned with 
improving production of nationally consumed food items as it was with improving 
production of export crops.13  This continued through the nineteenth century. At the 
inaugural meeting of the Colombian Society of Agriculturists (SAC) in 1878, for 
example, wheat, corn, and potatoes were discussed as much as cotton, sugar, and 
tobacco.14 Moreover, by the 1920s, Colombia’s coffee exporters recognized that, to 
ensure standard quality of their exported beans, programs to improve social conditions 
in the coffee-growing countryside were as important as scientific research.15   
The coffee exporters’ concern with the living conditions of peasant growers 
exemplifies another problem with the historiography on Latin American agronomy. 
The contradiction it paints between late-nineteenth century agronomists unconcerned 
with social conditions and mid-twentieth century agronomists battling the Rockefeller 
Foundation to ensure that those conditions were included in research design and 
                                                 
13 Bejarano, Economía y poder; Bejarano, “Las ciencias agropecuarias hasta mediados del siglo XX,” in Minagricultura 80 
años: La agricultura y las políticas sectoriales, ed. Absalón Machado Cartagena (Bogotá: TM Editores, 1994); Victor 
Manuel Patiño, “Historia de la tecnología agropecuario de Colombia,” in Apuntes para la historia de la ciencia en 
Colombia, ed. Jaime Jaramillo Uribe (Bogotá: Colciencias/Fondo Colombiano de Investigaciones Científicas “Francisco 
José de Caldas”, 1970); John Wilton Appel, “Francisco José de Caldas: A Scientist at Work in Nueva Granada,” 
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 84, no. 5 (1994): 1-154. 
14 Bejarano, Economía y poder; Salvador Camacho Roldán, “La agricultura en Colombia,” in Escritos sobre economía y 
política, ed. Jesús A. Bejarano (Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Cultura, 1976).   
15 Christopher London, “The Cultural Politics of Technical Change in Colombian Coffee Production,” unpublished 
master’s thesis, Cornell University, 1994; Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia, El café en el desarrollo de 
Antioquia: Visión histórica y acción gremial (Medellín: Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Antioquia, 2000). While 
the latter source was written by the Colombian Coffee Growers’ Federation, and was thus designed to portray them 
in a positive light, they still described early extension activities focused on housing and education that clearly 
demonstrate an interest in these issues from early in the twentieth century.  
 80 
dissemination clearly requires explanation – how did such a dramatic shift in social 
awareness occur, if indeed it did? A more likely explanation, and something that the 
contradiction present in the historiography overlooks, is the degree to which both 
tendencies were evident in both periods.16 Agronomists did not suddenly become aware 
of living conditions in rural areas during the Mexican agrarian reform of the 1930s or 
the social unrest throughout the region following the economic disruption of the 
Depression. Issues such as land concentration, rural education, housing, sanitation, 
medical care, and the effects of agricultural policies (or lack thereof) were always 
apparent to agricultural scientists. What the historiography overlooks is the way that 
their willingness to address those issues was situational; in some contexts they 
emphasized the need for social reforms and economic policies to accompany 
implementation of scientific reforms in agricultural production. In other contexts, they 
focused solely on science. Economic policies, in general, were often emphasized or 
ignored, depending on the context. The example of Hauzeur’s promotion of rye in 1945 
provides a perfect illustration: when he claimed that the growing conditions for wheat 
in the United States and Argentina were so propitious that they sometimes led to 
overproduction, he completely ignored the economic policies in those countries, 
particularly the U.S., that encouraged and allowed such overproduction to occur in the 
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first place. But, for the purposes of his argument that Colombia should grow rye, this 
erasure made perfect sense. 
Erasing or purposefully overlooking certain issues depending on contextual 
exigencies describes, to some degree, the final problem with the historiography on Latin 
American agronomy. An interesting paradox lies at its core. Scholars often accuse Latin 
American agronomists of perpetuating racist or class-based stereotypes, in order to 
validate their work and secure resources for research and extension activities. This is 
true even for the agronomists who incorporated social and economic issues into their 
work. Thus, peasant producers were described as “backward,” “pre-modern,” or 
“traditional” in comparison to “rational” and “modern” agronomists.17 But, those very 
same agronomists were themselves often considered “backward” by North American or 
European scientists. Their research institutions were described as “immature” and their 
methods broadly criticized: too much emphasis on social and economic aspects of 
agriculture, rather than on biology and chemistry; lack of interest in conducting 
research on experimental farms (in other words, they didn’t want to get their hands 
dirty and were focused on theory rather than empiricism); inattention to experimental 
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design, and preference for observation over statistical analysis.18 In many cases, Latin 
American agronomists themselves made such criticisms, suggesting that they had 
internalized the discourse that cast them in a subordinate role within the global 
scientific community. 
Thus, agricultural scientists in Latin American contexts occupied an intermediate 
space in which they were simultaneously “modern,” and “pre-modern.” Largely 
Catholic, speakers of a Western European language, inheritors of both Enlightenment-
era efforts to organize economies based on scientific rationality and the same Greco-
Roman political practices adopted by their northern neighbor, these agronomists were 
firmly part of “the West” and unlike their counterparts in India or China, had little need 
to reconcile their own scientific and spiritual traditions with the very different ones of a 
contemporary colonial power.19 Nevertheless, for centuries they had been stigmatized, 
first by western Europeans (both Iberian and non-Iberian), and later by North 
Americans, as a lesser partner in the community of people or nations that comprised 
Western civilization.20 Adding force to this, by the end of the nineteenth century, they 
were embedded in the global economy in a subordinate role – suppliers of raw mineral 
and agricultural materials, consumers of more expensive manufactured goods and 
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subject to a variety of neo-colonial attempts to secure continued control over raw 
materials and consumers.21  
Unfortunately, the intermediate space that these Latin American agricultural 
scientists historically occupied is reproduced in contemporary historiography. While 
emphasizing their concern for the social and economic issues of agricultural production 
is essential to understanding the history of agricultural sciences in Latin America, 
especially considering how much those concerns were present in their work, the way 
that this is often done – by pitting socially-focused Latin American agronomists against 
strictly scientifically-focused agronomists from the Rockefeller Foundation – 
reconstructs the “pre-modern”/“modern” dichotomy.22 Recent work has challenged 
that and begun to recover the shared goals of RF and Latin American agronomists, by 
focusing on institution building, struggles for recognition as important contributors to 
national development, and the continuity between agricultural research methods before 
and after the Rockefeller Foundation arrived.23 But while commendable, by not 
examining the work Latin American agronomists produced, these approaches fail to 
fully break down the pre-modern/modern dichotomy. In recent decades historians of 
science and technology focusing on western Europe and the United States have 
demonstrated the myriad ways that science can no longer be considered a coherent and 
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universal body of knowledge, but rather, a mix of various forms of local knowledge 
emerging from a particular social, cultural, and economic context. By examining 
scientists’ work, contemporary historians have readily demonstrated the presence of 
social issues in seemingly “objective” and “universal” scientific knowledge. To 
overcome the pre-modern/modern trap in which Latin America’s agronomists find 
themselves, their scientific production must be considered as well.24  
Research on the viability of wheat production in mid-twentieth century 
Colombia readily demonstrates the importance of such an approach. As Grace Shen 
noted in her examination of the relationship between “universal” and local knowledge: 
“What is interesting to me about science in modern China is how something so 
knowingly adopted from foreign models became so entwined in the Chinese quest for 
self-determination.”25 In the Colombian case, agronomists studying the possibilities for 
wheat production in the late 1940s and early 1950s were on a quest for self-
determination of a different sort, in two ways: 1) recognition of their important place in 
national economic development planning; and 2) demonstration of Colombia’s ability 
to become a self-sufficient nation. While governmental institutions and resources 
supported their work, agronomists were still often ignored when policy decisions were 
officially enacted or put into practice. Engineers were already widely regarded as 
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experts in the Colombian context, and contemporary scholars have examined their role 
in infrastructural and industrial development from a variety of perspectives.26 Very little 
work has been done on agronomists, on the other hand.27 Yet, they matter for more 
reasons than the need to simply fill in a gaping hole in the historiography. 
Enmeshed in a volatile political context, with intensely acrimonious partisan 
conflict at the national level echoed in violent manifestations in the countryside, the 
struggle of Colombia’s agronomists transcended national borders.28 On one hand, they 
battled powerful national interests who preferred imported wheat to domestically 
grown. On the other, they combated U.S. economic power, manifested in attempts to 
dominate the wheat markets of developing countries, partly by disparaging efforts to 
achieve self-sufficiency. The site of both fronts was their research. Adapting U.S. 
agricultural research on wheat and other crops, they conducted experiments and 
reported results that simultaneously demonstrated their expertise and clamored for 
independence from U.S. economic power.  
The following section outlines agronomists’ struggle for recognition as experts, 
manifested both in efforts to police the boundaries of their profession and in conflicts 
with governmental ministers and milling interests. The subsequent section examines 
the international context, demonstrating how the unstable global wheat market 
manifested itself in imperialistic attempts to control Colombia’s wheat market. Finally, 
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the last section looks at the response of Colombia’s agronomists to this imperial 
discourse, a response centered on the issue of wheat varieties and their adaptability to 
widely divergent soil and climate conditions.  
 
“Wheat Growers on an Industrial Scale”: Agronomy, Imports and Political Pressure 
 Colombian agronomists often divide the national history of their profession into 
two eras – “pre- and post-Rockefeller.” Referring to the establishment in 1950 of a 
cooperative program between the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, they claim that prior to the arrival of the Foundation-affiliated North 
American agronomists, agricultural science in Colombia was almost entirely theoretical, 
involving very little experimentation, field work, or soiling of one’s hands.29 
Surprisingly, this criticism is much sharper than any made by the Rockefeller 
Foundation, which generally assessed agronomy in Colombia positively, even before it 
established its cooperative program with the Ministry of Agriculture.30 Indeed, while it 
is highly likely that the pace of field research dramatically increased once the infusion 
of capital that accompanied the establishment of the cooperative program made such 
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work easier to conduct and maintain over the long-term, 1950 hardly marked the first 
time such hands-on research had been conducted in the fields of Colombia’s 
agricultural experiment stations. The Palmira experimental station was established near 
Cali in 1913, the Picota experimental farm near Bogotá in 1915, and the Juan de Dios 
Carrasquilla Tropical Experiment Station near present-day Armero in Tolima in 1917. 
Most of these operated sporadically over the next fifteen years. Palmira, for example, 
did not begin to systematically conduct experimental research on sugar cane, tobacco, 
tropical fruits, and pasture grasses until 1926. Other stations and experimental farms 
were established throughout the country; some never functioned fully, others survive in 
some form to the present day. Sporadic efforts eventually gave way to more formally 
organized initiatives. Law 132 of 1931 stipulated that promoting agricultural research 
and training was a function of the state and experimentation subsequently began in 
greater earnest at the various stations scattered throughout the country.31 
 Indeed, one of the most widely cultivated varieties of wheat in Colombia at the 
time that the Rockefeller Foundation agronomists arrived in 1950 was the result of 
research and experimentation done at the Picota farm near Bogotá in the 1930s. 
Researchers used essentially the same steps that the RF agronomists would later utilize 
and promote after they arrived: “native” varieties were chosen from farmers’ fields for 
characteristics such as yield and resistance to pests, they were taken to the laboratory 
for further study then re-planted under carefully controlled conditions on the grounds 
of the experimental farm. Varieties that performed well in the initial observations were 
                                                 
31 Bejarano, “Las ciencias agropecuarias”; Patiño, “Historia de la tecnología agropecuario.” 
 88 
selected and planted on a larger scale the following growing season for further 
observations, and so on for several years, until eventually, the variety Bola Picota was 
deemed “pure” and released commercially, promoted as the most apt for Colombia’s 
growing conditions. Colombian agronomists did not consider their work to be done at 
that point, however, as they then began to turn their attention to crossing Bola Picota 
with other varieties in order to create “improved” varieties with even higher yield or 
greater resistance to the pests that plagued the countryside.32  
 Moreover, in the years immediately preceding the arrival of the RF scientists, 
Colombia’s agronomists were already deeply committed to the professionalization of 
their field, a process that included efforts to ensure that the experiments on which they 
based their conclusions were properly conducted and analyzed. The pages of 
Agricultura Tropical served as a vehicle for policing the boundaries of their field and the 
quality of the work of the nation’s agronomists. In September 1945, for example, 
Gervasio Obregón published a study of the effect of densely planted fields of wheat on 
yield and resistance to disease.33 Two months later, the journal published a two-page 
commentary on the study penned by Fernando Súarez de Castro, one of Colombia’s 
most well-known agronomists. Súarez strongly criticized two elements of Obregón’s 
work: the size of the test plots and the fact that he had not done any replications. He 
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pointed out that while most experimenters recommended that the size of test plots be 
approximately one hundred square meters, Obregón had used test plots that were only 
nine square meters. Súarez questioned how representative Obregón’s results could be 
with such a small test plot. Similarly, he pointed out that all agricultural experiments 
were influenced by three factors: differences between test samples, the heterogeneity of 
soils, and annual weather fluctuations. Without replications, it was impossible to 
determine if the results achieved were applicable across time and space, or if they were 
merely flukes, characteristic of only that sample of seeds, on that spot of soil, under the 
particular weather conditions the year that they were grown.34  
 Súarez concluded his commentary by subtly chiding Obregón for ignoring the 
basic tenets of modern agricultural experimentation, pointing out that it was “an exact 
science far removed from ancient empiricism.” His subsequent criticism of poor 
scientific methods exemplify how ACIA’s agronomists utilized the pages of Agricultura 
Tropical to police the boundaries of the profession and exclude work that did not meet 
their specifications: 
“With the recent advances in statistical analysis of results and in the 
technology that can be used to obtain them, it is necessary that whoever 
dedicates himself to the demanding field of agronomy possesses not only 
magnificent observational skills and profound knowledge of the particular 
crop that he wishes to study, but also to be aware of all of the techniques 
developed by modern researchers and put in general use at the experiment 
stations in advanced countries.”35  
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At stake in protecting professional boundaries was the legitimacy of the profession in 
the eyes of policy-makers, state and private institutions, and the general public. Súarez 
argued that if shoddy research became the norm, the profession would never earn the 
respect of the public and agronomists would never play a role in the nation’s 
development: “the scientist…should not allow himself to commit serious errors in his 
recommendations. Such behavior is the origin of the loss of confidence in his work on 
the part of the very people who it is designed to benefit.”36  
Súarez was not alone in his desire to protect the reputation of the emergent 
profession and ensure that its practitioners were taken seriously. In previous decades, 
professionals in other fields, such as engineering, had succeeded in attaining status as 
experts capable of solving a variety of the nation’s infrastructural and industrial 
development problems.37 Agronomists, on the other hand, did not yet enjoy such status 
when it came to issues related to rural development. Lawyers had pride of place in that 
arena of public policy, since much of the nation’s agricultural problems were 
understood in legal terms, focusing almost exclusively on land tenure. Engineers played 
a role in that area as well, being that cadastral surveys went hand-in-hand with efforts 
to sort out messy land titles. The centrality of land tenure to agricultural development 
questions is evidenced in the political nature of the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
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consequent instability in leadership of related institutions. This both reflected and 
affected the ability of the nation’s agronomists to make an impact on agricultural 
development. In the ten years between 1938 and 1948, for example, six different people 
had been in charge of the wheat-breeding program at the Picota farm near Bogotá.38 
Evidently, the expertise of the nation’s agronomists was not yet widely considered of 
consequence. 
Luís Hernando Correa Cancino lamented this in his 1948 master’s thesis at the 
Faculty of Agronomy at the Medellín branch of the National University.  One of his five 
chapters about wheat production in a cold-climate region of the department of Valle 
was almost entirely a bitter protestation of the way that politics took center stage in 
formulating rural development policies, while agronomy was relegated to the sidelines, 
or worse still – ignored completely. Sadly, Correa asserted, this meant that most of the 
development projects government officials attempted to implement failed miserably. 
Rather than recognize that more careful attention to technical details and consultations 
with experts such as the nation’s agronomists would ensure success in the future, 
however, factional forces politicized the failures. That was the easier path, Correa 
argued, but one that the nation’s agronomists naturally avoided: “…today’s Agronomic 
Engineer will not unconsciously join that group of malcontents and pessimists who 
believe that our agriculture will always be rudimentary.”  Instead, the nation’s 
agronomists would be the ones who would lead the country’s rural areas out of 
poverty, misery and insufficient levels of production. Of course, they could only do this 
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if they were taken seriously and Correa lamented that so much of what passed for 
“expertise” in agricultural questions was based on poor scientific foundations:  
It is the agronomist’s right to have the last word in agriculturally oriented 
questions, in order to help the Government and the private sector in the 
unceasing efforts to rescue the poor farmer from his prostrate situation. Up 
until now, what else has been the principal work of the profession of 
agronomy other than an open struggle against incomprehension, negativity 
and secular ignorance?39 
 
The assertion of “rights” assumed a level of acceptance as an expert that was not 
yet widely diffused through Colombian society. No one understood this better than 
Jorge Ortíz Méndez, Director of the Ministry of Agriculture during the presidential 
administration of Mariano Ospina Pérez (1946-1950) and very briefly during that of his 
successor, Laureano Gómez (1950-1953). A Conservative from the department of 
Antioquia, Ospina Pérez was the son of Tulio Ospina Vasquez, one of Colombia’s most 
reknown engineers, who had studied “Agricultural Chemistry” in France in the 1870s 
and had been a founder and director of Medellín’s National School of Mines.40 Ospina 
Pérez thus grew up in an environment in which science and technology were revered 
and considered essential to economic and social progress.41 That he inherited his 
father’s enthusiasm for science in general, and agricultural science in particular, was 
evident in his work as founding member and later president of the National Coffee 
Growers’ Federation (Federación Nacional de Cafeteros – FEDECAFE), which was 
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dedicated to ensuring high quality in Colombia’s coffee exports.42 His commitment to 
agricultural modernization via the path of science is particularly evident in his creation 
of the Ministry of Agriculture during his first year of office in 1946. Moreover, in 1947 
during his second year as president, Ospina Pérez initiated talks with the Rockefeller 
Foundation to establish a cooperative program on agricultural science, talks which 
culminated in late 1949 with an agreement between the Foundation and the Colombian 
government.43 As Director of the Ministry of Agriculture toward the end of Ospina 
Pérez’ administration, Jorge Ortíz Mendéz played an important role in those 
negotiations.  
For the first half-year of its operation, the collaborative program, initially known 
as the Colombian Agricultural Program (CAP), enjoyed the broad support of the 
president and the Ministry of Agriculture. However, once the new presidential 
administration of Laureano Gómez began, the program started to experience some 
snags. Although they were both from the Conservative Party, Gómez and Ospina Pérez 
had a politically contentious relationship, partly resulting from the intra-party conflict 
in 1946, that had awarded the presidential candidacy to Ospina Pérez. Moreover, 
Gómez had a long-standing antipathy to the United States, stemming from resentment 
over its role in Panamanian independence and the building of the canal, resentment that 
was rekindled around the country in the 1920s – when Gómez was still a young man – 
after Colombia and the United States finally negotiated an indemnity in compensation 
for Colombia’s loss of Panama. Since that time, Gómez had been deeply suspicious of 
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the United States and bitterly opposed to its presence in a variety of forms in Colombia. 
Although his position did dramatically soften during his administration – he quickly 
became an ally of the U.S. during the Korea War, sending a Colombian battalion to the 
peninsula, the only Latin American country to do so – this was complicated by his 
concerns about Colombia’s racial composition. Along with other young Conservatives 
in the 1920s, Gómez had responded to the discourse of eugenics emanating from 
Europe and the United States by declaring in a 1928 speech that the blame for 
Colombia’s “backwardness” could be laid at the feet of its indigenous people, an 
inferior racial group.44 Thus, his antipathy toward the United States was complicated by 
an admiration for what he perceived as “racial superiority.” This ambiguity apparently 
pervaded his entire cabinet, evident in the words and actions of his Minister of 
Agriculture, particularly in regards to the Rockefeller Foundation.45   
As Ortíz Mendéz asserted in October 1950, Alejandro Angel Escobar apparently 
had very little regard for the governmental entity he had taken charge of in August: 
Your honor came to this Ministry totally convinced that it is completely 
disorganized, that its personnel are untrained and incompetent, that the 
only thing that exists here is excessive bureaucracy, and that one or two of 
the technical people may be capable, but they are not offering any benefit to 
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the country. Almost all of my work these past two months has been 
reduced to trying to rectify these concepts.46  
 
Ten pages of complaints followed that paragraph. One of the most important 
was the Minister’s response to Ortíz’ August request for funding so that several of 
Colombia’s plant disease specialists could attend a meeting of Latin American 
agronomists in Mexico in September, a meeting sponsored by the Rockefeller 
Foundation. His bitterness over the Minister’s reaction was still evident two months 
later: 
The response you gave me regarding the value of this conference is not 
appropriate to transcribe in this letter. At best, your opinion of the 
conference is that it was nothing more than a vacation and a gathering of 
friends who prefer tourism to work. You did not want to believe in the 
seriousness and careful attention that the Rockefeller Foundation gives to 
these questions or that institution’s particular interest in the attendance of 
our specialists at that scientific meeting.47 
 
This seemed particularly egregious to Ortíz, considering that for him, the very 
presence of the Rockefeller Foundation in the country demonstrated how far Colombia 
had advanced in agricultural research. Noting that the Foundation surely chose to come 
to Colombia rather than any other South American country because it found “adequate 
facilities and personnel” there, he asked, “Is it even possible to calculate the 
transcendence of the fact that we have achieved that Institution’s collaboration?”48 
Apparently, however, the value of scientific research was lost on the Minister:  
You maintain publicly and privately that nothing is being done here, that 
this is all a waste, and that the labor of this bureaucratic train isn’t going 
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anywhere at all. Perhaps what’s going on is that you don’t want to accept 
that the Ministry of Agriculture is charged with carrying out an eminently 
technical function because you don’t trust technicians or you feel 
animadversion toward scientific questions for reasons unknown to me. In 
addition, you have also confused public administration and the activities 
corresponding to the state with the ones for which the private sector is 
responsible. I clearly remember once when you said to me: ‘how is it 
possible that I, on my farm, produce more than two thousand liters of milk 
a day with only 15 or 16 farmhands, while Picota has many more workers 
and yet barely produces ten liters?’49  
 
It seems incredulous that a new Minister of Agriculture – even one with a background 
in law and economics, as Angel had – could be so ignorant of the purpose of an 
agricultural experiment station.50 Apparently, he was, as Ortíz felt it necessary to give 
Angel a short history of all the agricultural advances Colombia had made over in recent 
years, especially under the administration of Ospina Pérez. Among them was the 
creation of the very ministry that Angel now headed. Research at the agricultural 
stations, such as the one that Angel disparaged, had also made great strides, as Ortíz 
pointed out: “Isn’t it true that the wheat varieties cultivated today in Cundinamarca 
and Boyacá are products of the work done at the ‘Francisco José de Caldas Agricultural 
Station,’ formerly called ‘La Picota?’”51  
Ortíz also complained that politics had begun to divide the ministry and this 
greatly inhibited its scientific and bureaucratic work. The problems that had emerged in 
just two short months were so severe, in fact, that Ortíz had decided to resign, his 
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October letter serving as notice of his intentions, as well as a record of his reasons why. 
As he complained resignedly:  
There are problems of extreme importance in the country’s economic life 
and [many are] particularly crucial for our agricultural development, which 
I have tried to explain to you several times, and always fail in my attempts: 
these include wheat, lard, tobacco, rice, barley, sugar cane molasses, and 
chocolate. I would have to fill many more pages if I continued discussing 
here all the problems that are not being considered, but it seems useless to 
continue with these details because it’s wearing me out.52 
 
Ortiz’ resignation letter offers a poignant example of the struggle of the nation’s 
agronomists to gain the power to truly impact the nation’s economic development, 
especially in the polarized political context prevalent in Colombia at the time. 
Agronomists were quite aware, however, particularly because of the reigning political 
polarization, that science alone was insufficient to achieve their goals of self-sufficiency 
in staple food crops, especially wheat. Just six months later, another resignation letter 
reiterated how politics infused all the Ministries and affected national agriculture. 
Joaquín Ospina Ortíz was the Director of the National Price Control Office, an agency of 
the Ministry of Economic Development, charged with regulating prices for basic goods. 
In September 1950 he worked together with the Ministry of Development and the 
Agricultural Products Defense Corporation (INA) to devise an agreement that would 
address the nation’s wheat shortage. INA oversaw the importation and national 
distribution of essential food items, such as wheat. The September agreement came on 
the heels of a disastrous growing season, with excessive rain and low temperatures, 
leading to a serious domestic wheat shortage. To prevent complete financial ruin for 
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farmers, the agreement authorized an increase in the price of grain for sale to the 
nation’s millers, to take effect immediately. The agreement did not include a 
corresponding price increase on imported wheat. Ospina Ortíz lamented the chaos this 
caused – the price of domestic wheat was thirty pesos more per hectoliter than 
imported. As he considered the former an inferior product to the latter, this made no 
economic sense, and was particularly onerous for millers on the Atlantic coast, once the 
high transportation costs from the interior were added. Speculation with scarce 
imported and domestic wheat resulted. The National Price Control Office believed that 
increasing wheat imports would help to alleviate the situation, but only if the price of 
domestic wheat was reduced. It had no power to regulate how much or at what price 
wheat was imported, however. Only INA could do that. Ospina Ortíz complained that 
he had urged the Minister of Economic Development to sign the resolution authorizing 
the price increase under the assumption that shipments of imported wheat would be 
imminent, and would thus help to keep the market stable. The Minister of Agriculture, 
Angel Escobar, who had to sign off on import licenses before INA could purchase 
wheat from foreign suppliers, refused to do so, arguing that it would be detrimental to 
the nation’s wheat farmers. Ospina Ortíz outlined a continuing pattern of similar cases 
involving a variety of other items, such as rice and beef (due to an outbreak of foot-and-
mouth disease). He hinted that political considerations challenged his ability to keep 
prices stable and avoid (and certainly not exacerbate) chaos in the market. He finally 
gave up when he heard rumors that oversight of the National Price Control Office was 
going to pass from the Ministry of Economic Development to Agriculture. As he 
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informed President Gómez in his resignation letter, “owing to doctrinal reasons, I am 
not willing to collaborate with the Minister in charge there.”53  
Gómez’ shift from strong opposition to U.S. participation in the Colombian 
economy prior to assuming the presidency, to a more pragmatic position once in office, 
partly accounts for the confusion over import policies from one Ministry to another.54 
Pressure from competing interest groups was equally as important. Wheat growers’ 
demands for protectionist policies have been well documented (sometimes in quite 
disparaging terms) by several of Colombia’s economic historians.55 Less well-known is 
the demands made by the nation’s millers for increased wheat importation, particularly 
millers on the Atlantic coast, far from the central highlands where Colombia’s wheat 
was grown.56 As Raúl Varela Martínez, one of Colombia’s most well-respected 
agronomists, pointed out later that year, in 1950, Colombia imported over 40,000,000 
kilos of grain valuing more than eight million pesos. This grain was then ground into 
flour at milling companies located in Barranquilla, Cali, and Cartagena. Lamenting the 
location of those millers, Varela Martínez argued that if they were all located in the 
highlands, then wheat production there would receive a massive boost:  
…there would be no need to import wheat, being that these [milling] 
companies, together with the ones that already exist in th[e highlands], of 
which more than 96 are large capacity, would be responsible for making 
                                                 
53 AGN, Colección Rojas Pinilla, Despacho Sr. Presidente, Ministerio de Fomento – Decreto, Box 84, Folder 20, 1-4, 4. 
54 Sáenz Rovner, Colombia años 50. 
55 While Bejarano describes wheat growers’ calls for protection in sympathetic terms, Kalmanovitz and López blame 
much of Colombia’s poor economic development in the latter half of the twentieth century on the protectionist 
measures implemented in favor of the nation’s cereal growers.  See Bejarano, Economía y poder; Kalmanovitz and 
López, La agricultura colombiana, 193. 
56 Studies examining industrialists’ calls for free importation of raw materials for manufacturing generally focus on 
the powerful National Association of Industrialists, based in Medellín and centered largely around the textile 
industry. See, for example, Bejarano, Economía y poder; Sáenz Rovner, Colombia años 50; Eduardo Sáenz Rovner, La 
ofensiva empresarial: Industriales, políticos y violencia en los años 40 en Colombia (Bogotá: Grupo TM, S.A., 2007).  
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farmers cultivate wheat on a larger scale, using modern technology, 
mechanization, and fertilizer. Thus, the large landowners in the cold, flat 
highlands would become wheat growers on an industrial scale.57  
 
Varela Martínez clearly believed that the nation’s agronomists could reduce or 
eliminate Colombia’s dependence on imported wheat. The earlier part of his article, in 
fact, was an extended commendation of the agronomists at the Picota experimental 
station who had developed Bola Picota as well as the new collaboration between the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Rockefeller Foundation. His praise echoes the words of 
other agronomists struggling to secure a central place for their profession in national 
economic development. The science that would create apt varieties was not in doubt, 
even in the face of powerful opposition arguing that Colombia could not successfully 
grow wheat on a large scale because it simply did not have the right soil and climate 
conditions. What was lacking, as these agronomists saw it, was not scientific 
knowledge, rich soils, or sufficiently high temperatures. On the contrary, what the 
country lacked was the political will. As long as cheaper imports were freely available, 
millers on the coast had no incentive to use domestically grown grain.  
Of course, Colombia’s wheat promoters in the late 1940s and early 1950s faced 
more than domestic obstacles to achieving their goals. The volatile global wheat market 
during and after World War II had left the United States scrambling to secure steady 
customers for the massive quantities it produced. The next section describes that market 
and the effects it would have on how Colombia’s agronomists went about their work to 
promote domestic wheat production.  
                                                 
57 Raúl Varela Martínez, “La importancia económica del cultivo del trigo,” Almanaque Creditario 8 (1951): 83-85, 85. 
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“A Vain Effort to Become Self-Sufficient”: Shortages, Complementary Crops, and the 
Global Wheat Market During and After World War II 
 
Global food shortages and scarcity during and after World War II were without a 
doubt serious problems for the populations who lived through them and undeniably 
based in the concrete reality of devastated agricultural production in much of Europe 
and Asia. When economists, government planners, farmers, and hungry citizens around 
the world spoke of “shortages,” they were not merely speaking discursively or 
inventing a way of understanding the globe that separated it into agriculturally 
“developed” and “underdeveloped” regions. Nevertheless, there are nuances to those 
“shortages” and some of what passed for “scarcity” was actually constructed out of 
political and economic imperatives that had little to do with the lack of food and much 
more to do with attempts to create or monopolize export markets or take advantage of 
high grain prices in the post-war period. Consider, for example, the different post-war 
policies of four of the five major wheat producing and exporting countries at the time. 
Government monopolies in Canada and Australia controlled the domestic purchase and 
foreign sales of wheat, and in both cases, those monopolies sold it on the global market 
at the high rates that scarcity created, while returning to farmers only the lower price at 
which it was sold domestically, keeping the difference for government coffers. This, in 
turn, led wheat farmers in those countries to decrease plantings and turn to other, more 
profitable crops, and thus, further decrease the global supply. Policies that 
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discriminated against agricultural production in Argentina while promoting industrial 
development, along with depletion of the soil in wheat-growing areas and the 
abandonment of the countryside by rural workers and small land-owners, all served to 
decrease the amount of grain produced there as well. Only in the United States did 
wheat production increase during this period, largely due to the government pricing 
policy that passed to farmers the high profits generated from foreign sales. High profits 
thus motivated farmers to increase the amount of wheat plantings, which in some cases, 
such as in Kansas, meant conversion of cornfields to wheat. Thus, while wheat 
“shortages” were undeniably partly a result of devastated agricultural fields in Europe 
and Asia, the deterioration of farm equipment during the war years partially caused by 
diversion of resources to the war effort, and the decline of rural populations as a result 
of the national conflicts, there were also policies in effect in some places that served to 
either heighten the shortage in order to earn higher profits for the government or to 
take advantage of the artificially higher shortages those policies helped create by 
producing higher quantities and monopolizing the wheat market.58 
Beyond that, there were other ways in which the language of “shortage” was 
used to conceal the economic interests of exporting countries, particularly the United 
States. In 1946, for example, the Food Supply Division of the Institute of Inter-American 
                                                 
58 Helen C. Farnsworth, “International Wheat Agreements and Problems, 1949-56,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
70 (May 1956): 217-248; Daniel Lewis, “Internal and External Convergence: The Collapse of Argentine Grain 
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California Press, 1994); Nordin and Scott, From Prairie Farmer to Entrepreneur. The fifth major producer was Russia, 
but its wheat was generally consumed nationally and it did not participate in any of the international wheat 
agreements signed in those years and its presence beyond the markets within its sphere of influence was minimal. 
See, “World Wheat Production,” The Wheat Situation, bulletin of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, USDA, 
(hereafter WS) no. 98, (February 1947): 1.  
 103 
Affairs sent a representative to Peru for a “two-months’ study of the current milling and 
baking crisis” there.59 The Institute was founded in 1942 and empowered to “execute 
cooperative agreements with the other American Republics to alleviate war-caused food 
shortages and provide measures of continued long-term agricultural improvement.”60 
The meaning of “shortage” in this report, however, did not refer simply to the lack of 
grain.61 Peru’s problems were initially described as similar to those of other nations: 
“there is less wheat per capita available now than previously” and this meant that both 
the quantity and quality of bread diminished while the price rose.62 As the report 
continued in greater depth, however, Peru’s wheat problems were described less in 
terms of how shortages caused widespread hunger or malnutrition, and instead of how 
the low supply of hard wheat varieties had negative effects on the nation’s milling and 
baking industries. Millers and bakers had “little or no opportunity to select the wheat” 
that was purchased and although “Peru” was the entity that was “forced to accept 
[wheat] from wherever it [was] obtainable,” the consequences were felt most strongly 
not from a nutritional standpoint, but rather from “milling and baking standpoints.”63 
That this was a problem for industrial interests that preferred hard over soft wheat 
                                                 
59 J.A. Shellenberger, “The Milling and Baking Industries of Peru: Report to the Servicio Cooperativo Inter-Americano 
de Producción de Alimentos,” Lima Peru, 1946 (Washington: Food Supply Division, The Institute of Inter-American 
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60 Ibid., inside cover. 
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with the unequivocal statement that “a food crisis exists throughout the world as a direct result of the 
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inadequate “purchasing power.” Ibid., 1. 
62 Ibid., 1. 
63 Ibid., 3. 
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varieties rather than a problem for Peruvians in general was evident in the subsequent 
discussion of the “desirability” of “better than average wheat quality” for making long-
extraction flour – the kind generally used in large-scale industrial baking.64 “Better than 
average” in this case, meant hard varieties. The report argued that the reason none of 
Peru’s mills were producing “uniform-quality flour,” was the inconsistent availability 
of hard wheat: “the mills may find themselves milling strong Canadian wheat one week 
and soft Pacific Coast wheat the next.”65 Thus, as described by the Institute of Inter-
American Affairs, “shortage” in Peru was not a problem of starvation, but rather a 
problem of industrial production.  
It was also trouble for U.S. wheat exporters – at least some of them. Throughout 
the report, soft wheat from the Pacific coast was consistently disparaged with 
descriptions such as “irregular in quality.”66 Preferable was the hard wheat shipped 
from the Gulf Ports, which meant that it had most likely been grown in one of the lower 
Plains states.67  It was there, in the Plains, not Peru, that the “shortage” problem dealt its 
most serious blow. Most of the hard wheat produced in the lower Plains states was 
either being consumed in the U.S. or sent to Europe, leaving little available for shipment 
to foreign customers, such as Peruvian millers, and thus preventing wheat growers 
there from taking advantage of higher global prices. This also gave Pacific wheat 
                                                 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 9. 
66 Ibid., 3. 
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growers the opportunity to strengthen their foreign customer base and position 
themselves to better compete with Plains growers once the post-war crisis in Europe 
had subsided. The report’s author was well aware of this aspect of the “shortage” 
problem – he was Head of the Department of Milling Industry at Kansas State College 
and Senior Chemist at the Kansas Agricultural Experimental Station, “in charge of the 
Hard Winter Wheat Quality Laboratory” there.68 His connection with Kansan wheat 
growers and millers is apparent in his assessment of Peru’s “shortage” and tinged his 
final recommendations for solving this supposed problem. The second item on his list 
of recommendations, for example, was that flour in Peru be made only with “clean” 
rather than “dirty” wheat, euphemisms for “hard” and “soft.”69 Considering the low 
supply of hard varieties at the time, enacting this recommendation would have 
decreased, rather than increased, the amount of wheat available in Peru, making the 
goal behind the recommendation more evident: increase prices for Gulf Port wheat and 
prevent Pacific wheat growers from developing a customer base there. The Institute’s 
report thus provides a clear example of how the term “shortage” was sometimes used 
to mask economic imperatives rather than describe the low amount of wheat available 
globally at the time.  
Indeed, by early 1947, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) was 
already seeing signs of recovery in production around the world and expected imports 
to decrease, at the same time as record harvests in the U.S. and substantial increases in 
                                                 
68 Ibid., i.  
69 Ibid., 19. Soft wheat was described as “dirty” because its softer kernel was ill-suited to industrial milling processes, 
shattering rather than cracking, as hard varieties did, and thus, allowing more of the bran and germ to remain in the 
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Canada and Australia were forecast.70 Although foreign demand was likely to remain 
high for some time, it was clear that would not go on forever.71 The USDA fretted over 
how to ensure that the U.S. remained dominant in the world wheat market.72 Initial 
strategies, focused on keeping prices high despite increased supply, included holding 
wheat back from the global market and eliminating price supports for farmers.73 But 
this was unsustainable over the long term. With European recovery advancing steadily, 
the U.S. would find itself with reduced export demand precisely at the time that the 
increased plantings inspired by high prices would come to market.74 Moreover, 
attempting to keep prices on the global market artificially high despite increased supply 
would eventually have the long-term effect of further encouraging domestic production 
in importing countries and “reduc[ing] their demand for imported wheat in the years to 
come.”75  
A more long-term method of preventing that outcome was to focus on the 
amount of foreign exchange available to potential importers. With expanded trade, 
countries around the world would have more capacity to purchase U.S. wheat, and the 
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price factor would be mitigated to some degree: “Limited foreign exchange in many 
countries will restrict expenditures to the most essential food imports, particularly 
bread grains. Financing of imports will be increasingly difficult for many countries until 
their exports begin to recover.”76 The export capacity of other countries was thus the 
key to solving the long-term problem of managing record production in the U.S. and 
the imminent drop in demand:  
As an exporting country, the U.S. has a strong interest in a large volume of 
international trade in wheat. [Thus], it will be necessary (1) for war-
devastated countries to get back on their economic feet so that their exports 
will be sufficient to allow them to import wheat, and (2) for more backward 
countries to build up production and increase their exports so that they can 
buy from the U.S.77 
 
Over the long term, the USDA imagined that a more effective strategy was to 
focus on markets outside of Europe. Although noting that rice production in China and 
India would likely rise substantially in the coming years, for example, this was offset by 
the fact that their populations had grown considerably and would likely continue to do 
so. Hence, demand for wheat would likely remain high also. The problem, thus, was 
one of insufficient foreign exchange. Improving the ability of developing nations to 
export products to the United States, and thereby increasing their foreign currency 
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holdings, could help the U.S. ensure a steady market for its surplus wheat. As the 
USDA indicated:  
Financial aid to needy countries, permitting the purchase of food, will help 
wheat exports. Loans by the Export-Import Bank and the International 
Bank are made primarily for the purchase of services and nonfarm goods. 
But, some aid to agricultural trade would arise indirectly if these loans 
released other funds.78  
 
In other words, providing loans to purchase much-desired materials to help develop 
industrial enterprises would increase the amount of foreign exchange available to 
purchase wheat.79  
Another strategy for ensuring a steady market for U.S. wheat in developing 
countries was the promotion of “complementary crops.” This was an effort that 
preceded U.S participation in World War II, having begun in 1939 with legislation 
designed to foster cooperation between agricultural scientists in the U.S. and Latin 
America. It received a boost after Truman’s inaugural speech in 1949, the famous “Four 
Point Speech,” which exhorted U.S. citizens to share their scientific and technical 
knowledge in order to help underdeveloped nations. Although the purpose behind this 
technical cooperation was to help “people raise their levels of living,” this was not 
defined in terms of increasing nationally produced food supplies, but rather as 
“assisting a number of Latin American countries to develop their great natural 
resources, and thus helping them to increase their export trade and stabilize their 
economies.” Rubber, fibers, coffee, cacao, tea, and medicinal plants were some of the 
                                                 
78 “Exports Will be Large,” op. cit. 
79 One can easily see in such statements the germ of the impetus to establish the Public Law 480 Food Assistance 
Program in 1954, which offered U.S. surplus crops to developing nations, payable in national currencies rather than 
in dollars.  
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crops that U.S.D.A. technicians were working cooperatively on improving in several 
Latin American countries, clearly demonstrating the export-focused model of 
agricultural development at the heart of this effort. Helping stabilize Latin American 
economies was, ultimately, however, a peripheral goal to the central purpose of the 
program, which was to ensure supplies of “crops needed but not grown in the United 
States.” Justifying the program by indicating that it provided “an additional source of 
strategic and complementary crops,” the USDA asserted that “some of these crops…are 
vital to our national defense. The war years taught us the danger of relying on only one 
or two areas for commodities essential in times of emergency.” Latin America benefited 
from this program because the increased funds generated through foreign sales of those 
“complementary” and “strategic” crops meant that it was able “to buy more of the farm 
machinery, automobiles, electrical equipment, and many other commodities produced 
in the United States.”80  
Helping developing countries acquire the foreign currency necessary to continue 
purchasing U.S. wheat, whether through loans, aid, or increasing exports, were all 
longer-term strategies. Wheat analysts at the USDA, however, were more worried about 
the immediate future of the market. Although both prices and production remained 
high, that paradox contained the seeds of an impending price crash. High prices 
encouraged farmers to plant more wheat, which, combined with recovering production 
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in Europe, would eventually cause a market glut and depress prices. Moreover, 
continuing high prices could potentially spur traditional importers to develop their own 
national production, which, if successful, would further decrease demand and prices.81 
This was particularly worrisome for the USDA, which at one point argued that the 
“self-sufficiency policies that the great importing countries adopted” in the 1920s 
caused massive market disruption and “was an important cause of the depression of the 
1930s.”82 To forestall this, in March 1947, the International Wheat Council convened a 
meeting in London to discuss an agreement that would set price floors and ceilings over 
the coming years. Forty countries, including Colombia (and eight other Latin American 
nations), participated.83 Two years later, the International Wheat Agreement (IWA) was 
finalized. Under the agreement, a price range governed how high or low wheat prices 
could go, regardless of market conditions. Non-IWA wheat could still be sold at market 
prices. Pressure to buy and sell within the price range came in the form of stipulations 
regarding minimum quantities that had to be bought or sold in order in order for a 
country to meet its obligations. Thus, even if market prices sank below the range floor, 
importing countries still had to purchase a certain quantity of wheat at the higher 
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minimum price. The reverse applied for exporting countries; if market prices rose above 
the price ceiling, they were required to export a certain quantity at the lower maximum 
price before they could offer non-IWA wheat for sale.84  
A number of problems immediately arose. To begin with, in 1949, the USDA’s 
fears that prices would drop were realized. In response, three of the world’s five main 
wheat exporters – Canada, the United States, and Australia – worked together to 
artificially keep the price of non-IWA wheat above the maximum price set by IWA. 
Later, when prices rose as shortages and demand increased during the Korean War, 
those same three countries violated IWA stipulations in a variety of ways in order to 
take advantage of the higher prices. In 1951-52, for example, Australia claimed that it 
had had a bad harvest and asked to be released from its export quota that year, in order 
to ensure sufficient domestic supply. This reprieve was granted. But then afterward it 
sold “appreciable quantities of high-priced export wheat outside the Agreement and 
carried larger stocks than were essential on August 1, 1952.”85 Meanwhile, Canada 
declared that it would offset Australia’s “bad harvest” by increasing the amount it sold; 
it offered, however, only lower-quality grain. At the same time, it sold vast quantities of 
higher grades of wheat to Britain at the higher non-IWA prices. That same year, when 
importing countries in the developing world complained that they could not find 
enough wheat to purchase and pressed the International Wheat Commission, which 
oversaw the IWA, to enforce the requirement that exporting countries sell a minimum 
quantity, Canada was the only one to comply, but did so by offering only lower-grade 
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grains at non-IWA prices. Also in 1951, all three countries unilaterally added a 5-6 cent 
“carrying charge,” which raised the price and completely violated the spirit of the 
agreement.86  
While developing countries were harmed by the monopolistic maneuvers of the 
three largest wheat-exporting countries, Britain was as well, and it refused to 
participate in the new agreement negotiated in 1953. As it was Canada’s largest 
customer, this led the latter to ignore IWA stipulations and sell the vast majority of its 
wheat to Britain, outside of the agreement. An artificial shortage of IWA wheat resulted 
and kept its price at the maximum level, despite again-increasing production. 
Predictably, this led to a breakdown in the agreement, and a lack of interest in renewing 
it once it expired in 1956.87 With the British wheat market tied to Canada (and 
Australia) and revitalized production throughout the rest of Europe, this further 
spurred the United States to seek markets in the developing world. As mentioned 
earlier, the PL480 Food Assistance Program of 1954 was one response. Another was to 
discourage efforts to achieve self-sufficiency.  
Long before World War II even ended, in fact, the USDA had already made a 
clear stand on Colombian wheat production. As part of the earlier mentioned 
“complementary crops” program, in 1942 Kathryn H. Wylie, an associate agricultural 
economist at the USDA, compiled a report on Colombian agriculture, based on 
information provided by sources such as the Ministry of the National Economy, the 
Pan-American Union, the Colombian Coffee Growers’ Federation, the United Fruit 
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Company, and the U.S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Trade, among others. The 
report concluded that in spite of transportation problems, “primitive” cultivation 
methods (except in banana and coffee production), insufficient use of improved seed 
varieties, and inadequate training at the country’s schools of agriculture, the potential 
for developing successful “complementary crops,” such as copra (dried coconut meat, 
the source of coconut oil), cacao, and sugar was very high. This was partly due to the 
“Government of Colombia…becoming more and more interested in the development of 
the agricultural industry.”88  
That same interest, however, was portrayed as having either no impact, or a 
negative one, when it came to developing crops designed to achieve self-sufficiency: 
Colombia has imposed high tariff duties on imports of the principal staple 
articles of food and fiber in a vain effort to become self-sufficient in the 
production of these commodities. The outstanding result of this policy has 
been increased living costs within Colombia, especially for its low-income 
groups. Production of some crops has increased under the stimulus of the 
protected price, but not to the point of independence of foreign supplies.89 
 
Although the report discussed a variety of food products promoted under these efforts, 
including corn, rice, cassava, plantains, and sugar, wheat was singled out as a 
particularly egregious example: “wheat is raised on land and under climatic and soil 
conditions quite unsuitable for its economic production.”90 Never mind that on further 
elaboration, the report noted that Colombia had needed to import only 15% of the 
wheat it required in 1938; increasing production was deemed an impossible task, being 
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that most of it “was grown in the upland country where yields are low, the climate is 
cool, and the small farms are located on sloping hillsides.”91 The report did 
acknowledge the social, rather than technical nature of the last problem, indicating that 
“if production were transferred to more suitable regions, better yields and more 
intensive cultivation would be possible.”92 Land reform was not mentioned as a 
potential solution to the problem of peasant production on steep slopes – where most of 
Colombia’s wheat was, in fact grown at the time, while the flat valleys were 
increasingly being used for cattle-raising. In the end, this was not a priority for the 
USDA, evident in the report’s suggestion that before any efforts were made to expand 
the wheat self-sufficiency program, more studies of “the relative advantage of wheat as 
compared with other crops in this region” were required.93 In other words, the report 
subtly suggested, Colombia should return to the pre-Depression economic model based 
on comparative advantage.  
For Colombia’s agronomists, the suggestion that soil and climatic conditions in 
the highlands precluded increased production disparaged the efforts that they had 
already made to develop Bola Picota, as well as the growing success in the attempts to 
promote its use in the highland regions. In subsequent years, those agronomists would 
increasingly rely on research conducted in the United States (and other parts of the 
world) to counter the notion that wheat was unsuitable for Colombia’s growing 
conditions. The next section describes those efforts. 
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93 Ibid., 34. 
 115 
 
“Long-Day” Plants, “Short-Day” Varieties: Agrónomos Confront U.S. Wheat Imports 
Spurred by the success of Bola Picota in increasing wheat production, Colombia’s 
agronomists refused to accept that their country’s climate and soil conditions precluded 
them from achieving self-sufficiency in this food crop. A recurring theme in the 
introductions to several of the master’s theses or campus presentations at the UNAL’s 
Faculty of Agronomy between 1948 and 1952 was that of wheat’s origins. Luís F. 
Chamorro T., in his 1952 thesis, for example, included a section on the history of wheat 
and its introduction to the department of Nariño, the focus of his study. Historians 
disputed the location of wheat’s origins, he noted, some arguing that it was in the Greek 
city of Nisa in the Jordan Valley (now part of Israel), others claiming that it was in 
Mesopotamia and others still in India. Meanwhile, the Chinese claimed that it was 
native to their country, and Linnaeus argued that it originally evolved in Siberia. What 
was known for certain, according to Chamorro, was that wheat was already being 
cultivated in China and Egypt 6,000 years ago.94 In a 1955 lecture about the problems of 
wheat cultivation in Colombia, Manuel Rosero repeated these possibilities and, citing 
the work of “some Russian authors” added Afghanistan and Central Asia to the list. 
Rosero also discussed the work of Russian geneticist Nikolai Vavilov, known for his 
work identifying the connection between different geographic locations and specific 
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varieties of the same plant.95 Thus, Triticum vulgare, along with other wheat varieties 
with twenty-one chromosomes, originated in South-East Asia, while Triticum 
compactum emerged in Afghanistan, and Triticum spelta in Austria and Germany. 
Other varieties emerged in places as distinct as Turkey, Iran, Turkmenistan, and the 
Caucasus Mountains.96 
Clearly, none of these regions are at the same latitude as Colombia. Their 
inclusion in analyses of the problems and possibilities of wheat production was not 
meant to provide evidence that wheat could be grown with equal success in Colombia, 
simply due to similar climatic conditions. Rather, including them helped counter USDA 
claims that wheat was not an apt crop for Colombia. If different varieties could thrive in 
such distinct climates as the ones Vavilov suggested, then it was possible to imagine 
that, with scientific time and attention, varieties apt for Colombia could be developed. 
Countering claims from the United States that Colombia’s quest for self-sufficiency in 
wheat was a “vain effort” was not the only reason for their inclusion, however. 
Discussing wheat varieties’ different origin locations strengthened an argument about 
agronomy that was meant as equally for a Colombian audience as a foreign one. 
Recall that these agronomists operated in an environment in which they still had 
not fully gained the credibility enjoyed by the nation’s engineers. Several theses praised 
the important contribution of agronomists to improving the nation’s agriculture and 
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lamented the dire effects of rejecting or ignoring their work. Some of them did so 
subtly, such as Rosero, when he claimed that good yields could only be achieved 
through the use of carefully “selected seeds made from pure varieties, such as the ones 
at the Tibaitatá Experimental Station.”97 Similarly, Chamorro claimed that, after import 
restrictions between Ecuador and Colombia were put in place, leaving the people of 
southwestern Colombia without grain, the department was able to quickly develop a 
wheat industry there because of the Ministry of Agriculture’s campaign, led by 
agronomists – a “small group of selfless servants who performed their duties 
throughout the length and breadth of the department [of Nariño].”98  
The strongest statement, however, came from Luís Hernando Correa Cancino in 
his 1948 thesis about wheat production in Barragán, Valle, when he directly connected 
the important role of agronomists with the environmental arguments about the crop’s 
origins. It was crucial to guard against pessimism, he warned. The country was 
beginning to organize its agriculture “rationally,” he claimed, rejecting the old practice 
of “listening to the compromised opinions of groups antagonistic to agriculture, [who] 
incompetently and irresponsibly politicize the failure of every rural initiative, while 
rejecting without first analyzing the well-supported opinions of the agricultural 
technicians.”99 These naysayers and special interests had denigrated previous efforts to 
more rationally cultivate other crops such as sugar cane, rice, cacao, tropical fruits, and 
“even cotton.” Agronomists proved them wrong, Correa proudly declared, showing 
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that it was possible for Colombia to implement or improve production of these crops, 
even if complete self-sufficiency remained an elusive goal. Those same naysayers could 
be blamed for that, he argued, since a great deal of time and money had been lost trying 
to “convince those ignorant people of the truth.”100 
Correa was angered by the fact that despite efforts to elevate the profession of 
agronomy, it still did not enjoy full credibility. Nowhere was this more plainly evident 
than in the opposition that had arisen to domestic wheat production. “The same 
destructive criticism” that had been employed against the other crops, was now being 
directed toward wheat, he declared. The argument had been adapted, however, this 
time claiming that wheat couldn’t be grown nationally because it was an “exotic crop” 
for Colombia. Correa’s response to this adaptation was to combine the defense of 
agronomy as a useful science with positive effects on the national economy and the 
environmental argument that plants could adapt to different climates and soil 
conditions, demonstrated by the fact that so many different varieties of one plant could 
be found in so many distinct places of the globe. The result was a strong refutation of 
both domestic indifference or denigration of agronomy and foreign criticism of 
Colombia’s efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat: 
No country in the world has had the privilege of being the place of origin of 
all the plant varieties that feed humanity today, and yet, nevertheless, what 
a surprise the civilized countries gave to the rest of the world when they 
took exotic plants to their territories and, thanks to their creative 
agricultural techniques, were able to develop and make good use of them, 
as if they were native plants.101  
                                                 
100 Ibid., 34. 
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Without any specific examples of what he meant by “exotic plant,” it is difficult 
to know how critically or uncritically he used the term. Was an “exotic plant” the 
cinchona bark, for example, that was smuggled out of Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia in 
the 19th century and taken to the Dutch colonies in Indonesia to produce quinine? Or 
was it the potato transplanted from the Andes in the 16th century to Western Europe, 
where it quickly spread and became a staple crop? In either case, the message was clear: 
if the Western Europeans could turn “exotic” plants into “native” ones in their 
countries, through the application of agricultural science, then there was no reason to 
assume that Colombia could not do the same for wheat.  
The theses on wheat completed between 1948 and 1952 at the Faculty of 
Agronomy generally fell into one of two categories: those emphasizing social and 
economic issues and those focused on experimental research. Correa’s thesis was one of 
the former, and his was also one of the most polemical, forcefully decrying the interest 
groups in Valle and Cundinamarca that inhibited the development of Barragán’s wheat 
industry. Thus, his strong statement countering the argument that wheat was an 
unsuitable crop for Colombia was characteristic of his thesis as a whole. Other theses 
writers, however, made the same argument, also forcefully, but in far less 
confrontational terms. Instead, they presented their objections in seemingly universal, 
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scientific terms, by reporting results of their agricultural experiments, designed to 
demonstrate that it was indeed possible to develop wheat varieties that would grow 
well in Colombia.  
The goal of self-sufficiency is strongly evident in these theses. In 1952 four 
master’s theses reporting results of specific experiments on wheat were completed at 
the National University’s Faculty of Agronomy.102 All used seed variety as a variable. In 
one experiment, various varieties were tested in the farinology lab to determine their 
milling and baking qualities. The effects of photoperiodism and fertilizer applications 
on different varieties were studied in two others. Proving that varieties apt for 
Colombia could be successfully developed was the stated goal of only one of the theses, 
but all of them made that argument, even if indirectly. 
Francisco Villamizar Andrade, for example, wrote his thesis after a year of 
research in Uruguay, funded by that country’s Ministry of Agriculture and by 
Colombia’s National University. The purpose of his thesis was to demonstrate the best 
method for measuring how different wheat varieties responded to variables such as 
fertilizer application, and timing and density of plantings. Expanding on a simple Latin 
square, a practice in vogue in agronomic research throughout the world since the 1910s 
and refined in the early 1940s, Villamizar stressed that careful planning of an 
experiment was absolutely essential for reliable results.103 Words and phrases such as  
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“meticulousness,” “minuteness,” “neatness of execution” and “exactness of the weights 
and measures of the principal variables” peppered his concluding comments on 
research design. Calculation errors or poor statistical analysis were minor issues in 
comparison to faulty research design – he referred to the latter as “original sin” and 
“intrinsic imperfection.” There was no place for carelessness and it was the duty of 
every agronomist to dedicate the necessary time to planning; according to Villamizar, 
the preparatory stages “constitute essential labor, which must be attended to with a 
sense of maximum responsibility on the part of the relevant researcher.” For Villamizar, 
this was so important that it required agronomists to actually get their hands dirty. It 
wasn’t enough for them to merely design the experiment on paper and leave the 
physical labor in the fields to research assistants or farm hands. On the contrary, 
modern agronomists (those from upper class backgrounds, anyway) needed to 
overcome their long-standing refusal to engage in anything resembling manual labor:  
In all these questions, there is no limit to the diligence and attention with 
which the new man of science could oversee the practical execution of these 
manual tasks, trying to personally participate in them, if it were necessary 
or convenient.104  
 
The specific results of his experiment on nine wheat varieties were 
inconsequential, at least for Villamizar’s purposes. He participated as a junior member 
of an international wheat experiment, a joint project among Uruguay, Brazil, and 
Argentina, led by senior researchers from those countries and using native seed 
varieties. With the funding he had received from the UNAL and the Uruguayan 
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Ministry of Agriculture, he was put in charge of the project design and implementation 
in that country, under the supervision of Gustavo J. Fischer, the Deputy Director of the 
Estanzuela Phytotechnic Institute. Upon his return to Colombia, he did not present the 
results of his experiments on wheat varieties native to Brazil and the Southern Cone, as 
this would have been of little interest to the Faculties of Agronomy in Colombia, 
focused as they were on practical problems of national agriculture. The methodology of 
his research experiment would have been of great interest, on the other hand, providing 
a blueprint for other researchers to follow and increasing the perception that the work 
of Colombia’s agronomists was equal to the work done in other contexts. Villamizar’s 
thesis thus joined, although indirectly, the chorus of agronomists’ voices claiming that 
Colombia had the expertise necessary to develop productive and adapted wheat 
varieties.  
Ricardo Chaves’ thesis research on fertilizers and wheat was also conducted 
abroad. In 1948 he received support from the UNAL and the Rockefeller Foundation 
(RF) to study in Mexico at the Ministry of Agriculture’s Oficina de Estudios Especiales 
(OEE – “Office of Special Research”). His research centered on what agronomists called 
“cultural practices” – the preparation of soil, pest management, and fertilizer use. 
Specifically, he studied what combination of nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium 
applications most effectively increased wheat yield in different soil conditions. Again, 
while the specific results may have only been applicable to the regions of Mexico under 
study, the research design and methodology were relevant to Colombia. Some of 
Chaves’ concluding comments, in fact, could just as easily have been written for his 
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own country: “Wheat yield per land unit in Mexico, which is low in comparison with 
that obtained in other countries that produce this cereal, can be improved with better 
cultural practices.”105  
Much of his introductory section also echoed the wheat production problems of 
Colombia. He described how yield had been increasing in recent years, but was still 
insufficient “to satisfy national demands.”  The most obvious solution to this problem 
was to increase the acreage dedicated to wheat cultivation. Displacement of other crops 
would be necessary for that to happen, however, and that would likely generate social 
conflict. Thus, for this solution to be implemented, government intervention would be 
required. Opening new lands for wheat cultivation was another possibility, but this 
couldn’t happen without substantial initial investment, another solution requiring 
significant government involvement and resources.106   
Ultimately, then, the best solution for meeting Mexico’s wheat needs, according 
to Chaves, was increasing production using the same amount of land already in use, an 
achievable goal, but one that required “conscientious and reflective research.” That this 
was possible was made clear in Chaves’ explanation of why production in Mexico was 
lower than it could be, an explanation with strong implications for Colombian wheat 
production as well. According to Chaves, the reasons that yield was so low in Mexico 
included “low quality seeds, lack of mechanization, and loss of soil fertility due to 
continuous cultivation without any policies regarding rotation and fertilizer or erosion 
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and land tenure.”107 Climate is notably absent from this list of social and technical 
problems. Obviously, Mexico is at a different latitude than Colombia, and this may not 
have been as important of a question for the OEE. But aside from climate issues, 
Mexico’s wheat production problems, as described in Chaves’ thesis, were essentially 
the same as Colombia’s. Clearly, then, it would be easy to conclude that if 
“conscientious research” could solve the problems of one country, it could do so for the 
other as well.  
Beyond such similarities between Colombia and Mexico, Chaves’ research had 
more significant implications for wheat research and production in his own country. 
Chaves drew on research conducted a few years earlier in Iowa regarding the 
“efficiency” of increasing yield through nitrogen fertilizer.108 He made a fundamental 
adaptation, however. Converting the English units of measurements used in the Iowa 
research to the metric system used in Mexico and Colombia resulted in “very low 
values,” Chaves reported.109 To solve this analytical problem, he altered what was being 
measured and used a different mathematical formula to reach his conclusions. While at 
first glance this may not seem too consequential, those changes reflected the overall 
goal of his Mexican studies – mastering research methods that would help him reduce 
Colombia’s reliance on agricultural imports.  
Using either random blocks or Latin squares, C.A. Black, L.B. Nelson, and W.L. 
Pritchett conducted a series of experiments on different rates of nitrogen applications on 
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wheat in fifteen locations in Iowa. The goal was to rectify the nitrogen deficiency in the 
state’s soils, which reduced its wheat output in comparison to corn and oats. They set 
out to do this by determining the optimal quantity of nitrogen required to reach a 
maximum level of yield increase without crop loss due to lodging – a phenomenon that 
plagued wheat grown with significant fertilizer inputs, in which the stalks grew so tall 
due to the addition of nitrogen that they could no longer support their own weight and 
fell over. Quantities of nitrogen applied per acre ranged from 20 to 128 pounds. The 
researchers calculated nitrogen’s “efficiency index” by examining how much needed to 
be applied in order to produce one bushel of wheat (approximately sixty pounds). As 
they found that the higher the quantity of nitrogen applied, the lower the resulting 
yield per acre, their efficiency index reflected an inverse relationship.110 Thus, on 
average, it took only 2 pounds of nitrogen to produce one bushel when it was applied at 
the rate of twenty pounds per acre, but it took 2.9 pounds to produce that same bushel 
when forty pounds were applied, and 5.9 pounds when eighty pounds per acre were 
applied. In the end, they determined that the optimal range (depending on soil 
conditions) was between twenty and forty pounds per acre. It is important to note that 
variety made a difference. One experiment achieved the highest yield with little lodging 
while applying 128 pounds. A different variety had been used for that experiment, 
however. Pawnee, the variety used in the rest of them, was known for its “short, stiff 
straw” – making it more susceptible to lodging.111  
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Chaves didn’t fully explain why conversion from English units to metric ones 
caused such analytical problems.112  But rather than reaching conclusions based on an 
inverse relationship between the amount of fertilizer applied and increased yield, he 
used a direct relationship to define optimal quantities of fertilizer to be applied. This 
worked because he also changed the goal of his measurement. In the Iowa study, the 
goal was ultimately to determine how little fertilizer was necessary to grow one bushel 
of wheat. The study centered on that fixed quantity. Chaves, on the other hand, did not 
seek to reach a specified quantity of wheat, but rather, simply determine how much of 
an increase could be achieved by applying a mix of nitrogen, phosphorous, and 
potassium.  
Considering the different agricultural conditions in the United States, Mexico, 
and Colombia, this made sense. In the U.S. at the time, fertilizer use was widespread 
and the fertilizer industry well developed and ready to supply all the quantities that a 
farmer needed or desired and could afford to buy.113 A greater danger, in fact, was 
over-application, hence the need to determine an upper limit after which a farmer 
would experience diminishing returns. Neither Mexico nor Colombia at the time, on the 
                                                 
112 Perhaps the “low values” to which he referred were partly the result of differences in the size of the test plots and 
the amount of fertilizer applied. While the Iowa researchers applied nitrogen to acres, Chaves applied it to hectares, a 
unit of land approximately two and a half times larger. In addition, following the determination by Black and his 
collaborators that the optimal range was twenty to forty pounds, Chaves applied no more than 40 kilos to any test 
plot. But, of course, a kilo is the equivalent of 2.2 pounds. Thus, he applied more fertilizer over a larger area of land. 
While the larger land unit might seem to cancel out any effect of applying a larger quantity of fertilizer, the 
correspondence is not one-to-one, and that could perhaps account for some of the “low values.” As an agricultural 
scientist, however, it seems unlikely that he would not have been aware of these potential problems and devised 
some kind of solution.  
113 Deborah Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003). Fitzgerald examines the growing influence of the nation’s agricultural science researchers at land-grant 
colleges throughout the country in the 1920s, which spurred farmers, both large and small, to organize their farms 
along industrial lines. “Efficiency” became a goal and was widely discussed by both farmers and agricultural 
scientists. 
 127 
other, had well established fertilizer companies, and only the wealthiest of farmers 
could afford to pay the high prices for imported products. Thus, the problem in those 
contexts was getting farmers to use fertilizers in the first place, and a study 
demonstrating that application of a certain quantity of nitrogen and phosphorous 
resulted in a harvest increased by a corresponding amount made more sense. Indeed, it 
was likely that Chaves’ application of only between 20 and 40 kilos of fertilizer reflected 
not only his adoption of the optimal range suggested by Black and his fellow 
researchers in Iowa, but also, the limited supplies available in Mexico at the time, even 
at the country’s agricultural research stations.114 
Adaptation of experimental design to fit local conditions was one method used 
by Colombia’s agronomy students in 1952 to construct a nation that could be self-
sufficient in wheat. Another was to enter a scientific debate among agricultural 
researchers in the United States, a debate with strong implications for Colombia. 
Hernando Reaga Santos was deeply committed to the goal of self-sufficiency in wheat, 
which his thesis made clear from the very first page. He was appalled that Colombia 
had to import almost two-fifths of the wheat it consumed. Worse still, this did not even 
satisfy the nation’s nutritional requirements. Citing studies by the National Institute of 
Nutrition, Reaga lamented that while Colombia needed 375,000 tons annually, only 
approximately 175,000 tons were actually available from imported and domestic 
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sources. Sadly, the future looked even bleaker, and agronomists were partly 
responsible. Although Reaga did not blame them outright, he claimed that low national 
production was the result of the poor varieties then cultivated commercially: their 
yields were low, vegetative periods too long, disease resistance almost nonexistent, and 
overall quality poor. This, in turn, encouraged well-off wheat farmers to abandon grain 
cultivation and plant grass for cattle instead, further exacerbating the problem. But he 
couldn’t fault the landowners. He understood that, while investing in cattle was 
initially expensive, it paid off quickly and well. It was not their fault that conditions for 
growing wheat were unfavorable. Convincing them to keep their lands dedicated to 
wheat required a major transformation, which he wistfully imagined: 
How different the situation would be if these same landowners could be 
offered wheat varieties that were high yield, early blooming, disease 
resistant, adapted to different climatic regions, and of proven quality, at the 
same time as they could be assured of stable and remunerative prices, 
without fear that during harvests the door for imports would be opened, 
sometimes for commendable motives, but sometimes debatable ones.115 
 
Reaga’s rosy vision is intriguing for the additional elements he did not include in 
his initial assessment of the nation’s wheat problem. His earlier claim that landowners 
abandoned wheat production because good varieties were not available focused solely 
on technical problems that agronomists could solve. But, his subsequent portrait of 
improved national production included market issues that agronomists had no control 
over at all – market issues that he had only discussed in a more abstract way up to that 
point.  It also muddles the issue of Colombia’s lack of self-sufficiency: were imports the 
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cause or the effect? Initially, he seemed to suggest that imports were an effect of 
inadequate varieties and that the solution to this was technical. If more appropriate 
varieties were developed – a technical problem – then, imports wouldn’t be needed 
because farmers could grow all the grain the country needed. Better technology could 
even correct the market, he claimed. Varieties of “proven quality” would stabilize 
prices, presumably giving farmers further incentive to resume or remain in wheat 
production. Nevertheless, his subsequent assertion that imports were allowed at 
inopportune times suggests that the reason farmers turned away from wheat 
production had nothing to do with technical issues at all. What accounts for these 
confusing statements?  
His subsequent discussion of the problems facing the milling industry clarified 
the confusion he had created and clearly defined the problem as a technical one. 
Imports were necessary, if unwelcome, because the low volume of domestic production 
prevented the nation’s millers from producing a standardized, reliably high-quality 
product. Instead, they were forced to purchase anything that they could find, including 
“grains of different origins, and of varieties,” resulting in flour mixtures made with 
grains of “variable quality, dissimilar characteristics, and worst of all, unknown 
[characteristics].”116  
This, Reaga asserted, was a technical problem that agronomists could fix. He was 
firmly convinced that Colombia had the capacity to become self-sufficient and that its 
agronomists would be at the forefront of that movement for freedom from imports (at 
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least some of them). But, to make that happen, research on how varieties performed in 
the field was insufficient. If a variety was unacceptable for milling and baking 
processes, he argued, then it was essentially worthless, no matter how early it matured, 
how high its yield, or how strong its resistance to local pests and diseases. Therefore, 
Reaga set out to determine how successfully some of the new varieties that had been 
developed (or were still in developmental stages) performed in milling and baking 
tests, in order to determine which varieties were useful to continue pursuing and which 
could be discontinued.  
To guide him in this endeavor, Reaga drew on two different studies of wheat 
quality that had been recently published. The three co-authors of the first study were all 
affiliated with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, one in the Agricultural Research 
Administration and the other two in the Production and Marketing Administration. 
C.C. Fifield, Ray Weaver, and J.F. Hayes ultimately wanted to shift the way that wheat 
quality was discussed in agricultural research. They pointed out that numerous studies 
had clearly demonstrated that there was a “curvilinear relation...between protein 
content of wheat and bread loaf volume.”117 In other words, flour with protein content 
below 7% produced a loaf of bread with low volume; as protein content increased, loaf 
volume increased accordingly, but only up to a certain point. After protein content 
passed 19%, loaf volume began to decrease proportionally. While Fifield, Weaver and 
Hayes did not disagree with this, they also believed that it was not useful to emphasize 
it. More appropriate, they believed, was to focus on the linear relationship that did exist 
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between loaf volume and protein content within the 7-19% range. Only in that way, 
would researchers be able to adequately evaluate and characterize different varieties 
and the effect of environmental conditions. Using 589 samples of ten different varieties, 
grown at twenty-five experiment stations in nine states over the course of four growing 
seasons, Fifield and his collaborators determined that there was a consistently linear 
relationship between protein content and loaf volume across all the growing seasons for 
each of the varieties, except for one of them, which had a lot of variation, and which 
was “probably due to the relatively small number of samples for this variety.”118  
Fifield, Weaver, & Hayes reached this conclusion in spite of indications that 
protein content was not always positively correlated with loaf volume. Protein quality 
made a difference, as well, demonstrated by differences in loaf volume among varieties 
with the same protein content. For example, although Henry, Ceres, and Pilot X Mida 
were all varieties with 12% protein content, the volume of the loaves they produced was 
846 cc., 779 cc., and 783 cc., respectively.119 In the end, however, this was 
inconsequential for the study’s authors. Although they acknowledged that “loaf 
volume, of course, depends both on the quality and the quantity of the protein in the 
flour as well as on certain other variable factors,” they ultimately brushed that 
conclusion aside to claim instead that protein content was a “reliable” measure of 
“gluten quality and the potential breadmaking value of varieties of wheat.120  
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Other researchers did not accept this simplified conception of wheat quality, in 
which protein quantity was the most important variable, and it was considered 
relatively constant within a variety. At the University of Missouri’s Agricultural 
Experiment Station, for example, Ferne Bowman, Leta Maharg, and J.M. Poehlman, two 
home economists and a professor of field crops, respectively, saw a more numerous and 
multifaceted set of variables determining quality. Some of those variables were 
“inherent in the wheat itself and…change with variety.” Some wheat varieties 
responded dramatically to environmental conditions, while others did so only 
“slightly.” Milling procedures also affected flour quality. In the end, flour quality was 
determined by three inter-related factors: “…kind or variety of wheat, the environment 
where grown, and the skill of the miller.”121  
Unlike the USDA study, all the wheat in this study came from just one 
experimental station. Thirty-three different varieties, grown over eight years were 
tested. Using similar procedures as Fifield and his collaborators, such as baking tests, 
and physical and chemical tests to determine protein, ash, and moisture content, the 
Missouri researchers reached a far different conclusion than those from the USDA: 
“Protein content is important as a measure of gluten strength insofar as it indicates the 
quantity of gluten present in the flour. It does not give any information regarding the 
quality of the gluten.”122  
                                                 
121 Ferne Bowman, Leta Maharg, & J.M. Poehlman, “Testing Missouri Soft Wheat Flours for Quality: Methods, and 
Variety Comparisons,” University of Missouri, College of Agriculture, Agricultural Experiment Station, Research 
Bulletin 480 (July 1951): 1-71, 4. 
122 Ibid., 20. 
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While Reaga drew from both of these studies to conduct his research, he relied 
more on the methods and conclusions of the Missouri research team. Referring to 
Fifield’s use of protein quantity as a measure of gluten quality in his conclusion, for 
example, he countered by noting that other researchers had “proved that environmental 
conditions are more influential than varietal ones.”123 This was particularly important as 
Reaga had used only 10 varieties, all of them grown at the Francisco de Caldas 
experimental station near Bogotá, except for Ecuatoriano 150, which came from the 
Obonuco station in Nariño (southwestern Colombia). Reaga recognized that this was a 
potential shortcoming of his research, being that varieties grown in other parts of the 
country might have different protein content: 
Naturally, vegetative period varies with the climatology, and it is highly 
probable that these varieties would vary a bit if they were cultivated on 
sites away from the Experimental Station, which is like a little island on the 
Sabana de Bogotá with its own climate and soil. The same can be said for 
yield, as great variability has been observed on different soils, climates, and 
reactions to the attacks of different [wheat] rusts.”124  
  
Nevertheless, he still made recommendations about which Colombian varieties 
should be promoted in order to ensure more standard quality for the nation’s millers. 
Intriguingly, at the Caldas experimental station near Bogotá, Reaga was able to conduct 
all the same physical and chemical tests on grain and flour that the USDA and Missouri 
researchers were able to do, some of it involving very specialized procedures or 
equipment such as the “mixogram” (a high-speed, industrial strength mixer with a pin 
measuring torque used to determine the protein content of flour), but was not able to 
                                                 
123 Reaga Santos, “Características y posibles usos,” 25. 
124 Ibid., 8. 
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conduct all the baking tests the others had done as the Caldas laboratory lacked a 
sufficient number of “uniform baking pans.”125  
Insufficient baking tests notwithstanding, Reaga determined that Bola Picota, the 
variety commonly grown in Colombia after it had been developed and introduced in 
the 1930s, ranked the lowest among the ten varieties he had tested in terms of quality. A 
new variety then in development with the assistance of the Rockefeller Foundation, 
known as Menkemen, ranked fourth in the baking tests. However, when combined with 
the agronomic measures of quality, such as resistance to pests, high yield, and a short 
growing season, it was actually the highest quality variety available in Colombia at the 
time. Such a result must have been extremely satisfactory for Reaga, as it allowed him 
to demonstrate both the viability of wheat production in Colombia and the capacity of 
the nation’s agronomists to solve pressing problems of agricultural development. 
The parent varieties that were crossed to create Menkemen also received a great 
deal of attention in the final experimental thesis in 1952. Of all the Colombian agronomy 
students who completed a masters’ thesis that year, Rafael Paris Navarro asked one of 
the most interesting questions of the existing literature, all of it from foreign sources. 
Paris focused on photoperiodism, which refers to the amount of daylight and darkness 
a plant needs in order to flower. “Long-day” plants require anywhere from fourteen to 
eighteen hours of sunlight a day, while “short-day” plants can thrive with just twelve. 
By the time Paris began his research, wheat had been defined as a “long-day” plant, 
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despite evidence that certain varieties responded just as well in environments with 
shorter days.126    
Although the effect of amount of daylight on the flowering of plants was a 
phenomenon that had been observed prior to 1920, no formal research had been 
conducted on it. Between 1920 and the 1950s, however, a small boom occurred. Initially, 
researchers focused on simply documenting the effect of different day lengths on 
various plants.127 Eventually, they came to realize that the effect of photoperiodism 
varied from one variety of the same plant to another.128 Over time, research on 
photoperiodism shifted from documenting how different plants and varieties 
responded to day length, to attempting to understand the mechanism by which 
photoperiodism worked or exploring ways of manipulating available light to meet 
market demands for some plants.129 In the process, several issues emerged that would 
                                                 
126 Rafael Paris Navarro, “Fotoperiodismo y temperatura en variedades de trigo en la Sabana de Bogotá,” 
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Photoperiodism,” Botanical Review 3 (May 1937): 259-275, 261. See also, B.B. Elliott & A.C. Leopold, “A Relationship 
between Photoperiodism and Respiration,” Plant Physiology 27 (October 1952): 787-793, 792; A.C. Leopold, 
“Photoperiodism in Plants,” The Quarterly Review of Biology 26 (September 1951): 247-263; J.G. O’Mara, “A 
Photoperiodism Accompanying Autotetraploidy,” The American Naturalist 76 (July-August 1942): 386-393. 
129 For research focused on the role of light in greenhouses, calibrated to manipulate when flowers would be available 
on the market, see, E. J. Starkey, “Photoperiodism and Chrysanthemum Production,” Science 76 (December 23, 1932): 
594-595. Another question centered on how effectively researchers could make determinations about 
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later be relevant to Paris’ work on photoperiodism in wheat in Colombia. To begin 
with, research conducted on sesame in Burma revealed that even small changes in the 
amount of daylight mattered for some varieties. Thus, even at “low latitudes” of the 
globe, changes of just an hour or two could make a difference.130 Moreover, what 
constituted a “long day” or  “short day” was apparently an arbitrary decision of each 
individual researcher.131  
More importantly for Paris was a question that no one had yet asked: if different 
varieties of the same plant had different light requirements, what would happen if a 
short-day variety was crossed with a long-day one to produce a new hybrid? What 
would its light requirements be? And would it be possible to crossbreed specifically to 
create a hybrid with light requirements appropriate for the environment in which it was 
to be cultivated? More specifically, could Colombian agronomists develop a hybrid 
wheat variety adapted to that country’s constant amount of daylight? 
The “Colombian-ness” of this question is readily apparent. Such questions were 
not asked among researchers in the United States, first because they already operated 
under the assumption that wheat was a “long-day” plant, and as such, clearly suited to 
                                                                                                                                                             
photoperiodism, being that the rigid distinction between vegetative and reproductive stages were actually quite 
arbitrary and that scientists did not fully understand the difference between the two. See, Karl C. Hamner, 
“Correlative Effects of Environmental Factors on Photoperiodism,” Botanical Gazette 99 (March 1938): 615-629. Some 
of the other issues that occupied researchers’ attention at that time included: photoperiodic after-effect (effect of short 
exposure to light during the night hours), relationship between photoperiod and vernalization (the changes a plant 
experiences over the course of a year in response to temperature changes), artificial illumination, the effect of 
different regions of the visible light spectrum, and vegetative vs. reproductive development. 
130 As Garner noted, “Results with Sesamum reported by Rhind in Burma, with an annual range in day length from 
somewhat less than 11 to 13½ hours, emphasize the fact that photoperiodism is an important factor in plant growth 
even at low latitudes. Distinct ‘early’ and ‘late’ forms of Sesamum are recognized in Burma, the latter making, when 
planted early, a rank growth with little flowering and no fruiting, but producing normally if planted late. The late 
forms proved to be typical short-day plants, growing and reproducing abundantly when exposed to a photoperiod of 
12 hours or less.” See, Garner, “Recent Work,” 263.  
131 Hamner, “Correlative Effects,” 615. 
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the environmental conditions found there. Moreover, that country’s ability to grow 
wheat was not in question, and neither was the possibility of it achieving self-
sufficiency in that grain. In Colombia, on the other hand, while the issue of how 
photoperiodism actually worked and questions such as the role of hormones or 
respiration, while interesting, were certainly not pressing. How to achieve self-
sufficiency was a much more interesting question in Colombia, one that 
photoperiodism could potentially answer.   
Oddly enough, Paris began his thesis by echoing some of his fellow students and 
discussing wheat’s origins. The contradiction between his discussion of this and the 
other students’ discussion is exquisite, however. The other students who vigorously 
defended Colombia’s ability to grow wheat by referring to the wide array of climates 
and conditions where different varieties had first emerged tended to write theses 
focused on social and economic issues of agricultural production, and consequently, 
could not “scientifically” counter the idea that wheat was an unsuitable crop for 
Colombia. Paris, on the other hand, repeated the claim coming from “northern 
latitudes” that the reason Colombia had not yet achieved sufficient levels of wheat 
production was that, despite the heroic efforts of the Spanish to introduce its 
production to Colombia after the conquest, the country was tropical, and not one of 
“the world’s true wheat producers.”132  And yet, his thesis was the one with the 
strongest scientific refutation of that notion.  
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The effect of Colombia’s “tropical” environment on wheat was to a significant 
degree, the focus of his study. As he indicated, due to the climatic conditions, varieties 
that matured in only 100 days in Canada took far longer in Colombia. In order to find 
varieties that might be better suited to Colombia’s climate and relatively constant 
amount of daylight, he devised, as he called it, a simple research design. Fifty different 
wheat varieties from Colombia and around the world were planted every month on the 
first of the month for a year beginning in November 1950. Careful observation followed 
and the date that they first flowered was noted. That information was later combined 
with the meteorological information that had been regularly collected at the Caldas 
experiment station for several decades as well as the calculations he had devised for 
determining the length of day on the Sabana de Bogotá for any day of the year. The 
results were promising. 
Most varieties were exceptionally late in blooming, indicating that they preferred 
long-days and were not suitable to Colombia’s shorter hours of daylight. A few 
bloomed relatively early, however, and others showed no predictable response to the 
amount of daylight. Among the short-day varieties that bloomed early were Mentana 
and Baart, two varieties commonly cultivated in the Pacific Northwest of the United 
States, under climatic conditions (in terms of temperature and rainfall) similar to those 
found on the Sabana de Bogotá. Kentana and Kenya 10866, both with origins in that 
African nation at a similar latitude as Colombia, were among the indeterminate 
varieties. These varieties (with the exception of Baart) would shortly be crossbred to 
 139 
create the new hybrid Menkemen, which Reaga Santos would later declare the variety 
that best met the requirements of Colombia’s farmers, millers, and bakers. 
 
Conclusion 
Chaves’ 1952 thesis on soil fertility in Mexico began with a reference to Thomas 
Malthus, the 18th century English scholar, most well-known for his theory about 
population growth. According to Malthus, the earth’s ability to provide sustenance for a 
growing population was not infinite, and eventually, overpopulation would be checked 
by famine or disease. Although the political context in which Malthus wrote is often 
obscured, the core of his idea has traveled far. Thus, Chaves, a Colombian agronomist 
conducting research in Mexico 150 years later could begin his thesis by asserting that: 
“Malthus’ ideas and theories once again stirs public opinion in civilized countries; 
increased human population confronting [agricultural] production that does not 
achieve a similar rate of increase, is a topic gaining great importance among researchers 
and statisticians.”133  
Indeed, just a year later, a Harvard-based economist, Wilfred Malenbaum, 
introduced his book on the world wheat economy by also referring to Malthus. Like 
Chaves, he pointed to growing concern about food shortages and population growth. 
He did not believe that a “Malthusian specter loom[ed] ahead,” however. Agricultural 
production in the pre-war years had actually increased so much that the United States 
faced the problem of a wheat surplus. Yet, starvation and malnutrition had still been 
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significant problems. For Malenbaum, this reflected a distribution problem. And it was 
a problem likely to increase unless measures were taken to increase purchasing power 
around the world. As he indicated, post-war wheat production had recovered and 
begun to exceed pre-war levels. The hunger problem was thus not the one that Malthus 
had envisioned, but rather one that could only be solved by improving the “ability of 
importing countries to buy wheat in the international market.” This meant increased 
foreign aid. The consequences of decreasing such aid were dire: “…a rapid reemergence 
of wheat surpluses, along with an increase in the number of people who go hungry 
because their currencies will not buy wheat.”134  
While both Chaves and Malenbaum both refuted Malthus’ dire predictions based 
on the promise of increased agricultural production, their visions were radically 
different: increased domestic production in developing nations, on one hand, increased 
U.S. exports on the other. As this chapter has attempted to show, those visions 
competed with each other in interesting ways in the early 1950s in Colombia. Struggling 
to gain the credibility among government officials that would allow their opinions to be 
taken into consideration as the nation embarked on national development programs, 
the nation’s agronomists worked hard to construct of an image of themselves as strong 
professional scientists who had a crucial role to play in helping the nation achieve some 
of its cherished goals of national self-sufficiency in important staple crops, particularly 
wheat, which consumed a sizeable portion of the nation’s foreign reserves. This, in turn, 
retarded industrial development, as it tied up resources that could have been used to 
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import machinery or raw materials needed by various industrial interests. Improving 
the purchasing power of a country such as Colombia, in the meantime, eventually 
became the preferred post-war strategy of the United States, in its efforts to dominate 
the global market and ensure a steady customer base for its surplus wheat production. 
One strategy to achieve this was the discursive construction of the globe into “wheat 
growing/exporting” countries and “non-wheat growing/importing” countries. Thus, 
efforts to achieve self-sufficiency on the part of a country such as Colombia were 
described by the USDA as “vain,” and a waste of resources. Colombian agronomists 
bristled at such suggestions. A series of masters’ theses on wheat in the early 1950s (all 
completed in 1952) labored to both build their credibility as solid scientists and resist 
the imperialistic aims of the United States by demonstrating that wheat could be 
successfully grown in a “tropical” country. That a popular science magazine in 1953 
could compare the light requirements of “short-day” plants such as sugar cane with 
“long-day” plants such as wheat, as if such distinctions were rigid and natural, despite 
the scientific work that had been done in both Colombia and the United States 
demonstrating otherwise, indicated how far Colombian agronomists still had to go to 
convince their national leaders that resisting U.S. wheat imports was not only 
economically beneficial but technically feasible.135 
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CHAPTER 3 
At the Mercy of the Millers: Gentlemen-Bakers and the Construction of an Industrial 
Identity 
 
Fabio Jaramillo Gómez returned to Colombia from a twenty-five day tour of the 
U.S. wheat industry in the spring of 1958 more convinced than ever that without 
imports of American flour, the Colombian baking industry would collapse. Jaramillo 
Gómez was the Manager of the Federación Nacional de Fabricantes de Pan (ADEPAN), 
an association dedicated to protecting and promoting the interests of the bread-making 
industry in Colombia. Following his visit, ADEPAN asked the government to reduce its 
tight restrictions on flour imports. Commenting later on that request, Jaramillo Gómez 
indicated that a favorable response was likely, considering that over 100,000 people 
worked in the bread-baking industry and its collapse could have disastrous 
consequences.1  
Echoing these sentiments, that July the editors of El Panadero Colombiano (“The 
Colombian Baker”), ADEPAN’s monthly trade magazine, added that chaos in an 
industry employing 110,000 people would not only wreak havoc with the nation’s 
economy, but also invite “social disorder,” a frightening prospect at a time when 
Colombia was recovering from a period of violence and political conflict.2 Concern for 
the social implications of disruption in the baking industry apparently extended beyond 
the leadership of ADEPAN. During a meeting about flour shortages held that same 
month between Jaramillo Gómez, the Minister of Agriculture, and two other important 
                                                 
1 “Regresó de los Estados Unidos El Gerente de Adepán,” El Panadero Colombiano (hereafter PC) No. 9 (July 1958): 14. 
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members of ADEPAN – Pierre Albrecht Jr. (President) and Hernando Vélez Angel 
(board member) – the Minister, Augusto Espinosa Valderrama, expressed as much 
interest in the welfare of the baking industry’s 110,000 employees as he did in the 
problems of low national production, speculation, and inadequate distribution 
systems.3  
Throughout 1958 and into 1959, ADEPAN used several strategies to portray 
bread-making in Colombia as a modern, mechanized industry, as opposed to a craft 
engaged in by artisan-bakers. Continually referring to the industry’s 110,000 employees 
was one of them.4 Artisans worked alone, after all, or with their family members or an 
apprentice. Rarely did they have “employees.” Another strategy was to fill the pages of 
their trade magazine with articles discussing labor relations, business administration, or 
technical issues in the workplace. Salary negotiations, hygienic practices, the 
advantages of some types of baking equipment, preventing accidents in the workplace, 
improving management skills – while articles on such topics could be expected in a 
trade magazine for any industry, they also served to reinforce the notion that the baking 
business in Colombia was large and modern.5 To be sure, hints that some bakeries did 
not meet the hygienic and professional standards associated with the modern baking 
industry occasionally appeared, such as in an article about maintaining regular 
                                                 
3 “Entrevista MinAgricultura-Adepán,” PC No. 9 (July 1958): 19. 
4 In addition to the previous examples, see: “Una lucha sin tregua,” PC No. 11 (September 1958): 10-11; “El 
gremialismo, factor de orden,” PC No. 13-14 (November-December 1958): 34; “Las nuevas importaciones de trigo y 
harina,” PC No. 15 (January 1959): 13-14; “El problema sanitario en la industria alimentaria,” PC No. 15 (January 
1959): 22; “Relaciones obreros-patronales,” PC No. 16 (February 1959): 2.  
5 “Algo sobre pastelería,” PC No. 1 (November 1957): 31; “Todo industrial panadero debe asignarse un sueldo,” PC 
No. 2 (December 1957): 19; “La prevención de accidentes en la panificadora,” PC No. 5 (March 1958): 7-8; “Normas 
higiénicas que se han de observar en los trabajos de panadería,” PC No. 5 (March 1958): 9; “La prevención de 
accidentes de trabajo,” PC No. 12 (October 1958): 2; “Relaciones obreros-patronales,” PC No. 16 (February 1959): 2. 
 144 
customers. Bakers who gave their wives at the sales counter a short break by coming 
out of the kitchen to serve customers with a cigarette in their mouths and nicotine 
under their fingernails were unlikely to see many repeat patrons, the article argued. 
Striking a positive note, however, it also stressed that such experiences were becoming 
more rare as bakeries strove to meet the sanitary conditions their modern industry 
demanded.6  
Ultimately, subtle hints that the baking industry was not fully modern were far 
outnumbered by more direct indications that it was. The industrial nature of bread-
making was unmistakable in another article discussing salary issues, which began by 
noting that: 
“It is evident that the relations between capital and labor should be 
maintained at a high level of solidarity and cooperation. The industrialists 
of the baking industry constantly check requirements for appropriate 
salaries and wages for their businesses.”7  
 
The image conveyed is that of powerful businessmen in charge of an important slice of 
the nation’s industrial sector. Craftsmen or artisans were clearly the bakers of the past. 
Nonetheless, subtle indications that a truly modern baking industry was still a 
goal rather than a reality eventually gave way to outright declarations. In the February 
1959 issue of El Panadero, the editors asked: “to what degree we can consider Colombian 
bread-baking activities an authentic industry?” Before answering, the editors discussed 
the crucial distinction between large and small industries, based on factors such as 
capital investment, number of employees, degree of mechanization, use of raw 
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materials, consumer demand, and the possibilities for growth and increased 
consumption. By such measures, Colombian textile production was an example of a 
large (and “powerful”) industry, and ceramics production an example of a small one, 
characterized by products handmade in people’s homes. With such measures in mind, 
the editors concluded that the Colombian baking industry was not a small one, despite 
the fact that “…a considerable segment of it [was] still handmade, home-based 
production, with low mechanization and lacking significant capital investments.” These 
major issues aside, the baking business rated high enough on all the other measures that 
the authors felt confident to assert that it was not a small industry, and, thus, by 
implication, a large one, with some modernization still to be achieved.8  
Within a few years, the magic number ADEPAN used to describe the baking 
industry would change from 100,000 (employees) to 80% (artisanal bakers). This 
occurred after twenty of Bogotá’s largest industrial producers defected from ADEPAN 
and formed their own organization, the Federación de Industriales de Panificación (FIP, 
Federation of Industrial Bread-Makers). The split in the two organizations reveal strong 
class-based cleavages in Colombia. After the establishment of the new organization, 
ADEPAN would carve out a space for itself in the public sphere alongside the nation’s 
workers, poor urban residents and popular class in general. But, these different forms of 
public representation also reflected shifting socio-political climate. After 1960, a variety 
of strikes and public protests rocked the country, as the nation’s popular classes dealt 
with the disillusionment of the lack of reforms that promised by the National Front 
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when it came into power in 1958. Between 1958 and 1959, during the first two years of 
the National Front, the nation’s industrial associations also expected to be given pride 
of place in public policy formation. The year before, a coalition of business associations, 
individual industrialists, and other private interest groups had banded together to push 
for the ouster of General Rojas Pinilla, Colombia’s only, short-lived military dictator. 
Their success emboldened them to demand more changes beneficial to the nation’s 
industrialists and business owners.  
ADEPAN in those years worked hard to project an image of itself as an 
association of industrial business owners, equal to the other great industrial 
associations, and the businesses they represented. They cultivated this image both in 
the ways that they spoke of their own industry, but also in how they defined 
themselves in relation to the nation’s millers, who they portrayed as uncaring and 
uninterested in the general welfare of the nation. Part of this strategy was to emphasize 
the ways that the millers were not “gentlemen” – harking back to an earlier notion of 
the civilistas  - cultured men who worked together to ensure a stable political climate 
amenable to economic growth and stability, despite whatever political disagreements 
they may have had. They criticized the millers in a number of ways – their lack of 
attendance at meetings hammering out deals among the various business associations 
and the national government, their insistence on using new milling technologies that 
were economically harmful to the country as a whole, and most of all, the various ways 
that they engaged in speculation, harming bakers and consumers alike.  
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This chapter will examine the efforts by ADEPAN in its early years to publicly 
define itself as an association of “gentlemen bakers.” The first section will examine the 
political and economic climate in which they operated, showing the devastating effects 
of the coffee bust and the impact of U.S. wheat imports through the P.L. 480 program. 
The second section examines the founding and early history of ADEPAN. Finally, the 
third section looks in greater detail at the association’s attempts to construct its public 
image as “civilized and gentlemanly businessmen” in contrast to far more selfish and 
callous millers. 
 
Coffee Bust, Dictatorship, Import Restriction, and PL 480 
In May 1956, whenever Daniel Pino Vallejo walked past the storefront of the 
local milk vendor in Palmira, Colombia, he tipped his hat in greeting to the bottles of 
milk inside and walked on. As Pino explained, the price of milk had become so 
“scandalously high,” consumers could no longer afford to actually buy it, and had to 
satisfy themselves with simply saying hello to it as they passed. The same was true for 
housing costs and the price of medicine. Aside from inhumane landlords and doctors 
who had forgotten their Hippocratic oaths, Pino blamed the high prices on merchants 
and businessmen engaged in the crime of speculation. Pino suggested in a letter to the 
president of Colombia, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, that such people be punished 
with jail time.9 
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The previous month, José Juvenal González Corredor complained of similar 
difficulties providing food and clothing for his wife, Georgina, and their eight children 
in Tunja. The continuously rising prices for bread, molasses, meat, butter, corn, salt, and 
potatoes had sometimes led him and his family to “…beg God with tears in our 
eyes…to save us from dying from this frightening and horrible hunger.” Like Pino, 
González offered the president suggestions for solving the problem of scarcity and 
rising costs. His suggestions were more concrete (and less vengeful) than Pino’s 
however, and one of the first on his list of almost fourteen items was a reduction in both 
the sales tax and import tariffs.10   
Prices seemed to be getting so high and out-of-control that the national 
government froze the amount of rent landlords could charge, and the mayor of Bogotá 
implemented measures to keep the costs of some food items at reasonable levels. But 
was the rise in housing, food and medicine costs real or only perceived? In a radio and 
television address to the nation at the end of May, the Minister of Finance raised such a 
question when he suggested that while the cost of living had indeed risen slightly, the 
price panic that seemed to have gripped the nation was out of proportion to the 
country’s economic indicators.11 
The Minister, Dr. Carlos Villaveces, acknowledged that the nation had suffered a 
serious setback as coffee prices on the global market had fallen dramatically. 
Colombia’s dependence on coffee as the engine of its economy throughout the first half 
                                                 
10 AGN, RP, Desp. Sr. Presidente, Correspondencia/Gobernaciones, B 104, F 16, f 10-14. 
11 AGN, RP, Dirección de Información y Prensa, Correspondencia/Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, B 8, F 41, f 46-
59. 
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of the twentieth century has been amply studied by historians and economists and was 
certainly of great concern to contemporary actors. Although exports of bananas and oil 
had also grown in importance in the first half of the twentieth century, it was coffee that 
provided Colombia with the bulk of its foreign reserves and partially helped to fuel 
industrialization in the early 20th century. Coffee sales continued through the 
depression and World War II, but the general slow-down in international trade during 
those years gave Colombia a significant stockpile of foreign reserves which it began to 
use more liberally, once trade resumed after World War II. Global coffee prices rose at 
the same time, leading to a period in Colombian history known as the “coffee bonanza” 
(1948-1955), when the national economy rapidly grew at unprecedented rates. Light 
manufacturing of textiles and consumer goods strengthened its position in the national 
economy as the Conservative regimes in place between 1946 and 1953 implemented 
protectionist policies. Primary materials needed for their production enjoyed low 
import tariffs, but other food items, textiles, and finished consumer goods faced import 
restrictions, imposed through high tariffs. Heavy manufacturing also began. Import 
policies helped to spur their growth as well, in this case, charging low tariffs on the 
machinery essential for those industries to operate.12 
As Villaveces indicated, while global coffee prices were high, this was a 
successful policy. But, the dramatic fall in prices after 1955 revealed its flaws. Without a 
fair price or “satisfactory volume” of exports, the country had few foreign reserves and 
could not achieve its development objectives. As primary materials became harder to 
                                                 
12 Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America; Kalmanovitz and López Ancisar, La agricultura colombiana; 
Palacios, Café en Colombia; Saénz Rovner, Colombia años 50; Safford and Palacios, Fragmented Land.  
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come by, prices for food and consumer items began to rise. Outlining the flaws of the 
coffee economy, Villaveces sadly acknowledged that Colombia did not have the power 
to either increase consumer demand in foreign countries or set the price on the global 
market. While Colombia, Brazil and other coffee-producing countries were working on 
an agreement to control the supply (and thereby ensure a steadier income for the 
nations in question), Villaveces announced that the government was doing its best to 
make the Colombian economy less dependent on coffee. The foundation of the new 
strategy was further protection of Colombian industry.  
Industry, after all, had benefited enormously from the protectionist policies 
already in place, Villaveces argued. Citing statistics from the IMF, he indicated that the 
economy had been growing at an average annual rate of 6% – the highest rate in Latin 
America and “possibly the entire Third World.”13 As Colombia had only been 
importing 4% of its finished consumer goods, this was evidence that the protectionist 
policies were working, according to Villaveces. Countering detractors who had claimed 
that the government’s import policies would hurt the economy, he offered the examples 
of Cervecería Bavaria, Compañía Colombiana de Tabaco, Coltejer, Fabricato, and 
Tejicondor – Colombian beer, tobacco, and textile companies that had earned record 
profits since the late 1940s. These were all light industries, however, and Villaveces 
indicated that to truly reduce its dependence on coffee, Colombia needed to step up 
heavy manufacturing, which meant more importation of machinery and further 
restrictions on imports of food and consumer goods.  
                                                 
13 AGN, RP, Dirección de Información y Prensa, Correspondencia/Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, B 8, F 41, f 46-
59: 50. 
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Lest anyone question the wisdom of this policy in terms of the rising cost-of-
living, Villaveces then asserted that, while the economy had grown 6%, the inflation 
rate had increased at much more moderate rates – 2.8% for the middle class and 2.1% 
for the poorest sectors of society. Despite these “reasonable” rates however, over the 
previous year, a “mentality of scarcity” had taken hold of the country and led to higher 
prices. Villaveces did not mention speculation or measures to curb the practice, 
indicating instead that the construction of more food storage facilities and the 
implementation of better distribution systems would help to prevent the “false scarcity” 
which led to panic and rising prices.  
But, how would more storage facilities and better distribution solve the problem 
(real or perceived) of scarcity, if basic grains and milk, along with other food items, 
were not being produced in sufficient quantities within the country, and yet were 
included on the list of imported products that were restricted through high tariffs? 
Where was the food in the storage facilities to come from? That was the second part of 
the government’s strategy – to increase domestic production of agricultural goods by 
offering more credit to farmers. While small farmers provided supplies of a few basic 
food crops such as corn and beans, the bulk of agricultural output in Colombia had long 
been focused on export crops – coffee and bananas being the most obvious (and 
significant) examples. As outlined in the previous chapter, beginning in the 1930s and 
accelerating in the late 1940s, Colombia implemented agricultural programs designed to 
increase production of staple grains and foods, as well as those crops that were primary 
materials for Colombia’s light manufacturers: cotton for the textile industry, barley for 
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the Bavaria beer consortium, and tobacco for the cigarette companies. The policy 
announced by the Minister was a continuation of those programs.  
The student of twentieth century Latin American history will already recognize 
the outlines of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in these tariff policies. Less 
readily recognized is the policy of Import Substitution Agriculture (ISA), which 
accompanied it. Partially a response to the precariousness of international trade during 
the Depression and World War II, and further promoted by the protectionist economic 
policies espoused by the United Nation’s Economic Commission on Latin America 
(ECLA) in the 1950s, ISI was an economic development policy implemented throughout 
Latin America in the mid-twentieth century. As the name implies, the objective was to 
reduce reliance on imported goods and strengthen national industries. ISA is less well-
known than ISI, partly because the economic planners who pinned their hopes on this 
development policy tended to believe that agriculture was a “drag” on an economy – 
small farmers and agricultural workers rarely had the need to or the disposable income 
or access to the commercial centers that would allow them to become buyers of the 
consumer goods produced by the nation’s manufacturers. Thus, in many contexts 
where ISI was implemented, agriculture was ignored or de-emphasized. In Colombia, 
on the other hand, planners promoted a comprehensive import substitution package 
that focused on both industry and agriculture, encouraging the production of some of 
industry’s raw materials on Colombia’s own soil.14  
                                                 
14 A similar policy was implemented in other parts of the world at the same time as well. One of the most well-known 
cases is that of India, which, in its second five-year plan (1956-1961), emphasized rapid industrialization and would 
have probably continued with that policy if it weren’t for the threat of drought and famine which led India’s 
 153 
ISI policies in Colombia were accompanied by major shifts in the balance of 
power in the nation as a whole. One of those shifts centers on the relative power of 
agriculturalists vs. industrialists. From the late nineteenth century until the 1940s, 
agricultural interests, represented by either the Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia 
(SAC) or the Federation of Coffee Growers (FEDECAFE), were powerful actors, with 
significant resources, strong connections, and considerable influence, allowing them to 
shape government policy to their benefit. Beginning in the 1940s, however, SAC and 
FEDECAFE faced challenges to their power on the national stage, which came from the 
emergence, growth and consolidation of industrial interests, represented after 1944 by 
the Associación Nacional de Industriales (ANDI). (Sometimes, of course, particular 
members of ANDI also had agricultural holdings (or vice versa), so individual interests 
could be murky. But collectively speaking, one set of interests began to gain traction at 
the expense of the other).15 
ANDI’s growing power is evident in the Finance Minister’s address to the nation. 
Historians have debated whether Rojas Pinilla can be considered a populist.16 Coming 
to power through a bloodless military coup in 1953, he is the closest thing to a populist 
leader (actually in power on the national stage) that Colombia has ever had. Allied with 
                                                                                                                                                             
economic planners to give equal importance to agricultural development. See, for example, Gupta, Postcolonial 
Developments; Matthew J. Kust, “El desarrollo económico y los excedentes agrícolas,” (translated from Foreign Affairs, 
October 1956) Revista del Banco de la República 29 (November 20, 1956): 1259-1265. For the Colombian case, see: 
Kalmanovitz and López Enciso, La agricultura colombiana, 169-184.   
15 Bejarano, Economía y poder; Kalmanovitz and López Enciso, La agricultura colombiana, 75-83; Saénz Rovner, Colombia 
años 50; Eduardo Sáenz Rovner, La ofensiva empresarial: Industriales, políticos y violencia en los años 40s en Colombia 
(Bogotá: Centro de Estudios Sociales, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2007); Safford & Palacios, Fragmented Land. 
16 On Rojas Pinilla: César Augusto Ayala Diago, Resistencia y oposición al establecimiento del Frente Nacional: Los orígenes 
de la Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO) Colombia 1953-1964 (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1996); Silvia 
Galvis and Alberto Donadio, El Jefe Supremo: Rojas Pinilla en La Violencia y en el poder (Medellín: Hombre Nuevo 
Editores, 2002); Sáenz Rovner, Colombia, años 50. 
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the Conservative Party, he painted himself as the champion of the nation’s urban 
working class and campesinos – poor farmers, with or without land.17 In his first two 
years in power, he implemented several policies that favored popular sectors of society, 
particularly, tax reform and liberal import policies. The tax reform increased 
government coffers, enabling it to provide needed social services. The import policy 
ensured that a wide variety of food items and consumer goods would be available at 
affordable prices. Neither of these policies were well-received by the nation’s 
industrialists; the tax policy reduced their bottom lines and the liberal import policy 
increased competition. But, at the time, the coffee bonanza was still in full swing, and 
industrialists were earning record profits. Under such circumstances, they protested the 
president’s policies, but never forcefully enough to ensure their repeal. Thus, in the 
early years of the Rojas Pinilla regime, his populist policies remained intact, despite 
some opposition from ANDI.18  
The sharp decline in foreign reserves caused by the coffee bust two years later, 
however, compelled Rojas Pinilla to move from his populist stance and implement a 
more restrictive import policy. Initially, certain food items and consumer goods were 
given the same preferential status as the raw materials and machinery required to 
continue the nation’s drive to industrialize. But as the economic situation worsened in 
1956, Rojas Pinilla was forced to move farther still from his populist position on tariffs. 
                                                 
17 In a May 1956 speech in Soatá (Boyacá), he indicated that the greatest title he hoped to earn in his life was 
“President of the Campesinos.” See AGN, RP, Desp. Sr. Pres., Discursos, B 104, F 11, f 4-9. A wide variety of public 
and private programs designed to help small-scale and subsistence farmers began during his tenure in office 
(references for STACA, ACPO, stuff from Colombia Campesina, etc. here). Measures to assist urban workers were 
also put in place, and assistance for the poor was provided through SENDAS, an organization run by Rojas Pinilla’s 
daughter. 
18 Sáenz Rovner, Colombia, años 50. 
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In the plan announced by Minister Villaveces at the end of May that year, restrictive 
tariffs on imports of food items and finished consumer goods were strengthened, while 
raw materials and machinery continued to enjoy favorable tariff rates. With this plan, 
Rojas Pinilla clearly put long-term economic planning ahead of the short-term needs of 
the population. In other words, the interests of industrialists were favored over those of 
working class consumers – those most affected by increases in the cost of living. 
Villaveces began his speech with a populist flourish: “…it is not possible to think of a 
well-ordered society in which a few people have abundant use of the nation’s goods 
while others lack the most elemental [ones].” But the solution he proposed in his 
subsequent statement demonstrates the administration’s emphasis on industrial 
development: “…in this the thesis of modern economists coincides with Christian 
doctrine, when they identify the need to maintain and increase consumption as the only 
method of achieving effective development and greater productivity.”19 In his study of 
industry and politics in the 1950s, Sáenz Rovner ably demonstrates how the populism 
of Rojas Pinilla or the anti-Americanism of Laureano Gómez (1950-1953) were tempered 
by the economic challenges that they faced as well as the power of interest groups to 
compel their hand.20  
While ANDI gladly welcomed strengthened restrictions on imports of consumer 
goods, other interest groups were not as pleased.21 The National Merchant’s Association 
                                                 
19 AGN, RP, Dirección de Información y Prensa, Correspondencia/Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, B 8, F 41, f 46-
59: 46. 
20 Sáenz Rovner, Colombia, años 50. 
21 They were, of course, not very pleased about the tight controls on imports of raw materials also put into place at 
the same time, but at least they stood to gain somewhat from the new restrictions, unlike other groups.  
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(FENALCO), representing store owners and shop-keepers, was deeply opposed to the 
more restrictive import policies, which limited the goods that they could sell to the 
often more expensive domestically-produced ones.22 Similarly, FEDECAFE had been 
frustrated since 1955, when Rojas Pinilla permitted other export agricultural producers, 
such as banana growers, to convert the dollars they earned through international sales 
to pesos on the free market, but required coffee exporters to convert their dollars to 
pesos at official rates, which were far below the unregulated ones.23 For FEDECAFE, 
this essentially meant that they were being forced to underwrite the government’s 
coffers.  
Another group opposed to the government’s new policy was ADEPAN. It was 
the less stringent restrictions from the previous year that had partially inspired some of 
Colombia’s bakers to organize in the first place; they were in the process of formally 
establishing the association and electing officers when Minister Villaveces made the 
announcement that imports would be subject to even stronger controls.24 Unlike 
merchants, Colombia’s bakers were in the unique position of being simultaneously 
retail vendors and producers of a consumer food item – merchants and industrialists at 
the same time. As will be discussed in greater detail shortly, this generated an unusual 
                                                 
22 On the sometimes sour relations between ANDI and FENALCO, see Bejarano Economía y poder, 265-283; Safford & 
Palacios, Fragmented Land, 320-321. Sáenz Rovner also briefly discusses the opposing positions of ANDI and 
FENALCO to the enhanced import restrictions imposed in 1956 in response to the country’s growing economic crisis. 
See Sáenz Rovner, Colombia, años 50, 201. 
23 Sáenz Rovner, Colombia, años 50, 177.  
24 “Adepan cumple su primer decenio,” PC No. 31 (July 1966): 19. While ANDI, SAC, and FEDECAFE were arguably 
the most important representatives of the country’s industrial and agricultural interests, the 1950s saw the 
establishment of a variety of more specialized “lobby associations,” many with conflicting agendas. Some did not 
map neatly onto the “traditional” lines of agriculture vs. industry. Others involved different groups of large and 
small industrialists. To a significant degree, these conflicts have been overlooked in Colombian historiography, while 
the relations between SAC, FEDECAFE, and ANDI (and to a lesser degree FENALCO) with each other and the 
national government have received the majority of scholarly attention.  
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conflict with one of their main suppliers – the nations’ millers, represented by the 
National Association of Millers (ASEMOL). Moreover, American wheat vendors in 
Colombia and the U.S. surplus crops program, commonly known as PL 480, further 
complicated the bakers’ unique situation and their response to the tightened import 
restrictions. 
Between 1931 and 1955, the SAC, the Faculties of Agronomy at the National 
University in Medellín and Cali, and the national government implemented a variety of 
programs and campaigns to increase production and promote the use of domestically 
grown wheat and wheat flour, along with rice, cotton, cacao, and barley.25 
Unfortunately, the substitution of imported for domestic wheat for the bread and pasta-
making industries faced a complex set of obstacles. Low levels of production in 
Colombia often made national wheat difficult to find; the low protein content of many 
Colombian varieties often produced poor quality bread, leading bakers to prefer 
imported flours; large-scale production in Canada and the United States, along with 
excessive transportation costs within Colombia, often meant that imported flour was 
cheaper than domestic.26 Up until 1954, Colombia had purchased flour and grain from 
those countries through normal commercial channels, but that year, the United States 
passed Public Law 480. Billed as a food assistance program for “less developed” 
                                                 
25 Bejarano, “Las ciencias agropecuarias”; Kalmanovitz and López, Agricultura colombiana; Hugo E. Vélez M., 
“Difusión de la producción mercantil y de la tecnificación en la agricultura colombiana,” in La agricultura colombiana 
en el siglo XX, ed. Mario Arrubla (Bogotá: Editorial Andes/Instituto Colombiano de Cultura, 1976). Wheat growers 
had already been complaining about the influx of American wheat in the late 1920s. See Rafael Flórez, “El problema 
del trigo,” RNA 14 (March-April 1929): 76-79. 
26 In almost all the primary sources related to this issue, the Colombian authors or speakers referred to wheat 
produced in their country as “national wheat” rather than “domestic wheat.” Unless otherwise noted, I will use both 
terms interchangeably.  
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countries, its main purpose was to dispose of surplus crops by both directly selling 
them to other countries through the program and simultaneously helping to increase 
demand and create markets for them that could be filled through normal commercial 
channels. At first glance, the program seemed beneficial for developing countries, as 
they could purchase the excess food items using their own currencies rather than their 
foreign reserves, a highly attractive stipulation in Latin America during an era of import 
substitution, and especially so for coffee-producing countries such as Brazil and 
Colombia, facing rapidly dwindling foreign reserves brought on by the coffee bust. 
Moreover, the foreign currencies used to purchase the excess food items were to be held 
by the U.S. government in a special account, and dispersed back to the countries in 
question to help pay for mutually agreed-upon development programs. As shall shortly 
be shown, however, onerous provisions regarding the commercial purchase of food 
items and the use of domestic currencies were often required by the U.S. government 
before it would enter into a PL 480 contract with a developing country.  
The Rojas Pinilla administration signed Colombia’s first PL 480 contract with the 
United States on June 24, 1955, in the early stages of the coffee bust, before it began to 
truly wreak havoc with the country’s finances and national economy.27 Colombia 
agreed to purchase the equivalent of US $1,600,000 of wheat, the same amount of 
cotton, $1,000,000 of cottonseed oil and $700,000 of dairy products. Although these were 
relatively small amounts compared to other countries (the US $22,000,000 of wheat 
purchased by Japan, or the $34,932,000 purchased by Yugoslavia, for example, or even 
                                                 
27 “Second Progress Report on Public Law 480,” (Washington: House of Representatives, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 
Document No. 216, July 12, 1955), 6. 
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the $6,491,000 or the $6,420,000 purchased by Turkey and Peru, respectively), this 
represented approximately one-fourth of the wheat consumed in Colombia that year.28  
Six months later, on December 20, 1955, the Rojas Pinilla administration signed 
its second PL 480 contract and increased the amount of wheat it purchased to US 
$3,400,000.29 This contract was signed despite the fact that the Colombian economy was 
beginning to show signs of great stress. High-level functionaries from the World Bank 
had visited Colombia earlier that year and blamed the unstable economic situation as 
much on Rojas Pinilla’s poor management of the national government, as they did on 
the coffee bust, claiming that he assigned military leaders to important ministerial 
posts, despite their lack of experience.30 All the same, while things were bad at the end 
of 1955, industrialists were still making record profits and there was still hope that the 
coffee market would recover. By the following summer, however, the Colombian 
economy seemed on the verge of disaster.   
Representatives from the World Bank returned to Colombia in April 1956 and 
recommended that Colombia devalue the peso to help stabilize the economy. Rojas 
Pinilla rejected this suggestion, and instead, as the Finance Minister announced the 
following month, imposed tighter import restrictions and began cutting the 
government’s budget.31 This, of course, had no effect on the global coffee market, and 
                                                 
28 Ibid. Production in Colombia in 1955 totaled 147,000 tons; 63,000 tons were imported. See Jorge A. Beltrán B., 
“Factores económicos y sociales relacionados con la sustitución de trigo en pan y pastas,” Revista del Instituto de 
Investigaciones Tecnológicas, No. 97 (September-October 1975): 8-21. 
29 “Third Progress Report on Public Law 480,” (Washington: House of Representatives, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 
Document No. 294, January 12, 1956), 3. 
30 Sáenz Rovner, Colombia, años 50, 188. 
31 Sáenz Rovner, Colombia, años 50. 
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by October, the situation was even worse. Colombia defaulted on IMF loans, bringing 
further pressure from the United States to devalue the peso.  
The economic difficulties stalled negotiations for a new PL 480 contract. In July 
1956, the Minister of Agriculture wrote to the American Embassy in Colombia 
requesting a renewal of the contract and asking for a substantial increase of 374,000 tons 
of wheat per year for the subsequent three years (compared to the approximately 
250,000 tons imported the previous year). They also requested 40,000 tons of cotton and 
27,000 tons of cooking oils. Several weeks passed before the U.S. responded. The terms 
of the counter-proposal were quite unsettling for Colombia. Instead of 374,000 tons of 
wheat, the U.S. proposed to sell Colombia only 150,000 tons of grain and 26,250 tons of 
“wheat products” (mainly flour). They also dramatically reduced the proposed amount 
of cotton from 40,000 to only 6,826 tons, similarly reduced the proposed amount of oils, 
and added the sale of 1,900 tons of lard. The total quantity amounted to US $23,800.000. 
To some degree, there was nothing unusual in these proposed reductions. The PL 480 
program was designed to supplement commercial sales of U.S. crops, not supplant 
them, and thus, the amounts available varied from year-to-year, depending on what 
“surplus crops” had not already been sold through regular commercial channels. The 
reduced amounts proposed by the United States were not made so innocently, however. 
The U.S. would agree to accept Colombian pesos for the sale of those amounts only if 
Colombia also agreed to purchase “many tons” of those products through regular 
commercial channels, using dollars. As the Minister of Agriculture lamented, in the end, 
Colombia would end up having to spend “more or less” US $38,000,000, which was 
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particularly painful, considering that Colombia had not asked for, and did not need, 
several of the items for which they would have to spend their precious foreign reserves. 
To add insult to an already injurious counter-proposal, the U.S. Embassy added that 
“either [the Colombians] sign the contract in the form presented, or there was no 
contract.”32 
In spite of Rojas Pinilla’s observation that “negotiating [the terms of] these kinds 
of contracts [with the U.S.] was impossible and it was best to just sign it as proposed,” 
several more weeks passed before the contract was finally completed.33 Apparently, it 
was in the nick of time. At the Cabinet meeting on October 10, after the announcement 
that the contract had been signed, the Minister of Agriculture made a subtle plea for the 
various entities in charge of import licenses and logistical details to act quickly, as “the 
importation of wheat to the country is urgent because there is going to be a shortage.”34  
Some in Colombia at the time would have argued that shortage was already a 
problem. ADEPAN certainly made such claims, decrying the speculators who hoarded 
what flour was available, increasing its price and heightening both the actual and 
perceived shortage. By October 1956, the young organization had already spent several 
months lobbying various government ministries to renew the PL 480 contract and 
reduce import restrictions on wheat and flour. Who were these bakers-turned-
lobbyists? How clearly was their voice heard? What impact did they have, if any, on 
government policy and the national economy? And conversely, what impact did 
                                                 
32 AGN, RP, Secretaria General, Correspondencia/Ministerio de Agricultura, 1956, B 288, F 41, f 24. 
33 Ibid.  
34 AGN, RP, Consejo de Ministros, Correspondencia/Actas de Sesiones, 1956, B 145, F 1, f 28. 
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economic conditions and the rapidly changing government policies and political 
situation have on the newly founded organization? The next section will address these 
questions through a more in-depth examination of the early history of ADEPAN.  
 
Industrialists Large and Small and Political Transformation 
Seventy-three bakers gathered together in April 1956 to found ADEPAN.35 
Although they came from all over the country, the largest majority by far, was from the 
department of Cundinamarca. Within two months they had been officially chartered 
and held their first general meeting. Fifty people attended and the meeting was 
presided over by seven bakers representing several different departments. As these 
men were not members of organizations such as ANDI or SAC, their names do not 
appear in many of the business directories that have been published, either at the time 
or in later decades, that could provide some biographical information about the people 
in charge of this organization. For some of them, therefore, such as Bernardo González 
and Alfredo Vélez Angel, it is not even clear what department they represented. Others, 
such as Antonio Montañez and Pierre Albrecht, Jr., who was named President of the 
Board at that first meeting, were from Cundinamarca, but other than that, not many 
more biographical details are known about them. Alfonso Arteaga, on the other hand, 
was a “dynamic industrialist” from Ibagué, Tolima, who was instrumental in getting 
                                                 
35 “Adepan cumple su primer decenio,” PC No. 31 (July 1966): 19. Information about ADEPAN is scarce in 
Colombian historiography, and sometimes incorrect. Bejarano, in an overview of the many business associations 
established in the 1950s indicates that ADEPAN began in 1958. It is not clear from what source Bejarano drew this 
information, but it is clearly in conflict with ADEPAN’s own records. That such a respected scholar of Colombian 
economic history could make such a mistake, small though it may seem, speaks to the importance of expanding the 
historiography of Colombian economic, industrial and agricultural development beyond the three largest 
constituencies represented by ANDI, SAC, and FEDECAFE. See Bejarano, Economía y poder, 266. 
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the Tolima section of the organization off the ground two years later, and did so in 
order to make a contribution to the “rehabilitation” of that department, which had 
suffered greatly in the most recent phase of la Violencia.36 Jorge Benedetti, from 
Cartagena, was one of the most enthusiastic members of ADEPAN in its early years, but 
eventually withdrew from the organization, and apparently from the baking industry 
entirely. By the end of the 1960s, he worked in the construction industry, managing 
housing development projects sponsored by the Bavaria Beer Consortium.37 Of the 
seven men who presided at ADEPAN’s first meeting, sufficient details to provide a rich 
biographical portrait are available for only one of them – Francisco Montoya Isaza, from 
                                                 
36 “La labor de Adepan en 1958,” PC Nos. 13-14 (November-December 1958): 18; “Adepan en Tolima,” PC No. 18 
(April 1959): 13; “Noticias de nuestras seccionales,” PC No. 21 (January 1960): 23. La Violencia was a civil conflict in 
Colombia between 1946 and 1964 that claimed up to 200,000 lives. It was characterized by “waves of violence” that 
affected different departments at different times. Although these waves are not neatly discrete phenomenon, three 
main phases of la Violencia can be discerned. In the first phase, between 1946 and 1953, violence was concentrated in 
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Tolima coincided with the beginning of the “National Front” – a power-sharing arrangement between the Liberal and 
Conservative parties (partisan conflict between adherents of these two parties was a primary fault line driving la 
Violencia), which drove Rojas Pinilla from power. Although other groups in Tolima and the rest of the country had 
already begun efforts to “pacify” violence-stricken regions through a combination of social programs and increased 
military presence, when Alberto Lleras Camargo, the first National Front president, took office, the concept of 
“rehabilitation” gained greater traction. “Rehabilitation” referred to both a specific program and a general concept. 
The specific program was one of direct assistance to rural residents of Tolima (and other regions afflicted by violence) 
consisting of “school construction, assistance for displaced people, road-building, credit, distribution of public lands, 
completion and improvement of jails, juvenile delinquency programs, housing construction, and other similar 
measures.” See, Alberto Lleras Camargo, “La rehabilitación” in El primer gobierno del Frente Nacional, Tomo Primero 
(mayo de 1958-agosto de 1959) (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1960), 120.  “Rehabilitation” as a concept was obviously 
much broader and even more challenging to achieve. As Marco Palacios explained it: “The establishment of a 
peaceful, participative, and pluralist civic culture required the abandonment of confrontational styles of politics, the 
restoration of representative institutions, and the development of a modern public sector. Bringing the state and its 
citizens together would require the reconstruction of the judicial and police apparatuses, but also the honoring of 
commitments ranging from union rights and agrarian reform to the widening of access to education and urban 
housing.” (Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence, 170). Thus, “rehabilitation” came to be interpreted in a variety of 
different ways throughout Colombia and applied in contexts quite distinct from its original meaning as assistance for 
zones affected by violence. In September, 1958, for example, ADEPAN extolled the most recent congress of the 
National Association for Small Businesses (ACOPI) as of very “positive importance for the country, at this time of 
programs focusing on general economic rehabilitation.” See, “Noticias breves,” PC No. 11 (September 1958): 4. It was 
within this context that Alfonso Arteaga expressed his desire to develop the Tolima section of ADEPAN as his 
contribution to the rehabilitation of his department. For an examination of violence in Tolima see Henderson, When 
Colombia Bled. 
37 “Noticias breves,” PC No. 9 (July 1958): 4; “Informe de la Comisión Nombrada por la Asamblea General de 
Accionistas de Bavaria, S.A.” (Bogotá: Bavaria, 1969), 45, 46, and 49. 
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Antioquia. In 1956, Montoya was 45 years old, and had been involved in the baking 
industry most of his life. His family owned a bakery, apparently of such significant size 
that they could afford to send him to Belmont Abbey College in North Carolina, and 
later to the Bentley School of Accounting and Finance in Boston, Massachusetts, from 
which he graduated in 1933. He then returned to Colombia and until 1945, 
simultaneously managed his family’s bakery and worked as a sales representative for 
American and European manufacturing firms. By the late 1950s, Montoya also owned a 
delicatessen and was a major shareholder in a canning factory in Medellín. He was also 
active in the Asociación Colombiana de Medianos y Pequeños Industriales (ACOPI), an 
organization dedicated to assisting small business owners. His involvement in these 
two organizations focused on small business development was strong; in 1959 he was 
named ACOPI’s National Director and in 1961 he was elected President of ADEPAN’s 
Board of Directors. Montoya later noted that he devoted about 80% of time to his 
responsibilities at ACOPI and ADEPAN.38 
The portrait that thus emerges is that of a hard-working, well-educated, middle-
class, small-businessman, interested in laboring collectively to ensure conditions for the 
robust economic development of his city and country. This was largely the image that 
ADEPAN attempted to cultivate in its early years. ADEPAN itself portrayed the baking 
industry as a mixture of large and small businesses, and its membership as both home-
based producers using “traditional” methods and industrialists operating partially 
                                                 
38 “Nuestro mundo social,” PC No. 20 (December 1959): 6; Great Plains Wheat, Inc., “A Tour of the U.S. Wheat 
Industry by the Colombian Wheat Team, August 13-September 5, 1961” (Garden City, KS: GPW/OFAR/USDA, 
1961), 2. 
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mechanized bread factories. Of course, a partially mechanized factory could still be 
family-run, as the example of Isidro Pinzón in Bogotá attests. Pinzón was fairly new to 
the baking business in 1948 when he spent 3,000 pesos to purchase a few pieces of 
equipment, hired two employees, and struggled to sell bread to “a clientele 
unaccustomed… to consuming [his] product.” Thirteen years later, after tremendous 
effort and the constant assistance of his wife, Elvira Ordóñez de Pinzón, his small 
venture had grown to 39 employees, had thousands of customers, and had earned him 
“a fortune of over one million pesos.” Although his well-trained employees knew the 
bakery business well, from the simplest tasks “to the most complicated baking 
techniques,” Pinzón was proud to report that he had never requested assistance from 
foreign or national technical experts. He had trained them all himself, gaining his 
knowledge through experience; owner, production boss, supervisor, baker, manager, 
and salesman – Pinzón wore all of those hats and thus knew his business well. At the 
end of 1961, Pinzón was on the verge of further expansion. The latest baking equipment 
from Denmark was on order and expected to arrive in early 1962. The machinery had 
cost him over $300,000 pesos and he was building a whole new bakery in another part 
of the city to accommodate it.39 
Imported machinery played an important role in the expansion of another 
Bogotá bakery, as did immigration. Isidoro and Tania Katz were part of a small, but 
steady stream of German-speaking immigrants to Colombia that began to arrive in the 
                                                 
39 “Con sistemas europeos, ‘Pan Fino’ elabora el mejor y nutritivo pan en la capital,” PC No. 30 (December 1961): 6-8. 
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late nineteenth century and continued to do so after the end of World War II.40 
Immigrants from Switzerland, the Katz arrived to Colombia in 1951 and were the 
founders of “El Cometa” (The Comet), one of Bogotá’s busiest downtown bakeries and 
largest suppliers of bread products to several supermarket chains and airport cafeterias. 
Like Pan Fino, El Cometa began as a local bakery, with a small handful of employees, 
and eventually grew to quite significant size. Similarly, the Katz imported baking 
technology from Europe and, once it had arrived, learned to maintain it themselves, 
without importing further technology or expertise. In fact, the same equipment 
imported in the 1960s was still in use in downtown Bogotá in 2008 – equipment that 
was no longer manufactured in Europe and which had to be maintained by adapting 
locally made parts.41  
Immigrants or not, a clear portrait emerges in El Panadero Colombiano – ADEPAN 
was a diverse group of small industrialists and artisan bakers. No matter the size of 
their bakeries, however, they all faced the same problems of flour shortage in 1956 and 
banded together to lobby the national government to renew the PL 480 contract with 
the United States.  
                                                 
40 German immigrants in general have been highly represented in some of the most important industries or 
companies throughout twentieth century Colombian history. The Bavaria Beer Company, for example, was founded 
by German immigrants to Colombia in 1899. SCADTA, the precursor to Avianca, Colombia’s national airline, began 
as a Colombian-German consortium in 1919 and up until World War II, the majority of its shareholders, as well as 
many of the company’s pilots (veterans of World War I), were German-born. Paul Schauffelberger, a Swiss geologist, 
was the first director of the soil section at one of Colombia’s most important research entities – the Coffee Research 
Institute (CENICAFE), sponsored by the powerful Federation of Colombian Coffee Growers (FEDECAFE). See, 
David Bushnell, Eduardo Santos and the Good Neighbor, 1938-1942 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967); 
Galvis and Donadio, Colombia Nazi; Rebecca Tally, “A Young and Dynamic Country: Soil Science and Conservation 
in Colombia, circa 1950.” Presentation at the New York State Latin American History Workshop, Cornell University, 
Ithaca, New York, October 15, 2006; Jorge Angel Vallejo, 100 años de Bavaria: Una historia de la industria cervecera de 
Colombia (Medellín: Editorial Lealon, 1990). Intriguingly, a Panadero article discussing the explosive growth of 
bakeries and bread consumption in Japan indicated that bakeries were first established in Japan beginning in the 
1920s following a wave of German immigration. See “El pan en el mundo,” PC No. 4 (February 1958): 30-31. 
41 Tania Katz, interview with the author, Bogotá, July 14, 2008. 
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Shortage was not their only problem, however. Distribution of both national and 
imported flour caused a number of headaches, especially for the bakers in Medellín, 
who were neither in the wheat-producing regions of the central highlands, nor close to 
the port cities of Barranquilla, Buenaventura, or Cartagena. Transportation costs, a 
perennial problem in Colombia, partly contributed to the drastic shortages that seemed 
to occur frequently in Medellin. Diversion of flour to cracker and cookie producers was 
another problem. Food items such as flour, rice, and potatoes were regulated by the 
Instituto Nacional de Abastecimientos (INA), an agency set up in 1945 to ensure that 
basic staples were equitably distributed throughout the country and among different 
types of food producers or vendors.42 Imports of these items and national harvests all 
went through INA for redistribution. Bakers were allotted certain amounts, 
commensurate with the demand for bread, as were cookie and cracker makers. By the 
late 1950s, however, while the bread baking industry was still only partially 
mechanized, cookie and cracker companies, particularly Noel, based in Medellín, had 
become large industrial enterprises, and, as such, bought flour in larger quantities than 
bread bakers, making them attractive customers for millers and INA’s flour 
distributors.43 ADEPAN offered only veiled suggestions that flour allotted to bread 
                                                 
42 Also known as the “Corporación de Defensa de Productos Agrícolas.” 
43 Founded in 1916, the “Fábrica de Galletas y Confites Noel” had grown considerably by 1956 and was rapidly 
expanding both volume of production and the product line. See “Fabrica de Galletas y Confites Noel” in Antioquia, 
tierra de trabajo y progreso (Medellín: Interprint, 1961), 190-191. 
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bakers was being diverted to cookie and cracker makers instead.44 Add to this the 
inefficiencies within INA itself, and it does seem likely that such diversion occurred.45  
For ADEPAN, more equitable and efficient distribution was as important as 
increasing the amount of imports. Winning the right to act as INA’s official distributor 
of wheat flour designated for the bread-baking industry several months after its 
establishment in 1956 was thus a significant achievement for the new organization and 
an impressive demonstration of its influence on the national stage.46 
Despite the fact that the economic situation had become so bad by the end of 
1956 that the government closed the Oficina de Registro de Cambios, an act which 
basically prohibited all imports, ADEPAN worked together with INA during the last 
months of the year, and the first months of 1957 to distribute the flour that had arrived 
through the PL 480 program. An “exception policy” was put in place, which permitted 
some essential food imports and raw materials to enter the country.47 Wheat and flour 
were included on this short list. However, the amount imported was ultimately much 
                                                 
44 La crisis harinera,” PC No. 9 (July 1958): 5; “Por una nueva importación de harina,” PC No. 9 (July 1958): 7-8. 
45 In 1951, INA was criticized for complete lack of organization in distributing food items around the country. At the 
time there was an INA office in Buenaventura, Colombia’s main port on the Pacific Coast. The nearest large city is 
Cali, 46 miles away. Apparently, the officials in charge of the INA office in Buenaventura preferred living in Cali. 
Thus, when shipments arrived to the port, they would be shipped to Cali, paying freight costs to get there. Once 
distribution to the rest of the country was requested, the food items would be shipped back to Buenaventura, and 
from there on to other parts of the country, thus twice paying freight costs for two unnecessary train trips. See, 
Alvaro Miranda, Colombia la senda dorada del trigo: Episodios de molineros, pan y panaderos, 1800 a 1999 (Bogotá: Thomas 
de Quincey Editores Ltda., 2000).  
46 That ADEPAN was responsible for distributing flour in 1956 can be inferred from announcements made in 1957 
about flour sales, its annual report of activities in 1958, and informal histories of their relationship INA. “Harina 
americana,” PC No. 2 (December 1957): 2; “La labor de Adepán en 1958,” PC No. 13-14 (November-December 1958): 
18-19; “Controles necesarios,” PC No. 16 (February 1959): 5.  
47 Sáenz Rovner, Colombia, años 50, 205. 
 169 
smaller than the contract initially specified, amounting to only approximately US 
$5,000,000 of wheat.48  
Such a reduced amount didn’t last very long, and soon Colombia and the United 
States entered negotiations for a new contract. Meanwhile serious political conflict 
began to exacerbate the instability of the economic situation. Several months earlier, the 
leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties had met in Benidorm (Switzerland) and 
signed a pact agreeing to form a coalition and present a candidate to oppose Rojas 
Pinilla in the upcoming election. Calling themselves the “Frente Civil” (Civil Front), the 
coalition received widespread support from a various sectors of the country’s oligarchy. 
In response, Rojas Pinilla embarked on a campaign of severe repression against its 
leaders.49   
Business activities continued despite the political turmoil. On April 16, 1957, the 
Rojas Pinilla administration signed Colombia’s fourth PL 480 contract with the United 
States, which included approximately US $5,000,000 of wheat and wheat products. A 
new condition was attached, as onerous as the previous one requiring Colombia to 
purchase additional amounts through regular commercial channels. When the 
Eisenhower administration first created the PL 480 program, it stipulated that the U.S. 
could demand dollars for payment at any time, if circumstances in a given country or 
with its currency deemed it necessary. Such was their assessment of the situation in 
                                                 
48 I can find no sources to explain why there was such a discrepancy between the contract as it was apparently signed 
and the amount that was actually imported, but one can surmise that the precarious economic situation was an 
important factor. See ““The Seventh Semi-Annual Report on Activities Carried out under Public Law 480, 83D 
Congress, As Amended, Outlining Operations under the Act during the Period July 1 through December 31, 1957,” 
(Washington: House of Representatives, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Document No. 323, February 4, 1958), 30. 
49 Ayala Diago, Resistencia y oposición; Galvis and Donadio, Colombia Nazi; Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence; 
Sáenz Rovner, Colombia, años 50. 
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Colombia at the time, and thus, the U.S. demanded that 30% of the total be paid in 
dollars rather than in pesos.50  
But before any monies of either currency could be paid, Rojas Pinilla was ousted 
from power. The leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties had been working 
together with industrialists and several disaffected military leaders to force Rojas Pinilla 
to resign. The “Frente Civil” by this time had changed its name to the “Frente Nacional” 
precisely so that they could incorporate the military in their anti-Rojas campaign.51 On 
May 10, 1957, a military junta consisting of five generals took the reins of government, 
guaranteeing to hold elections and return Colombia to civilian rule as quickly as 
possible.52  
The promise of political stability, nonetheless, had no effect on the global coffee 
market and Colombia’s foreign reserves continued to plummet. Hoping to secure loans 
from the World Bank, the military junta devalued the peso and presented an austerity 
plan, which drastically cut the government’s budget. Restrictions on imports of raw 
materials were relaxed, but those on certain food and consumer goods remained in 
place. Predictably, the cost of living rose dramatically.  
                                                 
50 “Favorable modificación al acuerdo agrícola,” PC No. 12, (October 1958): 10-11. I give an approximate amount in 
this case because the record is unclear. Different reports list different amounts for the same contracts and thus, it is 
difficult to discern with precision how much wheat was sold to Colombia. The 7th report, for example, indicates that 
the total amount of the contracts signed with Colombia between July 1, 1956 and June 30, 1957 was US $8,400,000. 
The 9th report, however, indicates that the total amount for that same period was US $11,200,000. See, “The Seventh 
Semi-Annual Report on Activities Carried out under Public Law 480,” 30; “The Ninth Semi-Annual Report on 
Activities Carried out under Public Law 480, 83D Congress, As Amended, Outlining Operations under the Act 
during the Period July 1 through December 31, 1958,” (Washington: House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 1st 
Session, Document No. 60, January 29, 1959), 32-37. 
51 Mauricio Archila Neira, Idas y venidas, vueltas y revueltas: Protestas sociales en Colombia, 1958-1990 (Bogotá: Instituto 
Colombiano de Antropología e Historia/Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular, 2003), 89. 
52 Ayala Diago, Resistencia y oposición; Galvis and Donadio, Jefe Supremo; Sáenz Rovner, Colombia, años 50. 
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Of course, prices for specific items rose at different rates. Cornmeal, for example, 
produced from locally grown corn, rose only five cents a pound between May 28 and 
July 17 in Medellín. The price of rice remained constant during the same period. Wheat 
flour, on the other hand, rose twenty cents a pound. Recognizing the difficulties that 
this would cause for popular sectors, on July 1, the military junta raised the minimum 
wage. As the Minister of Fomento explained during an interview broadcast on the radio 
program “La Opinión” later that month, the military junta recognized that the peso 
devaluation meant that prices for certain items, such as “cacao, wool, cotton, lard, 
rubber, wheat, insecticides and agricultural machinery,” would be most affected, and 
that was precisely why they also implemented the wage increase. Note that, except 
perhaps for lard, none of these items were consumer goods. All of them, ultimately, 
were raw materials for industrial use. That the military junta intended to continue the 
economic policy of import substitution and emphasis on industrial development is 
evident from the Minister’s explanation of the mathematical equations that were used 
to determine changes in the cost of living, which ultimately, led him to the conclusion 
that, despite higher prices for many items,  
…workers still have, for now, an appreciable margin between the higher 
living costs and the salary increase – at least 10%, which has ensured 
continued consumption of industrial goods, and for some articles, such as 
beer, there has even been a substantial increase in sales.53  
 
                                                 
53 “La demagogía y el costo de la vida” (radio address by the Minister of Finance, undated). AGN, RP, Junta Militar, 
Correspondencia/Ministerio de Fomento, 1957, B 3, F 59, f 34-39. The statistics the Minister presented were compiled 
by Empresas Municipales de Medellín. On the increase in the minimum wage, also see Sáenz Rovner, Colombia años 
50, 237. 
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Putting aside the questionable implication that hungry people are just as well off 
drinking beer as they are eating bread (or arepa, the corn-based staple food of 
Colombia), the Minister’s assertion highlights the ongoing conflict between wheat and 
barley growers in the department of Cundinamarca, discussed at greater length in a 
subsequent chapters. More important in this context, is that, for the Minister, protecting 
consumers began with protecting industrialists, and for the moment, the situation was 
manageable.   
The future, though, looked far bleaker. The Minister expressed doubts about the 
efficacy of the wage increase in coming months, when the effects of the devaluation 
would truly be felt by industrialists and consumers alike. Asserting that the 
readjustment in the price of Colombian currency had not yet worked its way fully 
through the economy, the Minister made the dire prediction that “…many imported 
articles have not reached their readjustment prices and nationally produced goods have 
not yet felt the impact of higher costs for tools, fertilizers, and workers’ salaries.”54 In 
other words, it was going to get a lot worse before it got any better. 
How did bakers cope with this ever-worsening situation? Between the political 
intrigues of late April and early May, the ousting of Rojas Pinilla, and the devaluation 
of the peso, the PL 480 contract signed in April had been left unfulfilled and in limbo. 
ADEPAN lobbied the military junta to honor the contract and eventually succeeded in 
convincing it to do so, but the imported wheat did not arrive until November.55 
ADEPAN was once again put in charge of distributing it to Colombia’s bakers 
                                                 
54 Ibid.  
55 “Harina americana,” PC No. 2 (December 1957): 2; “Nuestras seccionales,” PC No. 3 (January 1958): 13. 
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throughout the country, although it seemed that some of it allotted for the bread makers 
still managed to find its way to the cracker and cookie companies.56 But before 
November, while they waited for flour to arrive, many bakers apparently cheated their 
customers by either making smaller loaves or making the loaf volume appear the same 
by adding more yeast and baking soda, but still charging the same amount as always. In 
a letter to the Minister of Agriculture, the SAC accused the bakers of such unsavory 
business practices and suggested that they be compelled to sell small loaves for one 
peso, rather than the five pesos they regularly charged. The SAC claimed that all other 
countries around the world had such legislation, and that inertia was the only reason it 
hadn’t yet been decreed in Colombia.57 ADEPAN would face similar charges at various 
points over the subsequent years and always vociferously denied them while speaking 
out against attempts to pass such legislation, claiming that it was not economically or 
technically feasible for bakers to sell loaves of bread that cost only one peso.58  
The SAC made other accusations in their memo to the Minister of Agriculture, 
directed not at Colombia’s bakers, but at the nation’s millers. Arguing that imported 
wheat and flour could last longer if it were mixed with national flour, the SAC argued 
that millers should be compelled to purchase all of the wheat produced in Colombia. 
ADEPAN eventually joined in this call, doing so in response to speculative practices by 
the millers. The bakers’ battles with the millers ultimately came to play a decisive role 
                                                 
56 “Cartas cruzadas entre la Corporación de Defensa de Productos Agrícolas ‘INA’ y Adepán sobre la distribución de 
harina Americana,” PC No. 1 (November 1957): 3. 
57 “Memorandum para el Sr. Ministro de Agricultura,” AGN, RP, Secretaría General, Sociedades/Memorandum, 
1957, B 297, F 63, f 4-8. 
58 “Estabilización de precios,” PC No. 11 (September 1958): 5; “Noticias que nos interesan,” PC No. 21 (January 1961): 
14-15. 
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in the organization’s self-perception and public image. While it was still a diverse 
organization of large and small bakery owners, it presented an image of itself as 
“gentlemen,” equal to Colombia’s industrialized millers. This helped the organization 
garner a place for itself at the table of negotiations among the “industrial gentlemen” 
who worked with President Alberto Lleras Camargo to stabilize the national economy 
after the ouster of General Rojas Pinilla in 1957. 
 
The Scourge of Speculation and the Forging of an Industrial Identity 
The advertisement on the back cover of the inaugural issue of El Panadero 
Colombiano in November 1957 was rather ironic. The Compañía Nacional de Levadura 
Levapan, a company that produced yeast, tried to entice bakers to purchase its product 
by declaring: “With every pound of Levapan Yeast that you use, you contribute to the 
country’s economic independence by saving foreign reserves.”59 The irony was that the 
pages between the covers were filled with advertisements for Colombian brands of 
flour made with grain imported from the United States or for U.S. brands directly 
imported to Colombia.60 Of the five advertisements for flour, only one explicitly stated 
that it sold flour made from national wheat, along with its “Super-Especial Americana” 
brand.61 Another Colombian brand, “Vitaminarina” did not say whether it used 
                                                 
59 “Simbolo de un gran esfuerzo colombiano!” PC No. 1 (November 1957): back cover. 
60 All from PC No. 1 (November 1957): “Premio a la Excelencia,” ad for La Insuperable flour produced by Generoso 
Mancini & Cia, S.A. in Barranquilla: 9; “Molino Pam-Pam, Ltda,” ad for the Super-Especial Americana flour 
produced by Pam-Pam Mills in Bogotá: 31; “¡La Famosa Harina de Trigo!” ad for Pillsbury’s Rey del Norte brand: 32; 
“La Harina Gold Medal” ad for flour of the same name made by Washburn Crosby Co.: 33.  
61 “Molino Pam-Pam, Ltda,” op. cit.   
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American or national wheat in its flour, but was probably a mixture of the two.62 In 
contrast, it is likely that the Colombian brand “La Insuperable” was made solely with 
imported wheat.  
If their ads didn’t explicitly state where their wheat came from, how is it possible 
to guess with any accuracy what kind the mills were using? The clue is where the mills 
were located. The SAC’s recommendation in the memo to the Minister of Agriculture 
that mills be required to absorb all the wheat produced nationally was eventually put 
into practice. But it was implemented in a way that was sure to cause conflict as time 
went on. Millers in the “productive zone” – the internal highland departments of 
Cundinamarca and Boyacá, where wheat was grown in Colombia – were the ones 
required to absorb all of the nationally produced grain, while millers in the “non-
productive zone” – in this case, mainly the city of Barranquilla on the Atlantic Coast – 
were not. In theory, this was an equitable policy; with transportation costs between the 
interior and the coast as high as they were, it was deemed unfair that millers in 
Barranquilla should have to pay a higher price for grain that was considered inferior, 
when they could get higher quality grain at a cheaper price by importing it from the 
United States.  
Of course, the larger irony is that there were so many ads for flour when it was in 
such short supply in the first place. After the long-awaited arrival of the PL 480 
shipment at the end of the year, no new contract was signed. The devaluation of the 
peso had created more confidence among global lenders (the World Bank, for example), 
                                                 
62 “Vitaminizada,” ad for Harina Vitaminarina made by Molinos La Concepción S.A. & Molinos Cundinamarca, S.A., 
in Bogotá, PC No. 1 (November 1957): 2. 
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but credit was still scarce and the coffee market had not recovered and helped 
Colombia rebuild its foreign reserves. Other than emergency measures such as the 
devaluation, the minimum wage increase, and expansion of social assistance in October 
1957 to alleviate the effects of the devaluation among poorer sectors, the military junta 
introduced no major changes in economic policy and basically acted as a placeholder, 
keeping the national government running until civilians could once again take the reins. 
The political machinations leading up to that transition absorbed much of the nation’s 
energy and attention. While the National Front had initially agreed to support a 
Conservative as its candidate for the presidential election set for May 1958, in the end, a 
Liberal, Alberto Lleras Camargo, became the National Front candidate. He won the 
election and was inaugurated on August 7.63 
Persistent shortage, rising prices in general, and government inattention was an 
ideal situation for flour speculators looking to make a tidy profit. ADEPAN recognized 
that many of the baking industry’s suppliers were “serious” and “responsible” and not 
out to take advantage of economic and political instability.64 For example, in March 
1958, the Empresa Palmin, Ltda., a margarine manufacturer, lamented the “anxious 
situation” caused by the dramatic rise in prices and announced that, considering the 
“new climate of national understanding,” it would not raise its prices, but continue to 
sell its margarine at the rates in effect since June 1957, before prices rose dramatically 
                                                 
63 Archila Neira, Idas y venidas; Ayala Diago, Resistencia y oposición.  
64 “Editorial,” PC No. 1 (November 1957): 5. 
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following the devaluation.65 Similarly, partially in response to the scarcity of raw 
materials and dramatic prices increases, in June 1958, fourteen bakers in Cali met to 
form a new section of ADEPAN in that department. An important collaborator at that 
first meeting was José Ignacio Sánchez L., the manager of Compañía Fleischmann 
Colombiana, Inc., who promised to be a constant partner in the struggle to stabilize 
prices for commercial and consumer goods.66  
Nevertheless, despite the presence of these apparently well-intentioned 
companies, speculation was a growing problem. After praising the serious and 
responsible ones that dominated the market, ADEPAN denounced the  
…infinity of opportunists who keep their eye out for a certain set of 
circumstances, so that they can ‘reap a harvest,’ exploiting [others] and 
creating urgent situations, wringing [their profits] out the bakers’ efforts, 
sacrifices, and hard work.67 
 
By July 1958, speculation had become so bad that bakers threatened to eliminate 
the sale of “five peso” bread – a low-cost option for Colombia’s poorest residents – and 
to decrease the size of other loaves, while increasing their price.68 Bakers did not make 
good on this threat, and instead, claiming that they always had the public good in 
mind, responded to the rising prices (reaching the “price of gold” they claimed) by 
                                                 
65 “La Empresa Palmin Ltda, al servicio de los panaderos, informa a sus clientes y amigos,” PC No. 5 (March 1958): 
31. 
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67 “Editorial,” (November 1957), op. cit. 
68 “Noticias breves,” PC No. 9 (July 1958): 4. 
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sacrificing their own profits in order to maintain the “weight, volume, quality, and price 
of bread” at constant levels.69 That they were simultaneously defending themselves 
from the SAC’s charges that they were cheating customers goes without saying.  
Based on the example of Palmin and Fleischmann, although speculation was a 
problem affecting all of the raw materials bakers needed, certain products, such as 
margarine, were available at a reasonable price.70 It was flour – bakers’ principal 
ingredient – that was most affected. But who was speculating with flour? Between 
November 1957 and July 1958, ADEPAN commented continuously on the scourge of 
speculation, lamenting its horrible effects, and using it as a clarion call to expand 
membership and encourage greater participation in the organization. As bad as 
speculation was during those months, however, ADEPAN seemed reluctant to point 
fingers and instead made strong, but still vague statements, such as when they warned 
that the only way for bakery owners “to stay out of the hands of unscrupulous 
speculators” was for all of them “to remain firmly united” or when they indicated that 
before they had started the organization, their “dispersion made them victims…of the 
speculation rampant in the market.”71 Even dramatic descriptions of the horrible effects 
of speculation were cloudy on crucial details: 
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The past proves, as the evidence attests, that ADEPAN’s distribution of 
imported flour met bakers’ most pressing need. There was not even a 
whisper of speculation, nor anarchy in the flour market, and neither was 
there any unstable or disruptive behavior in pricing policies. During the 
time that ADEPAN was responsible for the distribution of flour, it was able 
to consistently avoid the dangerous fluctuations that once again threaten 
the national baking industry. And naturally, it is to be expected that [some 
individuals] will take advantage of these circumstances, whether because of 
selfishness or group interest.72 
 
As strong as a statement as this was, the bakers left the identity of those selfish 
individuals a mystery. After July 1958, however, their complaints took on a new tone. 
Some of them were slightly less vague, with subtle hints about who they believed the 
perpetrators to be. Others were outright accusations that it was Colombian millers who 
were speculating with flour.  “Great quantities of flour leave the mills destined for a 
commerce awash in the crime of speculation,” they claimed at one point, and “it’s really 
strange that the milling industry, which only exists because of the baking industry, is 
engaged in the destruction of the latter,” they claimed at another.73 More subtle 
accusations were found in the absence of the miller’s national association (Asociación 
Nacional de Molineros – ASEMOL) on the lists of entities engaged in the battle against 
speculation. In September 1958, for example, ADEPAN indicated that it had been 
working closely with the Instituto Nacional de Abastecimientos (INA) to ensure a fair 
distribution of flour.74 The following month, ADEPAN lamented that, while it had been 
able to count on the important assistance of governmental entities (such as INA or the 
Ministry of Agriculture) to combat speculation, it was imperative to “extend the means 
                                                 
72 “Control de harinas importadas,” PC No. 5 (March 1958): 5. 
73 “La crisis harinera,” PC No. 9 (July 1958): 5. 
74 “Una lucha sin tregua,” PC No. 11 (September 1958): 10.  
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and resources of cooperation to a broader array of sectors – sectors that have 
unavoidable responsibilities to the collective good, to the national front of 
consumers.”75 ADEPAN’s effusive praise of INA’s cooperation in the battle against 
speculation contrasts sharply with their criticism of ASEMOL’s apparent lack of interest 
in working collaboratively. “Perhaps, and without hyperbole, there is no organization 
that has kept its promise to the Colombian people like INA has,” ADEPAN declared at 
the end of 1958.76 ADEPAN accused ASEMOL, on the other hand, of having no interest 
in Colombian consumers, in “eradicating scarcity” or in “national rehabilitation”:  
…ADEPAN has tried to collaborate with ASEMOL through all honorable 
means available. Unfortunately, up to now, ADEPAN’s elevated 
aspirations in this regard have been unsatisfied.77  
 
Increasing directness on the part of the bakers coincided with the installation of 
the Lleras Camargo administration. In fact, some of the strongest condemnations of the 
millers came in the months of July and August 1958 – precisely when Lleras Camargo 
was completing his cabinet appointments and preparing to be sworn in as president. 
Although ADEPAN had been striving to forge stronger ties with the incoming first 
government of the National Front since December 1957 when it first seemed likely that 
they would win the presidential election, it significantly stepped up its efforts in the 
weeks immediately before and after the president’s inauguration.78 For example, when 
Lleras Camargo designated Augusto Espinosa Valderrama the new Minister of 
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Agriculture, ADEPAN effusively endorsed his selection.79 The following month three 
important members of ADEPAN – Pierre Albrecht Jr. (President), Fabio Jaramillo 
Gómez (Manager) and Hernando Vélez Angel (principal board member) – met with 
Espinosa Valderrama. The meeting centered on the problem of flour scarcity and the 
principal objective was to convince the new Minister that a renewal of imports, 
particularly through the PL 480 program, would help to alleviate the problem and 
reduce the cost of living for Colombian consumers. Espinosa Valderrama demonstrated 
“good will” and “great courteousness” and seemed interested in helping the bakers 
resolve the problem of flour scarcity. Although it is probable that, like most politicians, 
Espinosa Valderrama was skilled at making vague promises without actually 
committing himself to anything specific, Albrecht, Jaramillo Gómez, and Vélez Angel 
left the meeting feeling very enthusiastic and quite certain that the new Minister was on 
their side and ready to help them solve the problem of scarcity. As they later 
commented: “…it seems evident that in a few weeks, the skies will have cleared for the 
baking industry, exhausted by the tremendous weight of scarcity and high production 
costs.”80 That month, ADEPAN also announced that it was conducting a detailed study 
of speculation in the flour market, to determine how bad it had really become. They 
intended to present the results of their investigation to the Ministry of Development 
and to the Secretary of Economic Affairs, part of the president’s cabinet.81 As if leaving 
no bases uncovered, that month ADEPAN also roundly praised INA and the incredible 
                                                 
79 “El nuevo Ministro de Agricultura,” PC No. 9 (July 1958): 12. 
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work it had been doing to combat high prices and scarcity. “Few public entities have 
fulfilled their missions the way that INA has,” ADEPAN claimed in El Panadero 
Colombiano, and despite “diverse” criticism, “it has overcome obstacles and created an 
atmosphere of public confidence.” So great was the work it was doing combating 
speculation, ADEPAN declared, that the government needed to increase its budget and 
allot it more resources, actions which would help to “satisfy the public’s desire to see 
balance between political democracy and…economic democracy.”82 
Although the directors of ADEPAN were probably sincere in their praise of INA, 
it seems hardly coincidental that the very same month they also sent a letter to Enrique 
Vargas Nariño, the manager of INA, asking him not only to increase the amount of 
flour imported to the country, but also to grant bread makers the necessary licenses to 
freely import “qualified flours” – a special subset of flour needed for mechanized 
baking, and already used by the cookie and pasta industries, which had official 
permission for such imports. ADEPAN hinted at the unfairness of allowing companies 
such as Noel to import such flour, while prohibiting the bread-baking industry from 
doing so, despite the fact that there were mechanized bread-makers who also required 
it. Moreover, the requested increase in basic flour was quite substantial: an immediate 
shipment of 20,000 tons and a monthly shipment of 3,500 tons after that.83         
As earlier indicated, these efforts to cultivate a wide variety of government 
ministers, cabinet members and administrators at a time of major political transition 
                                                 
82 “El Ina contra la escasez y los altos precios,” PC No. 10 (August 1958): 15. 
83 “Por una nueva importación de harina,” PC No. 9 (July 1958): 7-8. 
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was accompanied by stronger, and more direct, accusations against the millers, such as 
the assertion made in August 1958 that 
Everywhere around the world, the milling and baking industries are seen 
as complementary, overlapping, and contiguous; as such, they work in 
close harmony and great confidence. But between us [in Colombia] it is 
undeniable that the millers have declared a callous and exhausting price 
war against the bakers.84     
 
Whether such accusations were persuasive is unclear. Continuing shortages, 
spiraling costs for consumer goods, and increasing urban and labor unrest, on the other 
hand, were quite persuasive, and led INA to approve ADEPAN’s August 1958 request 
for a small amount of “American” grain to be allotted to them on a monthly basis, so 
that they could grind it and sell the flour on their own.85 Where this grain was to be 
milled was left unstated. One possibility is Molino Pam Pam (Pam Pam Mills) in 
Bogotá. Pam Pam was co-owned by Hernando Vélez Angel and Jorge Sierra T., both 
board members of ADEPAN. This was the only apparent case of such crossover, but 
whether it was singular or not, it suggests that the grain granted to ADEPAN in August 
1958 was being ground by its in-house millers.86 ADEPAN sold the “highest quality” 
flour produced from this grain to bakers for twelve pesos less than the millers’ official 
price of $170.00 pesos for 112½ kilos. Lest ADEPAN be accused of undercutting the 
millers with these reduced prices, they were quick to add that in some parts of the 
country, speculation had driven the cost of flour to $205.00 pesos for the same quantity 
and quality.  
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Two hundred additional tons of grain on a monthly basis (the amount INA 
allotted to ADEPAN) was certainly enough to keep the baking industry afloat, but most 
definitely not enough for it to thrive. Fortunately, ADEPAN’s efforts to cultivate all of 
those government ministers and administrators (as well as to publicize their plight in 
the media) seemed to pay off with an important invitation.87 On August 9, Alberto 
Lleras Camargo convened a meeting between himself, the Ministers of Finance and 
Economic Development (Hernando Agudelo Villa and Rafael Delgado Barreneche, 
respectively) and the leaders of some of the main business associations in Colombia at 
the time. Aside from the three major ones – ANDI, SAC, and FEDECAFE – these 
included the Banking Association, the National Association of Coffee Exporters (a rival 
to FEDECAFE), the Federation of Colombian Exporters, the National Federation of the 
Metallurgic Industry, the National Association of Drug-Makers, FENALCO, and 
ADEPAN. The meeting’s central topic was stabilization of the national economy and 
the president and ministers outlined their plans regarding taxes, monetary policy, 
exchange rates, credit, and promotion of productive activities. They discussed how all 
of the government’s various agencies would work collaboratively to implement these 
plans.88  
After the presentation by the president and the two ministers, representatives 
from all of the associations present attended a smaller meeting, at which they ratified a 
“Gentlemen’s Agreement” to stabilize prices. Specific details about the agreement, or 
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what transpired during negotiations are absent in El Panadero Colombiano’s report. 
Traces of discord at the meeting are evident, however, in the general statements about 
the importance of the meeting for Colombia’s consumers and bakers. Extolling the 
value of the monthly allotment of grain granted by INA, ADEPAN asserted that its 
efforts on behalf of bakers would save the industry over one million pesos annually, 
savings which, conceivably, would be passed on to consumers. Moreover, ADEPAN 
claimed that for the foreseeable future, grain production would not increase in 
Colombia, and further flour imports would thus be required in order to keep baking 
costs down and bread prices affordable.89 
Notice that ADEPAN suggested that the solution to the shortage of flour in 
Colombia was not increased importation of grain, which could have been converted to 
flour by Colombia’s millers, but of grain already converted to flour by milling 
companies in the United States. ADEPAN further proposed that from an economic 
standpoint, it made sense to “study all of the aspects connected to wheat importation, to 
determine if it makes more sense for Colombia to intensify the importation of flour, and 
progressively decrease the importation of wheat.”90  
For Colombia’s millers, these could have been fighting words, and in the next 
sentence ADEPAN conceded that “…this opinion is not unanimously shared, as the 
millers naturally believe that the root of the problem is not flour, but the availability of 
grain.” While ADEPAN’s report on this meeting was not by any means a blow-by-blow 
account of the proceedings, its statement regarding the position of the millers suggests 
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that such arguments may have indeed been made as the representatives of the various 
associations negotiated their “gentlemen’s agreement.”91  
But based on the list provided in El Panadero Colombiano, the millers’ association 
was not even present at the meeting. The subsequent assertion by ADEPAN, countering 
the (apparent) objections of the millers, indicates who might have been speaking on 
their behalf:  
…we really must take into consideration that Colombia has experienced 
abnormal growth in the milling industry; the country has three times the 
milling capacity it actually requires to meet its current consumption needs. 
The millers need to recoup losses on their capital investment through high 
prices on flour destined for commercial use.92 
 
 A 1964 study of the wheat milling industry indicated that 80% of Colombian 
mills were using technology that was at least thirty years old, and in quite a few cases, 
fifty. Their milling capacity was, correspondingly, quite low. Nevertheless, the study 
concluded that only approximately 50% of the total milling capacity available in the 
country at the time was actually necessary to meet Colombian demand for wheat 
products. Overcapacity was the result of a small minority of intensely capitalized, 
highly mechanized industrial millers who had invested in the latest technologies, 
perhaps in the days of the coffee bonanza in the early 1950s, but had never been able to 
fully utilize or make profit from their investments, due to consistent grain shortages 
and stagnant consumer demand. Some of these highly capitalized, industrial millers 
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had strong connections to ANDI, and that association was likely speaking on their 
behalf at the meeting to ratify the agreement on price stabilization.93  
While ADEPAN did not immediately achieve its goal of initiating a study to 
determine if it was more economical to import wheat or flour, its presence at the 
meeting attests to its growing stature with the newly installed Lleras Camargo 
administration and provided it with another opportunity to contrast its willingness to 
work toward “economic rehabilitation” with the millers’ apparent lack of interest in 
collaborative efforts toward national recovery. Read one way, to state that “the spirit of 
cooperation that the country needs right now was palpable among the associations 
present at the meeting,” simply described what ADEPAN’s representatives observed of 
the meeting’s mood. But, if one remembers that the millers association, for whatever 
reason, was not in attendance, the statement also displayed the whiff of a gibe at 
ASEMOL – a reminder of who did and did not have the country’s best interests in 
mind.94  
ADEPAN’s subtle hints about the millers were apparent even when they were 
discussing other things. For example, at one point, ADEPAN outlined a series of 
proposals it intended to make to the Ministers of Finance, Agriculture and Economic 
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Development. These included a campaign to increase bread consumption, assistance in 
the modernization of the bread-baking industry, and greater collaboration between the 
milling and baking associations. The first two proposals seem reasonable enough, but 
the third is odd. Why would the government need to help promote collaborative efforts 
between two private business associations? Rather than offering a legitimate solution to 
a problem, its inclusion appears to signal the uncooperativeness of ASEMOL and the 
subsequent insistence that the two industries “….really were connected and 
complementary” practically belabors the point. Such innuendos continued over the next 
several weeks. The following month, for instance, ADEPAN made a similarly 
suggestive statement when it reported that the country’s “most important associations” 
had been honoring the price stabilization agreement, even though there was not “total 
uniformity” at the national level. Worded this way, ADEPAN benignly described the 
national situation, expressed its hope that all of the associations would come on board, 
and underhandedly criticized ASEMOL all at the same time.95 A month later, in 
October, the lack of collaboration between the two associations, and the continued 
resistance of some sectors to implement the price controls stipulated by the 
“Gentlemen’s Agreement” prompted ADEPAN to lament that as long as some 
industries remained “isolated,” efforts to stabilize prices and keep living costs down 
would be “unfruitful.”96  
Of course, Colombia’s millers did not ignore ADEPAN’s accusations and 
insinuations, and rebutted with criticisms of their own. As can be imagined, one of the 
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most serious centered on the 200 tons of grain that had been allotted to ADEPAN on a 
monthly basis beginning in August 1958. Although many people questioned why grain 
that had been imported for the millers was being diverted to the bakers, clearly, no one 
questioned this more vociferously than the millers themselves. Two months after INA 
approved the monthly allotments, ADEPAN found itself having to answer the millers’ 
questions about this policy. In a full-page defense, ADEPAN first described the unstable 
flour market that prompted their initial request to INA, decrying, once again, the 
horrible effects of scarcity, speculation and rising prices for flour on bakers and 
consumers. Everyday Colombians were, in fact, the foundation of ADEPAN’s defense, 
claiming that the only people who could oppose INA’s policy were those who put “the 
interests of monopolies and speculation” above “workers and consumers.” Moreover, 
ADEPAN argued, the policy was beneficial in a number of respects; aside from 
supplying bakers with the materials they needed and helping to prevent scarcity of 
bread, it bolstered efforts to stabilize prices, improved the morality of the marketplace 
(thus discouraging continued speculation), set good standards for future business 
transactions, and reduced “social decomposition” by encouraging greater associative 
activity – a vital element at a time of national rehabilitation. As if to emphasize 
ADEPAN’s commitment to working collaboratively for the public good, the very next 
paragraph of their defense returned to their by-now standard accusation against the 
millers – essentially, that they weren’t team players and were not interested in helping 
the nation recover from economic and political instability:  
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In the current circumstances, it is obvious that the baking industry is at the 
mercy of the millers and subject to their will. Although milling and baking 
are complementary and linked industries, in Colombia, each one goes its 
own way, causing great malaise and considerable disruptions.97  
 
Ironically, the bakers’ forceful response to the millers’ question about the 
allotments from INA came at a time when the method of ADEPAN’s attacks on the 
millers began to shift. While in previous months almost half of the editorials, articles 
and news items in El Panadero Colombiano directly charged the millers with speculation 
or uncooperativeness, in the October 1958 issue, aside from the negative statements 
made in their defense of the 200 ton allotment, and one other editorial reiterating 
ASEMOL’s lack of collaboration with the price stabilization agreement, the issue was 
notable for the dramatic change in tone.98 This is not to imply that they were no longer 
criticizing the millers; on the contrary, their attacks continued, but they were done in a 
much more subtle, and perhaps more powerful, way.   
That month, ADEPAN published the second part of a three-part series about 
milling technologies in different regions around the world, specifically those that do 
and do not produce wheat. Penned by Gordon P. Boals, the Director of the Export 
Program at the Millers’ National Federation of the United States, the series combined 
history, technology, economics and social policy to argue that it was uneconomical for 
countries such as Colombia to have flour mills, especially modern ones.99 The first 
article in September focused on mills in regions where wheat was both produced and 
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imported, such as Europe.  Boals began with a short history of the connection between 
baking and milling, which was that they generally grew in tandem with each other, 
meeting local demand using local supply, but that late nineteenth century advances in 
terrestrial and maritime shipping technologies permitted the transportation of flour 
across much longer distances, leading to commercial flour production on a much larger 
scale. Milling capacity had, consequently, increased exponentially, particularly in the 
main exporting countries of Canada, the United States, and Australia, but also in 
“importing countries” as well. According to Boals, in 1958, many importing countries 
had milling capacity that far exceeded local supply, and they began to ask for 
government protection for their industries, mainly consisting of higher import tariffs for 
flour than for grain. This was “anti-economic,” Boals argued, as it increased the price of 
bread for consumers, while decreasing its quality (since the protected mills produced 
poorer quality flour). Although Boals recognized that food shortages in Europe during 
and after World War II contributed to an accelerated effort to reconstruct destroyed 
mills or build new ones, once the immediate problem of meeting “insatiable demand” 
for bread had been solved, the error of building so many mills with the new 
technologies become apparent. Long-term costs had not been taken into consideration 
and led to the expensive mistake of protecting milling industries – a sorry state of 
affairs, when it would have been cheaper to simply import flour from the “exporting 
countries.” Fortunately, according to Boals, many of those European countries had 
recognized the error of their ways and had begun to “rationalize” the milling industry, 
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a policy which basically meant closing unproductive ones and dropping high tariffs for 
flour.100  
While Boals was sympathetic to the post-war sense of urgency that drove the 
short-sighted economic policy of extensive mill-building in Europe, he was far less 
magnanimous to the originators of milling over-capacity in regions that did not 
produce wheat at all. These regions were generally in the “tropics” or “semi-tropics,” he 
explained, were often “economically backward,” and in many cases, were islands or 
colonial territories of a European power. Southeast Asia, coastal West Africa, Central 
America, the Caribbean, and northern South America were mainly where these “non-
producing” regions were located. Nevertheless, due to several decades of importation 
of well-known brands of flour, many countries in these regions were considered 
“traditional markets.”  
Boals’ second article in the series was clearly an anti-ECLA screed. For example, 
after his explanation of why these regions were considered “traditional markets,” he 
claimed that 
…the exportation of flour to these regions has been like the importation of 
coffee or bananas to the United States. It was a natural kind of trade in 
products that the other country needed and didn’t produce.101  
 
While “dependency theory” had not yet been fully elaborated, Prebisch’s Theory of 
Unequal Exchange most certainly had, and was, even as Boals wrote, being employed 
by a variety of Latin American nations as they implemented import substitution 
development policies. To suggest, then, that the exchange of coffee and bananas for 
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wheat was a natural (and by implication, equal) trade, may have been an effort by Boals 
to discredit protectionist policies in general, and ISI and inward-looking development 
ones in particular. 
This seems even more likely considering Boals’ subsequent discussion of 
countries that had recently ousted European colonial powers and declared 
independence. Nationalism had become an “active force’ in these regions, Boals 
asserted, and “economic development with improvements in generally low standards 
of living has become a common battle-cry.”102 At the same time, many of these countries 
were experiencing the twin phenomenon of population growth and massive rural-to-
urban migration, both of which had the effect of increasing consumption of and 
demand for flour and wheat products. Boals cited statistics from the International 
Wheat Council demonstrating that between 1949 and 1954, the consumption of wheat 
products in many of these developing countries had increased between ten and twenty 
percent, and in others, flour imports had doubled during the same period. Demand was 
expected to continue to rise for the foreseeable future, especially in the “Far East” and 
throughout Latin America.103  
According to Boals, this is when the story took a “strange” and “unexpected” 
turn. “Promoters,” of various stripes had taken advantage of the combination of 
nationalist economic policies and increasing demand for wheat products to encourage 
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the sale of modern milling equipment. These promoters included the manufacturers of 
milling machinery (particularly those based in Europe), grain exporting interests, 
highly-capitalized investors (again, mainly European) looking to diversify their 
portfolios, and investors with little capital, but great willingness to take risks “with 
other people’s money” and make wild promises that they would be able to help the 
new millers obtain concessions from their governments to freely import grain without 
paying tariffs. As Boals indicated, when those concessions failed to materialize, the 
investors claimed that they had done the best they could, but owed the millers nothing, 
leaving them to seek protective tariffs against flour imports on their own.  
Boals then painted a stark picture of the experience and effect of these mills in 
regions of the world where wheat was not produced. First of all, they consistently faced 
an uncertain supply of grain. Disruptions in international trade and bad harvests in 
exporting countries could cause a mill in a non-producing country to shut its doors. 
Second, modern mills in non-productive regions wreaked havoc on employment 
figures. These mills required fewer, more highly trained, workers, and in many cases, 
these were brought over from other countries, since the local workforce did not have 
the requisite skills. More significantly, stevedores lost their jobs as flour imports were 
reduced, a serious problem as dock-work was a major source of employment in these 
so-called “backward” countries. Third, unless the demand for animal feed was equally 
as high as the demand for flour, these mills produced flour of consistently poor quality. 
Generally, during the milling process 25% to 30% of the ground grain was converted to 
animal feed. If there was no market for this feed, millers extracted a greater percentage 
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of flour from the grain. This meant that the resultant flour included a significant 
amount of undesirable “residues” which greatly diminished its quality. Apparently, 
this was particularly a problem where there was a monopoly in the milling industry. 
Finally, these mills reduced governments’ budgets. Tariffs on imports were an 
important source of revenue for many of these countries, but, in many cases, when 
these mills were established they were granted concessions which allowed them to 
freely import grain without paying the normal tariffs. According to Boals, in one 
(unnamed) country, such concessions to modernized milling interests led to a 
budgetary crisis for the government. 
The third article in the series essentially picked up where the second left off, 
reminding readers that while mills used to exist only where wheat was grown and that 
modern mills could easily make a wide variety of flours of different quality and grades. 
He also condemned the growth of milling around the world, claiming that milling 
capacity had grown so large that the total amount of flour that could theoretically be 
produced in a day far exceeded daily consumption throughout the world. Finally, he 
concluded his three-part series by reiterating that new mills in regions where wheat was 
not produced were a drain on government revenues and bad for consumers who had to 
suffer from poor quality flour, especially in comparison to the high-quality flour of the 
exporting countries, such as the United States.”104 
                                                 
104 Gordon P. Boals, “Consideraciones generales sobre la molienda de harina,” PC No. 13-14 (November-December 
1958): 12-13. A significant, but rather odd, sub-point in Boals’ fourth conclusion was that these mills were also a 
vulnerable industry because their “vital and conspicuous character” meant that they could easily become crucial 
targets of a military operation. Once again, the destruction of European mills during World War II served as a 
warning. Multi-million dollar modern mills would be even more difficult to replace or rebuild, he cautioned, if they 
were attacked during a conflict. 
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Logical fallacies, internal inconsistencies, racist assumptions, and a little bit of 
Cold War paranoia clearly plague all three of the articles in this series.105 Those defects 
aside, the series was an important part of Colombian bakers’ revised strategy in their 
struggle with the millers. With the new Lleras Camargo administration in power, the 
possibility that another PL 480 contract could be negotiated seemed high, and the 
bakers clearly needed as many allies in their camp as possible. ADEPAN had, in fact, 
begun an informal campaign to promote the renewal of the PL 480 contract several 
months earlier, at the same time as it had stepped up its efforts to court members of the 
incoming administration. The roots of this campaign partly lay in the 25-day tour of the 
United States’ wheat industry in June 1958 by Fabio Jaramillo Gomez, ADEPAN’s 
general manager. Invited and sponsored by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Jaramillo 
was accompanied on the tour by Dr. Douglas Botero Boschel, general manager of 
ASEMOL, Dr. Luigi Marengon, president of the National Pasta-Makers Federation 
(FEDEPAS), and Dr. Rafael Camacho, president of SAC. Jaramillo left deeply impressed 
with the U.S. wheat industry, describing it as both “powerful” and “rational.” Although 
                                                 
105 For example (and in no particular order): 1) If mills are a significant military target, then wouldn’t it make sense to 
have more of them, rather than less, in case one was attacked? 2) Similarly, it seems rather condescending to assume 
that wars only take place outside of the United States (or the other main exporting countries of Canada and 
Australia). 3) In the second article, he first says that the promoters have often been unsuccessful at getting 
concessions for new (or newly modernized) mill owners to freely import grain, but then later says that such 
concessions are a serious problem for many governments in these countries, because they reduced their revenues so 
significantly. So, have these promoters been successful or not? 4) To definitively link milling with wheat (and thus 
“western civilization” via Europe and the Middle East) discounts the importance of milling in civilizations that 
predate the “Western” one, such as China, and in places where wheat was not consumed, such as Central Mexico and 
Central America. 5) Why are the development aspirations of newly-independent countries discounted as 
“nationalist,” while the policies he would have these nations adopt – which are ultimately also “nationalist” in that 
they help wheat growers, machinery manufacturers, millers and shipping companies in the United States (rather 
than machinery manufacturers in Europe or wheat growers in developing countries) – described with the term 
“economic” (as opposed to “anti-economic”), which gives them an aura of scientific objectivity and universality? 6) 
Why would stevedores lose jobs? Flour imports go down, but grain imports would go up, theoretically canceling out 
any loss of work unloading ships in ports. 
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it seems implausible that Dr. Camacho would have agreed, according to Jaramillo, the 
tour members came to the unanimous conclusion that the only way to prevent 
insufficient wheat production in Colombia from causing severe flour shortages, 
speculation, and high prices was to import more wheat and flour from the United 
States.  Whether Dr. Camacho agreed or not, Jaramillo concluded his report on the tour 
with great confidence that the Colombian government would take ADEPAN’s proposal 
to import more wheat and flour seriously, especially because the consequences if it did 
not was a “critical situation” of bread scarcity and disruption in an industry that 
employed over 110,000 people.106  
That same month, ADEPAN responded to attacks on the PL 480 program in the 
national press. Critics claimed that it was nothing more than a commercial endeavor, an 
opportunity for the United States to sell its surplus crops. Calling such condemnation 
“unjust,” ADEPAN outlined the Minister of Agriculture’s response to these criticisms. 
Dr. Jorge Mejia Salazar was, of course, in the final weeks of his tenure as Minister, soon 
to be replaced by Espinosa Valderrama; nevertheless, he conducted an “exhaustive” 
and “careful” study of the program, determining in the end that the United States had 
acted “…in harmony with the spirit and letter of Public Law 480,” and that the program 
was a useful resource for a developing country such as Colombia, with a variety of 
positive effects. These included preventing scarcity, preserving foreign reserves, and 
ensuring stability in the milling and baking industries. Acknowledging the programs’ 
critics, ADEPAN added that, while PL 480 did indeed defend some of the United States’ 
                                                 
106 “Regresó de los Estados Unidos El Gerente de Adepán,” PC No. 9 (July 1958): 14.  
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own economic interests, it did so in a way that provided great assistance to developing 
countries with which it had “profound financial and spiritual links.”107  
Ultimately, for ADEPAN, the economic benefits of the PL 480 program for the 
United States seemed irrelevant if it equally benefited Colombia. As long as the country 
was not “self-sufficient” in wheat, ADEPAN argued, it should not refuse any kind of 
available help, especially at a time when the country was laboring to recover financially 
and socially from a “…prolonged reign of chaos, violence and political conflict.” 
Fortunately for ADEPAN, Espinosa Valderrama, the incoming Minister of Agriculture, 
fully agreed with their position and that of his predecessor, Mejia Salazar. In the same 
article in which ADEPAN defended PL 480, they reported that Espinosa Valderrama 
had also studied the program, also shared the conclusion that it was beneficial for 
Colombia, and believed that ADEPAN’s calls for its renewal were “valid and 
justified.”108  
Violence was again discussed the following month in another defense of the PL 
480 program. Colombia’s inability to supply itself with all of the grain it needed was 
only partially a consequence of the violence that had caused so much disruption and 
dislocation in rural areas, ADEPAN argued. Paucity of credit and a shortage of proper 
farming equipment (due to Colombia’s credit problems and dwindling foreign reserves) 
wreaked as much havoc, and rehabilitating the parts of the nation that had been 
“bathed in blood” during the recent phase of violence would require not just political 
                                                 
107 “Un bien para Colombia: El Pacto de Excedentes Agrícolas,” PC No. 9 (July 1958): 15. 
108 Ibid.  
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compromise and a new spirit of cooperation, but infusions of credit and farm 
machinery as well.109  
But political and economic rehabilitation would take time, and without a renewal 
of the PL 480 contract, ADEPAN warned, might not happen at all. The consequence of 
the by-now familiar scenario of flour shortages leading to the collapse of the bread-
baking industry was extrapolated to the entire project of rehabilitation: “…it would 
aggravate social problems and amplify the disruptive factors that impede national 
prosperity.” Colombia would only be able to overcome many of its social and economic 
problems, ADEPAN’s argument continued, after it recognized that it was not, and 
would never be, a self-sufficient country, at least as far as wheat was concerned. For 
that reason, it made no sense for the country to deny itself the advantages offered to it 
through the PL 480 program. It was only by ignoring the social effects of not renewing 
the contract with the United States that the program’s “enemies” could advance their 
claims, ADEPAN concluded.110 
“Self-sufficiency” in wheat – or better yet, Colombia’s lack of it – was a common 
denominator in both of ADEPAN’s efforts to defend the PL 480 program, as well as 
Jaramillo Gómez’s report on his tour of the U.S. wheat industry. Note how neatly they 
dovetail with Boals’ three-part series on milling in wheat importing countries. Together, 
these constitute a new strategy for the bakers in their struggle with the millers. How so? 
Boals’ articles, by focusing as they did on the “big picture” – on the contemporary 
global situation rather than solely on Colombia – gave the articles an aura of 
                                                 
109 “Todavia no podemos autoabastecernos,” PC No. 10 (August 1958): 14.  
110 Ibid. 
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impartiality that any discussion by ADEPAN of milling overcapacity in Colombia could 
never have. That impartiality, combined with Boals’ elevated position within a major 
U.S. industrial association, ensured that his conclusions about the viability of milling 
industries in wheat importing countries would be more likely to be taken seriously by a 
wider variety of people in Colombia, particularly those important government 
ministers who had the power to re-negotiate trade agreements. In other words, 
ADEPAN had called in an expert. Of course, while he may have been an expert, Boals 
was hardly an impartial observer, as Colombian millers themselves later pointed out 
and which will be discussed in a subsequent section. Nevertheless, his observations on 
the “anti-economic” nature of milling industries in wheat importing countries 
strengthened ADEPAN’s own arguments about the devastating consequences of 
Colombia’s lack of self-sufficiency in wheat.  
And again, in September 1958, ADEPAN needed as many allies as possible. 
During the previous July and August, as ADEPAN simultaneously attacked the millers’ 
uncooperativeness and greed, while defending PL 480 imports, they never made any 
definitive statements regarding the importation of grain versus flour. As Jaramillo 
Gómez’ report explicitly indicated, “everyone” on the tour had agreed that Colombia 
needed to import both. In the August defense of PL 480, neither grain nor flour were 
mentioned specifically. Rather, imports were referred to in general terms: “…while we 
do not produce what internal demand requires, we need to continue the indispensable 
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imports.”111 Neither grain nor flour were mentioned explicitly and the statement could 
be construed to refer to both or either.  ADEPAN dipped its toes into that controversy 
that same month at the meeting to negotiate the price stabilization agreement, when it 
proposed a study to determine which one was more economical to import. But, even 
then, it had made no definitive statements (in writing anyway) on the issue. It would, in 
fact, be another year and a half before ADEPAN declared outright that INA should 
import only flour, rather than flour and grain.  
Nevertheless, by September 1958, ADEPAN’s preference for imports of flour 
over grain was already apparent. Insistent reminders throughout July and August that 
Colombia was not self-sufficient in wheat laid the groundwork for Boals’ arguments 
about the harm of milling in wheat importing countries. Simply proposing a study of 
which was more economical to import, as ADEPAN’s representatives at the meeting on 
the Gentlemen’s Agreement had done, suggested that they already had an opinion on 
the subject. But in September, even as increasing scarcity and a growing sense of 
urgency took hold, ADEPAN recognized that it would be useless to fight the powerful 
interests representing the milling industry. The price of flour in Medellín and on the 
Atlantic Coast reached $260 pesos for 112½ kilos, almost $90 pesos more than the 
official price.112 ADEPAN asked for immediate shipments of American flour and INA 
approved the request. This, however, was only a short-term solution to an immediate 
problem; in the long-term, the country faced the “unavoidable necessity for a rational 
flour import regimen in order to prevent the complete collapse of the bread-baking 
                                                 
111 Ibid.  
112 “Importaciones de harina americana,” PC No. 11 (September 1958): 13. 
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industry.” But, with those powerful milling interests in mind, ADEPAN immediately 
added that, “naturally,” increased flour imports would be accompanied by a 
corresponding proportional increase in grain imports, so as not to cause disruptions or 
losses in the milling industry.113  
Evident in this statement is ADEPAN’s recognition of the circumstances in the 
country at the time. José Gutiérrez Gómez, Colombia’s ambassador in Washington, was 
trying to negotiate a new PL 480 contract and it was unlikely, given the power of the 
milling interests, that it would dramatically decrease imports of grain in favor of 
increased imports of flour. At the same time, although they had been subtly and not-so-
subtly attacking Colombian millers and their association for months, ADEPAN had also 
been simultaneously attempting to forge stronger ties with ASEMOL and work 
collaboratively with them on projects of mutual interest, such as campaigns to increase 
wheat consumption in the country. Thus, the new strategy of reiterating Colombia’s 
status as “non-self-sufficient” in wheat production, and discrediting milling industries 
in importing countries allowed ADEPAN to continue to make its arguments about the 
need for increased flour imports, without unnecessarily provoking ASEMOL and 
simultaneously working to forge greater cooperation between the two organizations.  
It may have been a good strategy. The following month ADEPAN reported that 
the PL 480 contract had been re-negotiated and on quite favorable terms for Colombia. 
Approximately US $7,400,000 worth of wheat and wheat products was to be imported 
to Colombia in 1959 – 64,000 tons of grain, and 25,000 tons of wheat products, including 
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flour for bread, pasta and cookies. Better yet, the stipulation that Colombia purchase 
30% of that amount in dollars rather than pesos – put in place during the dark months 
of economic instability toward the end of the Rojas Pinilla regime in 1957 – was 
eliminated. Colombia could now purchase the entire amount in pesos, an enormous 
benefit that would help to preserve the country’s foreign reserves.114 Moreover, aside 
from the improvements in the contract, the Colombian government announced an 
additional measure to help stabilize the milling and baking industries as well as the cost 
of living, and to promote the increased consumption of wheat products. The Ministry of 
Agriculture had agreed to reduce the price of the imported grain and flour for millers 
and bakers to such a level that it effectively cut the regular import tariffs in half.115  
Clearly, this was a very welcome measure for Colombia’s millers and bakers. The 
new contract was not without its negative effects, however, as ADEPAN acknowledged 
when it indicated that all the grain would be, as usual, purchased by INA, and released 
periodically, so as to avoid a glut on the market, which could harm both millers and 
wheat growers. Dr. Henry Hopp, the U.S. Agricultural Attaché in Colombia, also 
indicated that a great deal of care had gone into the negotiations, to ensure that the new 
                                                 
114 Of course, Colombia was also required to purchase an additional 40,000 tons at the market price in dollars. This 
was designed to ensure that normal commercial relations were not disrupted. It also reflects the ultimate purpose of 
the PL 480 program, which was not merely to “dump” surplus crops in any given year anywhere that people would 
buy them, but to forge long-term commercial ties between grain producers in the United States and buyers in 
“developing countries.” The success of the program was, in fact, measured in the United States, by how much grain 
(and flour) had been sold through commercial channels, and if the program had contributed to an increase in those 
sales. See Joseph Rick Welsh, “PL 480 Title I and Market Development,” Washington: USDA, Foreign Agriculture 
Service, FAS Staff Report No. 28, December 1992.  
115 “Favorable modificación al acuerdo agrícola,” op.cit. Interestingly, this contradicts the Einsenhower 
administration’s records. According to the tenth semi-annual report, there was no PL 480 agreement signed between 
Colombia and the U.S. from July 1, 1958 to June 30, 1959. See “The Tenth Semi-Annual Report on Activities Carried 
out under Public Law 480, 83D Congress, As Amended, Outlining Operations under the Act during the Period 
January 1 through June 30, 1959,” (Washington: House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 
206, July 30, 1959), 43.  
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contract complemented Colombian wheat production instead of weakening it. Never-
the-less, ADEPAN reported that the nation’s press had “exhaustively examined” the 
terms of the new contract and “welcomed it without reservations,” while the nation’s 
economists had “all agreed” that the new contract would create new jobs in the milling 
and baking industries and “rapidly increase the supply of and demand for articles of 
primary necessity [such as bread].”116  
The renewal of the PL 480 contract reduced the sense of urgency and ushered in 
a new period of greater cooperation between ADEPAN and ASEMOL. Scarcity was still 
a problem of serious proportions – the same month that El Panadero Colombiano 
announced the contract, it also reported that ADEPAN had requested that INA 
immediately release “considerable quantities” of flour in Medellín, Cali, Ibague, 
Girardot, Neiva, and “other important cities” so that the baking industry in those places 
would not become paralyzed.117 Scarcity’s cousin, speculation, also continued, but 
millers in general were no longer considered the culprits. Rather, it was a small subset 
of “rogue millers” causing all the problems: 
…ADEPAN will always be opposed to any outbreak of speculation in the 
flour market, whatever its origin. But it will duly try to determine those 
                                                 
116 Ibid. That not everyone in the press so enthusiastically endorsed the new terms of the contract is clear from a short 
news item in the very same edition of El Panadero Colombiano, reporting that the agricultural minister, Espinosa 
Valderrama, had responded to negative statements about the PL 480 program which appeared in Semana, a major 
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That Colombia’s wheat growers were concerned about the renewal of this contract is also evident in a letter from 
Lewis M. Roberts, the Director of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Colombian Agricultural Program to the Director of 
the foundation’s Natural Sciences Division, James G. Harrar in September 1958. Lewis noted that Espinosa 
Valderrama was a lawyer-politician, who did not understand agriculture at all. Roberts expressed his concern for the 
program’s future and indicated that he and everyone else associated with it was pessimistic about the prospects for 
agricultural development in Colombia with Espinosa Valderrama heading the Ministry. See RAC, RF, RG 1.2, S 311, 
Box 3, Folder 15, “Letter from Lewis M. Roberts to James G. Harrar, dated September 13, 1958.” 
117 “Noticias breves,” PC No. 12 (October 1958): 4. 
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responsible, so that the leaders of the milling industry will not be misled by 
unscrupulous intermediaries who do not care about the collective good [of 
their industry].118 
 
Identifying the sources of speculation and scarcity became, in fact, a major pillar 
of an agreement reached between ADEPAN and ASEMOL at the end of 1958. The 
agreement consisted of two major collaborative activities: promoting consumption of 
wheat products and combating speculation. Agreeing to work together to develop 
campaigns promoting wheat products was logical; while ASEMOL and ADEPAN may 
have disagreed on the source and solution to the flour shortage in Colombia, they could 
certainly agree that low demand affected both of their bottom lines equally. Describing 
the agreement as “transcendental,” ADEPAN hoped that their collaboration with 
ASEMOL would contribute to the nation’s economic development. They also expected 
that the Ministry of Agriculture, the SAC, and INA would wholeheartedly join 
ADEPAN and ASEMOL in their efforts.119 
To a significant degree, ADEPAN’s new collaboration with ASEMOL was more 
symbolic than anything else. The previous year ADEPAN had already begun its own 
efforts to promote wheat consumption, and had enlisted a powerful collaborator from 
the start. Rather than focusing solely on bread, ADEPAN emphasized general good 
nutrition, discussing not only the importance of a balanced diet and the value of milk, 
eggs, nuts, fruits, vegetables, and grains, but also issues such as nutrition education in 
schools and homes, establishing regular mealtimes for children, the importance of 
                                                 
118 “Colaboración de Asemol,” PC No. 13-14 (November-December 1958): 22. 
119 “La labor de ADEPAN en 1958,) PC No. 13-14 (November-December 1958): 18-19. 
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family meals, and the impact of nutrient-rich food on children’s school performance.120 
The emphasis on general nutrition was codified in the establishment of a “Department 
of Nutrition” within the organization in late 1957. Although it focused primarily on 
nutrition education, the popularity of its pamphlets, newspaper articles, and radio and 
television programs surged after ADEPAN organized a charity drive in December 1957. 
While it might seem that it was in the spirit of the Christmas season that member 
bakeries donated bread to 500 working-class families in Bogotá, it was actually 
prompted by the desperate economic situation Colombia faced as a result of the 
continuing devaluations of the peso introduced by the military junta in power at the 
time. An editorial in El Espectador lamented the desperate situation in the country, 
describing how hunger had become ubiquitous not only in the homes of the city’s 
poorest residents, but in middle class ones as well. Roundly praising the charity 
campaign, the editorial extolled the spirit of cooperation and selflessness among 
ADEPAN’s member bakers as an excellent example of what was required of Colombia’s 
business owners in general in order to overcome the country’s economic and social 
malaise. Partially as a result of this good publicity, ADEPAN’s bi-monthly Wednesday 
night television program grew so great in popularity that they proposed expanding it to 
a weekly format. Between the television program and the broadcasts on Radio 
                                                 
120 See, for example: “Hoy tenemos que enseñar a los niños para que sean buenos clientes mañana,” PC No. 4 
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“Nutrición para niños, Serie IV,” PC No. 10 (August 1958): 25-26; “Nutrición para niños, Serie VI, Necesidades 
Alimenticias de los Niños Escolares,” PC No. 11 (September 1958): 25-26; “El mani y su valor en la alimentación,” PC  
No. 15 (January 1958): 29-20. 
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Sutatenza, ADEPAN claimed to reach over 400,000 Colombians with information about 
good nutrition.121  
The only four women who played a central role in ADEPAN were all connected 
in some way to the nutrition program. Carolina Gutiérrez was one of the association’s 
two nutritionists. In early 1959, when the Lleras Camargo administration was preparing 
to send “equipos polivalentes” (“polyvalent teams”) to rural areas affected by violence 
as part of the government’s rehabilitation program, it hired ADEPAN, and Gutiérrez 
specifically, to conduct a short course on nutrition for the teams’ members.122 Alina R. 
de Florén was a nutritionist for both ADEPAN and FEDEPAS, the pasta-makers 
association. El Panadero Colombiano’s inaugural issue contained an article by de Florén 
on how to cook pasta and the following issue contained another on the history of bread. 
Most of her articles, in fact, mixed nutrition with history, often making associations 
between wheat consumption and Western civilization. In the first article on pasta, for 
example, she began by stating that it had long been the traditional food of the Italians 
and that Italy was the cradle of Western civilization. A more disturbing example is 
found in her article on how much bread Colombians consumed, when she asserted that 
“the history of the white races, in other words, the human races to which we belong, is 
founded on a diet that has bread at its core.”123  
Ana Quintero was a well-known figure among Bogotá’s homemakers. She had 
her own column in El Espectador focusing on nutrition, fine dining, and good hosting, 
                                                 
121 “La campaña de ADEPAN,” PC No. 2 (December 1957): 18; “Noticias breves,” PC No. 8 (June 1958): 4. 
122 “Noticias breves,” PC No. 16 (February 1959): 4.  
123 Alina R. de Florén, “Como cocinar las pastas alimenticias,” PC No. 1 (November 1957): 12; de Florén, ¿Cuánto pan 
consume un colombiano?,” PC No. 4 (February 1958): 14-18. 
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regularly appeared on ADEPAN’s nutrition-focused television program, and wrote 
pamphlets with culinary tips and recipes that circulated in grocery stores and large 
bakeries throughout Bogotá. These free pamphlets were distributed twice a month and 
were “highly prized by Bogotá’s ladies.” In early 1959, plans were being made to 
broaden the distribution of the pamphlets to “other important cities throughout the 
country where there has traditionally been an interest in improving the family diet.”124 
Quintero’s articles and recipes were also regularly published or reprinted in El Panadero 
Colombiano. 
The fourth woman connected to the association’s nutrition efforts, for example, 
was neither Colombian, nor directly employed by ADEPAN. Joellene Vannoy was an 
“expert nutritionist” from the United States, with a Ph.D. and “vast experience” in the 
field. Although she directed ADEPAN’s nutritional programs, she was actually 
employed by the Millers’ Federation, and was one of its representatives in Colombia.125 
The impact of the federation on ADEPAN in general, and its nutrition program in 
particular, is simultaneously impossible to overstate and difficult to locate. On the one 
hand, ADEPAN itself plainly acknowledged the role of the federation on several 
occasions. Describing the “transcendence” and “significance” of the “efficient 
collaboration” of the Millers’ Federation in September 1958, for example, ADEPAN 
extolled how its “invaluable technical assistance” had “materialized in intense and 
robust campaigns to increase the consumption of bread in the country, which greatly 
                                                 
124 “Noticias breves,” PC No. 15 (January 1959): 4; “El pueblo debe y puede alimentarse mejor,” PC No. 16 (February 
1959): 20. 
125 “Seminario de Nutrición,” PC No. 11 (September 1958): 14; “Fomentemos el consumo de trigo,” PC No. 12 
(October 1958): 30; “Ilustres visitantes,” PC No. 20 (December 1959): 21. 
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improves the nutritional level of the everyday diet.”126 Financial assistance also appears 
to have supplemented the technical kind; ADEPAN’s year-end report in 1958 indicated 
that the support of the Millers’ Federation had enabled them to expand the distribution 
of free pamphlets and continue the television program.127 Their cooperative work on 
nutrition education was so successful, it earned “great applause from the official 
sphere” and sparked new collaborations with the National Nutrition Institute, the 
Ministries of Public Health and Economic Development, and the Inter-American 
Cooperative Service on Public Health.128 Evidence that the “official sphere” was indeed 
impressed by the collaborative nutrition program is evident from the hiring of Carolina 
Gutiérrez by the Ministry of Agriculture in January 1959; representatives from the 
Millers’ Federation were asked to come with her.129 Moreover, Vannoy was not the only 
representative from the Millers’ Federation with some degree of oversight on 
ADEPAN’s nutrition program; in late 1957, Dr. Francis H. Thurber, also from the 
Federation, was the “General Director” of the Nutrition Program.130 
Direct statements highlighting the role and importance of the millers’ federation 
occupy relatively few of the pages of El Panadero Colombiano. However, partly due to the 
evocative use of words such “transcendent” to describe the assistance of the Millers’ 
Federation, those few direct statements raise questions about its influence on the 
content of other pages. This is where the role of the Millers’ Federation becomes 
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difficult to locate. Reprints from magazines around the world regularly appeared in El 
Panadero, for example. In itself, this is not particularly noteworthy; considering, 
however, the fact that almost all of the reprinted articles focusing in some way on 
nutrition came from U.S. sources, while reprints focusing on general baking industry 
issues such as hygiene, labor relations, or new baking techniques, came almost 
invariably from European ones, makes the issue of reprints noteworthy indeed and 
raises the question of the role of the Millers’ Federation in the magazine’s content. For 
example, an article on the need for better-trained workers in the rapidly modernizing 
baking industry was reprinted from the Spanish magazine, Panadería y Molinería (and to 
further complicate matters, appears to have been originally published in a French-
language baking magazine).131 Another article from the same Spanish magazine 
discussed financial matters, arguing that every baker needed to pay himself a regular 
salary rather than messing up the bakery’s finances by “borrowing” money from the till 
and filling the cash drawer with IOU’s.132 Similar such articles were reprinted from Il 
Panettiere and Le Patron Boulanger.133 In contrast, an article describing how to help 
children withstand the “calorie-counting” and “weight-reducing” obsessions of their 
mothers by teaching them good nutrition from an early age, and encouraging them to 
not be afraid to eat bread – which would ultimately ensure that they became reliable 
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bakery clients as adults – was reprinted from El Panadero Latinoamericano, a magazine 
based out of Houston, Texas.134  
A July 1958 article in El Panadero Colombiano did not indicate that it was a reprint. 
However, the author was Lawrence Zeleny, a Czech-American biochemist who 
specialized in cereal chemistry. Zeleny had developed a widely-used test for 
determining wheat sedimentation. Although Zeleny wrote confidently about wheat 
production and cereal consumption around the world, he did not seem to have any 
particular interest in Latin America and neither was there any indication that his article 
on the role of cereal science in improving human nutrition was written specifically for 
El Panadero Colombiano. Thus, it seems safe to conclude that it was reprinted from 
elsewhere, especially since much of the argument for enriching wheat flour with 
vitamins and minerals was based on the experience of various countries in Asia, which 
had reduced the incidence of beriberi through rice enriched with thiamine, niacin, and 
iron.135  
While Zeleny’s article could seem to be a rather unremarkable discussion of 
vitamins and minerals in flour, several details suggest otherwise. Zeleny’s portrait of 
global flour production and consumption consists of a populace in the United States 
consuming vitamin-enriched flours and experiencing a simultaneous decrease in the 
diseases or conditions associated with vitamin B or niacin deficiency contrasted with a 
populace in “other corners of the world” suffering from diseases that could be 
prevented if they ate more cereal products made from vitamin-enriched flour. 
                                                 
134 “Hoy tenemos que enseñar a los niños para que sean buenos clientes mañana,” PC No. 4 (February 1958): 10. 
135 Lawrence Zeleny, “La ciencia cerealista y la nutrición humana,” PC No. 9 (July 1958): 21-22. 
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Certainly, such flours were available outside the United States; in Colombia, two 
associated mills - “Molinos Cundinamarca” and “Molinos La Concepción” – produced a 
brand of vitamin-enriched flour called “Vitaminarina” with the technical assistance of 
Hoffman-LaRoche Laboratories.136 Never-the-less, considering the role of the Millers’ 
Federation in directing ADEPAN’s nutrition program, it seems likely that Zeleny’s 
article in El Panadero Colombiano was designed to strengthen the case for importing flour 
from the United States. 
Malnutrition was certainly a serious problem in Colombia at the time.137 And 
ADEPAN’s nutrition campaign did address that problem. But, the program was 
designed to increase consumption of bread in order to improve bakers’ bottom lines as 
much as the rates of malnutrition in the country. 
 
                                                 
136 Advertisement for “Vitaminarina,” PC No. 1 (November 1957): 2. 
137 As a 1957 Planning Document indicated in a development plan for that year, “The average nutrition level remains 
low, close to 2,100 calories, with serious lack of healthy and vitamin-rich foods.” AGN, RP, Fondo Comité Nacional 
de Planeación, B 291, F 13, f 138. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Wheat is King, Barley a Distinguished Young Lady: Improved Seeds, Import 
Substitution, and Self-Sufficiency  
 
 
 Raspa and Pocha were descendents of barley seeds brought to Colombia shortly 
after the Conquest. By the 1940s, they were the most commonly used “regional 
varieties” in the highlands of Colombia’s eastern cordillera – the high altitude plains in 
the departments of Cundinamarca and Boyacá.  Until 1943, barley production in 
Colombia was a very small-scale agricultural industry; only about 6,000 tons were 
grown annually. Commercial production began that year, however, and by 1954, 
Colombia was producing 79,000 tons, an expansion achieved by increasing the land 
area under barley cultivation and using mechanized farming methods. Yet, despite such 
rapid expansion, it was still insufficient. To meet the commercial needs of brewing 
companies, the consumer demand for human and animal food products, and the 
requirements of seed multiplication entities, Colombia needed approximately 110,000 
tons of barley each year.1  
Imports had been making up the 31,000 tons difference, but that strategy was 
becoming increasingly untenable. The dramatic drop in global coffee prices beginning 
in 1955 – one of the worst “coffee busts” in Colombian history – was wreaking havoc 
with the country’s foreign reserves, making it difficult for importers to acquire the 
                                                 
1 Estebán Rico Mejía, “El cultivo de la cebada en Colombia,” Almanaque Creditario 13 (1956): 51-56. Conflicting 
numbers exist for barley production. According to one of these, Colombia produced 69,000 tons and required 100,000 
tons, which, nevertheless, results in the same 31,000 tons deficit. See RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 10, “En dos años 
Colombia no tendrá deficit de cebada,” El Tiempo, April 16, 1955. That Rico Mejía’s projections would be higher is 
unsurprising, considering his work with the Bavaria Beer Consortium on developing Colombian barley production, 
as will be discussed in a subsequent section.  
 214 
materials they needed from foreign suppliers.2 Colombia’s contemporary economic 
policies also emphasized protectionism and substitution of imported goods and 
agricultural commodities. Industrialists, farmers, economists, and the general public 
referred to these policies by a term that reflected their ultimate goal: self-sufficiency. 
The Bavaria Beer Consortium was one of the commercial entities in Colombia most 
committed to this goal. As much as possible, it sought to purchase all the manufactured 
and agricultural raw materials it needed from Colombian suppliers. If such a supplier 
didn’t exist, Bavaria created it.3 Thus, with national self-sufficiency at the core of its 
business model, finding a way to increase domestic barley production by at least 31,000 
tons annually became one of Bavaria’s major priorities. 
In 1956, Estebán Rico Mejía, a Bavaria agronomist, outlined three possible 
methods: 1) expand the areas under cultivation; 2) modernize farming methods; and 3) 
improve the seed varieties. The first method was not viable, however; competition for 
land in the regions suitable for barley growing was too intense. As Rico Mejía warned, 
“it is impossible to predict how much [expanding barley fields] would impact the 
productive zones of other crops such as wheat, potatoes, and cold-climate corn, which 
have similar soil and weather requirements as barley.”4 
Rico Mejía’s recognition of the complications involved in seeking to alter land 
use patterns in the highlands of the eastern cordillera hint at a major problem with the 
                                                 
2 Kalmanovitz and López Enciso, La agricultura colombiana; Palacios, Café en Colombia; Saénz Rovner, Colombia años 50; 
Safford and Palacios, Fragmented Land. 
3 Malterías Unidas (malt), Fenicia (glass bottles), Tapas y Envases (bottle caps), and Procebada (barley) are just a few 
of the companies or organizations founded by Bavaria to provide raw materials for beer making. See, “La tarea de 
Bavaria,” Negocios 5 (March 1959): 365-370. 
4 Estebán Rico Mejía, “El cultivo de la cebada en Colombia,” Almanaque Creditario, Vol. 13 (1956): 51-56. 
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goal of self-sufficiency: in what exactly was the country to be self-sufficient? Resources 
were limited after all – there was only so much land available at the right altitude to 
grow barley, and that was precisely in the heart of the potato and wheat growing 
region, and imported inputs or tools such as fertilizers and tractors were still necessary, 
while the foreign reserves to purchase them were dwindling. While economists, 
planners, and government officials debated these questions, business leaders, farmers, 
and agronomists engaged in a variety of strategies to promote their particular point of 
view. They formed associations, lobbied the government, sought alliances with other 
actors, both national and foreign, and created their own programs to promote their 
vision of agricultural self-sufficiency. This was particularly so in the case of wheat and 
barley. Rico Mejía’s suggestion that competition for land in the Colombian highlands 
presented a serious obstacle to increasing barley production only scratched the surface 
of the conflicts between promoters of these two different grains. Price policies, market 
stability, access to credit and technical assistance, strength of lobbying associations, and 
use of funds from the U.S. PL480 surplus crops program (which favored national barley 
production, to the detriment of wheat) all came into play. Wheat promoters worked 
hard to raise public awareness of these issues. Nevertheless, the national conversation 
often focused instead on the scientific factors related to wheat’s appropriateness for 
cultivation in the tropics. In other words, economic issues were masked by scientific 
ones and this served to obscure the powerful economic interests working behind the 
scenes to influence the outcome of this conflict.5 
                                                 
5 That barley promoters succeeded in obscuring those interests is evident in contemporary studies of Colombian 
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This chapter will bring those issues to light. Four sections follow. The first 
describes the efforts by the Bavaria Beer Consortium to develop an improved barley 
variety and promote it among farmers in the 1950s. The latter efforts included 
guaranteed sales, stable prices, and credit assistance. The second section contrasts this 
with the much weaker wheat campaign organized by the Caja de Crédito Agrario, 
Industrial y Minero, the nation’s largest farm credit agency. It outlines the more 
unstable market conditions wheat growers faced as they battled the nation’s millers, 
who preferred imported grain over domestic. The third section describes the 
negotiations in the late 1950s among several of Colombia’s largest manufacturing 
concerns (Bavaria among them), the Ministry of Agriculture, and the U.S. government 
to develop a Colombian fertilizer industry financed through loans derived from the 
importation of wheat under the P.L. 480 surplus crop program. The last section 
examines efforts by barley and wheat promoters to control national discourse about 
cereal production in Colombia.  As barley began to overtake wheat in Colombia’s 
highlands, barley promoters worked hard to downplay the effect of the favorable 
                                                                                                                                                             
economic history. In 2006, for example, Salomón Kalmanovitz and Enrique López Enciso, two of Colombia’s most 
well-known economists, argued that protectionist policies stalled the country’s economic development. Citing cereal 
grains as evidence, they argued that the protectionist measures cereal growers insisted upon in the 1950s and 1960s 
made wheat scarcer and more expensive. This was particularly unfortunate, they claimed, as those crops were 
“naturally” suited to more temperate climates, where cold winter temperatures kept pests and weeds under control, 
unlike Colombia, which needed heavy inputs of pesticides and herbicides to keep cereal grains healthy. The end 
result was that “the country ended up producing only a small part of the wheat it consumed, importing the rest.” 
Several things are striking about these claims, beginning with the unlikely coincidence that they are precisely the 
same as those that one set of cereal promoters (barley growers) made about the other set (wheat growers) in the late 
1950s. But, even more striking is the assertion that protection for a plant that was unsuitable for the country’s climate 
led to low production and the need to import. As this chapter will show, quite the opposite was true. A host of 
economic pressures, that had nothing to do with protection, discouraged wheat growers from continuing to sow that 
cereal. Prices, market stability, lack of credit or technical assistance, and ultimately, a plan among Colombia’s 
industrial producers of cigarettes, textiles, and beer to develop the nation’s fertilizer industry through funding 
provided by the U.S. PL 480 food assistance program – contingent on acceptance of imported wheat – were far more 
important factors than climate in decimating Colombian wheat production. Thus, the assertion by Kalmanovitz and 
López demonstrate how effective the strategies to obscure those market issues in the 1950s were. See Kalmanovitz 
and López, La agricultura colombiana, 193. 
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market factors for barley growers, and claim instead that better scientific research 
enabled its growers to achieve such spectacular success. This placed Colombian and 
U.S. wheat breeders in an awkward position. As scientists affiliated with the 
Department of Agricultural Research and the Rockefeller Foundation, they firmly 
believed that science held the answer to social issues such as hunger and malnutrition. 
But, the efforts of the barley promoters forced them to publicly acknowledge the limits 
of science. In the process, they became the strongest proponents of market regulation, 
price supports, and other forms of technical and economic assistance for farmers.  
 
Bavaria, DIA, New Seeds, and Market Intervention 
Estebán Rico Mejía and José Antonio Sierra first met as students at the Faculty of 
Agronomy in Medellín in the mid 1940s. Both were born in 1924, the former in 
Abejorral in Antioquia, and the latter in Sogamoso in Boyacá. After graduating in 1947, 
Rico Mejía went to work for private agricultural interests and gained expertise in plant 
genetics. Sierra finished his studies in 1950 and immediately went to the United States 
for a Masters’ degree at the University of Wisconsin. Fate reunited them in 1951 when 
both were hired by the Bavaria Consortium to develop an improved barley seed.6  
Rico Mejía and Sierra began their work to develop a new variety with a common 
first step used by plant breeders around the world: collecting samples of and 
information about the country’s existing varieties, some of which had been cultivated in 
Colombia since the colonial era. Months of traipsing through the barley fields of 40 
                                                 
6 “La multiplicación de la cebada y de los pesos; 91 millones cosechan dos agrónomos,” La nación agrícola: Una revista 
para agricultores y ganaderos progresistas (July 1961): 7-11. 
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different farmers in Cundinamarca, Boyacá and Nariño, noting the differences in ears, 
leaves, stems, flowers, cuticles, and pollen revealed an enormous family: 89 types and 
1,300 lines were discovered, of which 880 were eventually selected for experimentation 
and crossing. Samples from other countries were requested as well. Over 6,400 varieties 
arrived from the Cereals and Diseases Division of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
along with 90 from Ecuador, 50 from Brazil, and 15 each from Mexico and Argentina.7 
The native varieties were planted at the “Francisco José de Caldas” experimental 
farm located near Bogotá. Careful observations of their yield, environmental reactions, 
and resistance to disease, among other things, led them to narrow the selection to 100 
lines, which were then transferred to the experimental stations at Tibaitatá and Bonza. 
These were later crossed with some of the imported lines and 25 of the resultant crosses 
were selected for continued observation. At the same time as the varieties were 
carefully observed for their performance in the field, they were also tested in the 
laboratory for their malting and brewing capabilities.8 
In these efforts, Rico Mejía and Sierra had the assistance of the plant breeders 
from the Rockefeller Foundation, who were in the country as part of the foundation’s 
Colombian Agriculture Program (CAP). Early in the campaign to find a new barley 
seed, Bavaria had enlisted the support of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Caja Agraria 
(a quasi-governmental credit agency), and the Rockefeller Foundation. The 
collaborative effort among these three agencies and the Bavaria Consortium that 
                                                 
7 “La multiplicación de la cebada,” op. cit.; “Cebada,” RNA 50, (June 1956): 40-42; RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 10, 
“En dos años Colombia no tendrá déficit de cebada,” El Tiempo, April 16, 1955. 
8 “La multiplicación de la cebada,” op. cit. 
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emerged in 1952 was eventually partially funded by a ten-cent tax imposed on every 
kilo of imported barley. Responsibility for managing the monies collected through the 
tax was handed to the Caja Agraria’s “Revolving Development Fund.” The Rockefeller 
Foundation assisted Rico Mejía and Sierra, monitoring the growth of the varieties and 
crosses, and keeping records about temperatures and soil conditions. And the Ministry 
of Agriculture was the official entity that housed the research program of the 
Rockefeller Foundation in Colombia. In addition to these permanent collaborators, the 
USDA’s barley expert, Dr. G.A. Weibe, visited the Tibaitatá and Bonza experimental 
stations for three weeks in July 1953 to offer assistance and advice.9 
Imposition of the ten-cent tax was not without controversy. Nowhere in Decree 
0654 of March 3, 1954 is “Bavaria” mentioned. Only the Caja Agraria, Ministry of 
Agriculture, and the Rockefeller Foundation are indicated by name. Responsibility for 
“carrying out projects of technical and scientific research to obtain healthier, purer, and 
superior quality varieties” is attributed to “the State,” albeit “carried on cooperatively 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Rockefeller Foundation.”10 Noting that the 
climate and soil conditions in the cold-country regions of the nation were “propitious 
for growing barley at an industrial level,” and that it was a crop required not only for 
the brewing industry but for food products that were also high in demand, the decree 
indicated that the tax would cover both the costs of the research at Tibaitatá and the 
Caja Agraria’s campaign to promote barley cultivation in Cundinamarca, Boyacá, and 
                                                 
9 “En dos años,” op. cit.; “Cebada,” op.cit; “La multiplicación de la cebada,” op.cit. The author of “La multiplicación” 
claims that this was only a five-cent tax, but the decree itself clearly states that it was ten-cents.  
10 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 9, Letter from LMR to JGH dated March 17, 1954. Translation in original. 
 220 
Nariño. The decree stressed that this tax was in addition to regular import tariffs and 
applied to all importers.11 
Not all importers were pleased about this new tax, however. Lewis M. Roberts, 
CAP’s director, worried that it had “created a considerable amount of ill feeling among 
the officials in the brewing companies.”12 It seems unlikely that the beer companies that 
were part of the Bavaria Consortium would have been terribly upset by this tax, 
however, since it was their idea in the first place and the monies generated were 
returned directly to their own industry. But not all beer companies were part of the 
consortium, and it was unclear that this tax would ultimately benefit those unaffiliated 
with Bavaria.13  
Roberts’ primary concern was the impact of having the Foundation mentioned 
by name in a decree instituting a new tax. His supervisor in New York, Jacob George 
Harrar, brushed aside his concerns, pragmatically observing that “decrees of this sort 
are never very popular with the people who have to pay the tax,” and arguing that the 
additional funds generated by the tax might benefit the barley project. More 
importantly, in any case, was his the positive effect it would have on Colombian 
economic development. As he noted, the tax was necessary if Colombia hoped to 
achieve its import substitution goals:  
…if the government believes that such a tax should be levied in an effort to 
improve barley production in Colombia, then obviously it is strictly a 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Angel Vallejo, 100 años de Bavaria. One such beer company was also one of the country’s largest – Cervecería Unión, 
based in Medellín, Antioquia, which was also where the CAP was headquartered at the time, thus suggesting that 
Roberts would be more sensitive to Cervecería Unión’s concerns about the tax. 
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governmental decision, and the importers will have to conform. In the long 
run, I think such a tax might be very helpful in making it possible for 
Colombia to become self-sufficient in the production of malting barley.14 
 
Overall, however, this joint public-private barley improvement program was 
enthusiastically endorsed and with Sierra, Rico Mejía, the breeders of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Caja Agraria, Bavaria, and even a 
representative of the USDA all on board and working toward the development of a new 
and improved barley variety for Colombia, the dozens of lines and crosses swaying in 
the breezes blowing on the experimental fields of Tibaitatá and Bonza must have 
generated intense excitement and filled the hearts of those involved with great hope for 
a promising future for Colombian agriculture.    
Nevertheless, it was almost by accident that a natural cross with most of the 
requisite commercial characteristics was discovered growing wild in the fields of José 
Maria Giraldo, a farmer on the Sabana de Bogotá. The local origins of FR-12-52, as it had 
been known, were honored by giving it a name in Chibcha, the language of an 
indigenous group in Colombia.15 Although it had some flaws, “Funza” was resistant to 
a variety of diseases and had higher yield than Raspa and Pocha. Farmers could expect 
                                                 
14 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 9, Letter from JGH to LMR dated March 30, 1954.  
15 There is great irony in this name, considering the history of Bavaria and alcoholic beverages in Colombia. For 
centuries the alcoholic beverage of choice for many people of popular class extraction was chicha, made from 
fermented corn.  Bavaria was established in 1889 and its product competed with chicha for the next four decades. 
Beginning in the 1930s, the newly formed Bavaria Consortium initiated an anti-chicha campaign. Unsurprisingly, its 
main goal was to increase beer consumption. But this goal was concealed in rhetoric about hygiene. Chicha, even into 
the 1930s, was generally produced in small batches by hand, and the home-made nature of production was painted 
as unhygienic by the campaign’s organizers. Racist imagery regarding the indigenous origin of the beverage 
accompanied the discourse of hygiene. For almost two decades Bavaria waged an anti-chicha campaign, which 
ultimately met with great success in 1949, when the national government prohibited its production. By the end of the 
1950s, the most widely consumed alcoholic beverages in Colombia were aguardiente and beer, depending on the 
region. The association of hygiene with beer (and the corresponding lack of hygiene with chicha) was still evident at 
least as late as 1990, when, in an official history of the Bavaria Beer Company in celebration of the company’s 100 th 
anniversary, the author wrote of how chicha was produced “without any controls” and was therefore unhygienic. See 
Angel Vallejo, 100 años de Bavaria, 99.  
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to harvest 1,950 kilos per hectare rather than the 1,250 kilos with the other varieties. It 
also had a growing season of only 130 days, which was 15 to 30 days shorter than Raspa 
and Pocha. Given the country’s climatic conditions, this ensured that barley farmers 
could have two harvests per year rather than just one. After further genetic tests, 
breeding experiments, and study of its characteristics, Funza was declared “pure” and 
several farmers, including Giraldo, were asked to multiply the seed. All of them had 
farms in wheat-growing municipios (municipalities) of Cundinamarca, such as Soacha, 
Bosa, Madrid, and Mosquera. Thirty-five tons were available for commercial release by 
the end of 1954. The following year, forty different farmers in Cundinamarca, Valle, 
Caldas, and Boyacá were recruited to increase the multiplication efforts, resulting in 800 
tons of seed. With two harvests per year and an increased yield of 700 kilos per hectare, 
the Bavaria Consortium seemed to have engineered a fabulous import substitution 
success. Funza’s increased yields promised that Colombia would soon cover its 31,000 
tons deficit. Observers speculated that Colombia would be self-sufficient in barley by 
1957.16  
Indeed, Funza was rapidly adopted by highland farmers. While in 1954, Funza 
accounted for only 1% of the total barley produced in Colombia, by 1956 it accounted 
for 20%. A year later, half of the barley produced in Colombia was Funza. By 1960, that 
amount had practically doubled, to 95%. Over that same period of time, total 
production increased from 79,000 tons annually to 150,000. Profits also increased 
proportionally for Funza farmers. In 1955, farmers’ average Raspa and Pocha yields of 
                                                 
16 “La multiplicación de la cebada,” op. cit.; “En dos años,” op. cit.; “El cultivo de la cebada,” op. cit.; “Cebada,” op. cit.; 
RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 10, Juan Lamus Cáceres, “La tierra y el hombre,” El Tiempo, April 16, 1955. 
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1,250 kilos per hectare earned approximately $512 pesos. Only a year later, using Funza, 
that same hectare produced 2,442 kilos and earned $1,002 pesos.17  
Increased yields alone do not fully explain Funza’s rapid acceptance, however, 
and the expanded production was based on much more than genetic “improvements.” 
Bavaria recognized that many factors affected the adoption and success of Funza. 
Effective extension, easier access to credit, and market stability were all required if 
farmers were to take the risk of switching to the new barley seed. Technical assistance 
was crucial. While farmers certainly already knew how to cultivate and manage their 
fields, Bavaria wanted them to increase production and that required more than an 
improved seed. Rico Mejía estimated that even without the use of Funza, “production 
could be increased by 25% through the utilization of advanced practices on barley 
fields.” But this could only be achieved, he asserted, through “intensive educational 
efforts” teaching farmers the agricultural practices necessary to increase yield.18 Proper 
use of harvesting machinery was high on the list. Inadequate attention to the harvesting 
techniques had resulted in significant losses in previous years. Soil management, 
pesticide application, irrigation, and drainage were also important. Extension agents 
providing the information barley farmers needed were essential under these 
circumstances. While the pool of trained extension agents in Colombia at the time was 
still small, their numbers were slowly growing, and Bavaria made good use of the few 
                                                 
17 “La multiplicación de la cebada,” op. cit. Profits reflect gross receipts. Left unmentioned in the articles extolling the 
financial benefits of Funza for barley farmers is the higher cost of fertilizer and pesticide inputs these seeds required. 
Unless otherwise noted, “$” denotes Colombian pesos.  
18 “El cultivo de la cebada,” op. cit. This is not to suggest that farmers did not already know how to cultivate and 
manage their fields, only that they needed to adopt new cultivation practices if they wished to increase their yields.  
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available. Hired by Bavaria, and working in conjunction with the Caja Agraria, agents 
fanned the countryside in the barley-growing regions, spreading information and 
providing demonstrations.  
Training was important, but market stability also mattered. Farmers had to be 
certain that they could sell their harvests at a reasonable price. Unlike wheat, barley was 
not subject to price regulation by INA, and there were no intermediaries between 
growers and malting companies. To ensure that Funza farmers could sell their harvests, 
Bavaria intervened to provide a minimum level of protection. It promised farmers that 
it would purchase every last bushel of barley they produced – and kept its word, 
thereby ensuring market stability and encouraging more farmers to switch to barley 
production. Together with the RF, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Caja Agraria, 
Bavaria then implemented a comprehensive credit and extension program for new 
Funza farmers. This program provided them with all the technical and financial support 
they needed to successfully grow the new seeds. Combined with a guaranteed market, 
it was a persuasive campaign.19 
Wheat’s situation was quite distinct. The process of developing new wheat seed 
varieties was similar to that for barley. To some degree, the wheat campaign was even 
more successful, at least in the seed development stages. By its fourth year of operation 
(1953), the wheat breeders at the CAP had developed two different varieties that were 
appropriate for Colombia’s wheat-growing areas. “Menkemen” had already been sent 
                                                 
19 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 10, Juan Lamus Cáceres, “La tierra y el hombre,” El Tiempo, April 16, 1955. 
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over to the Caja Agraria for seed multiplication and distribution to farmers.20 By 1954 
over 1,000 tons of Menkemen had been planted in Cundinamarca and Boyacá. 
Meanwhile, “Bonza” was in development but was already considered superior to 
Menkemen: it was resistant to a rust fungus that plagued many varieties of wheat 
around the world (including Menkemen). Soon afterward, the Caja Agraria began 
multiplying it and planned to make it available to the public early in 1955.21 A year 
later, 113 tons of Bonza had been planted on 65 farms, and the RF expected that enough 
seed would be available by 1956 to plant approximately 13,500 hectares. In its 1954-55 
report on the CAP, the RF made special mention of the Caja Agraria’s Revolving Fund, 
which was the entity within the Caja in charge of seed multiplication and distribution. 
The RF praised the “commendable speed” with which Bonza was being increased, and 
suggested that such efficiency and speed would minimize any danger to Colombia’s 
wheat output presented by Menkemen’s inadequate resistance to rust fungus.22 
Unfortunately for the CAP and those affiliated with it, things got off to a bad 
start in 1954. Bad luck befell farmers who tried Menkemen that year. Unexpected frosts 
killed the pollen and reduced yields “in some cases to zero” – resulting in a rash of bad 
publicity, which affected seed sales the following year.23 Market instability 
compounded the problem. An influx of imported wheat played a role, as the Sociedad 
de Agricultores de Colombia (SAC) claimed in early 1955, when it pledged to support 
                                                 
20 Menkemen’s name resulted from combining the names of the two principal seed varieties crossed to produce it – 
“Mentana,” a variety that had been developed originally in Mexico and transferred to Colombia in 1950, shortly after 
the CAP began, and “Kenya,” one of the varieties that had arrived from collections around the world and used for 
observation and crossing in Colombia.  
21 RAC, RF, Agricultural Reports, CAP, Annual Reports, 1953-1954. 
22 RAC, RF, Agricultural Reports, CAP, Annual Reports, 1954-1955, 59. 
23 RAC, RF, Agricultural Reports, CAP, Annual Reports, 1955-1956, 47. 
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the next growing season’s wheat seed campaign, and thereby “prevent heavy [wheat] 
importations which can discourage farmers from sowing improved.”24  
Market instability was not entirely random or unpredictable. The SAC’s efforts to 
curtail imports attest to awareness that the domestic wheat market needed support. The 
RF and the Ministry of Agriculture also acknowledged this when they recognized that 
high yield and resistance to fungi and pests were not the only criteria determining a 
new hybrid seed’s potential for success. Equally important was its market acceptability. 
As the RF noted, 
…practically all wheat products are commercially processed before they 
reach the ultimate consumer. This means that an improved variety must 
meet the exacting requirements of processors – chiefly the millers and 
bakers – before it can pass the test of market acceptability.25 
 
Recognizing this, one of the first things that the RF did at the main experiment 
station was to establish a farinology laboratory staffed by Colombian chemists who 
conducted a variety of milling and baking tests on grain and flour. In 1954, this lab 
reported that, although the flour produced by Bonza and Menkemen was inferior to the 
flour produced by select varieties of North American wheat in some quality measures, 
such as color and protein content, it was equal or superior to those varieties in other 
measures, such as loaf volume. 
Despite this, serious problems emerged once the new varieties were released on 
a large scale. Apparently, after the first successful harvest, rumors about its poor 
performance in the milling process spread quickly in the countryside. Pessimism 
                                                 
24 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 10, “700 toneladas de trigo Bonza serán distribuidas este año,” El Tiempo, January 9, 
1955.  
25 RAC, RF, Ag Reports, CAP, 1953-54, op. cit., 66-68. 
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increased as horror stories circulated of farmers’ difficulties selling it. Many of them, 
arriving at millers with loads of grain produced by Menkemen seed, were told that it 
was a “horrible” variety and were forced to sell it at “ruinous” prices. The result was a 
serious setback in the Caja Agraria’s wheat campaign promoting the improved 
varieties. Farmers around the country watched the debacle of falling prices and decided 
that they would “…return to growing ‘Bola’ wheat, the variety traditionally grown in 
Colombia.”26 Hard evidence of who was responsible for spreading these rumors was 
difficult to track down, but fingers were pointed at the millers themselves.27 
Juan Lamus Cáceres, in his “Earth and Man” column in El Tiempo, was 
particularly vehement in his condemnation, describing how the milling industry had 
essentially “tied farmers’ hands,” leaving them no choice but to sell at excessively low 
prices and accusing the millers of lacking patriotism: 
…if these people’s attitudes had been different, the agricultural nation, the 
wheat-growing nation would be optimistic and dedicated to duplicating 
[new varieties] and thereby creating a [sufficient] supply. But civic 
consciousness, a sense of honesty, and the concept of patriotism are 
attributes that few people have…Nobody wants to work collaboratively, 
nobody wants to search for practical methods of growth through 
cooperation and association. Very few think in terms of the nation.28 
 
Meanwhile, as Lamus Cáceres reminded his readers, improved varieties of 
barley had met with great success. He praised the “patriotism” of Bavaria, contrasted it 
with the lack of such sentiment on the part of the millers, and pointed out that because 
                                                 
26 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 10, “Colaboración en la campaña triguera piden a los molineros,” El Tiempo, April 
16, 1955.  
27 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 10: “Colaboración en la campaña triguera piden a los molineros,” El Tiempo, April 
16, 1955; Juan Lamus Cáceres, “La tierra y el hombre,” El Tiempo, April 16, 1955. 
28 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 10, Juan Lamus Cáceres, “La tierra y el hombre,” El Tiempo, April 16, 1955. 
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of its initiative, the SAC had agreed to build malting factories, and thereby freed 
Colombia from reliance on “foreign markets” for almost every step in the beer-making 
process.29  
Dependence on foreign markets was clearly a vexing problem for Lamus 
Cáceres. Just two weeks later, in another “Earth and Man” column, he declared that “it 
was shameful that Colombia continued to import wheat, flour, and semolina [when 
scientists] such as [those] from the Rockefeller Foundation believe that we can produce 
here what we need to meet our needs.”30 Millers were once again the targets of his 
wrath. He wrote that they spread the idea that self-sufficiency was not possible and that 
they did so not out of genuine concern for the welfare of the nation, but because they 
speculated with imported wheat in a number of ways. Worse still, he suggested that 
they had the means to “psychologically manipulate” wheat farmers and convince them 
that improved varieties were useless – an idea, according to Lamus Cáceres, that was 
contrary to the “national interest.” Citing studies demonstrating that national varieties 
of wheat produced the same quality bread as that produced by Canadian varieties, 
which was from where the majority of the annual “rivers of wheat and flour” came, 
Lamus Cáceres proposed two solutions to the twin problems of reliance on foreign 
imports and insufficient national production. The first was that the government needed 
to stop the spread of “vicious lies” about national wheat varieties that circulated during 
                                                 
29 Ibid. At first glance, it is unclear why the SAC, an association of farmers, would suddenly decide to become 
industrialists and build a factory. When one considers, however, that many industrialists in Colombia had significant 
land holdings (and vice-versa), the line between “industrialist” and “farmer” becomes less clear and makes this 
proposal more understandable.  
30 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 10, Juan Lamus Cáceres, “La tierra y el hombre,” El Tiempo, April 29, 1955. 
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harvest time. The second was that millers needed to be compelled to contribute to 
extension and credit programs to assist wheat farmers, as it seemed unfair to him that 
the farmers should bear all the burden of experimenting with the new varieties on their 
own. Parallels with the collaborative Bavaria program are unmistakable. 
Clearly, for Lamus Cáceres self sufficiency was a goal not only for commercial 
crops, but for alimentary ones as well. Although Caja Agraria figures for 1955 showed 
that more land was still dedicated to wheat production (92,565 hectares) than to barley 
(53,000 hectares), without comprehensive efforts to promote production, there was no 
guarantee that such a balance would continue in the future.31 Scientific and 
technological innovation mattered a great deal in preserving that balance, but 
extension, access to credit, and market stability mattered as well. The scientific work 
was increasingly standing on solid ground. Just a year after Lamus Cáceres lambasted 
the millers for their lack of patriotism, the news from the farinology lab at Tibaitatá was 
better than ever. Reporting on the results of tests of experimental and hybrid varieties 
from a variety of “yield trials, multiplication fields, and small plots,” which consisted of 
667 milled wheats and 1,606 baked samples, the RF wrote that, “All of the wheats, with 
the exception of the check varieties Bola Picota and Menkemen, were of acceptable 
quality for bread.” True, they were on the low side of acceptability in some measures 
such as flour yield and test weight per hectoliter, but were acceptable none-the-less. On 
the other hand, “water absorption, mixing time, and loaf volume of the flours were 
                                                 
31 Departamento de Investigaciones Económicas, Producción nacional en Colombia (Bogotá: Caja de Crédito Agrario, 
Industrial, y Minero, 1955).  
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good to excellent.”32 In the future, the success of programs designed to increase wheat 
production would lie not in the lab, but in the extension agent’s ability to work well 
with farmers, with the Caja Agraria’s (and other agencies) willingness to extend credit, 
and the national government’s efforts to nurture the crop both through protective trade 
policies and price stabilization. How committed were Colombia’s wheat promoters to 
providing or ensuring the availability of this entire package? What steps were they 
willing to take to defend alimentary self-sufficiency? The next two sections examine 
these issues and questions, showing how problems providing credit and extension and 
protecting the market demonstrate the direction in which the nation was heading – 
toward an ISA policy, for tierra fria at least, focused on commercial crops.  
 
Prices, Procebada, INA, and SAC 
In April 1957, Pedro Bernal E., the president of SAC, grew tired of national 
economic policies that favored urban residents and consumers over the nation’s 
farmers. He expressed his frustration in a letter to Luis Bernal, the manager of INA. At 
the time, the price of harvested grain was set by INA, in an attempt to keep the cost of 
flour and bread within the means of the poorest of Colombian consumers.33 This was 
particularly important in the midst of the peso devaluations, dwindling foreign 
                                                 
32 RAC, RF Agricultural Reports, CAP, Annual Report 1956-57, 42, 49. 
33 INA managed a wide variety of market segments, controlling the amounts of grain and flour that could be 
imported, and where they would be distributed, as well as ensuring that milling companies purchased national 
grain, as they were obligated to do in order to receive import licenses for North American grain. In a brief overview 
of INA’s role in managing the wheat market, Machado discusses how wheat growers protested the INA’s 
protectionist policies in the late 1940s, mainly because the domestic price was set far below the price on the 
international market owing to the fact that post-war demand had increased but production had not. In the long run, 
however, those policies greatly benefited wheat producers. See Machado Cartagena, Políticas agrarias en Colombia, 
101-103.  
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reserves, and general economic instability that came with the beginning of the coffee 
bust. Keeping the cost-of-living in check was primordial for Rojas Pinilla and the Junta 
Militar that replaced him. For that reason, INA had not changed wheat’s sale price for 
several years, despite rising production costs.34 Nevertheless, although the price was set 
at $1.20 pesos “el punto,” during times of periodic scarcity, such as the weeks before 
harvest, the price often rose to $1.40 pesos.35 This convinced wheat growers that the 
market could bear a higher price, and thus, the SAC wrote to Luis Bernal in April 1957, 
asking that INA raise the official price to $1.30 pesos el punto.36   
Raising the official price was not the SAC’s only request, however. It also asked 
that the price be raised one cent each month for the five months following the October 
harvest. In addition, Bernal E. requested that a study be conducted in conjunction with 
the Caja Agraria, to develop a financing system that enabled large-scale wheat 
producers to build and maintain adequate storage facilities on their properties. All three 
of these requests were designed to work hand-in-hand to stabilize the wheat market, 
ensure affordability for consumers and guarantee that farmers received enough of a 
profit that they had incentive to continue producing wheat, rather than switching to 
another crop with a higher profit margin.37 
                                                 
34 Rojas Pinilla had increased the minimum wage, which raised labor costs, while essential machinery, repair parts, 
and fertilizer were all imported and their prices had all increased between 50-100%. 
35 AGN, Presidencia de la República, RP, Secretaría General, Sociedades/Memorandum, Box 294, Folder 63, f 4-8 
(undated memo from the SAC to the Agriculture Minister). “El punto” referred to the weight of a certain volume of 
grain. One hectoliter (equivalent to 100 liters) was weighed and the resulting number was used to determine the 
wheat’s “point” on the price scale. 
36 “Defensa de la producción nacional: Precios mínimos sobre trigo,” RNA 51 (April 1957): 10-11.  
37 Ibid.  
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Bernal E. carefully explained why such measures were necessary. Before the 
widespread use of combines, harvested wheat sat on farmers’ fields for several months, 
slowing drying. Every so often, the farmer threshed some and released it to the market. 
Demand was thus consistently satisfied and prices remained constant. Moreover, 
farmers had no need of storage facilities. The situation changed with the introduction of 
combines and drying systems. Threshed wheat had to be sold immediately so that it 
could be sent to the dryers as quickly as possible; farmers who used combines threshed 
as they harvested, which meant that they all had to take their wheat to the market at the 
same time. Massive glut resulted, leading to precipitous price declines. Thus, Bernal E. 
proposed the gradual increase in price over five months and the provision of credit for 
constructing dryers and silos. If farmers who produced significant quantities of wheat 
had their own dryers and storage facilities, then the market would return to its former 
stability – farmers could release their harvested grain gradually, avoiding glut and 
associated price decreases. Likewise, increasing the price by one cent per month for five 
months after harvest would provide further incentive for farmers to resist releasing all 
of their wheat at once.38  
With the fall of the Rojas Pinilla regime the following month, this proposal was 
lost in the shuffle. Meanwhile, millers’ refusal to accept national flour continued 
unabated, for example. In an undated 1957 memo to the Minister of Agriculture, the 
SAC reiterated Bernal E.’s request that INA raise the price of wheat and then also asked 
that the government require millers to produce flours made from a mixture of national 
                                                 
38 Ibid.  
 233 
and imported flours and that the “obligatory absorption of the entirety of the national 
harvest” be imposed as well. As it was, millers were required to show evidence that 
they had purchased national wheat before they could receive the licenses required to 
import North American wheat. This did not mean that every farmer was able to sell his 
complete harvest, however. Requiring “total absorption” would certainly remedy that 
situation. Echoing the 1954 barley tax, the SAC also asked for the establishment of price 
supports that would level the playing field between the cheaper imported wheat and 
more expensive national wheat.39  
Prices continued to be a serious concern for the SAC throughout 1957. In 
October, Bernal E. sent a letter to the Junta Militar voicing the SAC’s concerns about the 
decline of agriculture in general. Bernal asked that the letter’s contents not be made 
public, to prevent “interested parties [from] impeding the country’s return to 
normalcy.” He listed seven reasons for the growing “decadence” of Colombian 
agriculture. Second on the list were prices. Using wheat as an example, Bernal 
commended INA for raising the sale price of wheat that year from $90.00 pesos for 75 
“puntos” (kilos per hectoliter) to $105.00, an increase of 16.6%.  As helpful as that was, 
however, Bernal complained that agricultural production costs had gone up 43.3%. 
With that situation in mind, Bernal asked: “Can anyone justifiably imagine that there is 
any enticement that will keep a wheat farmer sowing this cereal?”40  
                                                 
39 AGN, Presidencia de la República, RP, Secretaría General, Sociedades/Memorandum, Box 294, Folder 63, f 4-8 
(undated memo from the SAC to the Agriculture Minister). 
40 AGN, Presidencia de la República, RP, Junta Militar de Gobierno, Situación del País/Sociedades, 1957, Box 4, 
Folder 85, f 3-8. 
 234 
Bernal acknowledged that the government had legitimate concerns about the 
cost of living. He denied, however, that food was a special category that should be 
singled out for more onerous price regulations than other items. Clothing, 
transportation, medicine, education, “even entertainment” – all of these items factored 
into rising living costs for Colombians. Indeed, as Bernal complained, schools along 
with “producers of clothing, drugs, beer [and] cigarettes…ask for price increases 
considerably higher than those asked for by farmers. These increases are authorized 
and farmers, who constitute 70% of the country’s population, have to pay them.”41 
The issue then, for Bernal, was one of fairness. He wondered if a “terrible 
injustice” was committed against farmers when they were prohibited from adjusting 
their prices the same way that manufacturers could or when the state made “frequent 
inopportune importations of products that compete with them, in order to lower ‘living 
costs.’” To make the situation’s unfairness more plainly evident, Bernal turned the 
situation around and asked why Colombia didn’t import the clothing that farmers 
needed when nationally produced textiles became too expensive for them to buy. 
Despite what Bernal saw as obvious unfairness, it was injustice suffered in silence – a 
silence with serious national ramifications, he warned. Farmers thought about all these 
issues, he claimed, but rather than “express themselves in noisy public protests to get 
authorities’ attention, as city residents are apt to do every time it seems necessary, they 
take more cautious measures to save themselves and their interests.” In other words, 
they either left their farms or took up cattle ranching, a more profitable and less 
                                                 
41 Ibid.  
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complicated enterprise. Bernal worried about the long-term, large-scale effect on the 
nation if abandonment of the countryside continued unabated. “Who will grow food?” 
he asked.42 
Bernal’s letter to the Junta Militar outlining the SAC’s position on the state of 
Colombian agriculture at that crucial moment in the nation’s history came at a time 
when its power to influence the national government was seriously threatened by the 
growing number of single-crop focused associations. Kalmanovitz and López argue that 
the SAC was already weakened in 1927 when the economic and political influence of 
small-scale coffee growers in western Colombia eclipsed that of large-scale growers in 
the eastern part, manifesting itself in the establishment of the National Coffee Growers’ 
Federation (FEDECAFE).43 The migration of the center of coffee power from east to west 
in Colombia has been well documented.44 Radical curtailing of the SAC’s influence as a 
result is somewhat overstated, however. While FEDECAFE indeed came to wield a 
tremendous amount of economic and political power in Colombia, the SAC’s 
membership consisted of more than just large coffee hacienda owners in Colombia’s 
eastern highlands. Large-scale sugar cane, tobacco, cotton, and rice growers were also 
members, and their influence grew throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s, as import 
substitution policies spurred by the Depression and World War II provided incentive 
for them to increase production. In the late 1940s and into the 1950s, the SAC competed 
                                                 
42 Ibid.  
43 Kalmanovitz and López, La agricultura en Colombia, 77. 
44 Christie, Oligarcas, campesinos y política; Palacios, Café en Colombia; Parsons, Antioqueño Colonization. Although 
Christie and Parsons deal more explicitly with political questions regarding the nature of colonization (mainly the 
degree to which it was a democratizing phenomenon in Colombia), they both embed this question within the context 
of the growth of small-scale coffee production in western Colombia.  
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with the industrialists’ association established in 1944 (ANDI) over protective tariffs, 
but the SAC’s large-scale growers were still a powerful voice on the national stage. The 
stronger challenge to the SAC came in the 1950s, when members, supported by their 
industrial consumers, began to establish their own specialized associations. Examples 
include the Federación Nacional de Arroceros (National Rice Growers Federation), the 
Federación Nacional de Algodoneros (National Cotton Growers Federation), and the 
Asociación de Cultivadores de Caña de Azúcar de Colombia (Association of Colombian 
Sugar Cane Growers), established in 1947, 1953, and 1959, respectively. Bejarano notes 
how this limited the advocacy role for the SAC and increased conflict among the 
various associations, as the SAC was no longer the glue that enabled farmers to speak 
with one powerfully united voice over issues of immediate concern. Instead, it was 
reduced to advocating for general agricultural policy, such as taxes on land holdings 
and property rights.45  
The circumstances that drove formerly united members of one organization to 
split apart simultaneously brought some former competitors closer together. 
Opposition to the 1954 barley tax had greatly diminished by 1957. Booming barley 
production had apparently convinced the beer companies outside of the Bavaria 
Consortium that achieving self-sufficiency in barley (and paying additional taxes to do 
so) was a good idea. Bavaria and the four major beer companies not part of its 
consortium – Andina, Barranquilla, Unión, and Clausen – united in October 1957 to 
form the Asociación para el Fomento del Cultivo de la Cebada (Procebada – Barley 
                                                 
45 Bejarano, Economía y poder. 
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Cultivation Development Association). Ensuring a steady supply of improved barley 
seeds was Procebada’s primary purpose. Barley farmers increasingly required technical 
assistance (even if they were not new to the crop, the new seeds required different care 
than the older “regional” varieties) and Procebada’s organizers made that an integral 
part of its mission as well. Immediately after its establishment, Procebada signed a 
contract with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Caja Agraria, transferring both the 
responsibility for multiplying seeds and providing technical assistance, and the right to 
the funds collected through the barley tax to the new organization. Each one of the beer 
companies involved also agreed to provide financial support.46 
Procebada quickly became the model for achieving self-sufficiency in agricultural 
production. Only one year after it had been established, it was roundly praised in a 
FAO-sponsored assessment of Colombian agriculture, claiming that it had provided 
“magnificent results for the development of barley production.”47  
What were “magnificent results” for barley producers and consumers, however, 
were problematic ones for wheat growers and promoters. The better things became for 
barley, the worse they seemed to become for wheat. A variety of resources were 
diverted from one to the other, including land, technical support, and credit. 
Eventually, even the pesos that had been paid to purchase PL480 grain from the United 
States returned to Colombia in a form that had dire consequences for the nation’s wheat 
growers. The following section examines the mounting pressure on wheat producers 
                                                 
46 “La multiplicación de la cebada,” op. cit. 
47 AGN, Presidencia de la República, Rojas Pinilla, Secretaría General, Informe sobre el desarrollo agropecuario de 
Colombia, Box 298, Folder 35, f 1-84: 48. 
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and the way that the definition of self-sufficiency was quickly becoming defined in 
terms of only one type of agricultural production.  
 
Fertilizer and the National Front 
During his inaugural speech on August 7, 1958, president Alberto Lleras 
Camargo put the nation’s industrialists on notice. The country had complicated 
economic problems and everyone needed to make sacrifices to solve them. Middle class 
and popular sectors had already seen their quality of life decline, as protectionist 
measures designed to help the nation industrialize hurt their pocketbooks in several 
ways. Lleras Camargo reiterated his belief that industrialization was a laudable national 
goal. But, industrialists needed to show stronger commitment to the nation and less to 
their bottom lines, he declared. There were several ways that they could do so: “price 
stability, profit reduction, reinvestment designed to diminish demand for imported raw 
materials, salary increases.” That is what the people want, he declared, to see “that 
industry begins to reciprocate the gigantic effort the Nation has done to create and 
sustain it.”48 Despite Lleras Camargo’s strong ties to industrial leaders, the social and 
economic pressures in the country were volatile enough that he had very little choice 
but to make such a strong call for industry to sacrifice some of its profits during those 
“critical times.”49  
Unbeknownst to the public, decreasing the use of imported raw materials had 
been at the center of several months of negotiations among industrialists, Jorge Mejía 
                                                 
48 Lleras Camargo, El primer gobierno, 53-77. 
49 Sáenz Rovner, Colombia, años 50, 238-239. 
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Salazar (the Minister of Agriculture), the Caja Agraria, FEDECAFE, and the Empresa 
Colombiana de Petróleos (Ecopetrol). They had been developing an expansion plan for 
the Industria Colombiana de Fertilizantes (Colombian Fertilizer Industry). The purpose 
was to increase national fertilizer and pesticide production in order to increase the 
amount of nationally produced agricultural raw materials.50 Unfortunately, few of the 
funds for this laudable goal would come from their own bottom lines. Instead, 
Colombians in general, and wheat farmers in particular, would ultimately bear the cost.  
The Industria Colombiana de Fertilizantes was incorporated in 1952. Original 
subscribers included the Caja Agraria, FEDECAFE, and Ecopetrol; they each pledged to 
capitalize the firm with $20,000,000 pesos. By 1958, only half of that amount had 
actually been paid, the bulk of it ($8,100,000) from the Caja Agraria. Early on, 
Fertilizantes contracted with Montecantini, an Italian engineering firm, to oversee 
construction and provide technical assistance. Choosing a site near Barrancabermeja, 
they determined that it would be able to produce 50 tons of synthetic ammonia, 150 
tons of nitric acid, 100 tons of ammonium nitrate, and 30 tons of urea on a daily basis, as 
well as 14,000 tons of nitrogen annually, which they believed was enough to meet the 
total needs of the country’s agricultural industries until 1961.51 To produce the nitrogen 
fertilizers, they planned to rely on the natural gas available in the Casabe and El Centro 
fields in the Magdalena River Valley. Phosphate and potassium, on the other hand, 
                                                 
50 AGN, Pres. de la República, Rojas Pinilla, Secretaría General, Industrias/Comunicaciones, Box 29, Folder 16, f 5-17. 
51 It was expected that by that time, demand would have grown and Fertilizantes’ production would need to expand.  
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would have to be imported until phosphorous rock deposits were discovered in the 
country.52  
Adding up the cost of equipment and construction, the total amount required to 
start the company was originally estimated at $28,000,000 pesos. By 1958, however, it 
had become clear that the actual start-up costs far exceeded that amount. At that time, 
Fertilizantes, the Caja Agraria, FEDECAFE, and Ecopetrol were negotiating how to 
convert the public company into a private one. Studies conducted in relation to this 
conversion estimated that it would actually cost $137,000,000 to build the plant and 
begin operations.53 This astronomical price increase persuaded the various parties 
involved that converting Fertilizantes into a private concern was the only viable means 
of making it operational. Government monies were far too sparse for it to continue as a 
semi-public venture.54 
For that, Mejía initiated a lengthy series of discussions with public and private 
entities in order to develop a financial plan. It was apparently a difficult process. In his 
memo about this to the new Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Augusto Espinosa Valderrama, 
he seemed concerned with making it clear that he had labored very hard over the deal 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 This quintupling was due as much to the recent peso devaluations as it was to adjusted cost estimates. 
54 Ibid. Providing statistics on how much demand for fertilizers had increased – from 15,927 metric tons in 1950 to 
130,296 metric tons in 1957 – Mejía Salazar, in his memo about this to the new Minister of Agriculture in August 1958, 
speculated that “those who are today involved in this business [of importing fertilizers] are not fans of the Industria 
de Fertilizantes and strongly criticize it.” Considering that the production of nitrogen-based fertilizers in 
Barrancabermeja was viewed as only the first step in the development of the nation’s petro-chemical industry, it is 
likely that the criticisms would grow even stronger in the future. Elements of the expansion plan included 
duplicating the original plant, production of nitroglycerin, polyethylene, plastics, caustic soda mixtures, chlorine, and 
pesticides, as well as construction of a sulfuric acid plant on the Atlantic Coast. Mejía noted in his memo that “Each 
one of these phases of chemical production will in turn create other by-products that will allow us to continue 
production of new chemical products almost indefinitely. This is one of the most important sources of import 
substitution in the country’s future development.” Of course, this pie-in-the-sky expansion of Fertilizantes depended 
on first being able to secure the $137,000 pesos it needed to get off the ground in the first place.  
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that was in the works: “The process was long and if the formula adopted seems at first 
glance to be simple, it was only arrived at after repeated conversations with diverse 
national private groups and taking all possible factors into account.”55   
The new financial plan relieved the Caja Agraria, FEDECAFE, and Ecopetrol 
from paying their remaining subscription obligations. Mejía noted that none of them 
had the quantities of cash available for continued investments at the level Fertilizantes 
required, nor did it fall within their missions to subscribe to private companies in such a 
way.56 Taking their place was a $12,000,000 peso loan from the PL480 fund generated 
through the purchase of surplus crops from the United States. The loan was designed to 
enable Fertilizantes to continue construction of the plant while the complete financial 
plan was developed. Once that initial loan had been secured, numerous private 
companies were invited to become subscribers. The response was enthusiastic. Most of 
the companies asked agreed that Fertilizantes was a good idea and would greatly 
benefit them. Enthusiasm didn’t immediately translate into investment agreements, 
however. With the country’s unstable financial situation, credit was limited and they 
had little capital to spare. As it was, they were struggling to stay afloat, trying to meet 
their own obligations.57  
Their involvement was essential, however. The previous year, Fertilizantes had 
approached the Export-Import Bank, seeking a US $7,500,000 loan. Despite the solidity 
of the construction and development plans, the Ex-Im Bank denied the loan because 
                                                 
55 Ibid.  
56 As he indicated, “it is unjustified to expect that these entities, created for other objectives, [should] divert their 
resources to promote industries belonging to the private sector.” Ibid.  
57 Ibid. 
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Fertilizantes was a public company. Attracting financing would be easier if Fertilizantes 
converted to a private concern, and it thus needed to secure the commitment of 
Colombia’s industries in the form of shares of stock. Conveniently, the PL480 agreement 
stipulated that 30% of the peso funds generated by the sale of surplus crops in 
Colombia be returned to the country in the form of loans to individual companies. 
Mejía Salazar and Fertilizantes negotiated with the U.S. Point IV representative in 
Colombia, whose approval was required for any disbursement of PL480 funds, and 
together they devised an ingenious solution that killed two birds with one stone – 
provided Fertilizantes with the capital it needed from corporate investors and met U.S. 
government requirements regarding PL480 funds. Up to $24,000,000 in fifteen-year term 
loans from the PL480 funds would be given to various companies interested in 
investing in Fertilizantes. The loan monies could only be used to purchase shares of 
stock in the new company. By August 1958, when Mejía Salazar wrote the memo to 
Espinosa Valderrama, the incoming Minister of Agriculture, Fertilizantes had received 
requests for these loans from twenty-one private companies totaling more than 
$26,000,000.58  
Of the four companies who wished to purchase the largest amount of shares 
($3,000,000 each), two were beer concerns – the Bavaria Consortium and Cervecerías 
Barranquilla y Bolívar, S.A. The other two were the Compañía Colombiana de Tabaco 
and the Compañía Colombiana de Seguros, a cigarette and an insurance company. 
Other well-known firms interested in purchasing shares were Cervecería Unión, 
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Coltejer, Cementos Argos, and Suramericana de Seguros. In addition to Coltejer, several 
smaller textile firms had expressed interest. The same was true for cement companies. 
Amounts requested ranged from $3,000,000 to $300,000, with almost half of them over 
$1,000,000. Mejía Salazar did not indicate the criteria that determined who would 
receive the long-term loans (and their amounts) from the PL 480 funds.59  
Even without the disbursement agreement fully completed, enough progress had 
been made that Mejía Salazar and Fertilizantes approached the U.S. Development Loan 
Fund. Inquiring about the possibility of requesting the same US $7,500,000 that had 
previously been asked of the Ex-Im Bank, the response the second time around was far 
more positive. The steps taken toward conversion into a private company, and the 
support of so many of the nation’s largest industrial firms had inspired confidence on 
the part of US loan officers. At that time, as the first National Front administration of 
Lleras Camargo loomed on the horizon, and Mejía Salazar was preparing to leave the 
Minister of Agriculture post, plans were in the works to make a formal request to the 
Development Loan Fund. In his memo to Espinosa Valderrama, Mejía Salazar 
expressed his great certainty that the loan would be approved. Moreover, if 
construction could keep on schedule, Fertilizantes would be able to bring nitrogen 
fertilizers to the market within a year.60 
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60 Ibid. The outgoing Minister of Agriculture seemed deeply worried that the project of converting Fertilizantes into a 
private company would be discontinued once he left. After outlining the new financial plan and the work that had 
gone into creating it, he speculated on what would happen if Fertilizantes continued as a public company. “How 
would it be financed?” he asked. And assuming that all of the financing outlined in the new plan could still come 
through even if it remained a public company, he wondered, “is it justified to ask the nation or the departments to 
contract new debt on top of the already heavy load of internal and external public debt? And even if it could be 
financed as a public company, what other State activities will have their funds cut in exchange?” For Mejía Salazar, it 
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Two inter-related points rise from this early history of the Industria Colombiana 
de Fertilizantes. The first is the narrowing definition of self-sufficiency. As distinct as 
the companies interested in investing in Colombia’s fertilizer industry were, they all 
shared one significant thing in common – none of them manufactured food products. 
Second, PL480 funding of Fertilizantes would mean increased use of imported wheat. 
The vast majority of surplus crops available for sale through the PL480 program 
consisted of wheat and vegetable oils, although the former far exceeded the latter. The 
loans were based on agreements that had already been signed for the shipment of grain 
over the subsequent years. And, if Fertilizantes hoped to continue expanding, as Mejía 
Salazar had indicated in his memo, further PL480 loans would likely be required, which 
would mean additional PL480 agreements and a further influx of grain from the United 
States. Thus, in order to develop Colombia’s petro-chemical industry, and thereby 
increase agricultural production, US wheat would have to circulate in large amounts 
throughout the country. The problems that Colombia’s wheat producers and promoters 
confronted would thus continue unabated. As long as US wheat was readily available, 
Colombia’s millers had no incentive to use national wheat that was more expensive to 
produce and transport.  
                                                                                                                                                             
made no sense for his successor to either maintain Fertilizantes as a public company or to reject the financial plans 
already in place. As he noted in his final paragraphs, most of the groundwork had already been laid – just a few steps 
remained: securing government approval, disbursing PL480 loans, and requesting the US $7,500,000 loan. It seemed 
senseless to start over. Mejía Salazar recognized, however, the politics involved in ministerial changes. Even within 
the same presidential administration, a change in ministers often meant that the predecessors’ programs were 
scrapped. His final words were cautionary, aware that his efforts may have been futile: “If the [new] government, 
nevertheless, does not agree with the program and the direction of this [fertilizer] industry, it will be necessary to 
suspend construction in Barranca as soon as possible, since there are no longer any funds to continue it as a public 
company. See Ibid., 13 & 16.  
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The contours of these two points were already evident in the case of barley and 
wheat in Colombia. Over the next few years, the disparities between these two crops 
would intensify. Barley, as an industrial raw material, would continue to receive a 
variety of governmental and corporate support, while wheat would increasingly 
struggle to survive. 
Sadly, the Ministry of Agriculture inspired little confidence in its ability or 
willingness to protect wheat. The problems of wheat producers were usually market-
related rather than technical. Yet, the Ministry ignored the market problems, and, in 
fact, actively sought confirmation that technical issues were to blame. That October, the 
U.N.’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) released a study of Colombia’s 
agriculture that the Ministry had commissioned in 1955. Dr. Maurice Amiot, the study’s 
director, spent three and a half years in Colombia reviewing all aspects of its 
agricultural sector. Collaborators included the SAC, FEDECAFE, the Instituto de 
Fomento Algodonero (IFA – the Cotton Development Institute), and the Federación 
Nacional de Arroceros (Rice Growers’ Federation). The provisional report was released 
in October 1958. Although it mainly focused on technical issues, it is interesting to note 
how market issues affected their assessment of the technical ones.  
Wheat production, for example, was considered deficient. The problem was 
defined as technical. Farmers apparently planted wheat wherever they wanted without 
regard to soil conditions. This practice needed to be curtailed if production was to 
increase: “the development of wheat cultivation in Colombia cannot be left to the 
arbitrary decision of farmers. Currently, wheat is sometimes cultivated in a correct 
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environment, but it is also cultivated in inappropriate places, and in inappropriate 
ways.” Dr. Amiot’s solution to this problem was bureaucratic and technical.  He 
proposed that the Ministry of Agriculture commission a study to determine the most 
effective regions for growing wheat throughout the country and the varieties most apt 
for them. Afterward, credit should only be extended to farmers who grew wheat in the 
areas approved by the Ministry for that purpose, using the seeds it had designated for 
that specific place.61 
The FAO had no recommendations for barley production, on the other hand. 
Procebada, by then in operation for almost a year, had generated such “magnificent 
results” that no improvements were required. In a 78-page report, the author dedicated 
only two paragraphs to barley, indicating that he mentioned it only to offer an example 
of a successful model of public-private partnership. Interestingly, however, the report’s 
author seemed either unaware or unconcerned with the tremendous contradiction in his 
assessment of why barely succeeded while wheat lagged. When he discussed barley’s 
success, Dr. Amiot wrote of the power of an association of “users of an agricultural 
product” – in other words, in this case, its industrial consumers who had the ability to 
manipulate the market in such a way that both they and the commodity’s producers 
benefited. Discussing wheat, on the other hand, he made no mention of market issues or 
the products’ consumers. Blame for wheat’s failure to take off lay with its producers 
                                                 
61 AGN, Presidencia de la República, Rojas Pinilla, Secretaria General, Informe, Box 298, Folder 35, f 50.  
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and their lack of attention to technical issues, not with lack of support from its end 
users.62  
It seems more than coincidental that a report with such a contradictory view of 
these two agricultural products would be released around the same time that many of 
Colombia’s most important industries were negotiating with the Ministry of 
Agriculture over the financial restructuring of Fertilizantes. Remember that Dr. Amiot’s 
main collaborators consisted of some of the associations dedicated to promoting crops 
such as cotton, coffee, and rice, and barley. Several of the corporate supporters of two of 
these associations (Procebada and IFA) were also waiting for approval of a PL480 loan 
to purchase shares in Fertilizantes. Thus, their interests ultimately conflicted with those 
of Colombia’s wheat growers. Without the PL480 loans, Fertilizantes could not get 
started. As those loans were contingent on continued circulation of US wheat in 
Colombia, it was not in the interests of Procebada, IFA, or the Ministry of Agriculture to 
help Dr. Amiot discover that millers and market issues played just as important role in 
deficient wheat production in Colombia as did poor soil conditions and use of 
inadequate seeds.  
Farmers were also, obviously, keenly aware of the market issues. For that reason, 
wheat production began to suffer and decline as it confronted a more stable market for 
barley. Bavaria and Procebada, for example, had had little trouble finding enough 
farmers to multiply Funza at the level required. The Caja Agraria, on the other hand, 
had not had similar good fortune finding farmers willing multiply Menkemen and 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 48. 
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Bonza. Eventually it resorted to an indirect method, in which it paid top price for the 
best wheat in annual commercial harvests and used those to develop seeds for the 
following growing cycle.63  
Initially, the Caja Agraria focused its sales of new wheat varieties in the 
departments of Cundinamarca and Boyacá. In 1955, Obonuco, another cold-climate 
experiment station, was established high in the Andes near Pasto, the capital of Nariño, 
and researchers discovered that Bonza and Menkemen grew well there also. The Caja 
Agraria then began to promote the new seeds in Nariño as well. Nariñense wheat 
farmers quickly adopted the new varieties. Although by 1959, Nariño was still only the 
third largest wheat-producing department in the country, the efforts to increase its 
production had made an enormous impact. The Caja estimated that almost 50% of that 
department’s wheat fields were planted with an improved variety, which compared 
quite favorably with Cundinamarca and Boyacá, where the “regional varieties” were 
still commonly used.64 
Unfortunately, during that year’s growing season, a new strain of wheat rust for 
which Menkemen had no resistance crossed the border from Ecuador to Nariño. After 
wiping out the Ecuadorian wheat harvest, Puccinia graminis ravaged the fields sown 
                                                 
63 Fabio Arango L. and Abraham Bravo, “Multiplicación de semillas de trigo en Cundinamarca,” AT 15 (March 1959): 
179-184. 
64 Carlos Serrano & Rafael Paris Navarro, “Las variedades mejoradas de trigo en el departamento de Nariño,” AT 15 
(May 1959): 303-306; RAC, RF, 12.3, Diaries: “Una granja modelo,” La República, July 26, 1959; “Importantes 
investigaciones agrícolas se realizan en Granja de Obonuco, Pasto,” El Colombiano, July 20, 1959. There is discrepancy 
over when Obonuco was founded and began wheat research. One source says that it was in 1953, not 1955. See RAC, 
RF, 12.3, Diaries, “Tecnificación de los cultivos y de minifundios de Nariño se emprende,” El Espectador, July 22, 1959. 
The station was still rather small in 1959, when members of Sociedad de Agricultores de Nariño asked for substantial 
improvements in the installations at Obonuco as well as those of the Caja Agraria’s seed treatment facility.  A few 
weeks later, the Caja Agraria announced the appointment of Oscar Saldarriaga as Section Chief of the Wheat 
Campaign in Nariño. See, “Otras noticias,” AT 15 (June 1959): 401-402; “Departamento de Fomento Agrícola,” AT 15 
(July 1959): 558. 
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with Menkemen in southwestern Colombia. Estimated losses surpassed one million 
pesos. In some wheat-growing areas, every field was decimated. The disaster wrought 
by the rust spurred DIA and the Ministry of Agriculture not only to discontinue the sale 
of Menkemen, but to eliminate it from Colombia entirely.65 Fortunately, two completely 
new varieties, apt for Nariño’s growing conditions and resistant to the new roya strain, 
were in advanced stages of research. “Diacol Toca” and “Diacol Nariño” had both 
already been sent to the Caja Agraria for preliminary multiplication.66  
Taking Menkemen out of circulation happened shortly after the Caja Agraria had 
begun a new program to attempt to further promote the use of improved wheat seeds. 
For some time, Procebada had been offering Funza seeds at an affordable price to barley 
growers, and assistance seeking credit, if they needed it. The Caja Agraria also offered 
improved wheat seeds at a low price, as well as the credit to help farmers pay for 
them.67 But, farmers were more likely to adopt the new barley seeds than the improved 
wheat varieties, and so the Caja Agraria devised a new plan to more widely disseminate 
the use of Bonza and Menkemen. Nominally called “Credit in Kind,” the program 
offered credit in the form of the seeds themselves, rather than the cash to purchase 
them. Fertilizer, insecticides, and fungicides were included in the “credit,” as well as 
technical assistance on proper growing methods. The program began early that year 
                                                 
65 RAC, RF, 12.3, Diaries, “Cuantiosas pérdidas en los cultivos de trigo en Nariño,” El Tiempo, August 6, 1959. 
66 “James G. Dixon,” AT 15 (June 1959): 400-401. RAC, RF, 12.3, Diaries: “Extraordinario impulso a la agricultura dará 
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67 See, for example, their ads in Agricultura Tropical: “Procebada,” AT 15 (January 1959): 6; “Caja de Crédito Agrario,” 
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and by July the Caja had made 386 such loans equivalent to $3,503,943.18 involving 
Menkemen, Bonza, Funza, and Monserrate (an improved potato seed).68      
Nevertheless, despite these promising efforts, the future for wheat looked 
bleaker by the day. In early 1958 the funding from PL480 and the Development Loan 
Fund eventually came through. By that June, the $36,000,000 from PL480 had been 
received and a new Agricultural Minister, Gilberto Arango Londoño was putting the 
finishing touches on a follow-up PL480 loan for Fertilizantes in the amount of 
$10,000,000.69 What did this mean for Colombia’s wheat and barley growers? In 1956, 
when Estebán Rico Mejía expressed concern about the competition for land in 
Colombia’s cold-climate regions, he could probably not have imagined the impact that 
Funza would have on the nation’s wheat-growing regions. What was that impact? The 
following section will review the effects of Funza and Fertilizantes on Colombia’s wheat 
production.  
 
The Battle of Wheat and Barley 
“Colombia, an agricultural nation par excellence, has finally understood that the 
integrity of its future and the possibility of obtaining a better life for all lies in the 
appropriate care and use of the land.” With those words, the Minister of Agriculture, 
Gilberto Arango Londoño, inaugurated the Fifth Agricultural Fair held in Bogotá in 
August 1959. Arango praised the remarkable technological advances the country had 
                                                 
68 RAC, RF, 12.3, Diaries, “Semillas mejoradas está suministrando la Agraria,” El Siglo, July 22, 1959. 
69 Dale W. Adams, Guillermo A. Guerra A., Philip F. Warnken, Richard G. Wheeler, & Lawrence W. Witt, “Public 
Law 480 and Colombia’s Economic Development” (Medellín: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1964), 132. 
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made, as well as the improvements in providing credit and technical assistance. His 
inaugural speech praised the nation’s agronomists, observing that, although the country 
still did not produce everything it needed, all signs indicated that it was moving in the 
right direction. He pointed to cotton as an example of how successfully the country was 
moving toward its goal of self-sufficiency. He invited the Fair’s visitors to stop by the 
pavilion of the Instituto de Fomento Algodonero (IFA – Cotton Development Institute) 
to see how the textile industry had become “authentically Colombian in all its 
[production] stages.”70  
Although Arango Londoño did not mention wheat in his speech, other 
statements at the Fair, both by the Minister and by barley farmers, were the first volleys 
in a two-month “battle of wheat and barley” in the nation’s press. Granted, many of the 
nation’s agronomists had been in battle mode before the Fair even began. The cover of 
that month’s issue of Agricultura Tropical featured a photograph of a lush field of Bonza 
wheat growing on the Sabana de Bogotá and included two different articles on wheat 
production. One was a feature explaining the steps involved in multiplying an 
improved seed such as Bonza. As the article mentioned that the Caja Agraria paid 10% 
more than the market price for seed to be used for multiplication purposes, it seems that 
it was partly designed to recruit farmers for this important step, especially considering 
the recruitment problems discussed in the journal several months earlier.71  
                                                 
70 RAC, RF, 12.3, Diaries, Box 21, “Colombia ha entendido al fin que en la tierra está la integridad de su futuro: 
Expresó el Ministro de Agricultura al inaugurar la V Feria Agropecuaria,” El Siglo, August 6, 1959. 
71 Rafael Paris Navarro, “Producción de semilla seleccionada de trigo,” AT 15 (August 1959): 517-525. 
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Esteban Rico Mejía penned the other article about wheat. Although he still 
worked on barley for Bavaria, he was also the president of the Asociación Colombiana 
de Ingenieros Agrónomos (ACIA – Colombian Association of Agronomic Engineers) 
and thus spoke in defense of all agricultural producers. Market instability and lack of 
will were the twin problems plaguing wheat growers and promoters, he declared. The 
simple laws of supply and demand explained why the country had not yet come 
anywhere close to successfully substituting this agricultural product. Echoing the issues 
raised by the SAC in 1957, Rico Mejía noted that at harvest time, prices drop 
considerably and rise again afterward. Farmers suffer when this happens, while 
speculators and middle-men benefit. Considering all of the difficulties facing farmers 
(bad weather, insect plagues, weed infestations, plant diseases, scarcity of land, seeds, 
fertilizers, machinery and labor, as well as theft and vandalism), it goes without saying 
that farmers look for the least risky crops to cultivate and unsurprisingly, the “preferred 
activities are those in which the conditions of credit, ease of cultivation, diverse 
markets, price stability, technical assistance from the Development Institutes, etc., offer 
the best prospects.” Hence, farmers preferred cotton, rice, and barley.72  
Wheat, on the other hand, according to Rico Mejía, offered none of these 
advantages to farmers. Noting the problem this caused because the required imports 
consumed so much of the country’s foreign reserves, he argued that promoting wheat 
production did not mean displacing other important crops. It meant improving 
conditions for the nation’s remaining wheat growers. The market circumstances he 
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505-506. 
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described for those growers were grim. Badly organized companies seemed to be their 
principal buyers: 
…fly-by-night operations, with inadequate installations for the proper 
receipt of harvests (scales, dryers, silos, warehouses), who constantly delay 
weighing, classifying, and paying for shipments. And even if they do 
complete the various buying operations fairly and with correctly calibrated 
equipment, farmers often have to resign themselves to suffering the 
martyrdom of coming and going from one place to another pleading and 
begging for them to buy their harvests. Sometimes they have to look on 
dispassionately as the quality of their wheat changes dramatically from one 
place to another as if by magic. And if the already excessively endemic 
importation of foreign wheat occurs at the same time as the harvest, as 
usually seems to happen, there is catastrophe. Then national wheat is not 
needed, isn’t appropriate for industrial uses, is humid, there are neither 
funds to purchase it, nor places to store it, or dry it and not even time 
available to wait on the farmer.73   
 
If these issues were resolved, Rico Mejía declared, then wheat growers could 
continue to cultivate this important grain, and they would be able to join their fellow 
barley and cotton farmers receiving improved seeds, credit, and technical assistance 
from the Caja Agraria and the Ministry of Agriculture. But this was only possible if the 
government enacted measures to stabilize the market itself, such as price supports and 
requiring complete absorption. As he argued, credit and improved seeds “are useless if 
the market is chaos.”74  
At heart, the problem lay in the promotion of wheat in word only. It wasn’t 
enough to just exhort farmers to grow wheat, he claimed; without backing up those 
words with solid measures to support them, the policy was senseless. Accusing the 
government, INA, and the Caja Agraria of lacking political will, Rico Mejía argued that 
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if those entities dedicated a bit of energy to the difficulties facing wheat growers, they 
would be able to fix things in no time.75    
Rico Mejia concluded with a paradox and a flourish. In a country that wanted to 
achieve self-sufficiency, especially in products that devoured foreign reserves, it was 
incomprehensible to him that the government did not truly stand up for wheat growers. 
Recognizing that tremendous inertia or powerful interests ultimately limited wheat 
promotion policies to mere words, he demanded, at the very least, honesty: “If we can’t 
or won’t produce the wheat we need, well, then let’s eat bread made from corn, or 
yucca, or banana. But let’s not be mistaken. Land for wheat growing is there, but what’s 
missing are incentives, and we can’t fill up one hole by digging another.”76  
That the government only paid lip service to the idea of self-sufficiency in wheat 
without actually committing real resources to making it happen was evident in 
statements the Minister of Agriculture made during an informal interview at the 
Agricultural Fair that month. After discussing the efforts that had been made to 
promote cattle-ranching and sheep-raising, a reporter asked Arango Londoño what 
other agricultural development campaigns his administration planned to support that 
year. Wheat and cacao were at the top of his list. The goal for both was to achieve 
“integral import substitution…in the shortest time possible.” The method was reliance 
on improved seeds. They were, in fact, the only thing the Minister discussed. Granted, 
the news about improved wheat seeds developed in Colombia was outstanding. 
Arango Londoño praised the work of the wheat breeders at Tibaitatá and proudly 
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noted that a delegation from the International Wheat Commission had recently visited 
Colombia and declared that Menkemen and Bonza “lead in the rankings of the highest 
quality and most productive improved seeds throughout the world.” While this was 
certainly something to celebrate, it also essentially proved Rico Mejía’s assertions that 
the government was unwilling to or uninterested in committing significant resources 
toward achieving self-sufficiency. The research at Tibaitatá was partially funded by the 
Rockefeller Foundation and it did not require sacrifice of other cherished political or 
economic goals to produce a high-quality improved seed. Providing the credit, technical 
assistance, regulation of the wheat market, and restrictions on imported grain that were 
necessary to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat, on the other hand, required spending 
significant political capital, confronting entrenched economic interests, and, ultimately, 
sacrificing resources (such as the loan monies available through PL480) that could be 
used to achieve other development goals. Arango Londoño did not mention any of 
those.77  
Other events at the Agricultural Fair reinforce the notion that developing 
improved wheat seeds was a way for the Ministry of Agriculture to claim that it was 
doing something toward the goal of self-sufficiency while not actually doing much at 
all. Procebada set up a booth at the fair, which was visited by thousands of people. The 
exhibit explained the entire process of barley production, beginning with the 
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preparation of the land for planting and ending with the most beneficial harvesting 
method. The exclusive use of improved seeds – provided by Procebada – was 
emphasized. Despite the importance placed on the science and technology behind the 
country’s increased barley production, price was the thing on everyone’s mind. As one 
reporter noted: “…the main comment heard at the National Agricultural Fair [was]… 
‘Barley is defeating wheat due to the incentive of good prices.’” These prices were not 
accidental. Production increases upward of 30% were attributed to the policy of the beer 
companies to set the price beforehand and honor it throughout the harvesting season. 
Procebada calculated that the combination of beneficial price policies and scientific and 
technological advances were saving the equivalent of $50,000,000 pesos in foreign 
reserves.78 
A reporter’s observation that “good prices have created a battle between wheat 
and barley, and barley is winning,” highlight the effect of inaction on the part of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Caja Agraria, and INA to protect and promote wheat 
production. Improved seeds were only a first step; they had to be supported in other 
ways for them to succeed. The contrasting levels of support for these two agricultural 
products was highlighted in an informal conversation outside of the Procebada exhibit. 
As a reporter approached the booth, José Maria Giraldo, the farmer on whose fields 
Funza was originally found growing wild, was standing nearby talking with some 
other farmers. By that point, he was cultivating Funza on a very large scale. When he 
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saw the reporter he interrupted his conversation to comment on the battle of wheat and 
barley: 
Good prices – and, naturally, good technical assistance – have created the 
barley boom, which is defeating wheat. I believe – and so tradition says – 
that wheat is the king and barley a distinguished young lady. What’s 
happening is that the young lady yields two harvests and has stable prices, 
something that doesn’t happen with wheat.79 
 
As the farmer whose fields fostered Funza in the first place, Giraldo had certainly 
earned some bragging rights. But the reporter uncritically assessed his statements: 
“Such was a direct comment made by a farmer who objectively understood the 
problem, just like the hundreds of his colleagues who sowed barley this year.”80  
The mood outside the DIA booth was far more subdued. Intriguingly, an article 
about its activities at the Fair appeared in El Tiempo the day after the article reporting on 
the Procebada booth and began with the words, “Also at the Agricultural Fair,” subtly 
suggesting that providing a report on DIA’s exhibit was an afterthought. One farmer 
standing nearby was enthusiastic, offering a positive assessment of the work at 
Tibaitatá: “Colombia has advanced in agricultural research more in ten years than in the 
previous hundred.” But the DIA exhibit was dedicated to more than just wheat, and 
included information on potatoes, beans, and corn; the farmer could have just as easily 
been referring to any of those crops or making a general statement about agricultural 
research overall. When it came specifically to wheat, the pessimism was palpable. 
Leonidas Angarita was the DIA wheat specialist providing information and answering 
questions at the booth and he lamented that, despite the research advances, “wheat 
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production was declining due to the lack of fixed prices, which allow the farmer to 
know how much he will receive for his harvest.” An animated conversation ensued 
when someone pointed out that the area under wheat cultivation remained stable at 
180,000 hectares, implying that the origin of production decreases lay elsewhere. The 
recent losses in Nariño from the rust fungus outbreak that hit Menkemen were 
mentioned, and Angarita discussed how research on new varieties to take its place had 
consequently been “very active.” Preserving DIA’s good reputation was as much at 
stake in that intensified pace of research, however, as ensuring increased production. 
And even exceptionally good measures attesting to the quality of the varieties produced 
at Tibatitatá were placed in a negative light through comparison with barley: “….yields 
with the Bonza variety have reached 2,500 kilos per hectare. The difference with barley 
lies in the fact that wheat only produces one harvest annually, while barley easily gives 
three.” With statements such as those, although “hundreds” of people visited the DIA 
exhibit, it is not surprising that the mood there was more restrained than at 
Procebada’s.81  
A few days later, the “battle of wheat and barley” escalated dramatically when El 
Tiempo published a column by Eduardo Caballero Calderón condemning the policies of 
the national government and the beer companies – essentially accusing them of 
promoting alcoholism in the name of import substitution, industrialization, and profit-
making. Caballero was a novelist and regular columnist in El Tiempo.82 Poetic prose and 
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imagery infused Caballero’s August 11, 1959 column titled simply “Wheat and Barley.” 
Color was an important theme in his first paragraph presenting bucolic vignettes of life 
and scenery in the countryside. The sky was blue, swept clean by the August winds. 
July rains brought beauty and color to the country: the sown fields were green, the 
fallow fields black, and the mountains blue. Colorful tiles clothed otherwise naked 
figures on the church dome in the village (by order of the local priest). Even tacky 
elements, such as the “pretentious cement screens” wealthy residents put on top of their 
houses, instead of the traditional clay tiles, looked attractive from a distance.83 
The town wasn’t just a sleepy village though, but rather a busy center of 
production and consumption, judging by the “interminable parade” of overflowing 
trucks that came and went. Drivers unloaded their cargo in front of side-street shops 
and on the unpaved central plaza, trucks sat idle while their operators sat inside cafés, 
refreshing themselves.  
But not all was well with this idyllic picture. The green of the fields was the blue-
green of barley rather than the bright green of wheat. What bright green there was to be 
seen had migrated from its former place in the level fields to the uneven slopes of the 
mountainsides. The giant trucks constantly coming and going “carried barley rather 
than wheat, baskets of beer rather than bundles of bread.” The sweet smell of freshly 
baked bread had been replaced by the unpleasant odor of bitter beer. The gentle 
imagery of country life was replaced by a series of war metaphors: 
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…in the hills and plateaus of the Andes, barley has been winning the battle 
against bread. A river of beer runs through the streets, knocks at the doors 
of farmers’ huts, forms pools in village plazas. With its victorious infantry, 
barley advances over the lands previously sown with wheat and corn. In 
one of the official bulletins released by the Ministry of Agriculture, it was 
reported that this year the nation would have to import wheat to knead its 
bread, because barley, or more specifically, beer won the battle on all 
fronts.84 
 
Caballero recognized that he was taking literary license with his topic, but 
excused himself by indicating that he, unlike the Ministers of Agriculture and Hygiene, 
was not an expert in the subject, slyly suggesting with his tone that they were not 
experts either. He alleged that he was merely describing the current scene in the rural 
areas of the Andes: “barley and beer, but not wheat or bread.” He claimed that it was 
only curiosity that led him to describe these scenes, as he did not like to “get involved in 
other people’s lives.”  What seemed most curious to him was that the nation’s leaders 
had managed to rescue the popular classes (“el pueblo”) from the “nauseating bowl of 
chicha, where corn and crime fermented,” only to end up throwing them into a vat of 
beer. For proof one needed only to follow the money trail: “To fully understand what 
Colombia drinks, it is enough to know that the main income of the eastern departments, 
of the farming regions by nature and by temperament, comes from taxes on beer.”85  
At that point Caballero made a number of accusations, a few of them valid, but 
some of them disputable at best, and others outright false. Nuggets of truth were 
exaggerated to the point of caricature. He claimed, for example, that the reason farmers 
no longer wanted to cultivate wheat was because they preferred beer to bread. 
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Considering the economic incentives barley producers enjoyed, and the disincentives 
for wheat growers, such a general pronouncement about the nature of Colombia’s 
farmers reduced them to irrational actors, incapable of analyzing a given situation and 
then opting for the most viable and reasonable path. They became nothing more than 
the sum of their bodily desires. Caballero also claimed that not one public or private 
entity offered “the least bit of stimulus” for wheat production: “Nobody worries about 
improving the product or stabilizing prices, as the beer companies are doing for 
barley.” While the reference to prices may have certainly been true, the accusation that 
nobody was attempting to improve wheat completely overlooked the almost thirty 
years of work that the Ministry of Agriculture had conducted to improve the country’s 
wheat production. Caballero ignored the existence of Menkemen and Bonza. Of course, 
there were valid criticisms about the Ministry’s policies promoting the development of 
these seeds without offering the other supports necessary for them to make a difference, 
but to say that nothing had been done at all was certainly an exaggeration. In another 
poetic accusation, he claimed that barley was “devouring farmers’ land, or rather, 
drinking it,” since barley was known to deplete the soil, or as Caballero put it, “sterilize 
and kill it.” Such accusations were usually lobbed at wheat instead of barley, making 
this reversal a surprising one, but ultimately, neither one depleted the soil any more 
rapidly than the other. Cultivation practices, rather than any inherent qualities in either 
of these crops, played a much larger role in soil conservation and fertility. Finally, the 
most vehement accusation was directed at millers. Caballero charged them with 
complete indifference to the nation’s well-being, claiming that their economic logic 
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made it acceptable for them to use imported North American wheat, while refusing to 
invest “even one peso” to support national production. Their coldness and lack of 
sympathy was harshly portrayed: “The millers, prostituted by a drunk State that is 
taking bread from the mouths of farmers’ children, can calmly say: ‘If they let us bring 
wheat from Canada and the United States, why should we care if farmers grow barley, 
destroying their soil in the process?’” Caballero warned that if the situation he 
described continued as it was, soon there would be no wheat grown in Colombia at all, 
other than perhaps in someone’s backyard garden, as a remembrance of past times.86  
Despite the fact that Caballero had repeated many of the complaints they had 
been making for several years, his article was not well-received by the individuals 
involved in wheat research and extension at the Ministry of Agriculture, DIA, Caja 
Agraria, and CAP. Canuto Cardona, the director of DIA, met with his staff and together 
they drafted a response which was published several days later in El Tiempo under the 
Agriculture Minister’s name.87 He began with a swipe at Caballero: “A few days ago, 
Eduardo Caballero, one of our most genuine, capable, and pleasant writers, published 
an article discussing, in what seems like a page ripped from a Romantic novel, the battle 
of ‘wheat and barley,’ and ‘bread and beer.’”88  
Whether Arango meant to compliment or criticize Caballero’s article by 
comparing it to a Romantic novel is unclear. The unfairness of Caballero’s piece was 
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ultimately his more pressing concern, in any case. He focused on Caballero’s assertion 
that no public or private entities offered “the least bit of stimulus” for wheat 
production, either in the form of improved seeds, price controls, credit, fertilizers, or 
farm machinery. Arango countered with data apparently suggesting otherwise. DIA 
had distributed 5,588,195 kilos of improved seed between 1953 and 1957. Planted on 
56,000 hectares, they had produced 1,500 kilos per hectare, comparing quite favorably 
with the mere 800 kilos per hectare produced during the same period by “common 
seeds.” Profits also grew. Total production with improved seeds amounted to 
84,000,000 kilos, valued at $74,928,000 pesos, while common seeds had produced only 
44,800,000 kilos, amounting to only $34,967,000 pesos.89 
Data on credit and loans seemed equally compelling. In 1957 a total of 1,035 Caja 
Agraria loans valuing $928,380.00 pesos had been granted to barley farmers, while 
wheat farmers, on the other hand, had received 9,477 loans totaling $6,441,061.00 pesos. 
The figures for 1958 were even more dramatic. While the quantity and amount of loans 
for barley farmers increased slightly – 1,334 loans equaling $1,656,403.00 pesos – loans 
for wheat farmers increased exponentially: 10,917 loans totaling $11,175,317.00 pesos 
had been made. Figures such as these proved that Caballero was wrong, according to 
Arango Londoño: “…with apologies to the esteemed author, that there has indeed been 
official attention directed toward improving yields and providing credit to farmers.”90  
But Arango Londoño’s numbers are incomplete. He provided loan information 
only for 1957 and 1958. Recall that Procebada was established in late 1957. While it did 
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not offer credit to farmers, it did supply them with seeds, fertilizers, and farm 
machinery. Consequently, after 1957 barley farmers had less need of direct Caja Agraria 
loans. Procebada, however, was partially funded through the barley tax paid by the 
beer companies to the Caja Agraria. In other words, there were other money streams 
channeling credit from the Caja Agraria to barley farmers, streams that bypassed its 
official system, and which could, thus, be hidden in plain sight, and left unmentioned 
by Arango Londoño. 
Ultimately, Arango Londoño’s attempt to show that wheat was not 
overshadowed by barley reinforced Rico Mejía’s criticisms (in Agricultura Tropical) that 
developing seeds, and even providing credit so that farmers could use them, while 
essential and commendable, were insufficient. As Rico Mejía asserted, market issues 
needed to be addressed. Arango Londoño did so, but in a way that completely 
sidestepped the crucial issues for wheat farmers. Instead of price supports, guaranteed 
sales, regulation of market transactions, or the construction of storage facilities that 
would assist farmers, he spoke instead about the connections among barley, wheat, and 
the nation’s foreign reserves. Increased barley production reduced Colombia’s 
dependent position by preserving its foreign reserves. P.L. 480 wheat imports did the 
same. He concluded by returning to technical expertise as the key to the problem and 
condemning what he saw as the false conflict generated by Caballero’s article: “In 
Colombia we have sufficient land for wheat and barley. One does not oppose the other, 
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and it is to be expected that the greater use of technology will allow us to increase 
production of both every year, which means reduced costs and better use of the land.”91 
Arango was not the only one who sidestepped market issues. A week later, when 
La República published an interview with Canuto Cardona Alvarez, the director of DIA. 
Cardona also protested Caballero’s assertions, claiming that barley and wheat received 
equal attention and the research and extension programs for each were similar. He 
echoed Arango Londoño when he discussed the new varieties that had been developed, 
focusing, like the Minister, on the technical aspects of production rather than market 
issues. As director of the research arm of the Ministry of Agriculture, he could add 
more in-depth information about new areas of research. DIA was developing a warm 
weather wheat variety that could be grown at Colombia’s lower elevations. Preliminary 
results at the Palmira experimental station near Cali seemed promising and, if 
successful, would allow Colombia to expand wheat cultivation areas. It had begun 
work with dwarf varieties to deal with the problem of “lodging” – the inability of a 
stalk to sustain its wheat and ultimately fall over.92 And much effort was dedicated 
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toward “combined fields” – plots sown with multiple varieties resistant to different 
plant diseases. In case of fungi or insect invasion, such fields protected farmers from 
total loss.93 
Cardona also directly addressed the market issues raised by Caballero and the 
farmers at the Agricultural Fair. Rather than skirting the issue by discussing PL480 and 
the import substitution benefits of promoting barley production, as Arango had done, 
Cardona went straight to the core of the widely circulated criticism, acknowledging that 
preset prices most certainly did seem to have a beneficial effect and encourage the 
expansion of barley production. Guaranteeing sale prices, however, was not part of 
DIA’s mandate, he protested. Other agencies existed to handle that.94   
Unfortunately, none of the other agencies in charge of managing the wheat 
market – namely INA – spoke up in response to Caballero’s article. This, of course, 
provided further strength to Rico Mejía’s assertions in Agricultura Tropical – that the 
state was not really interested in promoting wheat production and that emphasizing 
scientific and technical aspects was a convenient way of doing nothing while seemingly 
doing something.  
Up to that point, Ulysses J. Grant, a Rockefeller Foundation corn breeder who 
had become the director of the CAP earlier that year, was not overly concerned about 
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the bad press. Although he recognized that several of the assertions that had been made 
were “quite untrue,” he also believed that to some degree they stung because they 
reflected a serious problem: “Colombia is deficit in wheat by about 150,000 tons per 
year and this is hurting the national pocketbook.”95 Grant was fairly new in the country, 
however. John Gibler, the CAP’s wheat breeder had been there for several years and he 
was, according to Grant, “quite disturbed” about the articles in the press. Part of his 
anxiety may have stemmed from another that had appeared that week.96  
Penned by Raúl Varela Martínez, the article essentially condemned as useless all 
of the work that had been done to develop wheat in Colombia. Varela, unfortunately for 
the CAP, the DIA, and the Caja Agraria, was a well-respected Colombian agronomist, 
who had held several important positions within the Ministry of Agriculture during 
thirty continuous years of public service, including Agricultural Zone Chief, Director of 
Agricultural Experimental Station, Director of the National Department of Agriculture, 
Director of the Department of Agricultural Economics, and Director of the Department 
of Natural Resources. By 1959, he was the Ministry of Agriculture’s Technical Secretary. 
In 1952, ACIA awarded him the Medal of Agronomic Merit and in 1953 SAC awarded 
him the Medal of Agricultural Merit. At their November 1959 annual meeting, ACIA 
approved a resolution asking the Minister of Foreign Relations to award Varela the 
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Cruz de Boyacá, a medal awarded by the Colombian government for meritorious 
service to the nation.97 
Clearly a man of great standing among Colombia’s agricultural scientists, his 
opinions mattered a great deal. And his words may have been what so upset John 
Gibler, the Rockefeller Foundation’s wheat breeder. Even Grant commented to former 
director Lewis M. Roberts that he was confused by the situation: “I understood from 
you that Raúl Varela M. was a good friend of ours, but some of his recent statements to 
the press seem to indicate otherwise.”98  
Varela began with the oft-repeated argument about the origins of the wheat 
plant, claiming that botanists, geneticists, archeologists, and historians had determined 
that it originated in a temperate zone of Asia (Iran, in this case). This meant that for 
Colombia, “situated in the heart of the torrid zone,” wheat was an “exotic plant.” For 
that reason, according to Varela, neither the Spanish during the colonial era, who first 
brought it to Colombia, or contemporary agronomists had much luck adapting it to 
Colombia’s various climatic zones. Varela declared that current efforts to create a 
modified seed appropriate for Colombia “are not achieving the quality and volume to 
which the agronomists aspire, growers desire, and consumers need.” Suggesting that 
Colombia was fighting a losing battle, he claimed that all the tropical countries 
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imported wheat, and the five largest producing nations (U.S., Canada, Argentina, 
Australia, and France) were all in the temperate zone.99  
Following that introduction, Varela presented a lengthy and multifaceted 
argument addressing both scientific and economic issues. His conclusion was murky 
none-the-less. He began with a common theme: production. Despite intense efforts, he 
argued, production had remained essentially stable over the past ten years, averaging 
around 130,000 tons per year, approximately 70% of which was ground into flour at a 
Colombia mill.100 Countering recent claims to the contrary, he then offered statistics to 
show that wheat production still dominated the arable land in tierra fria not being 
utilized for cattle-raising, occupying 39% of it, in comparison to 26% and 23% for 
potatoes and corn respectively, and only a meager 12% for barley. He did acknowledge, 
however, that barley was more attractive for farmers and represented a “dominant and 
serious competitor for wheat.” 
He then focused on how intensely wheat consumption had increased, 
particularly in large-scale manufacturing of bread, cookies, crackers, pasta, and cones 
for ice cream. The last two items presented problems for Colombia, however. Cones 
required flour with less than 8% protein content, while pasta required flour with more 
than 14% - neither of which Colombia produced, and which therefore had to be 
imported. The average protein content of Colombian grain was between 11-14%, which 
was in the range for making bread; Varela made no comment on that, however, other 
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than to report that the vast majority of bread produced in Colombia was the small 
baguette made by hand (almost 68.5% of the bread consumed in Colombia was that 
kind). He did however, indicate where most bread was baked: there were only 16 large 
bread factories in the country, while the vast majority of bread was made at one of the 
more than 3,000 bakeries that used firewood in their ovens. Crackers, on the other hand, 
were mostly produced by one of the two large-scale crackers companies – Noel, based 
in Medellín and Santa Rosa in Caldas. Thirty-seven mills were located throughout the 
country, in both the productive and non-productive zones. Most of them, however, 
produced poor flour of inconsistent quality, and only five were equipped with the most 
modern machinery necessary for large-scale, consistent production.  
Of course, mills could only produce flour as good as the grain it used as raw 
material, and on that count, Colombia faced an insurmountable obstacle. Varela argued 
that due to the wide variability in topography, soil composition, and climatic conditions 
from one farm to another in the same region, “uniform wheat, in its biochemical 
properties, is impossible to produce at an industrial level in our tropical country.” For 
that reason, Varela claimed that Colombia would never be able to escape wheat 
imports: the cracker, cone, and pasta companies “need large quantities of consistently 
uniform flour with the same percentage of gluten, ash and viscosity,” but that this was 
impossible to achieve with domestic flour. Moreover, the country would have to import 
more than grain – imports of grain with the required characteristics outlined above 
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would be ineffectual if there were so few mills modern enough to handle it. Thus, even 
flour would have to be imported.101  
The nation’s nutrition was at stake, he argued. As it was, Colombia was not 
producing enough quality wheat to meet the nation’s consumption levels. And yet, 
those levels were woefully inadequate. Varela offered statistics from the Instituto 
Nacional de Nutrition showing that contemporary wheat consumption in Colombia 
amounted to 6.54 kilos per person annually. For minimal health, however, the Institute 
suggested that annual per capita wheat consumption increase to 22 kilos. This was a 
minimum, moreover. According to Varela, on a per capita basis, Canada consumed 277 
kilos of wheat annually, the United States 56, Venezuela 23 and Peru 21. Although he 
did not state it outright, it was clear what Varela was asking: if current Colombian 
production could not ensure that everyone consumed 7 kilos, how could it possibly 
raise that amount to 22 kilos?102  
This led Varela to his apparent final conclusion: wheat imports were increasing, 
but the country need not fear them, because they were being purchased through the 
PL480 program, which preserved foreign reserves. At that point, he took a swipe at 
those who promoted self-sufficiency in wheat production. He wrote how after 
Menkemen had been introduced with great fanfare in 1953, the then-Minister of 
Agriculture excitedly declared that after 1955, Colombia would have no more need of 
imported wheat. Somewhat sarcastically, he then wrote, “Let’s see the result of that 
ambition,” and gave statistics on the amount of wheat that had been imported since 
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1955, showing a dramatic increase over five years, from 75,720 tons in 1955 to 110,120 
tons just in the first half of 1959. The ultimate conclusion of all the material he had 
presented was the following: “…the wheat that gives the daily bread for all the nations 
of the temperate zones, because it is abundant, good and cheap, is not so for the nations 
of the tropical zones, because it is neither abundant, of good quality or cheap.”103  
Notable for such a detailed examination of the wheat market was the complete 
lack of attention to the price issues raised by Rico Mejía and the farmers at the 
Agricultural Fair. In fact, Varela’s article directly served the interests of barley 
promoters. There is no evidence that he was connected to Bavaria or Procebada. But, his 
article definitively moved the discussion away from economic policies and toward the 
scientific bases of wheat production in Colombia.  
Two days later, alarmed by Varela’s dire portrait, the editors of El Tiempo 
published an editorial decrying the lack of efforts to solve the “wheat problem.” At 
stake for the editorial’s author was the very idea of the nation and its development: 
“…like any self-respecting country in terms of food resources, ours needs good quality 
wheat in quantities sufficient to meet consumer demand.” In other words, countries 
worthy of respect were those that could feed themselves. But, while for Varela, there 
was no need for alarm, considering that the country could import wheat through the 
PL480 program, El Tiempo’s editors believed that imports were a problem and should be 
avoided. Their solution lay, however, in increasing the area under cultivation and 
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ignored other arguments about prices that had been made in its own pages over the 
previous two weeks.104  
The buzz in the newspapers riled the agronomists of the Caja Agraria’s Wheat 
Campaign, who had recently formed a working group to coordinate activities. At their 
second meeting that month, they grumbled that the country’s economic priorities 
favored self-sufficiency in commercial rather than food crops. Some of their conclusions 
echoed those of Varela Martínez. They agreed, for example, that production was 
deficient – the country only produced about half of the amount needed to satisfy 
demand. They also agreed with Varela’s statistics showing that wheat occupied 
approximately 170,000 hectares of Colombian soil. Only 29,100 of those hectares were 
planted with improved seeds, however, a point that Varela Martínez had not 
mentioned. With an average yield of 1,500 kilos per hectare, the agronomists calculated 
that if every hectare planted with wheat used improved seeds, rather than the 
“common ones” widely in use, Colombia could increase its wheat production by 
100,000 tons. Plans for achieving this massive conversion include the by-now familiar 
strategies of improved technical assistance, increased provision of credit, and better 
distribution of farm machinery. Also essential was the construction of more dryers and 
silos. Their longest suggestion was also a familiar one: improving the market. While 
previous commentators had denounced the nation’s millers, however, these técnicos, 
perhaps in light of all the criticisms they had recently endured, went straight to the 
source of the problem – the Instituto Nacional de Abastecimientos (INA), the agency 
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charged with regulating the market. While Rico Mejía earlier that month had declared 
that “fly-by-night” milling operations were the biggest problem Colombia’s wheat 
growers faced, these técnicos saw things differently: 
….although INA, as the entity charged with regulating prices and the only 
one authorized to import wheat, has intervened in the market, growers 
have received very little benefit as a result of its interventions, being that 
the price reductions INA imposes for various reasons (humidity, weight, 
grain size, etc.) radically decrease the regulated price paid to farmers, 
which often compels them to sell their product to intermediaries or directly 
to millers, under disadvantageous conditions.105 
 
The técnicos called for the creation of a “remunerative and honest market” for wheat 
farmers, but included no recommendations on how to force INA to change its practices. 
Granted, ensuring that farmers all switched to growing improved seeds could have 
eliminated some of the quality problems that INA might have been able to claim in 
order to reduce the price, but there was no guarantee that improved seeds would meet 
with more luck, and if nothing had changed, would only make matters worse for 
farmers. 
While the Caja Agraria attempted to keep economic policies at the forefront, it 
also worked in conjunction with the Rockefeller Foundation to counter Varela’s 
assertions about the scientific inappropriateness of growing wheat in Colombia. Yet, 
while this counter-attack certainly seemed necessary, especially to protect the 
reputation of the nation’s agronomists, their strategy ultimately helped to shift the 
discussion further away from the underlying economic issues and focus instead on the 
scientific ones. Although they intended their counter-attack to demonstrate that it was 
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scientifically feasible to grow wheat in Colombia and that the real issues that prevented 
the nation from achieving self-sufficiency in wheat were economic, the effect was the 
opposite – in the end, it strengthened the perception that wheat production in Colombia 
would thrive or perish based solely on the scientific bases of its production.  
Hoping to mitigate the bad press throughout August 1959, the wheat promoters 
lit upon the idea of organizing a “día de campo” – a visit to the Tibaitatá experiment 
station for reporters from the major newspapers. On August 28, Canuto Cardona and 
other Caja Agraria staff members had met with Grant and John Gibler from the 
Rockefeller Foundation to discuss strategies for dealing with the negative publicity. 
Further rebuttals in the newspapers, such as the ones published by Cardona and 
Arango Londoño, seemed pointless. Instead, a better strategy was to invite reporters to 
Tibaitatá “to see for themselves where we stand with the improved and good quality 
wheats.” Invitations should come from the Minister of Agriculture and the Manager of 
the Caja Agraria. Caballero Calderón and Varela Martínez were to be specifically 
invited. The día de campo should happen as soon as possible. As Grant noted: “If this is 
done within the next week, we can put on a very good show for our newspaper 
critics.”106 
Shortly afterward, El Siglo reported that an important día de campo was scheduled 
for Tuesday, September 8. Along with the reporters who focused on farming issues, the 
Minister of Agriculture had invited several members of Congress, some high-level 
Ministry staff, and the president of the SAC, as well as Douglas Botero Boschell, the 
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president of the miller’s association (ASEMOL) and Luís A. Rodríguez, the president of 
the baker’s association (ADEPAN).107 Grant’s prediction that they could “put on a good 
show” seems prescient, judging by the positive articles that appeared in various 
newspapers for almost two weeks afterward.  
John Gibler led the day’s activities together with Mario Zapata B. and Reinaldo 
Reyes, two DIA agronomists training as wheat breeders at the station. Their main goal 
for the day was to convince the reporters and invited guests that “up to 250,000 tons of 
wheat could be obtained annually, with the same growing area available, but utilizing 
improved varieties.” To counter some of the recent bad press about Colombian wheat 
varieties, Gibler began the día de campo with the “shocking” statistic that “national flour 
produces two percent more yield than that obtained by North American wheat.” 
Objections to the viability of wheat production in Colombia were quickly, and 
humorously, deflected. While describing the first test plot they visited that morning, for 
example, Zapata was interrupted by Rafael R. Camacho, the president of the SAC, with 
the protestation that in Colombia “wheat is an exotic plant.” Without missing a beat, 
Zapata immediately shot back, “Yes, it is just as exotic as the coffee of which Colombia 
is one of the largest producing countries.”108  
Zapata’s quick and “well-aimed” response introduced a lengthy description and 
tour of the Tibaitatá experimental station, which would have made it difficult for 
anyone to claim that wheat research was being neglected in favor of barley. Gibler, 
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Zapata, and Reyes discussed the over 3,345 hybrid varieties in test plots throughout 
Cundinamarca, Boyacá, and Nariño, as well as the laboratory studies involving 49,954 
lines, which had resulted in 296 crosses and 930 other varieties under observation at the 
international rust nursery.109  
The withdrawal of Menkemen from the market was raised. Tibaitatá’s wheat 
breeders explained that this was not a failure, as some were suggesting, but rather the 
normal course of things in plant breeding. Perhaps, they suggested, expectations had 
been too highly raised in 1954, when Menkemen was introduced as the “miracle seed” 
that would save Colombia from imported wheat. Gibler explained that it was common 
practice in the United States to take an improved seed out of circulation every four 
years. All seeds become susceptible to attacks by pests or plant diseases after a few 
years, he indicated, and research in the U.S. was ongoing in order to ensure a continual 
supply of new, resistant seeds. Thus, the discontinuation of Menkemen was not motive 
for disappointment or pessimism for the future of Colombian agriculture. As Gibler put 
it, “As far as Menkemen, which was once introduced as the ‘miracle seed,’ well, its 
retirement day has definitely arrived.”110  
Monoculture and its negative effects were discussed as well. After explaining the 
breeding process, Gibler, Zapata and Reyes took the reporters to a test plot apparently 
consisting of one variety because the plants were all of uniform size. The reporters were 
quite surprised to learn that it was actually a “multilineal plot,” in which ten different 
varieties had been planted. The breeders explained that since some varieties were 
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resistant to certain pests, and others not, it made more sense to plant several varieties so 
that if a pest or disease hit, only some of the plants would be affected and the farmer 
would not suffer a total loss that year.111  
Dwarf varieties were also a big hit among the reporters. As most of those 
varieties had originated in Japan, reporters referred to them as “exotic varieties,” which 
seems ironic in light of the earlier condemnation of wheat as an “exotic plant” in 
Colombia.112  
The “hundreds of acres” of wheat growing on the test plots at Tibaitatá offered a 
grand spectacle to the reporters. Two newspapers published very similar photographs, 
in fact, showing the business suit clad representatives of ADEPAN, ASEMOL, SAC, and 
the House of Representatives waist-high in wheat, in the middle of fields that seemed to 
stretch on for miles, broken by stands of trees in some parts of the background, 
disappearing into the horizon in others. The extensive areas of flat terrain near 
Facatativá and Mosquera on the Sabana de Bogotá, where Tibaitatá was located, 
certainly lent itself to such flattering camera angles.113 Photography tricks do not 
explain the enthusiastic optimism of the milling and baking representatives and the 
journalists present, however; the spectacle on the fields and in the labs were so 
persuasive that they apparently had become “…convinced that Colombia was on the 
road to solving its wheat deficit.” Even the president of the SAC, who, at the beginning 
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of the day, had seemed skeptical that such an “exotic plant” could thrive in the Andes, 
acknowledged that the obstacle was not wheat’s adaptability to Colombia’s climate, but 
rather, market conditions. Declaring that “the difference between barley and wheat lies 
in the quality of the market that absorbs them,” he condemned the practices of the 
nation’s millers, who refused to accept national wheat, claiming that they couldn’t 
purchase it because their grain storage facilities were already filled with imported 
wheat. The Vice-President of the SAC, also in attendance, supported that assessment, 
telling the story of a wheat farmer who had sold his entire harvest to one milling 
company, accepting bills of exchange in payment, but which sadly “…have not all been 
completely paid.”114  
These comments had come during a discussion of measures that could increase 
wheat production. Of the four, two were the jobs of extension agents – better seed 
distribution and enhanced technical assistance. The third was market intervention: the 
market needed to be better regulated to ensure that millers were prevented from 
speculating with grain and flour. The last measure was already in place – a campaign to 
promote bread consumption sponsored by ADEPAN. 
Discussion of bread raised the specter of beer, and the battle of wheat and barley, 
which had been so much in the news over the previous month. Gibler, Zapata and 
Reyes assured their visitors that the two crops could easily co-exist, as long as market 
conditions were fair. Great profits were at stake. While visiting the Caja Agraria’s seed 
multiplication facility, on the grounds of the experimental station, the trio of 
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agronomists argued that more than half of the total profits earned through sales of 
national wheat in the first half of 1959 came from improved varieties, despite the fact 
that they still occupied such a small percentage of total wheat fields in cultivation. 
Finally, the día de campo ended with a visit to Tibaitatá’s farinology department, where 
tests on the baking characteristics of improved varieties were conducted. Its manager, 
Dr. Hernando Arriaga, extolled the virtues of the center’s new variety, Diacol Nariño, 
claiming that its baking quality was equal to that of Hard Red Winter” and “Manitoba,” 
two varieties widely used in North America, and annually imported to Colombia in 
significant quanitities. Ironically, the negative effects of raising the public’s hopes too 
high in 1954 when Menkemen was released were ignored with the news that the release 
of Diacol Nariño was to be publicized by calling it the “savior seed.”115 
El Tiempo’s extensive report of the día de campo was one of several articles about 
wheat that appeared in a variety of newspapers after September 8. Although they 
emphasized different aspects of the visit, they were mostly quite positive. The release of 
Diacol Nariño was particularly lauded. La República celebrated its resistance to enanismo, 
a common wheat disease, and roya amarilla, a wheat disease endemic in Nariño. This 
resistance ensured that production could be resumed in that department’s wheat-
growing regions, which had ceased after the roya wiped out Menkemen. Perhaps 
reflecting the Rockefeller Foundation’s efforts to promote rotational farming with 
wheat, the article also reported that using “improved varieties” offered two other 
benefits: their yields were higher than “common varieties” and their growing season 
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were short, allowing farmers to plant two crops per year on the same soil. The only crop 
mentioned as a possible rotation partner was potato.116  
Juan Lamus Cáceres was still publishing his Earth and Man column in El Tiempo, 
and he appears to have been among the visitors in attendance at the día de campo. 
Echoing La República’s article about the release of Diacol Nariño, he assured readers that 
Colombia “need not be discouraged about the future of its wheat industry.” Plant 
diseases were no longer a problem with the specialists at Tibaitatá on the job, he 
asserted; if at any time wheat plants were threatened by fungal diseases, those scientists 
would quickly be able to develop and release a new, resistant variety. Tibaitatá was a 
“true laboratory” and the “Rockefeller Foundation and the Departmento de 
Investigaciones Agropecuarias [were] conducting an agronomic effort unparalleled in 
Latin America.” In that, Lamus Cáceres was not exaggerating, as Tibaitatá was indeed 
one of the few and perhaps the most highly developed cold-climate agricultural 
research stations in South and Central America. Lamus Cáceres was clearly on board 
with the campaign to downplay the “retirement” of Menkemen and promote Diacol 
Nariño. Remembering years past, when farm workers on the high, cold plains of 
Santurbán “used hats to thresh miserable wheat stalks,” he celebrated the change that 
Menkemen had wrought in increased yield, even though it had not fully lived up to 
expectations. But, the researchers at Tibaitatá had quickly recognized its limitations and 
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developed Bonza and then Diacol Nariño, giving Colombian wheat farmers two new 
“miracle seed” varieties from which to chose.117  
The rosy future in which “research at Tibaitatá…guarantees a steady supply of 
high-yield varieties…ensuring that decadent varieties are [always] replaced by young 
and strong ones” was not inevitable, however. Referring to John Gibler’s 
pronouncement at the día de campo that Colombian wheat produced flour with higher 
protein content than imported wheat, he asked “why then does the national product 
have such a modest reputation in comparison with imported wheat?” His answer was a 
familiar one. There was more money to be made speculating with imported wheat and 
raising cattle than with growing it in the highlands. As he declared: 
…essentially, the problem of the wheat deficit and the lack of bread on the 
Colombian table does not lie in [poor seed quality] or the protein content of 
national grain, but rather, in the lack of economic incentive in its 
production. Price anarchy and insecurity means more profit is to be made 
with extensive zones planted with kikuyo grass than with wheat.118  
 
Answering his question about the poor public perception of the quality of 
Colombian wheat by focusing on the market aspects that ultimately had very little to do 
with its quality echoes the construction of wheat as a “temperate” crop discussed in a 
previous chapter. Low protein content and high moisture were both important quality 
issues affecting the baking industry, but also discursive problems that conveniently 
allowed speculators, some millers, and those who preferred that land in the eastern 
cordillera be used for other purposes to deflect attention away from the market issues. 
The good press following the día de campo helped to briefly shift the public’s focus from 
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the scientific and technical issues toward the market ones and certainly served to dispel 
the idea that no work to improve wheat had been done in the country.  
This attention was cut short, however by none other than Estebán Rico Mejía. As 
one of Bavaria’s principal barley breeders and the president of ACIA, he had a unique 
and privileged viewpoint. Unfortunately, his opinions on the “battle of wheat and 
barley” frequently wavered. In his article in the August issue of Agricultura Tropical, he 
was unequivocal in his condemnation of market instability and certain that it alone 
explained the deficient wheat production in Colombia. By mid September, however, he 
seemed to have changed his mind. It was almost as if the characterization of barley’s 
success as being due to price and market factors annoyed him. He argued in a long 
article in El Espectador Vespertino that, while it was true that certain crops, such as 
barley, cotton, and sugar cane, were favored by industrial consumers who instituted 
measures to promote market stability, they would have had no success if there had not 
already been a strong scientific foundation in place. Issues such as seed selection, 
rational soil use, weed and pest control, and efficient harvesting methods had all been 
thoroughly studied before price policies were put in place. Even before those scientific 
issues had been studied, however, was the fundamental work to ensure that varieties 
were “perfectly adapted to soil and climate conditions.” Both of these factors – scientific 
study and market measures – were essential: “the lack of either one necessarily limited 
the development of the crop being researched.”119  
                                                 
119 RAC, RF, 12.3, Diaries, Box 21, Estebán Rico Mejía, “Productividad de los cultivos de cebada y trigo en el país,” El 
Espectador Vespertino, September 9, 1959.  
 284 
Barley provided a perfect example of what could be achieved, he argued, with a 
concerted effort to coordinate scientific research and market mechanisms. He proudly 
boasted that if the country still used the old varieties, it would have to “plant barley on 
over 125,000 hectares of land to produce the same 100,000 tons of grain that today [are] 
produced on only 60,000 hectares.”120 Moreover, he claimed, this freed up 65,000 
hectares that could be used to plant something else. 
That “something else” was the problem, he suggested. Wheat, unlike barley, had 
“agronomic problems such as diseases that could not be controlled except through 
disease-resistant varieties, and the plant’s climate demands that we don’t have in our 
tropical environment.” Attributing the success of the barley promotion program to the 
fact that it had a shorter growing season than wheat, he completely denied the 
possibility that the country would ever have any luck in achieving self-sufficiency in the 
latter crop: “if there are grave obstacles [facing] wheat production, nature has granted 
to the tropics the marvelous capacity to produce a great variety of other crops, such as 
corn, rice, beans, banana, yucca, and pasture grasses.”121  
 
Conclusion 
 That Rico Mejía’s opinion about wheat and barley production was compromised, 
despite his status as president of ACIA, was confirmed the following month when he 
was named Research Manager of the Bavaria Research and Extension Department, Inc., 
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a nominally autonomous organization supported by the Bavaria Consortium.122 Of all 
the people in a position to most effectively obscure the market support barley received, 
Rico Mejía was the one. He had intimate knowledge of the work that had been done to 
develop Funza, and thus, could readily counter any insinuation that barley succeeded 
not because it was developed on such a strong scientific foundation but rather because 
it enjoyed price supports and market mechanisms that wheat did not.  
 Of course, the work to obscure the economic policies that underlay barley’s 
success was not yet complete. Enough voices still called for equality in the treatment of 
the two cereals. ACIA itself, in its annual end-of-the-year report on agricultural 
production noted that wheat was not achieving the gains everyone had hoped, and the 
primary reason was the lack of a fair market.123 Over the next few years, Colombian 
agronomists and the Rockefeller Foundation would step up their criticisms of state 
policy that actively (although slyly) promoted agricultural production of industrial raw 
materials rather than food crops. They would eventually be joined by ADEPAN, the 
nation’s largest association of artisanal bakers, who complained about the declining 
availability of high-quality wheat and the state’s indirect promotion of beer – a 
“poisonous product” – among the lower classes.124 
But, with powerful industrial interests working together with U.S. wheat 
growers and promoters of surplus crops disposal, they would face strong challenges 
controlling the national discourse about “self-sufficiency,” increasingly defined more 
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narrowly to refer primarily to agricultural production that supported the nation’s 
industrialization goals.  This would marginalize voices such as those of the bakers’ 
association, who lamented, at the end of 1959, that wheat production was dramatically 
declining in Caldas, having been reduced to just two municipalities, while the areas that 
used to grow wheat, had turned to barley.125  
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CHAPTER 5 
“When the Powerful Organizations Convulse”: Artisanal Bakers and their Everyday 
Interpretations of the State and Economic Development in Colombia, 1960-1962 
 
 
The cheapest loaves of bread available in Bogotá at the end of 1959 never cost 
less than one peso, and often much more. But unlike other items of “prime necessity,” 
such as rice or milk, quantity and quality varied tremendously. Bakers faced a flour 
shortage and the price of sugar and other ingredients was unstable and on the rise. 
Some compensated by using more yeast and less flour to produce loaves that appeared 
similar in size to customers’ previous purchases, but which actually consisted of more 
air and less protein than in the past.1 As bread wasn’t sold by weight or volume, it was 
easy for bakers to trick consumers this way. Others made smaller loaves, but charged 
the same amount, while still others made the same bread as always, but raised its price. 
Whatever strategy bakers took, consumers suffered both through higher costs and 
reduced nutritional levels.   
Thus, bread quality was a major point of discussion during a meeting between 
Enrique Vargas Nariño, the General Manager of the Instituto Nacional de 
Abastecimientos (INA), a public agency charged with managing the price and 
distribution of basic food items, and representatives of the Asociación Nacional de 
Fabricantes de Pan (ADEPAN) in December 1959. Ostensibly focused on the price of 
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bakers’ raw materials, the two sides reached an agreement in which INA pledged to 
lower the price of flour by one peso per arroba (approximately twenty-five pounds) and 
ADEPAN pledged to lower the price of loaves by eight cents (falling short of INA’s 
initial request of a ten-cent reduction). This pledge raised a challenge for the 
representatives of ADEPAN who negotiated the agreement: how could they ensure that 
their member bakers complied? Quality and price already varied. The danger that some 
bakers would respond to the reduction in the price they could charge for bread by 
further reducing quality was high. Some might ignore the stipulation entirely, while 
still enjoying the reduced cost of their primary raw material. Thus, ADEPAN also 
pledged to initiate a campaign among its members to ensure compliance.2 
The campaign began soon afterward in ADEPAN’s monthly magazine, El 
Panadero Colombiano (“The Colombian Baker”). In an editorial discussing the agreement 
ADEPAN attempted to persuade its members to improve both the quantity and quality 
of bread available, while keeping prices stable, by appealing to several different ideals 
they thought their member bakers might value. Profit was certainly one of them – 
ADEPAN reminded members that “quality wins” and was “the best propaganda for 
their products and the most efficient system for gaining an edge over competitors.” 
Another was their responsibility as citizens, participants in a social contract among 
themselves, the public agencies regulating their industry, and the citizenry at large. 
ADEPAN asserted that INA’s request that quality and quantity be maintained was not 
made arbitrarily or dictatorially. It came, ADEPAN pointed out, as part of a bargain in 
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which the government would lower the price of flour – a bargain designed in the end 
for the good of the nation: “every price reduction that the State makes for the [baking] 
industry should reverberate to the benefit of the consuming masses.”3   
But most important of all, ADEPAN appealed to its members’ sense of class 
solidarity. This was a slightly complicated appeal, however. On the one hand, the 
editorial presented Colombia’s bakers as solidly middle class, a group of individuals 
who had the luxury of being in a position to help others in society. Bakers’ “own will 
and conscience” (rather than the State’s direction), led them to see their industry “as a 
social service, as the best way to help the people.” In other words, the very fact that 
bakers could put social responsibility above profit in order to help others meant that 
they occupied a privileged position. But at the same time, ADEPAN reminded its 
readers that the majority of its membership consisted of owners of small-scale, family-
run, artisanal bakeries, who needed state protection as much as the many other popular 
sectors struggling to make ends meet despite the constantly rising cost-of-living. 
Indeed, ADEPAN argued, it was precisely the fact that these bakers were not among the 
most privileged social classes that made their commitment to the collective good 
stronger than it might have been otherwise. As the editorial noted: “We are absolutely 
certain that we bakers, who have a large dose of social sensibility – well, to an 
overwhelming majority, we are an artisanal industry – will not oppose this campaign.” 
Concern for social problems in this case was directly tied to membership in a social 
group associated with the working- or lower-middle class. The editorial reinforced this 
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when it claimed that although bakers would not oppose the campaign to maintain high 
quality while charging less for their product, the State should not assume that a one 
peso per arroba reduction in the cost of flour meant that it had “favored” the bakers with 
the opportunity to “massively increase profits.” Production costs, including those of 
other raw materials, were still high, and these bakeries were small operations, unable to 
take advantage of the economies of scale enjoyed by larger, more industrialized bread 
manufacturers. For that reason, ADEPAN indicated that compliance with the 
agreement on the part of the bakers required that the price reductions remain in force 
on both sides: “…as small industries, at the same time as we recognize that we can 
today take advantage of price reductions for flour, is there a guarantee that these 
reductions will remain stable and that our costs can be maintained at current 
percentages?”4 
Without assurances from INA that flour prices would be maintained, it seemed 
unfair to ask bakers to offer a loaf of bread for sale for only one peso, a request the 
agency made, but which ADEPAN rejected. While the editorial suggested that it would 
be “noble” for bakers to offer one-peso bread for sale, and would certainly help bring 
down the cost-of-living for the nation’s poorest residents, the author declared that it 
could only be done after scientific studies of the exact quantity of ingredients and 
baking methods for such bread had been determined and standardized. Furthermore, 
bakers could not bear the cost of these studies alone; rather, they would have to be 
jointly funded by the baking industry and the state. Such studies weren’t enough, 
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however. Indeed, for ADEPAN, while a worthwhile long-term goal, they were not a 
pressing problem. Ensuring that the bakers’ sense of social solidarity be rewarded with 
the recognition that there were powerful forces manipulating public opinion was of 
much greater concern. ADEPAN emphasized bakers’ solidarity with Colombia’s poor 
and working classes, when it indicated that their vision of the baking industry as a 
social service, which led them to keep prices low, was evident in the fact that bakers did 
not speculate with bread (as millers did with flour). Proof of this lay in the lack of mass 
protests about the price of bread. This demonstrated, ADEPAN subtly insinuated, that 
offering one-peso bread for sale was not as important to Colombian consumers as it was 
to other sectors hoping to discredit bakers. In other words, the call for one-peso bread 
was a smokescreen, a method of deflecting the public’s attention away from some other 
issue.5 
The editorial did not name those sectors that sought to tarnish the bakers’ 
reputation. They were well-known to the bakers, however, and amply discussed in 
many other articles and issues of El Panadero Colombiano. Who were those sectors, and 
why would they seek to harm the bakers this way? More importantly, why does it 
matter?  
ADEPAN’s methods of attempting to convince its membership to honor its 
agreement with INA raise several intersecting questions about the consolidation of 
class, nation, and state in Colombia, and the role of economic discourse and neo-
imperialism in these processes: What role did Colombia’s less well-known and less 
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powerful gremios (guilds/unions/federations/associations) play in consolidating the 
state? As they went about defending their economic interests, what vision of the nation 
did they construct? What were the contours of their class and associational identity and 
how did they employ them? How did they challenge the national hegemony of more 
powerful industrial associations and the global hegemony of North American 
foundations, governmental agencies, and business associations? In short, what can a 
close examination of one case of “everyday forms of import substitution” tell us about 
the state, the nation, social classes, and neo-imperialism in Colombia? 
The Colombian state is often portrayed as subordinate to the nation’s most 
powerful agricultural, industrial, and financial interests, owing either to the presence of 
representatives of the latter on the advisory boards of many state agencies or to their 
power to dictate economic policy. This presence is described as strongly emerging in 
the 1920s and 1930s and dramatically accelerating between the 1940s and 1970s. The 
primary contestation in these descriptions involves conflicts among the large 
agricultural, industrial, and merchants associations for control over the state’s economic 
policies, or internal power shifts within an organization along regional lines or sectors.6 
Although the establishment of many other agricultural and industrial associations 
during this same period is mentioned, their role in conflicts over state economic policies 
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or internal power struggles is rarely discussed or analyzed.7 Meanwhile, the 
relationship between popular sectors and the state is considered, but these analyses 
tend to focus on labor organizing or mass social protests.8  
Emphasizing either elite or popular sectors, these accounts of relations between 
the state and citizens in Colombia broadly focus on either co-optation (by elites) or 
confrontation (by popular groups). But middle sectors such as the bakers of ADEPAN 
challenge both of these paradigms. Co-optation assumes that all the contestation 
happened horizontally, among the elite associations, and ignores the vertical conflicts 
among business associations with varying degrees of power. Confrontation assumes 
that civil society and the state do not mutually reinforce or help to construct each other. 
Considering the impact of violence on civic life in Colombia, particularly among more 
popular sectors, that the state’s violent response to public protest (either directly or 
through paramilitary forces) reduces both the autonomy of popular sectors and the 
legitimacy of the state should not be discounted. But violence did not touch everyone in 
Colombia equally.  Middle sectors such as the bakers of ADEPAN did not have the 
power to co-opt the state’s institutions, but neither did they face violent repression. For 
them, the state remained the legitimate authority with the power to ensure a level 
playing field among various sectors and business interests. At times they contested 
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what seemed to be collusion between large industrialists and certain state agencies. 
They also contested those same agencies’ interpretations of economic policies, but the 
process of arguing with them over those interpretations served to reinforce their 
subordinate position to the state. In other words, as the now-classic volume on 
everyday forms of state formation affirms, contestation by the bakers was a constructive 
process of state-building and of identity formation: as they negotiated the terms of their 
interactions, the state and the bakers mutually constituted each other.9 Contesting the 
state consolidates it. 
Similarly, offering alternative definitions of the state and its economic policies, 
and one’s relationship to them, consolidates one’s own group identity. The formation of 
workers’ identities has been examined in Colombian historiography, by looking 
primarily at their transformation from nineteenth century artisans to twentieth century 
workers, or from undisciplined rural peasants to disciplined urban laborers.10 The 
important role of managers and business owners is highlighted in these studies, in the 
process creating a dichotomy that overlooks many middle sectors.11 This is particularly 
unfortunate in the case of the bakers of ADEPAN. Although in the organization’s early 
years (1956-1959) it emphasized the industrial and technical aspects of bread-making in 
order to present an image of bakers as large-scale industrialists, after 1960 it 
emphasized the small-scale, artisanal aspects of Colombian bread-production and 
highlighted the family-run nature of most of the country’s bakeries. This was a 
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deliberate strategy designed to promote their interests vis a vis the state at a time when 
industrialists and large landowners were often vilified for their greed and called upon 
to make greater sacrifices for the good of the nation. Yet, the primary study of 
Colombia’s artisans ends in the early twentieth century.12 United in the nineteenth 
century, by the early twentieth, they became increasingly differentiated: although 
“industrial artisans” and “workers” often joined together to create unions, the more 
commonly-examined process of radicalization that labor unions experienced through 
the 1930s leaves artisans out of the picture.  
But, as ADEPAN demonstrates, they did not disappear. More importantly, they 
retained a degree of power that workers and peasants did not enjoy. This power 
manifested itself in an interesting way. Supported by transnational actors, particularly 
representatives of the Millers Federation of the United States, ADEPAN was able to 
mount a strong challenge to import substitution policies as defined by Colombia’s 
industrial millers (and the business associations and state agencies that supported 
them). Although in the end ADEPAN did not succeed in establishing its interpretation 
of those polices as the hegemonic one, its failure to do so illustrates the contingent 
nature of the power of transnational or neo-imperial forces in Colombia: in contrast to 
many post-colonial studies of economic development in Latin America, which assumes 
that powerful actors from the global North almost invariably succeeded in imposing 
their vision of economic policies in the global South, the bakers of ADEPAN 
                                                 
12 Sowell, Early Colombian Labor Movement. 
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demonstrate that the power of transnational actors is much more highly circumscribed 
than has often been portrayed.13  
Moreover, ADEPAN itself, separate from its North American allies, challenges 
the presumption that national governments, transnational NGOs, or World Bank 
economists unilaterally impose discourses of economic development. In these 
formulations, planners and economists in offices in New York, Washington, or Bogotá 
decide the best economic path a country should take, and then impose projects aligned 
with that economic vision on indigenous groups or poor farmers. Sometimes those 
indigenous groups or farmers resist those projects and develop an alternative vision of 
economic development. But, these alternatives often focus on their own community, 
rather than the government’s overall economic policies.14 ADEPAN, on the other hand, 
challenged the state’s policy of import substitution, a challenge with strong 
consequences for many different sectors, rather than just their own. In this regard, the 
concept of “everyday forms of state formation” is useful as a framework of analysis. As 
that volume demonstrated, non-state actors played an important role in constituting the 
state. The same can be said for economic policies. Economists did not have a monopoly 
on how economic policies would be interpreted and implemented.  
This chapter examines one case of “everyday forms of import substitution” by 
following the bakers of ADEPAN between 1960 and 1962, a period when the power of 
industrialists and large landowners was being called into question, as the country 
debated the possibility of agrarian and labor reforms. Closely following these bakers 
                                                 
13 Babb, Managing Mexico; Dezalay and Garth, Internationalization of Palace Wars; Escobar, Encountering Development.  
14 Escobar, Encountering Development; Gow, Countering Development. 
 297 
through their publication, El Panadero Colombiano (published monthly, although with 
some gaps, occasionally long ones), the chapter first outlines the conflicts between the 
artisan bakers and the industrial millers, conflicts which involved state agencies, 
particularly INA. Then, the chapter examines the construction of an associational 
identity, which attempted to finely balance one portrayal of the bakers as small-scale, 
socially conscious artisans with another portrayal of them as light manufacturers, with 
enough employees that they merited a space at the table of industrial negotiations. The 
difficulties of balancing these two images became apparent following accusations that 
the bakers were receiving funds from abroad, thus belying their claims that they were 
simply artisans. Although the bakers vigorously denied this, the subsequent section of 
the chapter demonstrates that the relationship between ADEPAN and the Millers 
Federation of the United States was very close through a detailed examination of the 
various articles, news items, and promotional materials supplied to ADEPAN by the 
Millers’ Federation, as well as the release of a report on Colombian flour consumption 
jointly produced by the Millers’ Federation and the USDA (which strongly supported 
the bakers claim that flour milled in Colombia was of poor quality and the country 
would be better served by importing flour rather than grain). The final section argues 
that in the end, this support did not make a difference, as ADEPAN still struggled to 
convince INA to support their perspective on import policies, while INA continued to 
implement policies that favored millers.  
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Ninety Millers versus One Million Wheat Growers 
Judging by the number of complaints coming from various quarters, December 
1959 must have been a challenging month for both Colombia’s millers and the directors 
of INA. One of them came from the Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia (SAC), the 
nation’s oldest agricultural association and traditionally the public face of large 
landowners.15 In an editorial reviewing agricultural production in 1959 they devoted 
most of their attention to wheat. Harvests were good, in spite of bad weather and the 
ongoing encroachment of barley production for the beer industry. But wheat farmers 
still suffered significant financial losses. The SAC blamed millers and INA for this, 
claiming that the problem was their lack of adequate drying equipment. Dryers were 
important everywhere, but especially so in Colombia; with two rainy seasons, harvested 
grain almost always arrived damp to its point of sale. Only a few of the largest millers 
had dryers. None of the smaller ones did. Within a few days after harvest began, most 
of the large mills had purchased all that they could store. Thus, only the very first 
farmers to arrive were able to sell their harvests at a good price. Everyone else was 
forced to sell at lower prices. Millers without dryers would not accept damp wheat, and 
thus, farmers had to sell to intermediaries who offered less from the outset and then 
cheated them by adjusting scales. Moreover, they rarely paid in full, but rather, in 
                                                 
15 Bejarano, Economía y poder. For example, the list of powerful public and private agencies or corporations that had a 
member of the SAC on its board, included the Banco de la República, the Junta Nacional de Aduanas, the Caja de 
Crédito Agrario, Industrial y Minero, and Ferrocarriles Nacionales. See, Bejarano, 215-216. 
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installments, a problem for farmers whose creditors started demanding payment 
shortly after harvest.16  
Millers were not solely to blame, however. Negligence on the part of INA played 
an equally important role. INA’s purpose, according to the SAC, was to protect basic 
commodities such as wheat, by ensuring a level playing field among producers, buyers, 
and sellers, and thus guaranteeing an adequate supply at prices even the poorest 
Colombians could afford. But the SAC found INA’s efforts to protect this crop “weak 
and disconcerting.” It was a timid criticism, however. Rather than laying the blame at 
the top, the SAC asserted that INA’s directors were “well-intentioned,” but its “low-
level employees haven’t understood the meaning of actively defending producers.”17 
The agronomists of the Asociación Colombiana de Ingenieros Agrónomos 
(ACIA) pulled less punches. Countering claims that there was overproduction of wheat 
in Colombia, ACIA offered halfhearted praise for INA, declaring that it had helped to 
“partly alleviate” the problem of millers’ refusal to purchase farmers’ wheat harvests, 
although without specifying how it had done so.  That feeble praise was followed by 
condemnation. While the lack of drying and storage facilities was indeed problematic, it 
was only symptomatic of a much larger issue. Disturbingly, according to ACIA, its 
roots lay firmly in INA’s hands. The agency charged with protecting the nation’s wheat 
growers did the exact opposite; rather than purchasing imported grain during 
Colombia’s growing season, it seemed to wait every year until it was harvest time. 
Thus, when Colombian farmers attempted to sell their wheat, the storage facilities of 
                                                 
16 Rafael R. Camacho, “Para dónde va la agricultura colombiana?” RNA 53 (December 1959): 5-6. 
17 Ibid. 
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both INA and the milling companies were already full – but not with nationally 
produced grain. This was unacceptable, according to ACIA: “The space occupied by 
these shipments is storage space stolen from our own grain.” Thus, ACIA argued that 
there was absolutely no “overproduction” of wheat in Colombia, as some had claimed:   
To speak of overproduction of cotton is to lack vision. To assert that there is 
overproduction of potatoes is an effrontery. But to say that there is 
overproduction of wheat is either a complete lack of awareness, an 
inexcusable gaffe, or a defense of obscure interests.18  
 
Strong as these complaints were, they also reflected differing interpretations of 
the meaning of economic protection and of how INA was to balance its potentially 
contradictory objectives. After all, INA could easily argue that it was fulfilling its 
mandate of guaranteeing that flour was available at a reasonable price for consumers by 
ensuring that imported supplies were in abundance. Protecting farmers, although also 
part of its mandate, would have to take a back seat.19 Obviously, the SAC and ACIA 
saw this differently. For them, defending farmers was equivalent to defending the 
nation and its economy –– Colombian consumers would not suffer from a lack of 
affordable bread if national wheat was purchased before imported wheat but this 
would ensure that Colombian farmers did not suffer economic hardship. Thus, two 
important sectors of Colombian society and economic life would benefit by adopting 
the protectionist policies espoused by the SAC and ACIA.   
ADEPAN also claimed that INA played an important role in the problems 
Colombia’s wheat farmers faced. Its interpretation differed, however. In December 
                                                 
18 Juan Orjuela Navarrete, “¡Superproducción!” AT 15 (December 1959): 837-838.  
19 “Conozcamos los objetivos legales del ‘I.N.A.’ y su organización,” PC Nos. 24-25 (May-June 1960): 35-36.  
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ADEPAN reported that millers in Nariño were refusing to accept wheat harvests. 
Farmers’ only recourse was to rely on INA to purchase their grain or the Caja Agraria to 
offer them enough credit to pay their bills while they waited for storage space to 
become available in millers’ warehouses. The long-term consequences were dire: in 
spite of the great advances made by the Ministry of Agriculture in developing 
improved seeds suitable for Nariño’s climatic and soil conditions – something 
ADEPAN lavishly praised that same month – production there would likely decline, 
since farmers had no incentive to continue growing something that they could only sell 
at ruinous prices, if at all.20  
In this, ADEPAN’s criticisms of INA did not differ substantially from that of the 
agronomists and farmers of ACIA and the SAC. But by the following month, ADEPAN 
had added a new dimension to its critique. This grew from insinuations that ADEPAN 
equally contributed to the problems of wheat farmers – insinuations evident in its 
subtle, but vigorous defense of the bakers whom INA had “obligated” to purchase all of 
the imported flour that had recently been shipped to the country. Considering how 
strongly and consistently ADEPAN had ask INA to increase flour imports over the 
previous four years, it was disingenuous to then claim that INA was forcing bakers to 
use that imported flour, but doing so portrayed ADEPAN as inculpable in the chain of 
blame. After all, one interpretation of the issue was that if millers were not purchasing 
national harvests because their warehouses were full, the problem actually lay with 
their customers, who were not purchasing their flour and thus prolonging the time that 
                                                 
20 “Noticias que nos interesan,” PC No. 20 (December 1959): 23; “Los esfuerzos trigueros de ‘Tibaitatá,’” PC No. 20 
(December 1959): 30-31. 
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imported grain sat in their storage spaces. The logjam, therefore, was not the millers, 
but the bakers. And why didn’t they buy the flour millers produced? For ADEPAN’s 
critics championing this interpretation, the answer was simple – the bakers preferred to 
use imported flour.21  
ADEPAN countered with a similarly simple explanation: the mills “prefer to 
grind American grain” and “INA obliged bakers to absorb the imported flour that it 
was distributing.” Combined, these two phenomena “paralyzed the market for national 
flour.”22  
But considering ADEPAN’s consistent calls for imported flour, why would 
millers’ preference for imported grain be a problem for bakers? Several articles in El 
Panadero Colombiano praised the quality of the wheat produced in the U.S., after all.23 
Presumably, flour made from that grain would be of similar quality, whether it was 
produced closer to its point of origin, or farther away, in Colombia. This was not the 
case, however. ADEPAN repeatedly criticized the quality of the flour that Colombian 
mills produced using U.S. grain. Millers over-ground it, they claimed, producing flour 
containing residues and particles that affected the quality of bread. Although bakers 
had complained about this for some time, millers refused to alter production processes. 
ADEPAN slyly hinted that this was simply due to greed: Colombian “mills can offer 
                                                 
21 “Noticias que nos interesan,” PC No. 21 (January 1960): 14-15. 
22 Ibid. 
23 “Que es el gluten…? Proteínas,” PC No. 21 (January 1960): 11; “El ‘Dark Hard Winter’, el mejor trigo del mundo,” 
PC No. 30 (December 1961): 16. On the very same page of that same issue, another short item appeared, which 
claimed that Colombia’s wheat requirements had been calculated at 340,000 tons, but it was only producing 150,000. 
Thus, Colombia had to make up the difference through imports, “preferably from the United States,” but there were 
also proposals to trade coffee for wheat from the Soviet Union. See, “Noticias que nos interesan,” (January 1960), op. 
cit. 
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flour [brands] almost as good as the imported [ones] but they know why they don’t do 
so – they squeeze everything they can out of the grain.”24  
Under such circumstances, for the bakers of ADEPAN the flour that best made 
the kind of bread that Colombians preferred was a mixture of imported and “national” 
flours – the latter being flour produced in Colombia using national grain. ADEPAN 
claimed that national flour was “weak” and didn’t absorb water very well, while U.S. 
flour was “too strong” and couldn’t be used on its own to make the soft rolls and 
baguette-type breads most commonly consumed in Colombia. Mixing a small amount 
of U.S. flour with a larger amount of national resulted in flour perfectly suited to 
Colombian bakers needs. Thus, ADEPAN responded to the criticism that it preferred 
U.S. flour by demonstrating its solidarity with the nation’s wheat growers:  
The stronger the imported flour, the larger the quantity of national flour it 
requires for a good mixture, and for that reason, farmers should view the 
highest quality imported flour as wheat production’s best ally, and in 
contrast, flour produced nationally with American grain as its greatest 
threat: these flours do not mix well with national flour – in fact, they are 
only slightly better than national flour, and being that they have the same 
price, end up displacing it from the market.25  
 
In light of the benefits of this mixture, ADEPAN’s statement that INA obligated 
them to purchase imported flour seems contradictory, but actually makes perfect sense. 
Required to spend their cash on imported flour, they had none left to purchase national; 
if millers would mix national and imported according to the bakers’ specifications, then 
they would be in a much better position to support the nation’s wheat growers. But 
“anarchy” in the marketplace, caused by INA and the millers, meant that Colombia 
                                                 
24 “El problema de los trigueros,” PC No. 21 (January 1960): 26, 28. 
25 Ibid.  
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faced the ridiculous situation of having “more than 40,000 tons of national wheat unable 
to be sold.... at the same time as the country experiences a huge wheat deficit.”26 The 
figures ADEPAN cited came from statements by Rafael R. Camacho, a member of the 
SAC’s Cereal’s Committee. Citing him increased the impression that they acted in 
solidarity with the nation’s wheat farmers and agreed with the interpretation of 
economic protection expressed by the SAC and ACIA. This further served to heighten 
the contrast with the nation’s millers, portrayed in these statements as caring only for 
themselves and their bottom line, at the expense of the nation.  
Millers apparently did not sit idly by and let these criticisms circulate without 
rebuttal. Moreover, turning the tables and claiming that bakers actually caused the 
backlog in their warehouses was not their only response. They also disparaged the 
quality of bread, and its price. As one observer noted: “…our housewives frequently 
complain, and rightly so, about the daily bread that they and their loved ones have to 
eat. It is small, hard, and expensive…”27 ADEPAN acknowledged that some bakers 
were shoddy and that they all needed to pay attention to constantly improving their 
manufacturing processes.28 But if bread was bad, they responded, it was mainly due to 
the poor quality of the primary raw material. Once again aligning themselves with the 
nation’s wheat growers, ADEPAN claimed that there used to be a time when Colombia 
was self-sufficient in wheat. This was no longer the case, for several reasons. Rural 
violence encouraged people to leave farming and head to the cities. Beer monopolies 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Elena Nieto Cano, “‘La calentura no está en las sábanas’ (Tomado de ‘El Espectador’):” PC Nos. 22-23 (February-
March 1960): 19.  
28 “El pan al peso,” op.cit.; “Noticias que nos interesan,” (January 1960), op.cit. 
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earned huge profits spreading barley production where wheat used to be cultivated 
(and in the process “feeding the vice of alcoholism”). Barley farmers also received 
protection (in the form of guaranteed prices) that the State did not offer to wheat 
farmers. Seeds and soils had only recently begun to be improved. And national flour 
brands had decreased in quality while foreign ones, particularly from the United States, 
had improved.29  
Changing this situation required better protection of wheat farmers and more 
attention to improving the quality of their crop. Unfortunately, this was not happening 
and millers were partly to blame. Fighting any efforts designed to increase how much 
national flour they used, millers ensured that the supply of imported grain never 
diminished.30 This had a pernicious effect on national wheat production, according to 
ADEPAN. As it argued elsewhere that month, only imported flour could be combined 
with national flour to make good bread. National flour made from imported grain 
could not be mixed with either one to improve its quality. The result, as ADEPAN put 
it, was that: “the more imported wheat there is, the less national wheat is consumed.”31  
At stake was not just the quality of bread or the future of the baking industry; for 
ADEPAN, this went to the very heart of the idea of protectionism and national self-
sufficiency. ADEPAN defined both of these goals as more than simply substituting 
                                                 
29 Hernán Villamarin Gutiérrez, “Una política panadera,” PC No. 21 (January 1960): 5-7. 
30 Distribution of national wheat was organized along regional lines. INA had divided the country into two zones: the 
wheat-producing one and the non-producing one. Millers in the wheat-producing zone were required to absorb all of 
the national production, while those in the non-producing zone did not have to absorb any at all. This was largely 
due to the costs associated with transporting wheat from the central highlands where it was produced, to the markets 
on the coast, and in late 1959 led to a split in the millers national association. A group of millers in the producing 
zone broke off from the Asociación de Molineros (ASEMOL) and established an organization that better served their 
interests, the Asociación de Molineros de la Zona Productora (ASEMOLPRO). See, “Asociación de Molineros de la 
Zona Productora,” PC No. 20 (December 1959): 25. 
31 Villamarin, “Política panadera,” op.cit. 
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imported goods or materials for domestic ones. Ensuring that the benefits of 
protectionism were distributed equally among different economic sectors, large and 
small, should be at the core of the state’s protectionist policies. They declared, for 
example, that “it was of utmost importance to define which protectionist policy was 
better (assuming that they are mutually exclusive): protection for the country’s ninety 
millers or protection for a million wheat growers?”32 Although they recognized that 
INA’s desire that national flour be consumed was “just and patriotric,” they ultimately 
believed that any policy regulating wheat should harmoniously balance the needs of 
bakers, millers, and farmers – and that asking bakers to purchase both imported flour 
and that produced nationally from imported grain did the opposite: it created a “false 
market” and lay all the burden on their shoulders (or wallets). As they noted: “The 
major preoccupation of the government and of INA has been protecting wheat 
production, which truly represents national wealth, and all of us Colombians share this 
desire for self-sufficiency, even though we have our doubts that the methods used [to 
achieve it] are the best ones.”33 
That everyone in the wheat industry needed to make sacrifices to achieve 
national self-sufficiency in wheat while improving the quality of bread was evident in 
ADEPAN’s acknowledgement that bakers needed further training. In January 1960 
ADEPAN announced that the baking school it had been working to establish in 
collaboration with SENA – the Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, a national vocational 
training school for adults – would soon be operational. This would help to ensure that 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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bread quality constantly improved.34 But that same month (in fact, on the same page of 
short news items), ADEPAN reminded readers that quality bread was dependent on 
quality raw material. Without directly attacking Colombian millers, ADEPAN 
reinforced its assertion that the former was producing poor-quality flour when it noted 
that “baking was a science,” one in which “more advanced countries than ours” were 
continuously improving production processes and raw materials. One of the most 
recent advances involved milling processes: “It is certain that very soon, milling 
systems will be able to produce singular flours for every purpose, with exact 
percentages of protein and gluten, at reasonable prices considering their high quality. 
With every passing day, man further overcomes nature.”35  
By evoking the perceived impartiality of science, ADEPAN slyly reinforced its 
accusation that millers were to blame for the poor quality of bread. Combined with its 
other subtle (or not-so-subtle) and repeated attempts to contrast the elevated aims of 
bakers concerned about the welfare of a million wheat growers with the baser aims of a 
much reduced group of greedy milling industrialists, ADEPAN labored to construct an 
image of itself as more worthy of state protection. This is an image echoed in the 
contrast it drew between itself and the smaller group of industrial bakers, a contrast 
discussed in the next section.   
 
 
 
                                                 
34 “Noticias que nos interesan,” (January 1960), op. cit. 
35 Ibid. 
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The Bakers Come of Age 
 As INA’s authorized distributor of imported flour, ADEPAN gave preferential 
rates to affiliated bakers, thus encouraging them to join the organization. But that was 
clearly not the only reason that its membership grew rapidly in the late 1950s – imports 
were not steady during those years of coffee bust and economic crisis and at various 
times INA gave distribution authority to other entities or to flour mills. Nonetheless, 
ADEPAN’s membership grew from 450 affiliates in March 1958 to 700 by June 1959.36 
Most were located in Cundinamarca. In July 1959, eighty-six of them met to establish a 
regional chapter, setting dues and electing Hernán Villamarín G. chairman of the 
chapter’s Board of Directors. With the dues, the chapter intended to establish a 
cooperative organization, Adepósitos, S.A., that would help supply members with the 
essential material and machinery for their bakeries at a reduced cost. Thus, a crucial 
first task was encouraging other ADEPAN affiliates in Cundinamarca to join, but a 
major obstacle presented itself almost immediately. Only a handful of ADEPAN’s 
affiliated bakeries were large-scale, industrial operations and most of them were located 
in or near Bogotá. Their larger scale of operations would have allowed Adepósitos to 
make larger bulk purchases of material and equipment, lowering the cost for everyone. 
But, the same month that the chapter began, twenty of those larger bakeries separated 
from ADEPAN and established their own association – the Federación de Industriales 
de Panificación (FIP – the Federation of Bread-Making Industrialists). Although FIP and 
ADEPAN remained on cordial terms – the latter received a representative of the former 
                                                 
36 “Noticias breves,” PC No. 18 (April 1959): 4. 
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as a special guest at ADEPAN’s Seventh National Congress the following February, for 
example – this negatively affected the new Cundinamarca chapter by both reducing the 
number of potential members and the amount of materials that it could purchase.37 
 Nevertheless, the defection of Bogotá’s industrial bakers was not a mortal blow 
to the Cundinamarca chapter. By September, membership had increased to 107 affiliates 
and by January 1960 stood at 139. Many had yet to pay their dues by that date, but 
Villamarín was still optimistic about the chapter’s future growth and impact.38 
Moreover, the establishment of FIP enabled ADEPAN to begin consolidating its image 
as an association of small- or medium-sized businesses. This mattered at a time when 
industrialists and large landowners were often publicly criticized for being selfishly 
unconcerned about the welfare of the nation. Ignoring poverty and massive inequality, 
they were accused of jeopardizing the nation’s social and economic future. As the 
previous chapter noted, President Lleras Camargo himself called for greater sacrifice on 
the part of the country’s industrialists in his August 1958 inaugural speech. Two years 
later he repeated this admonition during his speech at the installation of the new 
congressional session. Discussing the relationship between the state and private 
enterprise, he asserted that in a developing country it made no sense for the state to 
constantly threaten to redistribute wealth by appropriating private property or 
                                                 
37 “Informe del Director de la Seccional,” PC No. 21 (January 1960): 20-21; “Vista parcial de los asistentes al 
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noting that it was exciting to see “the baking family forgo selfishness” and think only about the future of their 
industry. See “‘ADEPAN’ Seccional Cundinamarca – Sus Asambleas Generales – Informes y Actividades – Informes 
de la Junta Directiva,” PC Nos. 26-27 (May-June 1961): 48-51.  
38 “Informe del Director,” op cit. 
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nationalizing companies and services, as this frightened investors and slowed down 
economic growth. But, he noted, 
…at the same time, it is essential to demand more intense, active, and 
generous solidarity from the more fortunate economic classes… There are 
sectors that not only show indifference, but hostility to any such request. 
Others make an uproar and create deliberate confusion at the suggestion of 
any official measure that might affect the ownership of their unlimited and 
sometimes abusive amount of personal property.39  
 
Although Lleras Camargo’s comments came at a time when Congress was 
discussing the possible implementation of an agrarian reform program, designed to 
reduce the inequitable concentration of land in Colombia, industrialists were not 
excluded from condemnations of unfairly monopolizing wealth and power. Thus, for 
ADEPAN, presenting itself as an association of small, family-based businesses selling 
one of the country’s most basic food items seemed a promising strategy for gaining the 
attention and favor of the various state agencies that regulated their industry.  
This was particularly important considering their often-strained relations with 
the nation’s millers – the suppliers of their primary raw material, and a much more 
powerful group of industrialists. While no bread baking companies were represented 
on the boards of the various regional chapters of the Asociación Nacional de 
Industriales (ANDI – National Industrialists’ Association) when it was established in 
1944, three different milling companies were: Compañía Harinera Antioqueña in 
Antioquia, Industria Harinera S.A. in Bogotá, and Molinos Roncallo in Barranquilla.40 
Sixteen years later, Alberto Roncallo Vilar, the co-owner of Molinos Roncallo, was still a 
                                                 
39 Lleras Camargo, “Instalación del Congreso,” in Primer Gobierno Frente Nacional, Tomo segundo: 451-486, 482-483. 
40 Sáenz Rovner, La ofensiva empresarial. Board members included Jesús Mora in Antioquia, Salvador Camacho Roldán 
and Roberto Venegas in Bogotá, and Alberto Roncallo Vilar in Barranquilla. 
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principal board member of ANDI’s Barranquilla chapter. Employing over one hundred 
unionized workers, in 1960 the mill produced 1,500 tons of flour a month.41  
Flour speculation by milling companies, a serious problem in the late 1950s 
(discussed in a previous chapter), apparently evolved in 1959 into an attempt to destroy 
the baking federation itself, at least in one region of the country. Although sparse on 
details, ADEPAN reported that at the end of 1959 the millers of Medellín tried to “wipe 
out” its section in Antioquia, and it was only by “launching a major battle” against 
them that the bakers there were able to save it.42 Working together, the bakers not only 
staved off the millers, but also eliminated all the other intermediaries whose 
interventions and market manipulations helped raise the price of their basic raw 
material and the other ingredients they required to make bread. They did this by 
forming a cooperative organization with some similarities to Adepósitos. Unlike in 
Cundinamarca, however, an overwhelming majority (95%) of Medellín’s bakers joined 
the “Cooperativa de Adepán – Coopán.”43 More importantly, both large- and small-
scale bakeries came on board. Large bakeries, in fact, were applauded for generously 
contributing so much more than their smaller counterparts, thus helping the entire 
industry in their city. Fernando Mejía, the Manager of Coopán and the Director of 
ADEPAN’s Antioquia chapter, lavishly praised both the large- and small-scale bakeries 
during his speech at a chapter meeting in January 1960: 
                                                 
41 Atlántico 50 años: Un homenaje al departamento del Atlántico en el primer cincuentenario de su fundación (Medellín: La 
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42 “Nuestras seccionales ADEPAN; Antioquia,” PC No. 20 (December 1959): 18. 
43 “Nuestro mundo social; Homenaje en Medellín,” PC No. 20 (December 1959): 6.  
 312 
While other similar organizations devolve into anarchy due to the internal 
struggle over factional interests, from the start our Cooperative overcame 
this distressing difficulty and eliminated the distinction between large and 
small, between the powerful and the weak. They have spontaneously 
agreed to mutually assist each other, and grown collectively stronger by 
coming together. And it has been precisely the economically strongest who 
have been faithfully motivated by the highest spirit of service, by a 
tremendous willingness to serve those in greater need.44 
 
The contrast between ADEPAN’s experiences forming baking cooperatives in 
Medellín and Bogotá was indeed stark, but the description of it in El Panadero 
Colombiano ultimately served not to highlight the organization’s internal differences, but 
rather, the larger ones between itself and industrialized millers and bakers. Its strategy 
for doing this was somewhat contradictory, however. One on hand, it demonstrated 
their differences by highlighting the various ways that industrial organizations and 
governmental entities took the bakers’ association seriously. When ADEPAN took steps 
to create its baking school, for example, it noted with pride that it had received praise 
and promises of collaboration from a variety of industrial and governmental entities, 
including ASEMOL, INA, Fleischmann, and ASEMOLPRO, a newly created association 
of millers in the wheat producing regions.45 Similarly, ADEPAN reported that it had 
received an inspirational letter from Douglas Botero Boshell, the manager of ASEMOL, 
praising the baking association for the quality of El Panadero Colombiano, claiming that it 
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would be useful and interesting not only for the association’s members, but also for the 
public at large.46 These milling and baking-related entities also sent greetings to 
ADEPAN when it held its seventh national congress in Medellín in February 1960. They 
were joined, ADEPAN noted with satisfaction, by several important governmental 
representatives, including Alberto Lleras Camargo, the President of Colombia, Gilberto 
Arango Londoño, the Minister of Agriculture, and Enrique Vargas Nariño, the General 
Manager of INA.47 Dramatically demonstrating the differences between itself and these 
other organizations in a more tangible way, ADEPAN noted that representatives of FIP 
and INA had been “guests of honor” at its National Congress in Medellín.48 Proudly 
showcasing the powerful individuals, companies and governmental agencies that sent 
congratulations during the Seventh Congress emphasized ADEPAN’s subordinate 
status, declaring that, while it may have a place at the table of the country’s large and 
powerful organizations, it was only there because those same powerful organizations 
had deigned to grant it space.  
Other concrete manifestations of the power differentials at play came in a year-
end activities and achievement report by Jaime Angel Villegas, ADEPAN’s National 
Director, published in the December 1959 issue. Internal ones, such as the establishment 
of regional chapters throughout the country and the collection of funds to set up a 
national supply cooperative, accompanied external improvements in ADEPAN’s 
relations with various governmental entities and representatives. Most significant was 
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INA. “Cordiality and cooperation” had begun to characterize relations between INA 
and the bakers association, with the former directly learning the latter’s point of view 
through a round table attended by “the highest authorities of the State.” Consequently, 
the Minister of Agriculture had appointed representatives of ADEPAN to a committee 
examining the problems of national wheat production and fair and equitable 
distribution of imported grain.49 Even more significantly, INA re-authorized ADEPAN 
as the distributor of imported flour. Doing so had already brought down the cost of 
flour, ADEPAN claimed.50  
The cumulative effect of these statements and reports was to highlight 
ADEPAN’s subordinate position to these more powerful organizations and agencies, 
while simultaneously demonstrating that it was itself powerful enough to not only 
merit their attention, but to also be granted attendant rights and obligations. Angel 
Villegas directly and eloquently expressed this dual position in his January 1960 
exhortation to ADEPAN’s membership that they attend the upcoming National 
Congress. That the organization’s bylaws stipulated that at least two members of each 
chapter had to be present at National Congresses and the “traditional hospitality” of the 
Antioqueños organizing it guaranteed a fabulous meeting were only the most basic 
reasons that members should attend, he argued. More importantly, ADEPAN was at a 
crucial stage of its organizational development. It had been around long enough that 
the membership needed to review its achievements, but still young enough that it also 
needed to evaluate them, in order to continue to grow and become an even stronger 
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voice representing the nation’s bakers. In other words, as Angel Villegas put it, “we 
could say that [at the Congress] in Medellín, the bakers’ association will be recognized 
as having reached maturity, as if it were grown up enough to have a citizenship card.”51 
The metaphor of youth and immaturity inherently suggest a relationship with a strong 
power differential. Angel Villegas reinforced this when he described how ADEPAN’s 
relations with the government had evolved:  
In effect, both INA and other government agencies with which ADEPAN 
has permanent relations focused on business and general policy, in order to 
maintain prices and the supply of raw materials, accept us as equals and 
our points of view are heard, discussed, and studied, case-by-case, with 
close attention.52  
 
Thus, ADEPAN illustrated the nature of its relationship with INA and the 
government in general – in the past the bakers could not automatically expect that the 
government agencies regulating their industry would even listen to them, let alone take 
their point of view into consideration. It was a supplicant, subordinate to a more 
powerful institution, able only to hope that its perspective was heard and problems 
understood. But, as the organization had grown, so had its power. The lopsided 
relationship had disappeared, replaced by a more equitable one, in which it had 
guarantees that its perspective and problems would be not only considered but studied 
carefully. This made it similar to the larger and more powerful industrial and 
commercial concerns, which were confident that the government would give serious 
consideration to their problems and points of view. Presenting this image of the 
organization helped ensure that member-bakers continued to pay their dues (and 
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encourage non-members to join), as it seemed to be an agency capable of solving their 
problems.  
But, there was danger in this strategy. Perception was one thing, but did not 
change the fact that ADEPAN still consisted mainly of small (often home-based) 
manufacturers. Being perceived as a powerful association could work against the 
bakers at a time when large landowners and industrialists were being publicly asked to 
adjust their sense of entitlement and make some sacrifices for the good of the nation. 
Thus, ADEPAN needed to walk a fine line between its image as an association with 
growing power and one consisting of small-scale industrialists who still needed state 
protection from larger industrialists. This it did through a series of statements and 
reports that seemingly contradicted the previous ones, either by highlighting the small-
scale nature of its members’ businesses or pointing out moments when its voice was 
ignored.  
For example, in December 1959, ADEPAN reported that Francisco Montoya, a 
member of its board of directors, had been named National Director of the Asociación 
Colombiana de Pequeños Industriales (Colombian Association of Small Industrialists – 
ACOPI).53 Calling this “profoundly significant for ADEPAN,” it located the bakers 
squarely with the rest of the country’s small businesses and industries. Montoya’s 
appointment was a positive reference to the small-scale nature of bread production in 
Colombia and ADEPAN’s limited power vis a vis larger industrial associations and the 
state. Other references were far more negative.  
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Speculation had once again become a serious problem. Bakers complained that 
flour couldn’t be bought through legitimate sources. Illegitimate ones were another 
story, however. As ADEPAN noted: “while flour supplied directly from the millers or 
INA is unavailable, huge quantities are available on the black market, generally at 
exorbitant prices.”54 ADEPAN did not hesitate to accuse the millers of nefarious 
activities designed to drive up the price of imported flour, declaring that the “excessive 
speculation” – which victimized bakers more than anyone else – was “caused largely 
by…the policy of irresponsibility that characterizes the millers’ association.”55  
Hoping to combat this speculation, in January 1960 ADEPAN sent a letter to INA 
requesting not only that it once again grant the bakers’ association the authority to 
distribute imported flour, but that it take such flour off the commercial market entirely. 
Even more dramatically, ADEPAN wanted INA to decree that all imported flour not in 
the hands of the nation’s bakers be declared “contraband.”56 By removing millers from 
the distribution channels entirely, ADEPAN believed that prices could be kept under 
control and shortages would cease.  
The tone of ADEPAN’s letter suggests that the bakers firmly believed that INA 
had the power to correct this problem. They seemed less confident of INA’s willingness 
to do so. Declaring that these changes would free bakers “once and for all” from millers’ 
speculative practices, it pushed INA to fulfill its duties by acceding to ADEPAN’s 
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request, pointing out that doing so would help farmers and consumers as well.57 
Nevertheless, this appeal ultimately fell on deaf ears.  
The following month, at its Seventh National Congress in Medellín, a firestorm 
of criticism and complaints came from almost every delegation around the country. 
Dubbed “the Flour Crisis” in the official report of the Congress, INA was the primary 
villain. A commission was established to write a policy statement addressing the crisis. 
Seven members representing different parts of the country met separately and after 
much discussion produced a statement that was accepted at the Congress “without 
comment.”58  
Better protection for the nation’s wheat farmers was first on its list of policy 
goals. Imported flour and grain were not those farmers’ principal problem, however; 
the inequitable implementation of agricultural protection was of greater concern. For 
ADEPAN, the protection granted to “the beer monopoly” was unjust. Accusing the 
State of promoting alcoholism, at the expense of the nation’s health and nutritional 
well-being, it marveled at the perversity of a policy in which “…wheat and bread, 
humanity’s basic food and hence, logically, the primary food industry of the Colombian 
people, are not protected.” While defending wheat growers seems natural – they were 
bakers, after all, and it is unsurprising that they would contrast the nutritional benefits 
of bread with the pernicious effects of beer consumption – there was also political 
calculation in this contrast. Discussing beer evoked the differences between small-scale 
artisan bakers looking out for the public good and large-scale industrial beer producers 
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colluding in monopolistic practices to fatten their wallets.  That these small-scale bakers 
did not enjoy the powerful privileges of large industrialists such as the beer producers 
was made more explicitly (and angrily) evident in another policy demand, focused on 
INA:  
As representatives of 85% of the bread production in the country, and as an 
industry intimately linked to national consumption, we demand that we be 
allowed to directly intervene in INA’s wheat and flour policy – as this is the 
only way that said entity will accept and implement the fair measures that 
bakers and Colombia’s consuming public demand – after all, it’s well-
known that when the powerful organizations convulse, the State helps 
them out, but not so when the rights and the wages of the people and of the 
small industrialists such as the bakers are at risk.59 
 
While such a statement may seem hyperbole, ADEPAN did have a concrete 
grievance against INA, specifically, the latter’s rejection of ADEPAN’s January request 
for greater control over the distribution of imported flour.  Although it did not single 
out INA in a follow-up letter to that agency the subsequent month, it repeated the 
charge that bakers were harmed by official indifference to the plight of the nation’s 
small businesses: “We can only conclude that the lack of State intervention and 
exaggerated protection for the milling industry, has produced the country’s artificial 
flour scarcity and attendant speculation.”60 
Official indifference could not continue, however. Unless the state took action, 
ADEPAN’s directors warned, a disaster was imminent – flour shortage and high prices 
would force 80% of the nation’s bakeries to close. But a return to the old system – in 
which bakeries received special licenses to purchase imported flour from INA and 
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bought national flour from millers – was not acceptable either. Although this system 
supposedly created equilibrium and prevented speculation, INA’s recent suspension of 
flour and grain imports in an attempt to spur consumption of national grain revealed its 
shortcomings and inequities. INA had divided the country into two wheat sectors: the 
producing zone (Cundinamarca, Nariño, and Boyacá) and the non-producing one 
(Medellín, and the Atlantic coastal cities of Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Santa Marta).61 
Each year, the producing zone was required to absorb all of the wheat grown 
nationally; the non-producing one relied exclusively on imported flour and national 
flour made from imported grain.62  
The result was that when INA suspended flour and grain imports, tremendous 
disparity in the availability and price of flour emerged. In the productive zone, national 
flour was so abundant bakers could buy it for twenty cents less than INA’s official 
minimum price. Meanwhile, in the non-productive zone, there was little flour to be had 
– and what there was had been put in the hands of resellers (speculators, the bakers 
called them) who sold it at prices ranging from $220.00 pesos per arroba (approximately 
twenty-five pounds) to $300.00 pesos, far above INA’s set maximum price of $180.00 
pesos.  Bakeries there had already begun to close in response.63 
Solving these problems required more than simply eliminating the artificial 
division between productive and non-productive zones. That was merely the starting 
point of ADEPAN’s proposals. Imported flour should be distributed throughout the 
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country based on bakeries’ capacity to produce bread, not on their location. ADEPAN 
argued that the “privilege” of grinding all the imported grain enjoyed by the millers in 
the non-productive zone did not serve the nation’s long-term economic goals. Similarly, 
national wheat should be milled on the Atlantic coast, not just at the mills in the 
productive zones. This would require training for the bakers in those regions, since they 
were not familiar with national flour and had no idea how to use it. Basically, if INA 
wanted to prevent scarcity and simultaneously promote national wheat production, 
then both national and imported grain “should be distributed in identical proportions 
to all the country’s mills, without discrimination.”64  
These changes were elemental. They also required relatively little oversight on 
the part of INA or other governmental agencies. In contrast, several of ADEPAN’s other 
proposals required far more vigorous state intervention. For example, another method 
of avoiding speculation was for millers to sell properly mixed flour. Making their 
product to bakers’ specifications – at least half imported flour and the remainder 
national flour – would reduce millers’ ability to speculate with the former. This would 
also benefit bakers and consumers, as better bread would result.65 ADEPAN did not 
doubt the ability of the nation’s millers to produce such flour. Their willingness to do 
so, on the other hand, was highly doubted. For that reason, the state had to get involved 
as both regulator and supervisor: “We are certain that the country’s mills can produce 
excellent quality flour that would improve poor quality national wheat, but this 
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requires that the Government regulate not only the milling capacity and technical 
processes of each mill, but also, the percent of extraction.”66  
Clearly, the level of supervision involved in overseeing each individual mill far 
surpassed any regulating duties INA had previously done. Another ADEPAN proposal 
pushed INA even further. Up to that point, punishing speculators, when it had 
occurred, meant revoking their import or distribution licenses. ADEPAN pushed INA 
to go much farther, proposing that it criminalize speculation, which would require it to 
work more closely with national law enforcement agencies. In this proposal two 
activities on the part of resellers could be classified as a “crime against the national 
economy.”67 One was for a reseller to simply be in possession of flour without going 
through INA to purchase it and the other was to charge more for it than INA’s official 
maximum price. ADEPAN argued that the police would need to be involved not only to 
guarantee that price violations or contraband sales did not occur, but also to ensure that 
a “sufficient stock of flour” was maintained.68  
Finally, ADEPAN insisted that state agencies needed to respect bakers’ 
willingness to fairly set the price of bread. Prices were determined both by the quality of 
the loaves and the cost of raw materials. Having established elsewhere that the 
country’s bakers were committed to serving the public good by keeping bread prices as 
low as possible, it was unjust, ADEPAN complained, that “official agencies” (by which 
they likely meant INA) were colluding with millers in the call for lower bread prices. 
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Referring to the late 1959 agreement between INA and the bakers in which the prices of 
both flour and bread were to be lowered, ADEPAN accused INA of using the reduced 
price of flour as a pretext to mount a publicity campaign focused on further lowering 
the price of bread. This put undue stress on bakers, who were squeezed between public 
pressure to lower prices and the continually rising costs of their other raw materials.69  
With this last demand, ADEPAN addressed the main problem it saw with state 
agencies in general, and INA, in particular: not only did they fail to fulfill their missions 
of ensuring a level playing field between large and small manufacturers, when they did 
act, it was often to favor the powerful associations and their industrialized members. 
Although it did not state this outright, ADEPAN implied that the failure to fulfill its 
mission was partly caused as much by laziness or incompetence. The closing line subtly 
insinuated that this was so. Copies of the letter were to be sent to the President and the 
Ministers of Agriculture and Economic Development. The message to INA was clear: its 
higher-ups were being informed of the situation, to ensure that it stopped fooling 
around and did its job.  
But the bias toward the powerful industrial concerns and associations was not 
caused by laziness or incompetence. Small-scale and artisanal manufacturers and the 
associations representing them simply did not have the power to command the 
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attention of the agencies of the State in the same way. Thus, the fine line that ADEPAN 
walked with its members comes sharply into focus. On one hand, it needed to cultivate 
an image of itself as an association with growing power, one that got results and could 
ensure that its members’ interests were not ignored. Increasing its membership and 
maintaining the loyalty of already-existing members depended on the strength of that 
image. But, on the other hand, ADEPAN needed to highlight the ways that bakers were 
abused by those more powerful than they. One of the strongest motivations for joining 
the organization was to collectively confront the problems they faced, and ADEPAN 
needed to cultivate the image of itself as an association of suffering manufacturers in 
order to pique non-members sense of solidarity. Naturally, this image was strengthened 
by their tangibly weaker position vis a vis large industrialists and certain state agencies, 
manifested in ADEPAN’s February letter to the director of INA.  
These dual images and conflicting goals were concretely evident in the report of 
ADEPAN’s Cundinamarca chaper at the National Congress. The growth of Adepósitos, 
despite the defection of industrial bakers, was one of the highlights. Rafael Molano 
Olarte, a member of the Board of Directors, reported that, among other efforts to further 
strengthen the chapter and Adepósitos, they had reached out to millers in 
Cundinamarca with a proposal for their mutual benefit. The chapter proposed that 
Adepósitos become the millers’ exclusive flour distributors.  According to Molano, this 
would decrease millers’ administrative and production costs, largely by eliminating the 
expense of collecting on bad debts. Relying instead on bakers’ “moral and commercial 
solvency,” millers would gain greater security. That increased security would, in turn, 
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work to benefit bakers. Molano outlined what millers would give in exchange: 
preferential sales, perhaps even exclusive ones, at better prices and improved services, 
such as faster delivery of flour and other raw materials, sales of smaller quantities of 
higher quality flour, made to special order, and increased and improved credit terms. 
Most importantly, this would eliminate the middlemen and their attendant price 
hikes.70 
Note that the benefits accruing to bakers were critical to their operations. Better 
flour at reasonable prices, delivered in a timely fashion on good credit terms – bakers’ 
ability to run their small businesses depended on the existence of these factors and 
inputs. Meanwhile, although having guaranteed sales and eliminating some 
administrative costs would certainly help millers’ bottom lines, these benefits were not 
central factors in the success of failure of their businesses. Thus, even when bakers 
negotiated with millers for their mutual benefit, the playing field was not level and the 
former still approached the latter almost as a supplicant rather than an equal.  
Moments such as this when the bakers reported positively on their attempts to 
work collaboratively with millers were rare. More commonly, ADEPAN reported that 
the millers were uncooperative or rebuffed their attempts. Although bakers would 
likely have infinitely preferred working together with millers, the latter’s unwillingness 
to do so provided rich fodder for ADEPAN to cultivate its image as an organization of 
small manufacturers facing off against large and powerful ones, an image based on a 
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contrast between good and noble bakers and selfish and greedy millers. Such image-
making was not left unchallenged, however. Millers contested this perception by 
pointing out that bakers were not the weak, small manufacturers they clamed to be, but 
rather, an industrial sector with powerful allies and a strong hold on the state’s ear. The 
next section examines the foundation on which those charges rested.  
 
Children Shouldn’t Country Calories and Other Reasons to Buy Wheat from Kansas 
In April 1960, Douglas Botero Boshell, the president of ASEMOL, accused 
ADEPAN of receiving funds from abroad. Botero’s statements appeared in one of 
Colombia’s major dailies, El Espectador, a Liberal-leaning newspaper. ADEPAN’s dual 
position – as an industrial association large enough to defend some of its interests vis a 
vis the state and more powerful industrial associations, and simultaneously an 
organization of family-run, small artisan bakeries was evident in its refutation of these 
charges. Luís A. Rodríguez, ADEPAN’s vice-president, insisted that Botero’s statements 
were “completely inexact” and that ADEPAN was in no way subsidized by any foreign 
entity, adding that he had been the organization’s president from March 1959 to March 
1960, and was thus in a position to speak authoritatively about its finances. He 
acknowledged that ADEPAN had worked collaboratively on a publicity campaign with 
the National Miller’s Federation of the United States a few years earlier. This 
collaboration emerged when Colombia re-negotiated the PL480 contract after Lleras 
Camargo took office in 1958, and in fact, the activities of the Millers’ Federation in 
Colombia were subsidized through PL480 funds. According to Rodríguez, ADEPAN 
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had paid for all the costs of a publicity campaign focused on nutrition education and 
the Millers’ Federation later reimbursed ADEPAN for the former’s share of the 
campaign costs. That was the extent of foreign monies ADEPAN had ever received and 
Rodríguez adamantly argued that they were not donations, but rather payments the 
U.S. millers owed to the Colombian bakers for their share of the costs of the publicity 
campaign.71 
Rodríguez then went on the counter-offensive. These dishonest charges were 
neither serious nor frivolous, he declared. Instead, they were “a distraction used by Dr. 
Boshell, hoping to exploit a badly informed nationalism, openly hostile to the policy of 
economic collaboration with the United States.” They were also a transparent ploy to 
prevent public discussion of the millers’ much more serious misdeeds: 
It is easy to see that [this distraction] is designed to divert public attention 
and prevent debate about the truly important problem: the poor 
distribution and the bad quality of the flour millers provide and the serious 
harm [this causes] for both bakers and consumers.72 
 
As a result, bread remained expensive, in short supply, and of poor quality. Shifting 
blame from the bakers, Rodríguez decried the effects of the millers’ monopoly over 
national and imported flour: they paid no attention to the suggestions bakers offered for 
improving the flour they sold and refused to consider any measure that would enhance 
bread quality if it meant increased competition or decreased profits. Worse still, they 
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took great care to “make it appear that it was the bakers who were responsible for the 
bread shortage that they themselves created with their monopoly.”73 
Emphasis on the millers’ monopoly over flour production and distribution was a 
crucial element in the contrast Rodríguez’ drew between the two organizations: 
ASEMOL is an association of businessmen powerful for their millions and 
scarce in their numbers. ADEPAN is a non-profit union consisting of more 
than one thousand bakeries, 80% of which are artisanal and home-based. 
The remaining 20% are not large industrial baking concerns, as those 
belong to another organization. ADEPAN’s affiliates are distributed 
throughout the country, and as was recently shown at the Federation’s 
[annual] congress in Medellín, are those most committed to ensuring that 
one-peso loaves of bread are available for sale.74 
 
In one short paragraph, Rodríguez did more than simply condemn the millers 
for abusing the power of their monopoly; he portrayed the struggle between the millers 
and the bakers in epic terms as a confrontation between the powerful and the weak. 
Moreover, he connected their conflict to some of the fundamental issues in Colombian 
society and politics at the time, specifically, the concentration of power, the nature of 
representative democracy, and the responsibilities of citizenship. For example, at a time 
when agrarian reform was widely discussed and likely imminent, the nation’s large 
landowners were commonly portrayed as an aristocracy, and criticized for their 
selfishness in the face of massive poverty and landlessness. Reminding readers that the 
members of the millers’ association were powerful and wealthy, but “scarce,” subtly 
suggested that they were as aristocratic as any estate owner. This contrasted sharply 
with the portrayal of the members of the bakers’ association. Their far greater numbers 
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immediately signaled them as an association of non-aristocrats, a status strengthened by 
indicating that they were predominantly artisans.  
Referring to ADEPAN’s larger membership base also placed it squarely in the 
center of contemporary debates over the meaning of representative democracy. 
Growing discontent over the state of the economy and dissatisfaction with Lleras 
Camargo’s handling of continuing violence and social discontent joined already-
existing criticism of the anti-democratic nature of the National Front – described as 
“democracy in name only.” Recall that Lleras Camargo came into power at the head of 
the National Front, a coalition of the two main political parties, created in 1956 to 
oppose the dictatorship of General Rojas Pinilla. A power-sharing arrangement between 
the two parties first negotiated in Benidorm, Spain, the National Front marginalized the 
voice of the nation’s poor from its inception and prohibited third parties from running 
in elections for sixteen years (1958-1974). Beginning in the late 1950s and continuing 
throughout the 1960s, various forms of opposition to the anti-democratic nature of the 
National Front emerged or consolidated. These ranged from guerilla organizations to 
opposition parties growing from disaffected groups within the two main parties.  
Rodríguez’ contrasting portraits of ADEPAN and ASEMOL weave the bakers’ 
problems with the millers into the nation’s overall problem of representative 
democracy. As an association consisting of numerous members spread out over many 
parts of the country, rather than a few individuals located in a handful of large urban 
centers, ADEPAN better exemplified the type of organization that should have its 
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interests protected by the state. While Rodríguez didn’t declare this outright, he 
forcefully implied so in his depiction of the two organizations.  
Moreover, Rodríguez asserted, it wasn’t just the bakers who needed the state’s 
protection from the millers. Consumers also suffered because of the latter’s greed. High 
quality, one-peso bread was impossible to make because the millers ground grain to 
80% extraction, rather than to only 74%, the standard around the world. This meant that 
millers could produce more flour, but its quality was extremely poor – far too poor to 
produce decent bread. The only way to produce good bread with the flour milled to 
80% extraction was to add larger quantities of other, higher quality flour – a recipe that 
obviously increased bakers’ production costs. And as if that wasn’t bad enough, millers 
also controlled the distribution of flour. Withholding flour from the market served the 
economic interests of the millers, but resulted in a lack of “regularity and reliability” in 
its distribution. Under such conditions of instability and unfairness, it was impossible 
for bakers to ensure that one-peso bread was consistently available to consumers.75 
But worst of all, according to Rodríguez, the millers’ monopolistic control didn’t 
end with the production and distribution of national and imported flour. Millers, 
represented by ASEMOL, also attempted to control public discourse and public entities. 
Recognizing that national wheat and flour production were insufficient, Rodríguez 
accused ASEMOL of attempting to sway public opinion toward supporting the 
importation of more grain, as a way of covering up the country’s true need, which was 
for millers to update their old and inefficient milling practices. As he put it: “To lower 
                                                 
75 Ibid. 
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prices, improve quality, and increase production, it is necessary to start at the root, at 
the beginning of the process, and not at the end, which is retail sales.”76  
ADEPAN may have very well had a point about the poor quality flour millers 
produced, their monopolistic control over production, and the fact that they made 
accusations of foreign funding for the bakers as a way of removing the spotlight from 
those issues. Nevertheless, while Rodríguez did seem to directly address ASEMOL’s 
claims about monies from abroad, in some ways, he resorted to the same tactic of which 
he accused the millers – deflecting attention away from the charges made against the 
bakers by decrying the millers’ poor production and distribution practices. And, while 
he seems to have solidly refuted Botero’s insinuations, there is much left unaddressed 
in his response.  
Indeed, Rodríguez and other ADEPAN officers worked hard to portray the 
organization as a gremio of artisans with relatively little power on the national stage, 
supported financially only by themselves, and working on their own to defend their 
small businesses against much more powerful industrial interests. But, it’s not entirely 
clear that this is true. From the very start, ADEPAN had received various forms of 
assistance from public and private entities in the United States, most of them focused on 
increasing sales of U.S. flour in Colombia. To this end, those entities supported a variety 
of initiatives, such as nutrition campaigns to increase Colombian bread consumption 
(and hence, flour sales) and a more insidious campaign to discredit the economic 
viability of milling operations in countries that were not large wheat producers (as 
                                                 
76 Ibid.  
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discussed in a previous chapter). The support of these organizations potentially 
increased ADEPAN’s power to influence national policy and this may very well be the 
foreign support that concerned ASEMOL. Moreover, much of it was almost invisible. 
Financial transactions or monetary donations were not so easy to hide, which made 
refuting their existence (if they did not indeed exist) relatively simple. Collaborative 
publicity campaigns and the sharing of ideas and information were much more subtle 
forms of assistance, on the other hand.  
Certainly, the presence of the National Millers’ Federation of the United States 
seems very strong in El Panadero Colombiano. Between 1960 and 1961, ADEPAN 
published a variety of articles and illustrations focused on nutrition and the importance 
of bread in the diet. Considering their content, it is likely that many of these items were 
produced in the United States and later translated and published in El Panadero 
Colombiano.  
One series in particular stands out in this regard. Focused on the connection 
between good nutrition and achievement in athletic pursuits, the series consisted of 
illustrations with accompanying text highlighting individuals, teams, or tournaments in 
the United States, often participating in sports that were not popular or widely known 
in Colombia. The headline of one such item in the January 1960 issue of El Panadero 
Colombiano, for example, read “Bread’s Nutritional Goodness: Bread is Protein.” Two 
illustrations appeared underneath the headline, one of several men playing “North 
American football” and the other of a group of children competing in a national junior 
golf tournament in Orlando, Florida.  Smaller headlines dotted the page, declaring that 
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bread was a complete food, containing carbohydrates, fats, proteins, vitamins, and 
minerals, that its proteins helped the central nervous system, that there was no food 
better than bread, and that “bread has been, is, and will be humanity’s basic food and 
its history is lost in the darkness of the centuries.”  A caption at the bottom of the page 
drove the message home by declaring that “to feel healthy one had to follow athletes’ 
example and eat more bread.”  The text accompanying the illustration of the football 
players seemed to be addressed specifically to the readers of El Panadero Colombiano; it 
assumed no knowledge of the game or the season it was played and offered an 
explanation of the basic facts of football, such as the size of the field, the existence of 
yard lines, the object of the game, and how many points a touchdown was worth. It also 
noted that every year between the end of summer and New Year’s Day, football 
absorbed sports fans in the United States. Presumably, a North American would know 
all of these basic facts about the game, thus suggesting that the text had been written 
specifically for a Colombian audience, or at least one outside of the United States.77  
This does not mean, of course, that a Colombian wrote it. In fact, considering the 
sports that were and were not included in this series, it seems highly unlikely that it 
would have been produced in Colombia. In addition to football and golf, the series 
discussed volleyball, basketball, weightlifting, marbles, baseball, track and field, 
                                                 
77 “La bondad alimenticia del pan: El pan es…proteinas.” PC No. 20 (January 1960): 4. Another clue that the article 
was produced in the United States lies in the title formatting. While in English, titles are generally formatted using 
title case (in which all major words are capitalized, but most articles and conjunctions are not), in Spanish, titles are 
formatted in sentence case (in which only the first word and proper names are capitalized). Titles in Spanish-
language publications are often formatted using all uppercase, so as to avoid confusion and for aesthetic reasons, and 
such was generally the case throughout El Panadero Colombiano. But, the titles of this article and several of the others 
in the series were formatted using title case, suggesting that English-speaking North Americans produced them.  
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waterskiing, and roller hockey.78 Individual profiles examined the lives and 
achievements of basketball star Wilt Chamberlain, and Olympic medal winners such as 
Tommy Kono, a Hawaiian weightlifter, and the three U.S. runners who claimed the 
gold, silver, and bronze medals in the 100 meter race in 1960. Yet, aside from baseball 
on the Caribbean coast, and basketball in schools, there was little interest in most of 
these sports in Colombia at the time. Conversely, two of Colombia’s most popular 
sports were not included. The first soccer clubs were established in Colombia in 1906 
and by mid-century, the sport was well established throughout the country. Likewise, 
the first “Vuelta a Colombia” – a bicycle race similar to the Tour de France – was staged 
in 1951 and has been held every year since. Neither of these popular sports was 
mentioned in the series.79  
Clearly, it seems that if the purpose of these illustrations was to encourage 
Colombians to eat more bread, a better approach would have been to highlight sports 
and athletes that Colombians might have actually cared about. This strongly suggests 
that they were produced in the U.S. and likely supplied to ADEPAN by the Millers’ 
Federation of the United States. Similarly, a theme running through several articles on 
nutrition also suggests that they were penned in the United States. Like other countries 
in Latin America at the time, hunger and malnutrition were serious problems in 
                                                 
78 “Deportistas…Hombres de Trabajo…Mujeres…El pan debe ser la base de su alimentación: El contiene proteínas 
irreemplazables,” PC Nos. 22-23 (February-March 1960): 4; “Los deportes y el valor biológico del pan,” PC Nos. 24-25 
(May-June 1960): 4; “Los deportes y el valor biológico del pan,” PC Nos. 26-27 (May-June 1961): 59; “Los deportes y el 
valor biológico del pan,” PC Nos. 26-27 (May-June 1961): 63.   
79 Matt Rendel, Kings of the Mountains: How Colombia’s Cycling Heroes Changed their Nation’s History (London: Aurum 
Press, 2002). See also, Safford and Palacios, Fragmented Land, 273. 
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Colombia and many organizations and initiatives were working to overcome them.80 
ADEPAN had a clear stake in this, and participated in or publicized a number of 
them.81 As a previous chapter indicated, when ADEPAN’s Colombian nutritionists 
wrote articles about the importance of bread, they discussed the calories and protein it 
provided, and described the role it played in combating malnutrition. But ADEPANS’s 
in-house nutritionists were not the only ones who wrote about bread in the diet for El 
Panadero Colombiano. Other nutrition articles also appeared; invariably they lacked 
bylines (although they sometimes indicated their country of origin). Calories in bread 
was a theme in several of them. Unlike the ones written by ADEPAN’s nutritionists, 
however, these articles did not argue that bread provided a healthy method of ensuring 
that malnourished children consumed a minimum daily number of calories. Instead, 
they argued that bread was an important food for weight loss. One article reprinted 
from an Australian milling and baking magazine, for example, explained what a calorie 
was and that if the amount of them a person consumed was exactly the amount that his 
body needed to perform all voluntary and involuntary functions, that person would not 
                                                 
80 According to statistics compiled by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1962, more than 90,000 
children under the age of five died each year in Colombia, almost half of them directly or indirectly due to 
malnutrition. Responding to these grim statistics, the Ministries of Agriculture, Public Health, and National 
Education, together with the FAO, UNICEF, and WHO, established the “Applied Nutrition Program” in 1962 to 
improve awareness of nutrition education among home economists, extension agents, agronomists, doctors, 
veterinarians, teachers, and community organizers. See Francisco A. Perlaza S., “Programas nacionales del ‘PINA,’” 
Carta Extensionista No. 3 (November 1963): 18-19. Other organizations focused on the issue of hunger and 
malnutrition included the Bavaria Beer Consortium, which commissioned and published a study of the nutritional 
requirements and problems of the Colombian working class in 1962, and the Rockefeller Foundation, whose 
Colombian Agricultural Program was guided, as were all of its agricultural programs, by the desire to overcome 
hunger. See, Alvaro Iregui Borda, El problema nutricional en la clase obrera colombiana: Producción de alimentos populares: I 
– Algunos aspectos de la situación económico-nutricional de la población obrera en Colombia: calorias y proteínas (Bogotá: 
Bavaria, S.A., 1962); Stakman, Bradfield, and Mangelsdorf, Campaigns against Hunger. 
81 In September 1958, for example, ADEPAN applauded an Inter-American Nutrition Seminar organized by the FAO 
and held at the Luis Angel Arango Library in downtown Bogotá, which concluded that a “vast” nutrition campaign 
in both urban and rural areas was necessary to combat hunger in Colombia – a campaign in many respects similar to 
the one ADEPAN was already conducting. See, “Seminario de nutricion,” PC No. 11 (September 1958): 14. 
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gain weight. Losing weight, however, was not a simple question of merely consuming 
less food. To lose weight, one had to go on a special weight-reduction diet, which 
ensured proper nutrition despite reduced calorie intake.82  
The direction the article then headed is easy to imagine. Calories were not all 
exactly the same; fat and carbohydrate more readily converted to fat in the body. 
Protein, on the other hand, did not convert so readily, and thus, a weight-loss diet 
should focus on consuming more of those kinds of calories and less of the others. This 
made bread a good component of a weight-reduction diet, despite its carbohydrates. It 
contained so much protein that it essentially canceled out the carbohydrates. And better 
still was the enriched flour manufacturers produced. So helpful was it to weight 
control, the article argued, that someone on a reduced-calorie diet could still enjoy the 
same amount of bread as always, as long as it had been made with enriched flour.83  
Another article reprinted excerpts of an interview with a German scientist, 
originally published in the bulletin of the “West German Center for Marketing Studies 
for Cereal Products.” Bread was practically a miracle food, according to “Professor W. 
Lintzel.” Bread eaters enjoyed increased longevity, while those who consumed a diet 
high in animal-based fats were more likely to experience a heart attack. High fat and 
protein consumption was a factor in increased levels of stress among executives, since 
their daily activities did not afford them the opportunity to burn off large quantities of 
calories. And without a doubt, bread was the most powerful weight-loss food around. 
As Professor Lintzel stated unequivocally, “to combat obesity, eating bread is 
                                                 
82 “El pan y las calorias,” PC No. 29 (August 1961): 32-33. 
83 Ibid. 
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necessary.” Lintzel wasn’t referring to regular-sized slices either. He considered those 
insufficient: “Fasting for a long time is not necessary, and above all, one should follow 
this piece of advice. Cut the bread into thicker slices and put butter and condiments on 
it.”84   
That same month, a “special report for El Panadero Colombiano,” appeared. 
Although it was ostensibly about bread preservatives, much of the article focused on 
developing loyal customers for bread products. A key strategy, the article argued, was 
“starting at the root” – creating tomorrow’s consumers by teaching children about 
nutrition and the value of bread. Ideally, this education should begin in the home. 
Sadly, the article lamented, this was not happening. Instead, mothers with “weight-loss 
manias” were instilling poor eating habits. Teaching their children that calories – like 
“measles” – were to be avoided, these mothers never gave children the chance to learn 
how to manage calorie consumption. Although this section of the report focused on 
calories from all sources, the author implied that bread was particularly singled out by 
these irresponsible mothers and that this was unacceptable: “children need complete 
and well-balanced meals and they shouldn’t be allowed to reject a nutritious food for no 
good reason.”85 
While concerns over physical appearance and maintaining a healthy weight were 
certainly not absent in Colombia at the time, the emphasis on weight loss in these 
articles contrasts sharply with ADEPAN’s concern for overcoming hunger and 
malnutrition, evident in other articles and news items. Significantly, those latter items 
                                                 
84 “Aunque Ud. no lo crea: Los que comen pan de trigo viven más tiempo,” PC No. 31 (March 1962): 23-24.  
85 “La conservabilidad del pan,” PC No. 31 (March 1962): 25-27. 
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usually listed bylines by Colombian authors (mainly ADEPAN’s nutritionists) or 
discussed national events and issues, indicating that they were written in Colombia. 
This makes even starker the contrast between the “first world” problem of over-
consumption of calories and the “third world” problem of under-consumption. It also 
increases the likelihood that the articles focused on weight-loss were supplied to 
ADEPAN by the Millers’ Federation of the United States, as part of the collaborative 
nutrition education program between the two organizations.  
Ironically, the article immediately following the one focused on the preservation 
of bread was titled “How Much Bread Does a Colombian Consume?” Although it never 
directly answered the question the title posed, it noted the importance of cereals in the 
diet and discussed how the world’s strongest wheat-growing countries had made 
massive production gains in recent years, while other countries with increasing 
populations, such as Spain and Colombia, had not. Imports were thus necessary to 
ensure good nutrition among Colombians.86 A similar assertion had appeared a few 
months earlier in El Panadero Colombiano, when ADEPAN reported that a study by the 
UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) concluded that while the recent 
increase in global food production (2%) outpaced global population growth (1.6%), it 
was still insufficient to combat malnutrition and hunger in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. The only solution was to increase agricultural output in those regions. 
According to this FAO study, however, such an increase would be difficult to achieve, 
                                                 
86 “¿Cuánto pan consume un colombiano?” PC No. 31 (March 1962): 28-29. 
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considering the growing conditions prevalent in those tropical and sub-tropical areas of 
the world, which inhibited output comparable to that achieved in temperate zones.87  
Although the FAO was a well-known organization in Colombia and there is no 
reason to assume that the editors of El Panadero Colombiano could not have come across 
its study independently of the Millers’ Federation of the United States, the contrast the 
study apparently made between the agricultural abundance of temperate climates and 
the insufficiency of tropical and sub-tropical ones was echoed in two other articles that 
made a case not only for the consumption of wheat grown in temperate regions, but for 
that specifically produced in Kansas or the Mid-West. Only one of these articles appears 
to have been written in Colombia. Nevertheless, in the first paragraph it indicated that 
it was based on a study in a magazine titled Panadero Latinoamericano, published in 
Houston, Texas. Discussing the importance of gluten, which provided bread’s protein, 
and how the quantity of it present in flour changed depending on wheat variety and the 
climate in which it was grown, the article asserted that it was the “strong” flours that 
most readily absorbed water and hence made the best bread, and that those flours were 
produced primarily in Canada and the United States. Argentina could also grow them, 
but to a lesser degree.  
Relying on the work of Dr. Octavio Oltra Bravo, a Chilean agronomist, the 
Panadero Latinoamericano article claimed that “in our Latin American countries the 
conditions for strong wheat are less possible than in the United States and Canada.” For 
that reason, imports were always necessary, so that millers could mix a small quantity 
                                                 
87 “Mundo-Trigo,” PC No. 28 (July 1961): 36-37. 
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of those “strong wheats” to the ones grown nationally, in order to produce adequate 
flour for bread-making purposes. For ADEPAN, those excerpted statements by Oltra 
Bravo provided compelling evidence of the problems they faced:    
These last words from Dr. Oltra Bravo seem as though they were speaking 
specifically about Colombia, but we ignore that the problem of poor wheat 
quality is one of all the Americas – even Argentina, which produces the best 
[among us] can’t equal Canadian, American, or Russian, and we don’t 
produce anything better than soft wheats and this is unfortunately because 
of our tropical position, which is unchangeable.88 
 
An article that seems to have come from Spain was much stronger in its 
presentation of “temperate” wheat as superior to that produced elsewhere; it 
specifically singled out “Dark Hard Winter” – a variety widely grown in Kansas – as 
one of the best varieties available. Titled, “Dark Hard Winter: The Best Wheat in the 
World,” the article discussed a Belgian campaign to increase bread consumption there, 
which had been declining. According to the article, bread quality had diminished and 
this discouraged consumers from purchasing it. To remedy this problem, the campaign 
promoted production of bread made with a combination of regular flour brands and 
that produced with Dark Hard Winter wheat.89 
Quickly moving past the introductory paragraphs about this Belgian campaign, 
the rest of the article focused solely on the history and high quality of Dark Hard 
Winter wheat. Although it was apparently Spanish in origin, the text could have easily 
come from a promotional tract by Kansas wheat growers. It included a map of the 
United States (published in the original Spanish version, but not in El Panadero 
                                                 
88 “Que es el gluten…? Proteínas,” op.cit. 
89 “El ‘Dark Hard Winter,’” op.cit. 
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Colombiano) that vividly showed the magnitude of “the Great Wheat Plains, in other 
times the land of redskins and bison” but now the home of “the largest wheat fields.” 
Immigrants had brought the variety to the region in the 1880s, and it had been 
gradually improved over the years through a careful breeding process, selected for 
“vigor” and pest resistance, until, in 1958, it reached production levels of 26,300,000 
tons on 15,358,000 hectares.90 In the end, however, it wasn’t solely the entrepreneurial 
spirit of Kansas wheat farmers or the science they applied to their breeding efforts that 
made Dark Hard Winter the incredible variety that it had become: “the exceptional 
climate, the rich soil, and the abundant sunshine…had made it the best variety in the 
world.” In fact, without those crucial factors, Dark Hard Winter was simply another 
decent, but not spectacular variety, evidenced by its failure to thrive in Spain. Although 
the first few harvests after it had been introduced were “satisfactory,” it quickly 
“degenerated… leading to the conclusion that it could not adapt to our climates or 
soils.”91 
The hand of the US Millers seems strongly evident here, but they were not 
ADEPAN’s only source of foreign assistance. The baking industry also received various 
forms of support, some indirect, from one of its most important suppliers – Compañía 
                                                 
90 For comparison, in 1952 Colombia produced 140,000 tons on 187,900 hectares and hoped to increase production to 
300,000 tons by the end of the decade. See, Alberto Moscoso Rodríguez, “Análisis de la producción y mercadeo del 
trigo en Colombia, 1963,” unpublished senior thesis, Universidad La Gran Colombia, Bogotá, 1963), 22.  
91 “El ‘Dark Hard Winter,’” op.cit. Spain was a recipient of PL480 wheat in the 1950s and 1960s and possibly also 
received propaganda from Kansas wheat growing associations, similar to that of its neighbor, Portugal, whose 
milling and baking interests were invited to Kansas for a tour of the wheat-growing industry there in the late 1950s. 
See, Marketing Kansas Wheat (Topeka, KS: Marketing Division, Kansas State Board of Agriculture, 1959), 95. That 
could possibly explain how an article promoting Kansas wheat ended up in a Spanish publication.  
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Fleischmann Colombiana, a subsidiary of the US-based company.92 Some of this 
assistance came in the form of advertising in El Panadero Colombiano. Advertisements 
alone do not make this company distinct from many of the baking industry’s other 
suppliers, of course. Colombian milling companies, such as Generoso Mancini & Cia. or 
Molinos Cundinamarca, consistently placed full-page ads  for their flour, as did 
distributors of U.S. brands (such as Gold Medal by General Mills and “Rey del Norte” 
by Pillsbury). But only Fleischmann consistently paid for two-page ads filled with dense 
text and photographs. They were elaborate advertisements, often containing a narrative 
arc demonstrating its solidarity with and commitment to the baking industry. One for 
example, drew on the poor conditions of Colombian roads and highways, particularly 
in the steep and mountainous areas, to make its point. Displaying a full-page 
photograph of a washed-out bridge, introduced with the headline that “Only 
Fleischmann offers such rapid and frequent deliveries of superior yeast,” part of the 
accompanying text told of the various forms of transportation to which Fleischmann 
had resorted to deliver its products despite washed-out bridges and impassable roads. 
Sometimes they had to use airplanes or contract special boats. Usually, however, such 
problems were overcome using repair trucks in their numerous locations throughout 
the country. But like the proverbial postman, the impression the ad created was that no 
                                                 
92 While in the United States the company’s commonly known name is “Fleischmann’s,” in Colombia it is 
“Fleischmann” and that is the term used here.  
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matter the circumstances, Fleischmann would never leave its baker-customers high and 
dry with no yeast to make their bread.93  
Such uniquely expensive ads no doubt provided significant funds that helped 
keep El Panadero Colombiano in print.94 Other Fleischmann assistance took the form of a 
charitable gift made in honor of the bakers in the nation’s capital. Specifically, in 
December 1961, Fleischmann donated several dozen cribs to three different hospitals in 
Bogotá. Four years earlier, ADEPAN had organized a charitable drive among its 
member-bakers, asking for bread donations to distribute to poor families at Christmas. 
This campaign boosted their public profile, helping them cultivate their image as an 
association of socially aware business owners.95 Fleischmann’s donation strengthened 
this image.96 
Fleischmann helped ADEPAN develop another aspect of its public image as 
well. Recall that in late 1959 Colombia’s bakers were criticized for the poor quality of 
                                                 
93 “Sólo Fleischmann ofrece tán rápidas y frecuentes entregas de levadura superior,” PC Nos. 26-27 (May-June 1961): 
36-37. The other characteristic of Fleischmann’s advertisements in El Panadero Colombiano that set them apart from the 
rest is how distinctive they were. While others used the same advertisement over and over again, Fleischmann’s had 
a whole series of such elaborate ads. One discussed at length the role of yeast in bread-making, describing its brand 
as the “miracle ingredient.” Another wrote of how bakers were offering a greater variety of products than in the past 
and this required a closer relationship with their suppliers, which Fleischmann’s could ensure with its seven factories 
throughout Latin America. A third discussed how its yeast product was still effective in Colombia’s lowland regions, 
where high temperatures reigned. See, “Un paquete o mil, este es el ingrediente milagroso,” PC No. 1 (November 
1957): 16-17; “Más variedad significa más ventas,” PC No. 3 (January 1958): 16-17; “A 45o a la sombra,” PC Nos. 24-25 
(May-June 1960), 20-21. 
94 Evidence that ADEPAN looked to Fleischmann (and its competitor yeast supplier) as a source of funding to keep 
the baking association afloat, came in a proposal at the 7th National Congress in Medellín in February 1960. Someone 
proposed that Fleischmann and Levadura set aside three cents from every package of yeast that they sold to the 
association’s members, to be dispersed back to ADEPAN to help it grow its operating funds. It is unclear if this 
proposal was ever requested of the yeast suppliers, or implemented. See, “‘ADEPAN fija su política,” op. cit.  
95 “La campaña de ADEPAN,” PC No. 2 (December 1957): 18. 
96 “Compañía Fleischmann Colombiana obsequia camas-cunas,” PC No. 30 (December 1961): 20. This donation 
possibly helped Fleischmann with its own publicity problems. Five years earlier, in 1953, it had closed its yeast 
factory in Facatativá, on the outskirts of Bogotá, after building a new factory in Palmira, near Cali. The Bogotá factory 
had been operating since 1930. See, Fleischmann-Colombiana: Alofleischmann, “Historia,” 
www.alofleischmann.com/co/LaEmpresa/Historia/tabid/681/language/es-UY/Default.aspx. 
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their bread and the high prices they charged and that ADEPAN’s strategy to deflect that 
criticism was to argue that bakers were deeply committed to producing high-quality 
bread and alleviating poverty through low prices, but were prevented from doing so 
due to the poor quality flour Colombia’s millers produced. As part of that strategy, 
ADEPAN called on a variety of public and private entities to support their efforts to 
create a baking school. These included Fleischmann, Levapan (another yeast producer), 
millers, the SAC, and the Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (SENA), a national 
vocational training service for adults. Collaboration was essential, ADEPAN argued, 
because everyone had a stake in bread quality and working together would reduce 
costs and ensure that no single entity had too onerous of a burden. The SAC should be 
involved, it argued, because bakers had become accustomed to using imported flour 
and wheat growers needed to explain the properties of national grain so that bakers 
would not waste resources during a costly period of trial and error while they figured 
out how to work with it. This, in turn, would increase demand for national grain, to the 
obvious benefit of Colombian wheat growers. The same was true for millers and the 
different brands of flour they produced. Such a collaborative baking school furthered 
SENA’s interests as well, since its goal was to rapidly increase training programs 
throughout the country. And, obviously, as ADEPAN maintained, this was essential for 
bakers who cared about quality and profit, since the latter was dependent on the 
former.97 Sadly for ADEPAN, this proposal went nowhere. The SAC and the millers 
                                                 
97 “Por una escuela de panificación,” PC No. 20 (December 1959): 27. 
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showed no interest at all. SENA took its time getting on board; only Fleischmann was 
enthusiastic from the start.98  
Beginning in 1961, Fleischmann and ADEPAN provided training courses for 
bakers in various cities throughout the country. The first course was held in August at 
the Universidad del Valle in Cali and was quickly followed by two others in Medellín 
and Barranquilla. Each course lasted three weeks and was led by Antonio F. Araujo, a 
baking expert Fleischmann hired to conduct training courses throughout Latin 
America.99 The courses were well-received by bakers.100 These training courses – and 
the bakers’ enthusiastic response to them – demonstrated ADEPAN’s dedication to 
improving the quality of its production processes and hence, the bread it produced. Not 
only did this contrast with the image it propagated of milling companies uninterested 
in improving their technical processes or creating a better product, it also touted its 
commitment to serving the public good by offering better bread for sale.  
Fleischmann was not the only entity with ties to the United States that promoted 
training for bakers. In March 1962, ADEPAN reported that Great Plains Wheat Market 
                                                 
98 Fleischmann had promoted training for bakers independently of ADEPAN since the late 1950s, sending Antonio F. 
Araujo to various parts of Latin America and organizing the first training session in Bogotá (for a select group of 
ADEPAN bakers, mainly the association’s leadership) in early 1960. See, “El primer curso de la escuela Fleischmann 
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subordinates to Araujo. They seem to be trying too hard, the sweetness of their praise making them seem almost 
innocent and provincial. See,  “Glosario del mes,” op.cit. 
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Development Association, Inc. had made great strides in Colombia. Although it had 
only been established four years earlier, in 1958, its representatives had made many 
contacts in both the milling and baking industries, and it had been instrumental in 
helping to set up and support the Baking School, a program jointly sponsored by 
ADEPAN, INA and SENA, and which ultimately fulfilled the dream the baking 
association had expressed two years earlier. Simply helping the bakers finally establish 
their long-planned school was not the only assistance Great Plains Wheat provided; it 
offered grants to bakers who wished to attend.101  
Great Plains Wheat (GPW) also played an important role two years before in 
early 1960, when it co-sponsored a study of Colombia’s flour needs. In fact, GPW may 
have been one of the organizations that ASEMOL had in mind when it argued that 
foreign interests were funding ADEPAN. In late 1959, the U.S. embassy in Bogotá 
commissioned a study of Colombia’s flour needs and supplies. Two men closely 
connected to wheat and flour interests in the United States were put in charge of the 
study. Roy E. Durham was an advisor to both Great Plains Wheat and the Millers’ 
Federation. Edward F. Seeborg was a representative of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA).102 During December 1959 and January 1960 they traveled 
throughout Colombia to survey Colombia’s flour situation. In February, their report 
was released with much fanfare. Significant portions were reproduced in Colombia’s 
                                                 
101 “Becas para panaderos,” PC No. 31 (March 1962): unpaginated. 
102 RAC, RF, 12.3, Diaries, “Criterios antagónicos desconcertantes rigen la política triguera en el país, hoy,” El 
Colombiano, March 25, 1960. 
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major newspapers.103 El Panadero Colombiano introduced its version with a short note by 
the U.S. Agricultural Attaché, Henry Hopp.104  
Although Durham and Seeborg expressed support for Colombia’s agronomists 
and their goal of developing seeds apt for the country’s growing conditions – and that 
could produce good quality flour – the gist of their report was that Colombia needed to 
dramatically increase the amount of wheat and flour it imported.105 As they explained, 
demand was increasing, but production was not keeping pace. Moreover, the wheat 
varieties grown in Colombia were not good quality and their resulting flour could only 
be used to make decent bread by mixing it with “stronger” imported flour (or flour 
milled from American grain). Worse still, Colombia’s high milling capacity further 
decreased flour quality. Low national production and governmental limitations on 
imports meant that millers did not have enough grain to justify the costs of running 
their operations. To compensate, they extracted more flour from the grain they did 
have, which resulted in a poor quality product, filled with ash and other debris.106  
                                                 
103 Ibid. 
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106 “Los técnicos agregados agrícolas de la Embajada Norteamericana,” op. cit. 
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If the Colombian government took bakers’ need to mix some quantity of 
American flour with national flour into account, Durham and Seeborg argued, then its 
calculations of how much wheat and flour should be imported would dramatically 
change. Moreover, they outlined the various modern advances that millers needed to 
learn, such as bleaching and chemical maturation of flour. Much of the report, in fact, 
seemed to have been written with the needs of Colombia’s bakers in mind. There were, 
in fact, a variety of subtle and more direct suggestions that the bakers of ADEPAN were 
foremost in the minds of Durham and Seeborg as they wrote their report. 
For example, in a section outlining the benefits of increasing flour imports, the 
only organization the report mentioned by name was ADEPAN. Indicating the it had 
recently established warehouses in different cities to help ensure steady supplies of 
flour for its member bakers, Durham and Seeborg wrote that regular imports would 
help ADEPAN keep those warehouses stocked and thus prevent periodic shortages. 
Similarly, in a discussion of flour quality, the report dedicated only one short paragraph 
to the needs of pasta makers – already a highly mechanized industry despite only 
having recently been established. Yet, it dedicated a page and a half to the needs of 
bread makers. In a different discussion on the role of INA in ensuring sufficient quality 
and quantity of flour, Durham and Seeborg told of an incident in which a shipment of 
flour had arrived at a “northern port,” but had not been distributed quickly and instead 
succumbed to a bug infestation while sitting in an INA warehouse. Part of the reason 
this had happened was that it was not useful for bread-making. No bakers wanted to 
buy it, and thus, it rotted in Barranquilla. Durham and Seeborg suggested that this 
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problem could be avoided in the future if INA focused less on buying the cheapest flour 
available and more on buying the kind that the country’s bakers actually required, once 
again putting the needs of Colombia’s bakers front and center.  
Durham and Seeborg also seem to repeat word-for-word many of the complaints 
that bakers had made over the years and would continue to make in the future. They 
mentioned, for example, that INA was considering a change in the policy authorizing it 
to purchase all flour produced by the mills and determine how to distribute it among 
bakers. The proposed change would have permitted bakers to buy flour directly from 
millers, resulting in increased competition and thus, improved flour quality. The two 
North Americans strongly favored this proposed change. Similarly, they wholly 
supported the efforts of Colombia’s bakers to further mechanize their industry. 
Reporting that ADEPAN’s leaders believed that partial mechanization in the baking 
industry would lead to better and more affordable bread, Durham and Seeborg 
expressed their complete agreement with the baking association’s efforts to gain import 
licenses: “This is a highly commendable movement and INA should promote it to the 
point of permitting the importation of baking machinery.”107 Finally, the report’s 
                                                 
107 Ibid. It is unsurprising that the North Americans would support increased mechanization among bakers. A 
previous study had concluded that good French bread could be produced in Colombia with a mixture of 77% 
national flour and 23% national American flour. But, the percentages were different for the kinds of pastry-like baked 
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Seeborg represented. Intriguingly, “sliced bread” – the kind of loaves often used to make sandwiches, and a food 
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(25%) and flour (75%). Despite Colombian’s disinterest in this product, some of the images in El Panadero Colombiano 
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Federation of the United States. The cover of the inaugural issue, for example, featured several slices of such bread 
superimposed over a map of Colombia. See, Panadero Colombiano, No. 1, (November 1957): cover. 
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authors lauded ADEPAN’s efforts to establish a baking school, noting the positive 
effects such training would have on the quality of bread.  
Millers, in contrast, were not praised at any point in the report, neither for 
concrete advances they had made in improving milling capacity or flour quality, nor 
even for efforts to do so. Instead, they were disparaged as having insufficient 
knowledge, expertise, and training to properly mill flour. Although the report 
acknowledged that Colombia as a whole lacked the laboratories that could conduct the 
experiments on flour that could guide millers through the process of improving their 
product, it still did not let them off the hook for their lack of knowledge and expertise. 
And again, while it also recognized the difficulties millers faced, in terms of irregular 
supplies of imported grain and the poor quality of national, no proposals specifically 
benefiting them were put forward. 
This does not mean that millers got nothing out of the Durham-Seeborg report. 
On the contrary, the report’s primary goal – to increase imported flour and grain – 
benefited millers as much as bakers. Flour use in the country at the time consisted of 
56% national, 35.5% national American, and 8% imported; the North Americans argued 
that it should actually consist of 43.5% national, 45.5% national American, and 11.4% 
imported.108 But, this represented an overall increase of all kinds of grain, which would 
benefit millers, allowing them access to more of their necessary raw material, and thus, 
increase their productivity. It also helped the millers that Durham and Seeborg 
                                                 
108 Although this represented a 13% reduction in the use of national flour, Durham and Seeborg presented it as an 
increase in the use of national grain, since they proposed an overall increase in the total amount of wheat consumed 
in Colombia, to be achieved by increasing both national production and imported grain. The latter, of course, would 
increase at a higher rate. 
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recommended that INA take not only current demand into account when calculating 
imports, but also the amounts purportedly necessary to ensure that all Colombians 
enjoyed proper nutrition. When taking the latter into account, the amount of flour 
Colombia needed increased substantially. Similarly, calls for consistent shipments 
addressed one of the millers’ primary concerns. 
Thus, although the report seemed to favor ADEPAN and Colombia’s bakers, 
millers were not harmed by its recommendations and, in fact, benefited. Ultimately, 
garnering the support of both millers and bakers in Colombia was a primary strategy of 
Great Plains Wheat. Unlike the Millers’ Federation of the United States, who worked 
principally (and essentially solely) with ADEPAN, GPW had something to offer both 
sectors. Building strong connections with both of them would eventually pay off for this 
organization representing U.S. wheat interests, as the next section will discuss.  
But, that would take some time. In early 1960, ADEPAN still struggled against 
the more powerful voice of the millers. When the Durham and Seeborg report was 
released in February that year, ADEPAN announced it with much fanfare. Hernán 
Villamarín, a board member, wrote glowing praise for its statistical work and rational 
conclusions. But, he also wondered if anyone, particularly INA, would pay attention 
and implement its recommendations, or if it would be disparaged instead.109 During his 
year-end report at the organization’s Seventh National Congress that month, 
ADEPAN’s outgoing president, Luís A. Rodríguez, wondered the same thing. 
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ADEPAN had based their new policy statement on the report and asserted that it made 
no sense for the government to ignore its recommendations.110  
Three months later, ADEPAN predictably lamented that INA had not taken the 
report seriously. In protest, it drafted a memo to the Minister of Agriculture, Gilberto 
Arango Londoño, complaining about Colombia’s apparent inability to implement a 
comprehensive policy on flour and demanding that Durham and Seeborg’s 
recommendations be implemented. It also asked that INA respond to the numerous 
letters and memos it had sent over the previous weeks and months regarding the report 
and its official policy.111 Another ADEPAN board member decried the government’s 
indifference to their plight and INA’s willingness to turn a blind eye to speculation by 
the millers – and those complaints formed the basis for another letter, this one to the 
Commission on Administrative Reform, demanding that a special committee on wheat 
be set up within INA.112  
In spite of all these demands and the support of both the Millers Federation of 
the United States and Great Plains Wheat, it would be almost two more years before 
ADEPAN would see the policy reforms it desired. Ministerial changes affected its 
fortunes, as well as the nation’s economic situation and the focus on implementing 
agrarian reform. Ultimately, getting INA to institute consistent flour and grain 
importation required the re-union of the artisan bakers of ADEPAN and the industrial 
bakers of FIP, as well as the collaboration of ASEMOL and ASEMOLPRO. That the 
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voice of ADEPAN’s artisan bakers could only gain the clout it needed on the national 
stage by uniting with more powerful domestic industrial concerns points to the 
limitations of U.S. hegemonic discourses of economic and agricultural development.  
But again, many months passed before this collaboration took place. During that 
time, ADEPAN attempted to maneuver through the economic and political waters, 
shifting how it represented itself and its interests as conditions changed. This also 
affected how it saw itself vis a vis the Colombian state. The next section will discuss 
these processes of identity- and state-formation.  
 
The Bread Oligarchy Battles the Boll Weevils 
The photographs of an Atlantic City exhibition on industrial baking published in 
the December 1961 issue of El Panadero Colombiano seem more fitting for a travel 
magazine than a trade journal. In one, a group of passengers are assembled in front of 
the Avianca jet they were about to board, all of them with matching Avianca bags in 
their hands. In another, a giant elephant statue stands guard at the entrance to a fancy 
restaurant, and in others, picturesque boulevards and monuments are praised for their 
cleanliness, beauty, and width.113  
The levity of the photographs, however, belied the serious subject of the text they 
accompanied. With the support of Fleischmann, fifty ADEPAN members attended the 
exhibition – the largest delegation from any single country. Francisco Montoya Isaza, 
the then-current president of ADEPAN, and Luís A. Rodríguez, the immediate past 
                                                 
113 “Luís A. Rodríguez habla sobre: La Exposición Industrial de Atlantic City,” PC No. 30 (December 1961): 9-11. 
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president, were both part of the delegation. After several days viewing the latest baking 
technologies at the exhibition, the two presidents and the members of the delegation 
concluded that the baking industry in Colombia was fifty years behind in bread-making 
technology and in great need of modernization. Rodríguez and Montoya discussed this 
with a few of the exhibition presenters, who were quite enthusiastic about helping them 
acquire some of the equipment, even offering to send technicians, free of charge, to help 
them get the machinery installed and operating. Thus encouraged, the two presidents 
took action. Even before the return flight to Bogotá had left Atlantic City, Rodríquez 
had contacted the appropriate Colombian governmental agency, to request import 
licenses for the machinery.114 
Upon their return, however, their excitement quickly faded, replaced by deep 
disappointment. Rodríguez and Montoya made dozens of inquiries and visited several 
government agencies, seeking approval for their import licenses. But, to no avail. As 
Rodríguez later declared, the baking industry will never modernize, because “official 
policy will not allow it to do so.” While it might seem hyperbole to equate state policies 
with a conscious attempt to stymie the modernization goals of an entire industry, the 
response of a top official at the Superintendency of Imports suggests that Rodríguez 
was not exaggerating. The official rejected not only ADEPAN’s request, but the 
underlying argument on which it was based. He responded disparagingly, asserting 
that “Colombians are already eating good bread, and in the previous century it was 
                                                 
114 Ibid. 
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even better, and didn’t require special machinery, [making this] request a luxury that 
the Colombian people cannot approve.”115  
While the bakers’ request may seem fairly innocuous – perhaps even exemplary 
– making the Superintendent’s disparaging reply seem all the more callous, it is 
surprising that ADEPAN expected that they would have any luck at all. Economic 
circumstances were such that only the most essential machinery for industrialization 
was being imported. But there was another, more personal reason that made 
ADEPAN’s expectation that their request would be warmly received rather unrealistic.  
Earlier that year, its relations with the Colombian state had soured after INA had 
altered its import policies. Pressure from the two millers’ associations had led INA to 
cancel all imports of “qualified flours.” Once again, this threatened to decimate national 
production and ruin the quality of bread – harming everyone who was not a powerful 
miller in the process – farmers, artisanal bakers, and consumers.116 In response, at its 
Eighth National Congress in April 1961, ADEPAN declared Enrique Vargas Nariño, 
INA’s director, “persona non grata.” Pointing to his “monopolistic policies and lack of 
social sensibility,” they demanded his immediate resignation and the abolishment of 
INA as the country’s only official wheat importer. Millers should be allowed to import 
what they wanted, the bakers declared, calling on President Lleras Camargo to 
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simultaneously increase flour imports and programs promoting national wheat 
production.117  
Vitriol abounded at the congress. The mildest criticism came from Jaime Angel 
Villegas, ADEPAN’s National Director, who lamented that relations between ADEPAN 
and the national government, particularly INA, had “completely deteriorated.”118 Most 
comments, however, lacked such understatement. For example, Luís A. Rodríguez, the 
Vice-President of ADEPAN’s Board of Directors, decried the injustices committed by 
INA – injustices that ADEPAN had been suffering in silence. No longer, Rodríguez 
declared:  Vargas Nariño had taken advantage of the fact that the baking association 
was dependent on good relations with INA and thus, inclined to remain silent about the 
latter’s many “errors.” But, this silence came with a price, and now the bakers were 
taking to heart the maxim, “Ni tanto honor, ni tanta indignidad.” He added that if INA 
chose to deny Adepósitos access to imported wheat or flour, it would be acting illegally, 
trampling on the bakers’ right to free assembly.119  
Epic injustice was a common thread. Villamarín Gutiérrez, for example, penned 
an editorial arguing that ADEPAN’s problems with INA were just one example of the 
continent-wide social and economic issues brought into sharp focus by the Cuban 
Revolution. Newspapers, pamphlets, and the National Department of Statistics pointed 
every day to the same thing: the cost of living was continually on the rise, “growing in 
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geometric progression,” in fact. But, the State didn’t care. The government’s attention 
was instead focused on political issues, not economic ones. Villamarín noted that the 
resultant unrest was blamed not on the underlying economic problems, but rather on 
communist agitators, supposedly taking orders from Fidel Castro and concealing 
themselves in Leftist movements. “Reactionary forces and the government” responded 
by devoting all their attention and resources to combating those agitators and political 
movements. For Villamarín, this approach was completely wrong-headed.120  
Villamarín described the difference between a “healthy” and a “broken” 
economy. In the former, “confidence” and “stability” reign, which leads to 
“tranquility.” In the latter, “unscrupulous intermediaries” manipulate markets, prices 
rise, unemployment goes up, and social unrest results. If things get too out of hand, the 
masses lose complete confidence in the government and join social movements, some of 
them violent.121 
Modern states, Villamarín noted, have bureaucratic mechanisms in place to 
ensure that the latter scenario doesn’t occur. A crucial element of these mechanisms is 
price regulation, particularly for “items of prime necessity.” Such elements were not 
“absent” in Colombia, he continued, and they were functioning – “in theory.” As 
Villamarín saw it, the important issue was less whether or not such mechanisms existed 
and operated in Colombia, but rather, whether or not they actually fulfilled the 
purposes for which they had been established and who benefited from their activities.  
                                                 
120 Hernán Villamarín Gutiérrez, “El costo de la vida,” PC Nos. 26-27 (May-June 1961): 4-5. 
121 Ibid.  
 358 
From the inaugural issue of El Panadero Colombiano in 1957, ADEPAN had 
complained about speculators.122 They were usually referred to as anonymous 
intermediaries or resellers. Occasionally, ADEPAN hinted that millers and INA were 
involved. But, in May 1961, Villamarín Gutiérrez pulled no punches. He directly 
accused INA of being Colombia’s worst “unscrupulous speculator.” According to 
Villamarín, each harvest saw INA running around the country, purchasing the grain 
farmers had grown at “ruinous” prices. Then, it stored all the grain, keeping it off the 
market to create artificial scarcity and drive up the price. Once that occurred, it released 
the grain to intermediaries, who it then accused of raising prices unnecessarily – putting 
on a show of doing its primary job of combating high prices. Worse still, it helped set 
the whole process in motion in the first place, by timing grain imports to coincide with 
harvests, ensuring low prices for national grain. INA could thus buy low and sell high, 
making “outrageous profits” from the whole venture. Or as Villamarín angrily 
denounced: “in this way, every year its capital multiplies with the illicit profits 
extracted from the efforts of national labor.”123  
This did not mean that the Colombian legislature had made a mistake when it 
created INA, according to Villamarín. Nor did he believe that the baby should be 
thrown out with the bathwater – he refuted the idea that INA was rotten to the core. Its 
purpose was good, and if it carried out the functions with which it had been charged, 
the nation’s economy would improve. The problem was its director, Vargas Nariño. 
That all of ADEPAN’s members had no doubt that he was personally responsible for 
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INA’s corrupt dealings was made explicitly evident when Villamarín defended the 
existence of this regulating agency by noting that to fulfill its challenging mission, it 
needed a specific kind of person in charge – “a practical economist and not a usurer, a 
man of social sensitivity and not a dealer in hunger.” Stepping up the rhetoric a notch, 
he further claimed that it was precisely his nefarious activities that led “the country’s 
bakers at their Eighth Congress to declare Mr. Enrique Vargas Nariño persona non grata 
to the Colombian people.” While another report in that issue had declared him 
unwelcome by the bakers, Villamarín extended that ostracism to everyone in 
Colombia.124  
When ADEPAN’s bakers protested increasing living costs and the attendant 
exploitation of the poor and working classes by the more powerful and wealthy, they 
did not invent these issues or exaggerate to make their point. But, in their efforts to 
discredit INA, they did make strategic use of the discourse on prices and inequality 
circulating at the time. For example, in that same issue, ADEPAN reprinted a manifesto 
produced by a union of bank employees affiliated with the Banco Francés e Italiano. 
The manifesto argued that although unions had been successful in recent years in 
helping employees achieve salary increases, living standards had not improved as a 
result. Costs for consumer goods far outstripped wage and salary increases. Rising 
prices of staple goods was particularly onerous. The banking union stressed that those 
rising costs stemmed from diverse factors. Inequitable land distribution, inadequate 
roads from rural areas to cities, insufficient production, antiquated agricultural 
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machinery, poor soil conservation, and lack of technical expertise all contributed and 
could only be solved through land reform, “something that the majority of Colombians 
believe should happen.” Speculation was also a primordial problem. The bank 
employees lamented the times that farmers had brought their goods (such as eggs, 
chickens, cheese, and butter) directly to consumers in local markets, only to have 
resellers descend “like birds of prey,” buy everything at once and then re-sell it with a 
“5, 80 or 100 percent mark-up.” Often they let things rot rather than sell them for 
anything less than a ridiculously jacked-up price. Adding insult to injury, large-scale 
manufacturers and the national government lied during times of crisis. Pleas to 
consumers that price increases were necessary were accepted with the understanding 
that when conditions improved, prices would fall. But, they never did.125  
The bank employees noted that these problems had both long- and short-term 
solutions. The manifesto was their initial step in a campaign to spur the government to 
implement the short-term ones. Mainly these focused on heightened enforcement of 
existing laws regarding speculation and ensuring that farmers had access to markets. 
INA was the only governmental agency mentioned by name. In one short line at the 
very end of the long manifesto, the bank employees demanded that INA ensure that 
prices were properly regulated.126 
INA was certainly a primary agency in charge of such a governmental function, 
but it was not the only one involved in controlling prices or improving conditions for 
Colombia’s farmers. Nevertheless, that one mention in one line at the very end of the 
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manifesto led ADEPAN to reprint it under the title “Unions Ask INA to Regulate 
Prices.” While this was technically true, that had hardly been the manifesto’s primary 
focus. But, for ADEPAN, third-party confirmation obviously strengthened the 
argument that ran through the entire May 1961 issue of El Panadero Colombiano: INA 
was working for the millers, the oligarchs, and the powerful financial and industrial 
interests, and thus, not a friend to the artisans, workers, small farmers, or the majority 
of consumers.  
This theme ran through almost every article of that issue, which was lengthier 
than most. ADEPAN even departed from its usual seriousness and published a 
caricature of the situation with INA. Prior to the Congress, the directors had received a 
communication from “Quico” París Arbelaéz, ADEPAN’s Administrative Manager, or 
as they referred to him, their “King of Accounting and Wizard of Quarterly Reports.” 
Rather than the check they were expecting, the communication consisted of a letter by 
París Arbelaéz which took humorous stabs at INA. The directors were so delighted with 
the letter, they sent a copy to “our friend Don Enrique Vargas Nariño” and asked París 
Arbelaéz to read it aloud at the Congress, which he did, apparently to great applause. 
“The bakers, who are second only to President Lleras in moving dough around the 
country,” the letter’s second paragraph read, “have a problem with the Instituto 
Nacional de Abastecimientos, led by Enrique Vargas Nariño.” And it wasn’t just the 
bakers of ADEPAN, as the next paragraph noted. A few months earlier, the bakers of a 
“parallel association,” a local one to which Bogotá’s “bread oligarchy” belonged, had 
mounted a campaign against INA, or “more concretely, against its manager.” But, their 
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movement “lacked heat or yeast, and never rose, staying flat like any cake without the 
wonderful characteristics of a Ramo Cake.”127  
Not to worry, the letter continued: FIP and ADEPAN had joined forces to battle 
INA. From then on, it seemed that Vargas Nariño would be on the run – he had lost the 
masses, the letter declared, using the Spanish term “masas,” which means both 
“dough” and “masses.” In other words, the popular classes were in line with the bakers, 
and their campaign was likely to pulverize him, or, as the letter put it, “turn him into 
flour.”128  
The next paragraph took a slightly more serious turn. Alarming reports had been 
received that INA’s offices on the Atlantic Coast contained more than three thousand 
bags of rotting national flour, filled with boll weevils. Worse still, INA was forcing the 
bakers there to buy it anyway. At the same time, it refused to sell them any American 
flour, which they needed to mix with the national, in order to make palatable bread. In 
other words, the letter argued, INA was making the people on the Atlantic Coast pay 
for its own distribution mistakes, “condemning them to consume damaged flour.” The 
humorous tone then returned. Based on ADEPAN’s baking expertise, it seemed that the 
only thing the coastal bakers could do was to invent a new type of roll, flavored with 
boll weevils, which was “very different from the kind we consume here, flavored with 
toasted pork skin.”129  
                                                 
127 “El INA y Contrapunnto,” PC Nos. 26-27 (May-June 1961): 33. “Ramo” was the name of a famous brand of pre-
packaged snack cakes, called “Ponque Ramo,” one of the most widely consumed wheat products in Colombia at the 
time (and to the present day). Its owner, Rafael Molano Olarte, was a member of ADEPAN’s board of directors. See, 
“Glosario del mes: Progreso de una industria,” PC No. 29 (August 1961): 4. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid.  
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The letter ended there, to great applause. Two bakers from the coast responded 
with a short ditty of their own, which playfully teased that París Arbelaéz had 
“mischevious little eyes that look like rolls with toasted pork skin.”130 Regional jesting 
aside, the coastal bakers agreed with the general thesis of the Congress – although they 
did blame millers as much as INA, believing that the two were in cahoots, working 
together to make huge profits at the expense of Colombia’s “humble people.” Like 
Villamarín’s editorial, there was no subtlety in their accusations, which specifically 
charged INA and the millers with raising cost of living, an appalling situation, 
considering that INA was a “semi-official entity and in that capacity has contributed to 
the destruction of the baking industry.”131 The Cundinamarca section was equally 
frustrated and accusatory, adding that INA provided shoddy regulation of the milling 
industry – which meant that millers could grind grain to one hundred percent 
extraction, if they felt like it. This, of course, would result in completely useless flour for 
almost any purpose.132  
Without a doubt, however, the strongest denunciation of INA came from a 
representative from Medellín. Recall that in late 1959 Francisco Montoya, a member of 
ADEPAN’s board of directors, had been named director of ACOPI, a national 
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131 “La Costa Atlántica fijó su criterio en el VII Congreso de Panificadores,” PC Nos. 26-27 (May-June 1961): 31. 
132 “‘ADEPAN’ Seccional Cundinamarca: Sus asambleas generales – Informes y actividades,” PC Nos. 26-27 (May-
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were included – Rafael del Castillo and the owners of Molinos Roncallo. See, “El VII Congreso de ‘ADEPAN’ fue un 
éxito y una Promesa de Lucha contra los Enemigos del Gremio de la Panificación,” PC Nos. 26-27 (May-June 1961): 8-
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association representing small businesses. A few months later, Montoya was elected 
president of ADEPAN’s board. With two such prominent positions in organizations 
representing small businesses, Montoya’s commitment to protecting the interests of 
those small manufacturers was clearly very strong. This commitment was highly 
evident in his president’s report at the Congress.  
During the first few months of 1960, Montoya had spent a great deal of his time 
in dialogue with Vargas Nariño and Gilberto Arango Londoño, the Minister of 
Agriculture. Much of this dialogue took place during official INA meetings; as Minister, 
Arango Londoño was an ex officio member of its board of directors. Montoya labored to 
make the Minister understand the problems of the nation’s bakers, repeatedly pointing 
out that most of them were caused by INA’s haphazard importation and distribution 
policies. Sadly, just when Arango Londoño seemed to have finally begun to understand 
the bakers’ problems and was demonstrating interest in learning more and coming up 
with a solution, he was pushed out of the Ministry and replaced by Otto Morales 
Benitez. A lawyer and academic, Morales Benitez had previously served in Lleras 
Camargo’s administration as Minister of Labor. In that position he had championed 
widely popular labor reforms. When he moved to Agriculture, he picked up where 
Arango Londoño had left off, dedicating himself to the implementation of land reform. 
While ADEPAN certainly supported the idea of land reform and believed that it was a 
necessary part of the long-term solution to their flour problem, Montoya expressed 
disappointment that Morales Benitez seemed to have no interest in other issues under 
his jurisdiction as Minister of Agriculture, particularly the short-term ones that directly 
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affected the bakers, such as import policies. Montoya lamented Colombia’s 
“disconcerting instability in public offices [which] don’t allow anyone to achieve any 
constructive work to help any sector of the national economy.”133 
Constant Ministerial changes was only the beginning of his disillusionment with 
the national government, which he accused of being the cause of most of the country’s 
problems, especially the bakers. Montoya presented himself as someone who had been 
loyal to the government under the leadership of Lleras Camargo, but had grown weary 
of having the concerns of his industry ignored: 
I am allergic to the idea of creating problems for the Government and 
perhaps my only sin consists of having been excessively Frente-
Nacionalista and an unconditional admirer of the current government, but I 
would be a traitor to our cause and to the trust that you all have placed in 
me, if at this Congress, I did not raise my voice to protest official 
negligence, not only for not resolving our problems, but for not even 
listening to them.134 
 
 Montoya described the collaborative campaign ADEPAN had recently initiated 
with FIP. To draw the public’s attention to their plight, the campaign began with a 
manifesto indicating that, although they highly regretted having to do so, the bakers 
were considering going on strike. The response was rapid, but not what the bakers 
expected. Articles and editorials opposing this strike appeared in respectable 
newspapers, written by authors “of good conscience, but who have no insight into the 
situation.” These writers declared that such a strike would be illegal, because the baking 
industry, like public transportation and banks, was a public service. In the published 
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text of Montoya’s presentation, the words “public service” were printed in bold and all 
capital letters, as if to visually express his incredulity.135  
His surprise at such a response, however, was not owing to his disagreement 
with the idea of the baking industry as a public service. On the contrary, he and several 
lawyers with whom he had consulted all agreed that it was. What left him flabbergasted 
was that the government didn’t protect it more effectively, especially if it was now 
going to be considered a public service. He asked why the government hadn’t ever set 
an official price for flour or established milling standards that met the needs of the 
baking industry. Sugar and other basic items were subject to official control, he pointed 
out. It made no sense to not do the same for flour.136 
Once again, Vargas Nariño took the blame. Montoya noted that he had been 
director of INA for a long time, was thus fully conversant with the industry’s problems, 
and had a lot of power within that organization. His insinuation was clear: if anyone 
could solve INA’s distribution problems it was Vargas Nariño; the fact that the 
problems continued meant that he was uninterested in finding any solutions. Montoya 
prefaced his subsequent indictment with the statement that ADEPAN was always ready 
to work with him to find solutions that worked for everybody. But, he charged, Vargas 
Nariño wanted no part of collaborative problem-solving: “Unfortunately, INA’s 
manager does not tolerate disagreement with his way of thinking [whether it’s] by the 
bakers, millers, or any other entity. The only people who prosper under him are those 
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who adjust themselves to his exclusive and personal perspective.” Two further points 
providing the damning evidence that Montoya needed to make his case: although 
Vargas Nariño had been invited to the Congress, he chose not to come and he refused to 
implement any of the recommendations made in the study by Durham and Seeborg the 
previous year, claiming that it was “a biased repot, written under the influence of North 
American milling interests.”  
Just as other participants in the Congress decried the injustices perpetrated and 
permitted by INA, Montoya also made similar charges. To demonstrate the bakers’ 
willingness to compromise and work collaboratively, he noted that ADEPAN did not 
object to the consumption of national flour; in fact, it was fully in favor of using home-
grown wheat, as long as it could be combined with a small amount of imported flour. 
Similarly, it did not completely oppose INA’s policy to discontinue importation of 
“qualified flours,” certain kinds of flour with lighter import restrictions. It did object, 
however, to the discontinuation while the nation’s millers refused to update their 
production methods. It also strenuously objected to a prevailing double standard in 
import policies. Large industrialized cracker and cookie-making companies such as 
Noel and La Rosa, and pasta manufacturers were still permitted import to those 
qualified flours, despite the fact that they could be produced in Colombia, if the millers 
chose to do so. For Montoya, such a discriminatory policy was both unjust and anti-
democratic. As he declared, “Or the law applies to everyone, or it applies to no one.”137   
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Further evidence that INA was working against the bakers came from several 
recently published newspaper articles. They asserted that Colombia’s bakers were a 
“privileged and exploitative oligarchy” complaining about the discontinuation of the 
qualified flour imports because it “took a profitable business out of their hands.” 
Furthermore, the baking oligarchy had been enriching itself at the expense of the 
Colombian people by making bread that consisted of only 30% flour. With baking soda 
as the primary ingredient, the bakers were robbing Colombians of essential nutrients.  
Montoya accused INA of planting these articles to discredit the bakers. He then 
reminded the Congress attendees of the oft-repeated composition of Colombia’s baking 
industry – 85% small, artisanal businesses, with an average of ten employees (most of 
them family members) and total capital of no more than $20,000 pesos. Another 12% 
were medium-sized, partially mechanized businesses with capital of approximately 
$50,000 pesos. Only 3% were highly mechanized operations with over $100,000 pesos in 
capital.138  
Montoya was outraged at such accusations and countered that the true exploiter 
of the Colombian people was the Colombian state. It saw hunger as a cash cow. Rather 
than promoting national production and permitting limited imports, it preferred to 
allow humanitarian organizations such as CARE and CARITAS and the Kennedy 
administration’s new Food for Peace program to import significant quantities of flour 
and wheat products to distribute to Colombia’s poor. For the national state, Montoya 
claimed, this represented a windfall in tariff duties – over fifty million pesos, far more 
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than the annual income of all of Colombia’s bakeries combined. Montoya condemned 
such a disgraceful state of affairs: “Isn’t it sad, gentlemen, that our Government has to 
strengthen its bottom line with massive taxes on the wheat and flour used to make our 
daily bread, while it is foreign powers who come to the relief of our people?” The 
contrast Montoya drew with other countries that had wheat deficits was stark. Rather 
than charging taxes on wheat and flour imports, they let them in duty-free and, in fact, 
subsidized their importation, in order to keep bread prices low. In sum, Montoya 
created a vision of an uncaring, anti-democratic state, enriching itself at the expense the 
nation’s poor and working classes.139  
To reinforce Montoya’s depiction of Colombia’s bakers as small artisans rather 
than the oligarchs Vargas Nariño purportedly claimed them to be, in addition to the 
numerous and lengthy reports from the Eighth Congress, that issue of El Panadero 
Colombiano also included a photo essay on the baking industry. It was descriptively 
titled “Such are our Bakeries. An incipient industry lacking modern mechanization. 
Small factories which employ many workers and where the very owners work like a 
good wage laborer.” Several photos depicted people at work in various baking tasks. 
One showed a man tending to a brick oven with the caption “The baking industry is not 
a sector of speculation: it is a trade of much activity and little remuneration.” Although 
the oven was built into a brick wall, suggesting older technology, the man was using a 
type of diesel-powered blowtorch to heat it. In contrast, the opposite page showed a 
man putting a tray of rolls into an electric oven. Its support wall was missing some tiles, 
                                                 
139 Ibid.  
 370 
and trays of rolls lay haphazardly around it, some on shelves, others on the floor. 
Unlike in the other photograph where empty trays were neatly stacked up on a large 
shelving unit, empty trays in the second one were lined up in a row on the floor in front 
of the electric oven. A pat depiction of progression from old to new technologies this 
was most definitely not. The photographs explicitly illustrated the claims in the photo-
essay’s title: this was an industry with an incomplete transition to modern techniques 
and technologies. And if the photographs didn’t make that clear enough, the caption 
above the photo with the electric oven reinforced the message. While it began with the 
simple statement that the photos showed the two most common baking systems and 
named each of them in order, it quickly dispelled any notion that the electric one was 
the better system by including a small critique – it didn’t work during times of energy 
rationing.140  
The accompanying text of another photo further drove this point home. In the 
photograph, two men stand side-by-side, each working at a different baking machine. 
The text indicated that one was a dough moistener and the other a cylindrical dough 
mixer, both powered by a DC electrical system. These represented “some mechanized 
elements” that were used in bread production. The emphasis was clearly on “some” –
 as the text noted: “In Colombia there is still not one bread factory that is completely 
mechanized.” This was not for lack of interest on the part of bakers, the text indicated – 
both owners and workers aspired to use “modern advances.” What held them back was 
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financing; bakery owners and workers would like to mechanize, but could only do so 
“as far as their economic resources would allow, being that we bakers are all poor, and 
the few capitalists [among us] have made their fortunes in other activities.” The 
combined impact of such statements along with the framing of the photographs, in 
which only one or two individuals appeared, rather than a factory floor of workers, 
powerfully conveyed an image of the baking industry as a small-scale, family-run, 
artisanal industry.141  
The combination of all the comments made at the Congress and the visual 
representation in El Panadero Colombiano worked together to effectively consolidate 
ADEPAN’s image as an industry of small business owners, rather than oligarchs. Yet, 
by the end of the year, ADEPAN changed direction and labored to revise its public 
persona, emphasizing efforts to increase mechanization among its member bakers, and 
the larger scale of their operations. Recall the fine line that ADEPAN walked between 
its competing images as an association of artisan bakers with little access to power and 
one of small manufacturers with enough political clout to successfully lobby the state to 
benefit it members. Depending on the circumstances, ADEPAN played up one or the 
other of these images. But what had changed to precipitate this revised strategy by the 
end of 1961? Several factors worked together to lead to this change. Some were broad 
societal changes, such as an altered political dynamic, while others were more 
particular to ADEPAN, although still connected to the larger economic and political 
context in which it operated.  
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 To begin with, the establishment that year of the Colombian Land Reform 
Institute (INCORA), combined with a shift in leadership at the Ministry of Agriculture 
and changes in import policies, led to improved relations between ADEPAN and INA – 
or at the very least, less adversarial ones. In fact, just two short months after the May 
issue, which skewered INA from all angles, the bakers had changed their tune, praising 
the agency for its efforts to combat the speculators that had plagued them. Never mind 
that only two months before they had directly accused INA of being the country’s 
primary speculator – it had changed its policies, allowing monthly wheat imports, and 
this meant that for the bakers, INA was now on their side (and apparently no longer 
speculating).142  
This change in import policies coincided with the establishment of INCORA and 
the installation of a new Minister of Agriculture. Both of these factors boded well for the 
bakers. From the beginning of the Lleras Camargo administration in August 1958, the 
primary goal of two of his three Ministers of Agriculture had been instituting land 
reform. Following the rural violence of the 1950s, alleviating the factors that were 
believed to have fomented it in the first place was obviously a top priority. Overcoming 
inequitable land tenure was at the very top of that list. While it had been on the agenda 
of Lleras Camargo’s first Agriculture Minister and the primary goal of his second one, it 
was the obsession of his third, Otto Morales Benitez. Recall that Francisco Montoya, 
ADEPAN’s president, had complained about the instability in cabinet appointments in 
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his report at the Eighth Congress. Nevertheless, the installation of a new Minister later 
that year was likely received as good news for Montoya and the rest of ADEPAN’s 
leadership. In a speech outlining the National Front’s agricultural policy, the new 
Minister, Hernando Toro Agudelo, emphasized the role of the state in protecting “the 
weak” in society, but said nothing about land reform. He spoke instead about requiring 
obligatory consumption of nationally grown agricultural products and setting official 
prices for basic items and staple goods. He asserted that combating stockpiling and 
speculation was one of his Ministry’s primary functions. He reminded his listeners that 
the stated economic goal of the Lleras Camargo administration was to equitably 
redistribute income. In other words, he touched on many issues dear to the hearts of the 
bakers of ADEPAN. Moreover, the fact that the Land Reform Institute had been 
established that year meant that the new minister could devote more of his attention to 
solving all of these other societal needs.143  
The establishment of INCORA also changed the political dynamic for ADEPAN 
in another crucial way. With land reform institutionalized, ADEPAN’s need to 
emphasize that its members were not oligarchs or wealthy aristocrats was diminished. 
Simultaneously, the growing economic instability that would eventually lead to a series 
of peso devaluations during the subsequent presidential administration focused more 
attention than ever on imports. Under these two circumstances, ADEPAN’s interests 
were better served by returning to a discourse of modernization when it spoke of the 
baking industry, in an attempt to portray it as an important sector of the Colombian 
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economy, and hence, one that should be given priority when it came to importation of 
machinery and raw materials. 
This was reinforced after the return of the Colombian delegation from the baking 
industry exhibition in Atlantic City that October. The denial of their request for import 
licenses for new baking machinery stung. As Montoya opined, if the functionary who 
had told them that Colombians were already eating good bread and didn’t need fancy 
new machinery to improve it had had the opportunity to see for himself how much 
more advanced the baking industries of the United States, Europe, and even Mexico 
actually were, he would have sung a different tune.144 Since he did not, it now 
behooved ADEPAN to demonstrate to the national government how important those 
import licenses were. 
But, it could not do so by simply continuing to demonstrate how the baking 
industry was only partially mechanized, as it had so effectively shown in the May issue 
of El Panadero Colombiano. Although the portrayal was not incorrect, it was also not the 
slant that would effectively solidify the bakers’ case that they needed new machinery. 
The May portrayal was ultimately rather negative. There was transition, but it was 
sporadic, incomplete, and improvised. This could have generated an image of bakers as 
interested in mechanizing, but only in a haphazard way, with lack of foresight to ensure 
success with the new machinery and baking techniques. A different portrayal was 
necessary.  
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Isidoro Pinzón helped them achieve it. Pinzón was the owner of Pan Fino (“Good 
Bread”), a combined bakery and soda fountain, located in one of Bogotá’s more 
exclusive neighborhoods, at 54th Street and Seventh Avenue. The December issue of El 
Panadero Colombiano, the same one that reported on the Atlantic City exhibition, 
published a profile of Pinzón and Pan Fino. The contrast with the partially mechanized 
bakeries profiled in the May issue could not have been starker. From the very title – 
“With European Systems, ‘Pan Fino’ Makes the Best and Most Nutritious Bread in the 
Capital” – ADEPAN established that this was not a haphazard operation. Pinzón had 
worked diligently over thirteen years to build a small bakery empire, amassing a 
“fortune of over one million pesos” – a fortune he began in 1948 with an investment of  
$3,000 pesos in some old machinery that barely functioned. Starting with just two 
employees, his bakery had grown to thirty-nine. At first, he had only a few customers, 
but by 1961 his “luxurious establishment” served thousands of people daily. The barely 
functioning machinery he initially used had all been replaced with more modern 
equipment, and at the time of the profile, he was in the midst of a sizeable expansion, 
involving the importation of $300,000 pesos worth of new machinery from Denmark, 
which he planned to install at a new bakery he was opening in a neighborhood even 
further to the north, at 83rd Street.145  
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All of these tangible measures of progress were matched by the intangible ones 
evident in the operation of his 54th Street Bakery. As the profile’s author noted: 
A tour of the building where Bogotá’s best bread is currently made gives 
the sensation of order, discipline, absolute hygiene, constant supervision of 
the operating systems, absolute control over the orders that come from the 
managers and production bosses, and, basically, a dynamic and integral 
adoption of what needs to be done to maintain hard-won prestige. In ‘Pan 
Fino’…nobody is standing still. Everyone, from the very owner, is making 
something, and something good.146 
 
Testifying that he saw this with his own eyes, the profile’s author observed that despite 
Pinzón’s technological advances and great fortune, there was still a humbleness about 
him, a simplicity that manifested itself in the fact that he had done every job there was 
to do in the bakery, and still got his hands dirty every day doing manual labor. To 
reinforce the image of Pinzón as a simple, hard-working man, he appeared in only one 
photograph, dressed in his white baker’s uniform, looking away from the camera and 
sitting informally in a chair talking to the interviewer (dressed, in contrast, in a suit and 
tie). Moreover, he was not just a good businessman. He was a solid citizen, a dedicated 
family man – he proudly declared that his wife had worked at his side from the 
beginning and that he owed all of his success to her. The profile included a photograph 
of his three smartly-dressed children and indicated that they were the source of his 
great happiness.147  
The other photographs in the series visually represented the industriousness of 
Pan Fino. No matter what the workers in each one of them were doing, numerous trays 
of rolls or loaves of bread surrounded them. In one particular photograph, the visual 
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effect of rows and rows of rolls stacked on a cart from the floor to several feet above the 
workers’ heads was stunning. Another showed the bakery’s storefront. Three women 
worked behind the counter, which was jammed with customers eyeing the trays of 
bread for sale.148  
Pinzón was a perfect new public face for ADEPAN not only because of the 
success he had already achieved. As his expansion to 83rd Street suggested, he was not 
content to rest on his laurels. Although he claimed that he was satisfied with what he 
had accomplished thus far, he also believed that there was still more to do: “I keep 
thinking that our capital deserves better products and we will provide them.” In that 
vein, he praised the newly established baking school, a collaborative program between 
ADEPAN and SENA. Colombian bakery workers had no training, he asserted, and had 
only achieved anything at all because they were “very good, very intelligent…and have 
a sense of responsibility.” Trained bakery workers would offer a great service to the 
nation, he argued, essential if it was to advance at all. He saw his own expansion plans 
as an integral part of national economic development:  
My future plans are really quite simple, but of absolute importance, 
because I have always thought that only by producing something good will 
the country achieve the development that reflects its importance in the 
concert of most advanced nations and be able to offer revolutionary 
systems that will give us a pre-eminent place in the world.149  
 
The change in tone from the May depiction of the baking industry is dramatic. 
While Pan Fino was exceptional in many ways, it was still struggling to modernize, just 
like the more artisanal bakeries previously highlighted. But the earlier photo essay had 
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none of the heroic imagery of the profile of Pan Fino. Although the other bakery owners 
and workers were toiling just as hard, and adopting as much new technology as they 
could, they were not presented as part of the nation’s great economic future, held back 
from helping the country reach its rightful place on the global stage by insufficient 
training and mechanization.  
Presenting the daily activities of Colombia’s bakers on such a higher level 
strengthened the portrayal of the rejection of ADEPAN’s import licenses as a major 
injustice. Like Pinzón, the delegates to the Atlantic City baking exhibition were trying to 
help ensure progress for the entire nation, not just for their own businesses. Denying 
their request was thus not only an injustice toward the bakers, but an unpatriotic act 
directed at the entire nation.  
And if that wasn’t enough, there was a deeply moral component to the issue as 
well. Providing bread was a charitable act, a symbol of compassion and concern for 
others. To make this message very clear, ADEPAN published an excerpt of the Pope’s 
Christmas Message for 1961. “Share your bread with those who are hungry,” the first 
line of the excerpt read.150 Reinforcing this message was a photograph of President 
Lleras Camargo at a fundraising dinner for a housing project in one of Bogotá’s poor 
neighborhoods. The photographer captured the president sitting next to Father Rafael 
García Herreros, both of them with a piece of bread in their hands. The caption noted 
that two of Colombia’s beauty queens served the bread to the dinner’s participants, 
“like at the Last Supper.” Granted, this was December and a time when many were 
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focused on the religious holiday and its meaning. But, such overt religious references 
had not appeared in other December issues of El Panadero Colombiano. The December 
1957 cover greeted readers with “Merry Christmas and Happy New Year,” 
accompanied by an illustration of a candle and holly leaves. That issue also reprinted an 
article that had originally appeared in the newspaper La República, praising ADEPAN 
for the charitable drive it was organizing for poor families. But, there was no other 
mention of the holidays. The following year, the only seasonal reference appeared in an 
advertisement; a margarine producer thanked its customers for a great year and wished 
them future prosperity. In 1959, the holidays weren’t mentioned at all. The only item 
not related to the Colombian baking industry that appeared was a love poem by Pablo 
Neruda.151  
It is intriguing that the only times El Panadero Colombiano mentioned the holidays 
over the course of five years was in reference to charity for Bogotá’s less fortunate. The 
first, in November 1957, appeared when the industrial bakers of FIP had not yet 
separated from ADEPAN and the organization worked hard to portray baking as a 
major, large-scale industrial sector in Colombia (as discussed in chapter 3). This was 
during the transition from the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship to the military junta that 
replaced him and then to civilian rule under the National Front. At the beginning of 
Lleras Camargo’s administration, he worked with Colombia’s major business 
associations to establish a “gentlemen’s agreement” focused on restoring the nation’s 
                                                 
151 “Felices pascuas,” PC No. 2 (December 1957): cover; “La campaña de ADEPAN,” PC No. 2 (December 1957): 18; 
“Muchas gracias,” PC Nos. 13-14 (November-December 1958): 1; Pablo Neruda, “Poema 20,” PC No. 20 (December 
1959): 19.  
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economy, which had been battered by both the coffee bust of the late 1950s and the 
fiscal mismanagement of the Rojas Pinilla years. ADEPAN’s efforts to portray the 
baking industry as a large one helped secure it a place at the table where the agreement 
was hammered out.  
The second came in late 1962, after land and labor reforms had been 
implemented and the new Minister of Agriculture signaled that his administration 
would focus on import policies and better protection of the nation’s agricultural 
products. These were issues in which ADEPAN clearly had a direct and significant 
stake. But it also signaled a shift in the Ministry’s overall priorities for the Colombian 
countryside from an emphasis on social justice to development of the national economy. 
For the bakers of ADEPAN this meant shifting their public image from one of an 
organization of small artisans who needed state protection to one of small 
manufacturers who played an important role in the nation’s economic development. 
Charitable acts by bakers helped to cement this transformation. As pointed out earlier, 
the ability to provide for others meant that bakers occupied a higher position in society. 
Thus, it is notable that El Panadero Colombiano mentioned the holidays and the 
connection between bread and charity only at those two different points in time when it 
was making the case that bread-making was an important manufacturing sector whose 
interests needed to be protected not because bakers were weaker members of society 
but precisely because of the strong role they played in developing and maintaining the 
national economy.   
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Definitively asserting that ADEPAN’s attempts to manage its public image 
helped it achieve its goals is untenable. The same can be said for its heavy criticism of 
INA. But, one thing that is certain is that just a few months later El Panadero Colombiano 
lauded the signing of a formal agreement among the four main associations with a stake 
in the issue of imported wheat and flour. In March 1962, representatives from 
ADEPAN, FIP, FEDEMOL, and ASEMOLPRO met several times to discuss their 
competing interests and mutual problems. Eventually they hammered out an 
agreement on flour production designed to help them all equally. The terms of the 
agreement were very specific. 
From then on, every month INA was to import 1,200 tons of high-quality wheat 
designed specifically for making bread. INA was to consult with millers on what 
constituted “high-quality” for their milling purposes. INA was to then distribute it 
immediately to those mills around the country that were affiliated with one of the two 
milling associations, in quantities proportional to their productive capacity rather than 
geographic location. Mills were then to grind the grain to 72% extraction, following the 
specifications laid out by bakers. Within fifteen days of receiving the grain, millers were 
to distribute it in the form of flour to ADEPAN and FIP in quantities proportional to 
how much each of the association’s members required. Payment was to be made 
immediately. The same held for further distribution of the flour – member bakers were 
to pay ADEPAN or FIP immediately for their purchases. In the regions where ADEPAN 
and FIP did not have warehouses, bakers were to buy the flour directly from affiliated 
millers. Those bakers had thirty days to do so voluntarily; if the mills were still in 
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possession of the flour after that point, then ADEPAN’s bakers would have to buy it 
whether they could store it or not. Prices were pre-set, both what INA could charge the 
millers for grain and what the latter in turn could charge the bakers for flour. To ensure 
quality, the Institute for Technological Research was to certify that the flour met baking 
standards. Mills that failed to follow the agreement’s stipulations would no longer 
receive the high-quality grain INA imported. Finally, to keep the agreement from 
falling apart, INA would “obligate” unaffiliated mills to make the high-quality flour 
and sell it exclusively to FIP or ADEPAN, rather than to unaffiliated bakers. The 
agreement did not specify how this obligation was to be enforced.152  
What led to this agreement? Did INA respond to the heavy criticism it had 
received at the hands of ADEPAN’s bakers the previous year? Was ADEPAN’s 
collaboration with FIP crucial to gaining INA’s ear? Did the revamped image of the 
baking industry have an effect? Did the new Minister of Agriculture fulfill his promise 
and put pressure on INA to control speculation? No doubt, all of these were 
contributing factors; not one of them on their own would have been sufficiently 
powerful to lead to this agreement.  
The effect it had on ADEPAN was striking. Successfully negotiating with the 
powerful milling interests emboldened the bakers. Although still representing largely 
family-run businesses of artisan-bakers, ADEPAN’s leaders were presented as equals to 
the powerful interests that had given them such headaches over the previous years. It is 
                                                 
152 “El doctor Douglas Botero Boshell y don Luís A. Rodríguez,” (photo caption) PC No. 31 (March 1962): 
unpaginated; “Convenio sobre producción y entrega de Harinas Calificadas Especiales, que reemplazan las Harinas 
Importadas,” PC No. 31 (March 1962): unpaginated. 
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telling that the issue introducing the agreement put individual photographs of “The 
Gentlemen of the Agreement” on the cover. Four “gentlemen” were included: Douglas 
Botero Boshell (FEDEMOL), Pedro M. Arenas (ASEMOLPRO), Luís A. Rodríguez 
(ADEPAN), and Hector Izquierdo (ADEPAN). Note that two representatives from 
ADEPAN were placed on the cover, while Jaime Arrázola Lombana from FIP was not. 
Izquierdo was ADEPAN’s legal advisor and he was credited with being the architect of 
the agreement.153 Similarly, photographs of various meetings that took place that month 
showed ADEPAN representatives either consulting together with each other or meeting 
with representatives of the milling associations; representatives from FIP appeared 
nowhere.154  
The agreement also spurred ADEPAN to redouble its efforts to promote 
modernization within its industry. At its annual congress in March 1962, the emphasis 
was on training and technology, while flour supply, availability, and distribution were 
not even on the agenda.155 That same month, the Great Plains Wheat Market 
Development Association sent representatives to Colombia to visit the baking school it 
had helped to establish in collaboration with ADEPAN and SENA. El Panadero 
Colombiano promoted the school announcing that Great Plains Wheat had begun to offer 
grants for bakers to attend.156   
                                                 
153 “Los caballeros del convenio,” PC No. 31 (March 1962): unpaginated. 
154 El doctor Douglas Botero Boshell y don Luís A. Rodríguez,” op.cit. Even more dramatically, ADEPAN’s depiction 
of Enrique Vargas Nariño changed radically. Now he was a loyal and dedicated public servant, to be congratulated 
for his “industriousness, integrity, and honesty.” See “Los caballeros del convenio,” op.cit. 
155 “Agenda para la reunión del IX Congreso Nacional de Panificadores,” PC No. 31 (March 1962): unpaginated. 
156 “Becas para panaderos,” PC No. 31 (March 1962): unpaginated. 
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All of these signs suggest that ADEPAN had truly finally come of age. That was 
certainly the image that the association wanted to convey. But, the agreement still 
existed only on paper. Foreseen and unforeseen problems would both rear their heads, 
and other sectors negatively affected by this agreement (such as Colombia’s wheat 
growers and agronomists) had yet to weigh in or make their displeasure known. In 
addition, there were other powerful actors in the shadows, fighting among themselves 
and with their Colombian allies and enemies, to gain hegemony over Colombian 
economic development policies, and not in a way favorable to the bakers.     
 
 
 
Conclusion 
ADEPAN’s success also carried the seeds of its destruction. Now that millers 
were producing the flour that it had insisted upon, the powerful incentive to become 
and remain a member, let alone an active one, decreased. Sadly, some bakers also 
undermined the organization, by sidestepping the “official” channels and purchasing 
the special qualified flour directly from millers at a reduced cost. Similarly, some chose 
to purchase flour that wasn’t special qualified and were thus able to avoid paying extra 
to ADEPAN.  
During the presidential administration of Conservative Guillermo León Valencia 
(August 1962 to August 1966), ADEPAN published only one issue of El Panadero 
Colombiano – in July 1966. By then, the next president, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, a Liberal, 
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had been elected. That ADEPAN was clearly most active during Liberal administrations 
suggests that there was a stronger connection to political parties and political processes 
than the pages of El Panadero Colombiano reveal. This concurs with other analyses 
pointing to the connections between Colombian artisans in general and the Liberal 
party.157 But the four-year absence of their newsletter was not simply due to a change in 
presidential administration. The July 1966 issue lauded a “new era,” during which the 
bakers’ association would be restored to its former heights of unity and solidarity. But 
unlike previous years when ADEPAN officers and member-bakers themselves wrote 
many of the articles and edited the newsletter, the editor and primary author during the 
“new era” was a lawyer. He had been ADEPAN’s legal counsel for several years, but 
was not a baker himself. This alone suggests that the bakers were less interested in the 
organization than they had been previously. Moreover, the divisions that had clearly 
crippled the organization for several years had not disappeared, evident in his constant 
exhortations to the membership – he wrote article after article chastising the bakers for 
not participating in the organization. Although he made a valiant effort, El Panadero 
Colombiano ceased publication for good at the end of 1967, only one year after the “new 
era” began.  
But ADEPAN did not disappear entirely during the administration of Valencia 
León. The agreement about “special qualified flours” eventually fell apart. At the same 
time, Colombian agronomists and Rockefeller Foundation wheat breeders continued to 
voice concerns about INA’s handling of imported wheat, millers’ refusal to purchase 
                                                 
157 Sowell, Early Colombian Labor Movement.  
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domestically grown grain, and the Ministry of Agriculture’s growing emphasis on 
commercial over alimentary crops. All of this came to head in 1964. To resolve the 
problem, the Ministry organized a “National Wheat Congress.” All the major industrial 
associations, research organizations, and governmental agencies with some connection 
to the wheat industry in Colombia attended, including ADEPAN.  
Although agreements favoring the interests of Colombian wheat growers and 
artisanal bakers emerged from that Congress, the country was already well down a 
path leading to complete reliance on foreign sources for wheat. To a large degree, at 
least as far as the bakers are concerned, this chapter points to the primary reason for 
their inability to clearly articulate and defend their interests. Unlike Bavaria, for 
example, which was able to create solidarity among all the brewing companies toward 
the goal of achieving self-sufficiency, even if it meant paying more in import duties, 
ADEPAN’s membership was far more numerous and diverse. For a period of time, 
ADEPAN was able to generate some level of solidarity centered on a class-based 
discourse. This powerfully served them during a time of intense public protest by 
popular sectors. 
But, the divisions within the organization, even after the departure of Bogotá’s 
twenty industrial bakers, remained strong. Following the success of the special qualified 
flour agreement, ADEPAN’s leaders immediately turned toward a modernization 
project within the organization. No doubt, these divisions prevented a truly unified 
class-based identity from emerging, presenting a challenge to a lobbying organization 
that had partly built itself around a class-based identity. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Neither Bread nor Cookies: The Rockefeller Foundation’s Collaboration with 
Colombian Wheat Promoters, 1956-1965 
 
 
 On April 29, 1960, the dinner conversation at the home of Mr. James Lankford, 
Assistant Agricultural Attaché in Colombia, was a bit strained. The dinner was held in 
honor of an economic study group that had come to Colombia from the United States. 
Among the invited guests was Ulysses J. Grant, the Director of the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s Colombian Agricultural Program (CAP). Earlier that day, the study group 
had visited the CAP’s main research site, the Tibaitatá Experimental Station, located in 
the Sabana de Bogotá. Grant had been unable to accompany the study group during 
their visit to the station, and had put Dr. John Gibler, a wheat breeder, in charge of the 
group’s tour and meeting with the station’s staff. As Grant later noted in his diary, 
Apparently, most of the [meeting’s] discussion centered around why 
Colombia should grow wheat when they could buy it cheaper than they 
can grow it. The members of the study group insisted that it was 
uneconomical for Colombia to grow wheat, while the staff of the CAP 
attempted to explain that, whether it was economical or not, Colombia was 
growing several tons a year and as long as they were doing so, the 
Foundation’s job was to help them grow the best variety that can be grown.  
 
 Later that evening, the meeting at Tibaitatá came up during the dinner 
discussion at Mr. Lankford’s home. According to Grant, one of the dinner guests, a Mr. 
Shoemaker, commented that “Dr. Gibler seemed to have a chip on his shoulder 
concerning the production of wheat in Colombia.” Grant defended Gibler by informing 
Mr. Shoemaker that a commission from the Midwest Wheat Growers Association had 
been to Colombia not so long before and upon returning to the U.S. had published… 
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…a report with considerable erroneous information in it and we were not 
consulted about this report prior to its publication, neither were we 
consulted about the points covered in the report on the wheat 
improvement program. 
 
Apparently, the pronouncement that cultivating wheat in Colombia was uneconomical 
that had been made at the earlier meeting was repeated to Grant following his defense 
of Gibler. Grant, as diplomatically as possible, responded by suggesting that, in light of 
the errors made by the previous commission, “we might expect John Gibler and others 
to have a small chip on the shoulder in this case.”  He concluded his diary entry that 
day with the following observation:  
It is quite obvious that the Colombian people with whom we work do not 
appreciate the types of so-called economic study groups that are 
repeatedly being sent to Colombia since many Colombians think their 
obvious mission [is] to sell American wheat here.”1 
 
 This exchange between different groups of Americans in Colombia in 1960 
illustrates an interesting twist to the story of the Rockefeller Foundation in Latin 
America and to the general narrative of development in the post-World War II era 
which posits that the power to define “development” and to set priorities lies in the so-
called “First World.”2  In much of the literature on the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) in 
Latin America, the Foundation is generally portrayed as the active agent, the Latin 
Americans as the passive ones.  The Foundation sets priorities; the Latin Americans 
accept or reject them.  The Foundation establishes programs; the Latin Americans carry 
them out or put up obstacles.  The Foundation’s goals and objectives define success or 
                                                 
1Rockefeller Archive Center (hereafter RAC), RF: Record Group 12.3, Diaries, Box 21, Ulysses J. Grant’s diary notes of 
April 29, 1960.  All of the quotes from the previous page are from this source.  
2 Escobar, Encountering Development; Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine. 
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failure; the Latin Americans’ goals and objectives are rarely considered.  While most of 
this literature does provide some historical context of the particular Latin American 
nation in question, it is often broad and cursory, generally there to provide the 
background necessary for understanding the Foundation’s motivations for being in any 
particular country, and the advantages or disadvantages it had and the actions it took.  
The context is set up to provide a backdrop for the Foundation.   
 Obviously, this portrait of the literature on the Rockefeller Foundation in Latin 
America is painted with a broad brush: some studies do a far better job than others at 
weaving the context into the story so that the Latin Americans are not just “extras on 
the set.” In addition, repeated use of the term “Latin Americans” papers over a great 
deal of diversity.  To begin with, the RF operated a wide variety of public health, 
agricultural, and basic research programs in an array of Latin American nations, from 
Mexico to Brazil, Chile to Costa Rica, and most of the countries in between.  While the 
overall goals and objectives of the leaders of these nations may have some broad 
similarities, the specific contours were different in each case.  Moreover, the term “Latin 
Americans” is far too general to be truly useful.  Subsistence-level farmers, cattle 
ranchers, wealthy wheat growers, university professors, municipal sanitation 
authorities, Ministers of Agriculture and Public Health - all these groups and more 
played a role at some level in shaping the contours of the various RF programs 
throughout Latin America.  And they all had different points of view and different 
motivations that directed their dealings with the Foundation officers or programs.  To 
lump them all into the category of “Latin Americans’ is not only to erase their great 
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diversity but also to elide the significant differences among them in terms of access to 
the Foundation and ability to affect the course of its programs as well as the varying 
positive and negative effects that those programs may have had on their lives.  But, the 
term illustrates the larger point, which, again, is that much of the literature on the 
Rockefeller Foundation tends to subtly or overtly place the various Latin American 
actors in a passive role next the active one of the Foundation.3  
 Similarly, this literature papers over the relationships between the officers and 
members of the various Rockefeller Foundation missions and other actors from the 
global North. Although the notion that no empire is monolithic is well established at 
this point, when it comes to the Rockefeller Foundation, it is often still presented as one 
part of a unified or solitary effort at global domination originating in offices in New 
York and Washington. In reality, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Foundation was at the 
center of a competition between two North American groups struggling for global 
hegemony: those promoting Green Revolution agricultural technologies for staple crops 
and those promoting the sale of U.S. surplus crops. Wheat was at the center of both 
                                                 
3 A representative sample of this work on the Rockefeller Foundation in Latin America includes: Christopher Abel, 
“External Philanthropy and Domestic Change in Colombian Health Care: The Role of the Rockefeller Foundation, ca. 
1920-1950,” HAHR 75 (August 1995): 339-376; Marcos Cueto, “Sanitation from Above: Yellow Fever and Foreign 
Intervention in Peru, 1919-1922,” HAHR 72 (February 1992): 1-22; Cueto, Missionaries of Science; Marc Edelman, 
“Agricultural Modernization in Smallholding Areas of Mexico: A Case Study in the Sierra Norte de Puebla,” Latin 
American Perspectives 7 (Autumn, 1980): 29-49; Fitzgerald, “Exporting American Agriculture”; Jennings, Foundations of 
International Agricultural Research; John H. Perkins, “The Rockefeller Foundation and the Green Revolution, 1941-
1956,” Agriculture and Human Values 7 (Summer and Fall 1990): 6-18. More recent works that provide a more nuanced 
portrait of the interactions between the Rockefeller Foundation and various Latin American actors, and often give 
equal weight to the agency, goals and activities of the latter include: Anne-Emanuelle Birn, Marriage of Convenience: 
Rockefeller International Health and Revolutionary Mexico (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2006); Cotter, 
Troubled Harvest; Matchett, “At Odds over Inbreeding.” 
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these efforts: the Rockefeller Foundation’s agricultural work is most associated with its 
wheat improvement programs in Mexico, India, and Pakistan (and rice in the 
Philippines) and one of the most famous agronomists in the world is Norman Bourlag, 
a Rockefeller Foundation sponsored agronomist, whose work developing hybrid wheat 
seeds earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970. In the other corner, the United States 
P.L. 480 surplus crops disposal program had begun in 1954 as an effort to deal with 
growing surpluses following the resumption of European agricultural production in the 
post-World War II era and the breakdown of a series of international commodity 
agreements focused on stabilizing the wheat market. Although P.L. 480 was not 
exclusively focused on wheat, it constituted the vast majority of the surplus crops it 
offered for sale. The P.L. 480 program was designed to not only unload contemporary 
surpluses, but also, to develop long-term demand in developing countries. Thus, these 
two groups – the Rockefeller Foundation on one side, and the USDA and U.S. wheat 
growers on the other – were clearly at odds.  
 This chapter will examine one of the fronts in this global struggle for hegemony. 
Specifically, it will examine a series of conflictive interactions between representatives 
of the Rockefeller Foundation and of the USDA (and U.S. wheat interests) as they 
clashed over wheat production in Colombia. Their arguments and criticisms of each 
other demonstrate clearly that statements or analyses linking the Rockefeller 
Foundation to the U.S. government’s imperial projects during the Cold War period 
cannot be accepted without hesitation, and in the process demonstrate the contingent 
and diverse nature of neo-imperial projects.  
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The Green Revolution at the Hotel Tequendama 
Kenneth Wernimont was quite displeased by two things that happened on 
March 16, 1956, the second day of a twelve-day trip to review the progress of the CAP. 
The Assistant Director of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Agricultural Sciences program in 
New York, he had spent the morning with Carlos Navarrete, an ingeniero agrónomo at 
the Caja Agraria, visiting its new seed handling plant at the Tibaitatá experimental 
station. In his trip diary, Wernimont made no mention, positive or negative, of the plant 
itself or its operations. He did, however, note that it was loading wheat seeds produced 
by the Caja into sacks partially labeled “Ministerio de Agricultura y la Fundación 
Rockefeller.” A terse sentence followed that observation in his notes: “KW will discuss 
this with LMR.”4 Why was this label so problematic that Wernimont planned to discuss 
it with Lewis M. Roberts, the director of the CAP?  
There were several reasons. To begin with, the RF made considerable efforts to 
publicly disassociate itself from the Ministry of Agriculture, despite the depth of their 
collaboration. Partly this was based on political expediency. The RF worked hard to 
keep itself outside the fray of Colombian politics. Considering how polarized the parties 
were and how quickly political fortunes changed in the 1950s, too close an alignment 
with one party or the other would have seriously impeded the foundation’s ability to 
achieve its goals in Colombia.5 Thus, publicly distancing itself from the Ministry of 
                                                 
4 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 11, Kenneth Wernimont’s Diary of his March 1956 trip to Colombia. 
5 This is not to suggest that the foundation or, more specifically, its individual representatives in Colombia, had no 
political preferences or affinities with members of one political group more than another. There is evidence to 
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Agriculture was essential for the Rockefeller Foundation. Although the Ministry was its 
principal partner in Colombia, the RF recognized how deeply politics permeated it. 
Wernimont noted this directly in his trip diary. Describing a conversation he had with 
Albert Waterston, Herbert Stewart, and Maurice Perkins, members of a World Bank 
mission in Colombia, who had been arguing that the national government needed to 
centralize its agricultural functions, which were dispersed across a variety of public and 
semi-public entities, Wernimont 
…ventured the opinion that care would have to be taken in considering 
such a reorganization to insure (sic) that functions now relatively well 
protected by the non-political character of the Caja Agraria could be equally 
well managed by an essentially political Ministry of Agriculture.6 
 
Political considerations were not the only reason, however. An important goal 
for the RF in all of the countries where it had cooperative programs was institutional 
development. It hoped to establish or strengthen agricultural research entities and 
governmental agencies, helping them acquire the capacity to function effectively once 
the RF had withdrawn from the collaboration.7 Toward this goal, one of the RF’s 
policies in Colombia was, as much as possible, to publicly attribute the advances in 
                                                                                                                                                             
suggest, for example, that Roberts, the director of CAP, had personal ties with prominent members of the 
Conservative party. 
6 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 11, Kenneth Wernimont’s Diary of his March 1956 trip to Colombia. This dispersal 
of responsibilities among a variety of public and semi-private entities was a general characteristic of the Colombian 
government at the time, and not solely a feature of the Ministry of Agriculture. Ocampo and Tovar note, for example, 
that while there were only 35 autonomous state entities created in the five decades between 1886 and 1939, 18 were 
created in the 1940s, 32 in the 1950s and 43 in the 1960s. See Ocampo and Tovar, “Colombia in the Classical Era.” 
Also, the notion that the Caja Agraria was not a politicized organization will certainly strike the observer of 
Colombian history as odd. While, as a semi-private organization, it was less subject to the annual transfers of power 
and reshuffling of posts that the Ministry experienced, it most certainly had political alignments that affected the way 
credit was dispersed and its monies were managed. 
7 For a positive assessment of the RF’s goal of institutional capacity building in other contexts, see Arthur A. 
Goldsmith, “The Rockefeller Foundation Indian Agricultural Program: Why It Worked,” in Philanthropy and Cultural 
Context: Western Philanthropy in South, East, and Southeast Asia in the Twentieth Century, eds. Soma Hewa and Phil 
Hove (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1997): 85-114. For a more critical examination, see Jennings, 
Foundations of International Agricultural Research. 
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agricultural research to the Ministry of Agriculture, Faculties of Agronomy at the 
National University, or the Colombian researchers at the various experimental stations, 
such as Tibaitatá. For example, in November 1954, a writer who claimed to be under 
contract from National Geographic to produce an article about the Cauca Valley, 
contacted Roberts to inquire about the RF program at Palmira, the hot-climate 
experiment station near Cali. Roberts consulted with Jacob George Harrar about 
whether to provide him any information. Aside from doubts Harrar expressed about 
the veracity of the writer’s claim that he was “under contract” (Harrar suggested that 
the writer did not have such a contract and was perhaps only planning to use a profile 
of the Rockefeller Foundation as a “hook” to sell his story idea to the magazine), he 
indicated that the request once again raised…  
…the question as to whether we should authorize the publication of credits 
to the Foundation for work being done in collaboration with a local 
government. It would be much better to avoid this situation and, if 
unavoidable, make sure that it is put in the proper setting and the very 
important role of the Government of Colombia is clearly established.8  
 
Consistent attribution of credit to the relevant Colombian agencies was one of 
the Foundation’s methods for strengthening the agricultural research institutions it was 
supporting. Thus, it believed that a label listing the Foundation and the Ministry as joint 
sellers of improved seeds undermined their overarching objective in Colombia. This 
issue had, in fact, been raised before and partly explains the brusqueness of 
Wernimont’s diary entry – he was likely under the impression that it had been dealt 
with the previous year following a visit to the CAP by J.N. Efferson, the Director of the 
                                                 
8 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 9, Letter from JGH to LMR dated December 2, 1954. 
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Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College. Efferson had gone 
to Colombia in the summer of 1955 to attend the Third Latin American Meeting of 
Phytogeneticists, Phytopathologists, Entomolygists, and Edafologists, partially 
sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation. While there, he toured the various programs 
and facilities of the CAP. As the director of an agricultural college, experienced at 
administering a research and training facility, his opinion of the CAP would have been 
quite valuable to the RF, and Jacob George Harrar asked him to review the program 
and give an assessment. For the most part, he had only positive things to say about the 
CAP. He praised the dedication of the staff, the enthusiasm of the affiliated Colombian 
agronomists, and the quality of research being done there. Only two problematic issues 
were worthy of note. One of them regarded internal administration and paperwork. 
The other was the use of seed bags labeled with both the Ministry of Agriculture and 
the Rockefeller Foundation. Efferson objected to these bags for two reasons. 
The first was the previously-mentioned concern with attributing research 
achievements to Colombian agricultural entities. Efferson added a slightly different 
twist, however. While the inherently paternalistic aspects of the Foundation’s entire 
program of building institutions in Latin America are undeniable, the RF employees 
rarely made direct statements (in their correspondence, at least) that displayed blatantly 
paternalistic attitudes toward the Colombians with whom they worked. Efferson, 
however, was not an RF employee. Compare Harrar’s relatively neutral mention of the 
Colombian’s government’s “very important role” with Efferson’s statements about why 
the Foundation’s name should not appear on the bags: 
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As I understand it, it is not popular approval of the masses that is needed in 
the Foundation programs in Latin America but to help the responsible 
people to help themselves. In this, we need the support of the thinking 
minority and the more credit we let them take for themselves, the more 
effective this support will be.9 
 
The paternalistic tone of “letting them take credit” is striking. It suggests that 
Colombians had no ideas of their own or that they would unable to implement them if 
they did. To some degree, it paints them as children, in need of the guidance and 
encouragement from their adult supervisors. And again, this statement is so striking 
partly because of the almost complete absence of similar ones in the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s records. While they certainly recognized that Colombia needed technical 
assistance and monetary contributions to achieve its agricultural goals, they never 
spoke disparagingly of their Colombian colleagues.10 
Paternalistic attribution of credit was one of the two reasons that Efferson 
objected to the use of seed bags displaying the Foundation’s name. Bad publicity was 
the other. Efferson noted that “it has been my observation that in many countries of 
                                                 
9 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 10, Letter from J.N. Efferson to JGH, dated 10/17/55. 
10 From the start the Foundation seemed to regard agricultural research in Colombia with great respect. In 1948, for 
example, when Richard Bradfield and Paul C. Mangelsdorf conducted a review of Colombia’s agricultural 
institutions, to help the Foundation decide whether or not to establish a program there, they commented several 
times on the fact that “agricultural research in Colombia has already advanced beyond that in the majority of Latin 
American countries,” and favorably compared the situation in Colombia to that in Mexico (both Bradfield and 
Mangelsdorf had consulted for the RF in Mexico and were familiar with its conditions). This respect for what 
Colombians had already accomplished probably kept paternalistic undertones in check. Instead, they said things 
such as: “Because, as we have already mentioned, Colombia has made progress in developing agricultural 
organizations, it would be much better in our opinion if there were no clear-cut organization of American personnel 
with permanent headquarters [as there was in Mexico]. Each American specialist sent to Colombia should make his 
headquarters, we believe, at the institution where he can best function. He should identify himself closely with one or 
more of the Colombian institutions and should integrate his work with the work of Colombians in the same field. His 
success should be measured not by his own research accomplishments but by the extent to which he ‘activates’ 
Colombian specialists into doing effective research.” RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 1, Folder 2, Report on trip to Colombia 
and other South and Central American countries, June 10-July 8, 1948 by Richard Bradfield and Paul C. Mangelsdorf. 
The only remotely “paternalistic” instances apparent in the foundation’s archival records about the CAP occurred 
very early in the program, and were related to social norms rather than scientific knowledge or ability. They centered 
on issues of arrival times at meetings and party etiquette. 
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Latin America, farmers tend to blame crop failures on seed sources more than on any 
other one factor and in some cases have made these claims stand up from the viewpoint 
of the general public.”11 He acknowledged that he did not fully understand the 
Foundation’s need for publicity in Colombia, but suggested that it could work out 
poorly for the Foundation if there was ever a bad harvest.12 Of course, the RF really had 
no interest in publicizing its work in Colombia, and preferred to avoid bad press; thus, 
taking its name off the bags used for improved wheat seeds was important to 
Wernimont and merited a discussion with Lewis Roberts. In some ways, considering 
the publicity problems Menkemen and Bonza faced both at the time, due to 
misinformation by the millers, and in the coming years, as Menkemen’s lack of 
resistance to Roya Puccinia wiped out harvests, for the RF this was an informed and 
insightful policy.  
Seeing the “improperly” labeled bags during the morning visit to the Caja 
Agraria’s seed handling plant was the first thing that displeased Wernimont that day in 
March. The second occurred that evening. Back at the Tequendama Hotel where he was 
staying, he made the acquaintance of two other North American guests – Gordon Boals, 
                                                 
11 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 10, Letter from J.N. Efferson to JGH, dated 10/17/55. 
12 Ibid. An even scarier scenario was sabotage. Efferson claimed that it would be very easy for an individual or group 
in Colombia to sabotage the Rockefeller program for “political or other reasons.” All they had to do was acquire or 
make their own supply of the bags, fill them with “poor seed” and distribute them throughout the countryside. 
Apparently he had seen such a scheme in action in 1948 when “…the North Koreans obtained a supply of 
ammonium nitrate bags stamped with the F.A.O.-U.S.D.A. label, filled them with caustic soda mixtures, slipped them 
back into the distribution system, killed out several thousand acres of rice, and then started the propaganda that the 
F.A.O.-U.S.D.A fertilizer was being supplied to South Korea to make them helpless by destroying their crops.” 
Presciently, four years later, the Colombian Ministry of Justice investigated an alleged crime in which bags used by 
the Caja Agraria to sell fertilizer were stolen and filled with “adulterated fertilizer.” Over 40,000 tons of this fertilizer 
were sold in Cundinamarca and Boyacá and drastically affected the potato harvest that year. See, RAC, RF, 12.3, 
Diaries, “Perjuicios en Cundinamarca y en Boyacá por adulteración de abonos: Los agricultores solicitan severa 
investigación,” El Siglo, July 22, 1959. 
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who worked for the USDA’s Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS), and Gordon L. 
Munson, who was the U.S. Agricultural Attaché in Ecuador. Boals would later become 
an ally of the Asociación Nacional de Panaderos (ADEPAN) – who would use some of 
his articles about the inefficacy of milling operations in wheat importing countries in 
their battles with Colombian millers over whether the country should import grain or 
flour. Wernimont, Boals, and Munson had an animated conversation that evening. At 
one point, Boals characterized the Foundation’s program as “pushing production of 
surplus crops.” For Boals, this suggested that the RF operated on shaky economic 
premises in Colombia – after all, why would the government bother to devote so many 
resources to developing production of a crop that it could just as easily buy from the 
United States, and on good terms through the PL480 program, unless it was encouraged 
to do so by an organization of such solid repute as the Rockefeller Foundation? This 
subtle accusation of economic illogic was made more plainly evident when he 
wondered why the foundation didn’t support research on “consumption.” In response, 
Wernimont refused to cede the point that such studies might be a good idea; instead he 
dismissed Boals’ criticism by indicating that the foundation “was always glad to listen 
to concrete suggestions,” but didn’t really have “much competence in the field of 
consumer research.” He also countered the inherent criticism of the RF’s program on 
economic grounds, arguing that “a predominantly agricultural country such as 
Colombia could hardly be prosperous while importing basic food stuffs.” This was 
especially important, Wernimont argued, considering that its population was increasing 
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exponentially and its urban areas experiencing rapid expansion, both of which 
demanded that Colombia “use her limited agricultural lands efficiently.”13  
Boals apparently did not counter that argument and even seemed to accept 
Wernimont’s point of view, suggesting that lower wheat prices overall would help to 
increase bread consumption in Colombia, and that such price reductions “might 
happen sooner if farmers could reduce their costs as a result of the findings of the RF 
scientists.” In the end, however, Wernimont made clear that such criticisms of the 
Rockefeller Foundation ultimately missed the point. As he explained, the RF was in 
Colombia to develop research institutions and train agricultural scientists. They were 
not there to achieve specific agricultural outcomes. Doing research on specific crops was 
simply a way of achieving their objective. As Wernimont noted: “A successful program 
of applied research is not solely an end in itself, but an essential tool for providing 
training.”14 
 Although technically true, Wernimont’s final words are slightly disingenuous. 
Training agricultural scientists was indeed the main objective of the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s Agricultural Program. But, like the “program of applied research” to 
which Wernimont refers, it was not the end in itself, but a step toward that end. The 
Foundation’s ultimate goal for its Agricultural Program was the elimination of hunger 
and to achieve that goal they focused on the world’s staple crops – initially corn, wheat, 
and beans, and later adding potatoes and rice. In Colombia the RF received continuous 
requests for assistance in developing agricultural research programs for a variety of 
                                                 
13 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 3, Kenneth Wernimont’s diary of his 1956 trip to Colombia. 
14 Ibid. 
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other crops, some of them for domestic consumption and others for export or industrial 
use. Roberts, in fact, wrote to Harrar in May 1956 requesting that an “Assistant 
Director” be hired, as he spent so much time responding to invitations from the 
Ministry of Agriculture to attend meetings about the development of various crops that 
he was finding it difficult to fulfill his responsibilities. He always attended the meetings, 
as he felt that doing so helped to keep Rockefeller-Ministry relations running smoothly, 
but he never committed the Foundation to greater participation than his presence at the 
various meetings.15 Indeed, aside from the Bavaria consortium on barley, some 
technical assistance to sugar cane growers in the Cauca Valley, and the addition of 
pasture grasses to the research program in 1953, the Foundation consistently rejected 
requests to add more research areas to its Colombian program. While their refusals, on 
one hand, indicate an attempt to avoid the problems associated with “mission creep,” 
they also belie Wernimont’s assertions about the Foundation’s objectives in Colombia.16  
Keeping the CAP focused on its core mission required constant vigilance. 
Although it seems logical that agricultural extension would be an integral part of any 
“successful program of applied research,” the Rockefeller Foundation saw that as a 
completely distinct area of activity.  While plant breeders and extension agents clearly 
have very different skills and knowledge, they are dependent on each other for the 
successful completion of their area of activities. Certainly, Colombians saw it that way, 
                                                 
15 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 11, Letter from LMR to JGH, dated May 18, 1956. Wernimont himself rejected a 
request made to him on the last day of his March 1956 visit, when Alfonso Cuadros Piar, a representative for the 
Pacific Vegetable Oil Company, stopped by the Tequendama Hotel to ask the RF to support a project developing 
edible oils in Colombia. See, RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 3, Kenneth Wernimont’s diary of his 1956 trip to 
Colombia, 50. 
16 On the Rockefeller Foundation’s goal of combating global hunger, see Stakman, Bradfield, and Mangelsdorf, 
Campaigns Against Hunger. 
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and had first asked the RF for assistance setting up a comprehensive research, training, 
and extension agency in 1953.17 The RF declined to get involved, but various Ministers 
and faculty deans kept asking over the next decade, until the RF finally agreed that it 
was a good idea and pledged its support.  
Another example occurred during Wernimont’s visit – the same one that started 
off on the wrong foot with the mislabeled bags and the unpleasant conversation with 
Boals and Munson at the Tequendama Hotel. For the next ten days, Wernimont toured 
the various installations of the CAP in and around Bogotá, Cali and Medellín. At the 
same time, he met with a variety of people, including the Minister of Agriculture, the 
Deans of the Faculties of Agronomy and all the staff of the Rockefeller Foundation. A 
number of individuals also came to see him at the hotel. One of them was Orlando Fals 
Borda. Only recently having completed his Ph.D. in rural sociology from the University 
of Florida, Fals was still a young man trying to make a career for himself and was not 
yet the widely known and respected figure that he eventually became.18 Hoping to 
revisit the area near Choconta where he completed the fieldwork in 1950 that became 
the basis of his dissertation and first book, Fals approached Wernimont in the hopes 
that the foundation would be interested in funding a follow-up project in the area, as 
                                                 
17 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 8, Letter from Warren Weaver to General Chary dated August 24, 1953. 
18 Fals was one of the founders of the National University’s Faculty of Sociology in the early 1960s. In 1962, he and 
two collaborators published a two-volume examination of the causes of the recent violence in Colombia. These 
volumes moved discussion of la Violencia’s origins away from political partisanship and toward the social conditions 
in the countryside. His most important works on rural sociology, communication, participatory development, and 
radical social change are foundational texts for Colombian students of sociology and agricultural extension. See Fals 
Borda, German Guzmán, & Eduardo Umaña Luna, La Violencia en Colombia, estudio de un proceso social (Bogotá: 
UNAL, 1962); Fals, Acción comunal en una vereda colombiana: su aplicación, sus resultados y su interpretación (Bogotá: 
UNAL, Departamento de Sociología, 1961); El hombre y la tierra en Boyacá: Bases sociológicas e históricas para una reforma 
agraria (Bogotá: Ediciones Documentos Colombianos, 1957); Subversion and Social Change in Colombia (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1969).  
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well as tests of some new extension methods. Wernimont explained that the Rockefeller 
Foundation did not support individual research projects. Fals did not apparently walk 
away empty-handed, however. As he was affiliated with two different research entities 
in Colombia at the time, he could submit an application with the sponsorship of one of 
them and suggested to Wernimont that he would do so at some point in the near 
future.19 
 Fals Borda’s name came up again three days later, when Roberts and 
Wernimont paid a visit to the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Philip Bonsall, and the 
Agricultural Attaché, Earl Loveridge. After roundly praising the RF’s work in 
Colombia, Bonsall spoke highly of the rural education program being conducted by 
Monseñor Salcedo and encouraged Wernimont to inspect it. This was the Radio 
Sutatenza project, an education program providing technical information for farmers 
over the airwaves. Wernimont promised to do so if there was time. Bonsall then 
mentioned Orlando Fals Borda and his work, noting that he was a young man who 
“…would be worth watching as he gains experience in research in the field of rural 
sociology.”20  
Wermimont never found the time to visit the Sutatenza project, and the 
Rockefeller Foundation never funded any of Fals Borda’s extension work or sociological 
research in the Colombian countryside. But, these examples illustrate the way that the 
Rockefeller Foundation was perceived at that time among Colombian agronomists, 
                                                 
19 RAC, RF, 1.2, 311, Box 2, Folder 11, Kenneth Wernimont’s diary of his 1956 trip to Colombia, 41. 
20 Ibid., 45. On Radio Sutatenza, see Stephan F. Brumberg, “Colombia: A Multimedia Rural Education Program,” in 
Education for Rural Development: Case Studies for Planners, eds. Ahmed Manzoor & Philip H. Coombs (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1975). 
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extension agents, and officials at the Ministry of Agriculture: it was a respected 
organization with whom they hoped to deepen their collaboration. Obviously, the 
Foundation’s deep pockets made it very attractive, but the respectful way that it treated 
its Colombian collaborators and the way that it followed their lead in terms of 
agricultural goals and policies surely heightened not only the esteem with which it was 
held, but also the perception that it could play an important role in helping to the nation 
from predatory policies by certain U.S. actors attempting to discredit and disrupt 
national goals of agricultural self-sufficiency. A few years later, these competing visions 
would begin to clash more publicly. 
 
Neither Bread Nor Cookies 
 In February 1960, Roy Roy K. Durhan and Edward F. Seeborg released a 
damning report about Colombian wheat production. Durhan was an advisor to both the 
Great Plains Wheat Development Association and the National Miller’s Association of 
America. Seeborg was a representative of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Colombia’s millers could not have made a better case for increasing imports.  They 
began by stating that the gap between the amount of grain necessary for Colombia’s 
needs and the amount available was growing every year and suggested that only 
increased imports could alleviate such a shortage. According to Durhan and Seeborg, 
domestic production could not fill this gap because, as they explained it, “Colombian 
wheat is of relatively poor quality. Its protein content is approximately 11%, and 
therefore, the flour it produces contains too little protein to make good bread and too 
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much to make good cookies.”21  Attempting to demonstrate objectivity and fairness, 
they stated that Colombia’s millers were “anxious” to buy local wheat since their mills 
were largely lying idle.  They acknowledged the work of Colombian agronomists 
valiantly attempting to develop varieties adapted to the country’s growing conditions, 
but expressed great pessimism that they would be able to overcome the diseases to 
which wheat was so susceptible, or the climatic factor, implying that wheat was 
naturally a temperate, rather than a tropical crop.  Revealing the true target of their 
comments, however, they also indicated that Colombia’s mills were inactive not only 
because of low levels of national production, but because the severe import restrictions 
then in place prevented them from purchasing the grain necessary to feed Colombia.  In 
other words, the same restrictions that were put in place half a year earlier, when wheat 
farmers couldn’t sell their harvests because the mills were filled with imports were now 
being blamed for the shortage facing the country. 
 Dr. Enrique de Rojas Pena, on behalf of the Colombian Association of Agronomic 
Engineers quickly responded to these charges with a several page rebuttal that was 
published in at least three different newspapers (under three different titles).22  The 
main argument of Dr. Rojas’ response was based on the assertion that the percentage of 
protein content in wheat depended on the region in which it was grown.  With that as a 
starting point, he discussed the protein content of the same wheat variety grown in 
different areas of Wisconsin, Minnesota and North Dakota, which was shown to vary 
                                                 
21 RAC, RF, 12.3, Diaries, “Criterios antagónicos desconcertantes rigen la política triguera en el país, hoy,” El 
Colombiano, March 25, 1960.  
22 Ibid.; RAC, RF, 12.3, Diaries, “450 Millones en Importación de Trigo Afecta a la Economia Nacional,” El Espéctador, 
February 28, 1960; “En Colombia Puede Producirse Trigo Fino y de Bajos Costos,” La República, February 28, 1960. 
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from between 10.8 to 13.5 percent. In contrast, a similar list highlighting Menkemen and 
Bonza grown in 20 different localities in Cundinamarca, Boyacá, and Nariño 
demonstrated the same variability, but at higher levels of protein content – between 11.7 
and 18.3 percen.  Wheat was abundantly cultivated in Colombia’s tropical regions 
throughout the colonial era, another article explained, but had died out in the 
nineteenth century, attacked by a microscopic fungus for which it had no defenses.  By 
1959, however, Colombian agronomists had “completely eradicated this wheat 
fungus.”23 Moreover, combating Durhan and Seeborg’s implicit assumption that wheat 
could only be successfully grown in cooler climates, the author felt compelled to add 
that “wheat’s origins were in warm climates, as it was originally cultivated in Asia, 
Ethiopia and North Africa,” thus rendering Colombia an excellent location for wheat 
cultivation.   
 Charges that Colombia could not produce wheat in its lower elevations seemed 
particularly offensive to the Rice Growers Federation.  As a show of support to the 
Colombian Association of Agronomic Engineers, the Rice Growers Federation issued a 
statement, published in La República.  The Federation began with a shot across the bow, 
claiming that the erroneous information contained in Durhan and Seeborg’s article was 
provided to them by the U.S. Embassy in Colombia.  After declaring that they were 
“completely opposed” to their assessment of Colombia’s wheat growing capacity, the 
Federation discussed how well wheat adapted itself to the country’s rice-growing 
regions, claiming that it was an excellent crop to add to the rotation process.  As 
                                                 
23 RAC, RF, 12.3, Diaries, “Superior producción del trigo de climas cálidos,” La República, March 27, 1960. 
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support for their argument that wheat could be grown in Colombia’s warmer regions, 
the Federation called upon the expertise of none other than José Francisco de Caldas, 
one of the country’s national heroes from the independence era: 
The wise Caldas, in his admirable study of the plants that were cultivated 
in vicinity of Ecuador, published in 1803, indicated that the warm climates 
of New Granada, particularly Cartagena, Popayán, Patía, Cali, and Santa 
Fe de Antioquia had been intensely cultivated with wheat during the 
colonial period.    
 
Caldas wrote that wheat was decimated during that era by an unknown disease. 
According to the Federation, that disease had now been identified and new, resistant 
strains had been developed. Thus, the Rice Growers claimed that “this fearful 
disease…is completely eradicated.” Moreover, they asserted, wheat was a crop native to 
warm climates, being that it was first cultivated in Asia, Ethiopia, and North Africa. The 
statement then provided several paragraphs of specific results of recent research that 
had been conducted on wheat in warm zones, and finally concluded with a parting 
shot: “In addition, the cultivation of wheat in warm climates enjoys the advantage of 
easily being able to produce two harvests each year, an exceptional condition, and one 
which places the wheat-growing regions of the temperate zone in an inferior 
position.”24   
 While it may seem odd that the Rice Growers would come so vociferously to the 
defense of the wheat growers, in reality, they were in similar situations – attempting to 
increase the production of what was, at that time, not considered a “traditional” crop in 
Colombia, and one which competed for land with extensive banana plantations and 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
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cattle ranches. Being that the Ministry of Agriculture was attempting to promote such 
“non-traditional” crops as wheat and rice, among others, it served their interest to show 
support and solidarity for the wheat growers. 
 Ultimately, the combination of what appeared to be a public furor over the 
encouragement of barley over wheat and the attacks by North Americans on Colombian 
wheat varieties led the Ministry of Agriculture to propose the creation of an “Institute 
of Cereals.” Although a Federation supporting both wheat and barley was eventually 
established, it was poorly funded and ultimately achieved very little.25 On the other 
hand, shortly afterward, the Ministry established an organization designed to oversee 
and combine the three main functions of agricultural research institutions – research, 
training and extension. The Rockefeller Foundation played an important role in the 
creation of the Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario (ICA). Over the next few years, 
officials and colleagues at the Ministry of Agriculture, the Caja Agraria, and ICA relied 
heavily on the Rockefeller Foundation to help defend their attempts to grow more 
wheat from attacks by the USDA, and other U.S.-based wheat interests.  
How Not to Win Friends 
At heart, the goals of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Colombian Ministry of 
Agriculture (and the agronomists and agriculturalists throughout the country who 
worked for or supported the CAP) were quite divergent.  The RF hoped to eradicate 
world hunger through the application of advanced biology and chemistry to 
                                                 
25 As a previous chapter indicated, these two crops were actually in severe competition at the time, so it is surprising 
that the Ministry of Agriculture thought a joint effort would achieve anything useful. 
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agricultural production.26  The Ministry of Agriculture wanted to reduce grain imports, 
substituting them with domestically grown ones.  That eradicating world hunger was 
ultimately only a secondary goal for the Colombians who supported the CAP is 
evidenced by statements made by Camilo Cabal, the Minister of Agriculture in 1953, 
just a few months before the military coup overthrew the conservative government of 
Laureano Gomez.  In a March 1953 meeting between Cabal and Jacob George Harrar, 
then director of the RF’s agricultural programs worldwide, the Minister indicated his 
pleasure with the results of the CAP up to that point and emphasized that with the RF’s 
help Colombia could easily produce the 40,000 tons of wheat that it was currently 
importing in order to achieve the 160,000 tons needed each year to meet the nutritional 
needs of the Colombian people.  As Cabal suggested, by producing those 40,000 tons 
themselves, Colombia could save the four to five million dollars that it then spent on an 
annual basis to purchase imported wheat.27  
Clearly this has nothing to do with eradicating world hunger.  Their 
contradictory goals did not ever seem to pose a problem for the Rockefeller Foundation, 
however, and it’s easy to understand why: Colombia’s desire to reduce reliance on 
imported grain did not contradict the RF’s desire to eradicate world hunger.  By helping 
the Colombians achieve their goal of import substitution, the RF ultimately worked 
toward achieving its own goal in the long run as well.   
                                                 
26 Stakman, Bradfield, and Mangelsdorf, Campaigns Against Hunger. 
27 RAC, RG 1.2, S 311, Box 2, Folder 8, Jacob George Harrar’s (JGH) diary dated March 19, 1953, regarding his trip to 
Colombia. 
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Somehow, though, import substitution and national self-sufficiency seemed to 
become goals in and of themselves for the RF officers stationed in Colombia. They 
rarely spoke of the impact that the CAP would have on the Foundation’s overall goal 
and frequently spoke instead of the way that their program was helping Colombia 
achieve self-sufficiency in grain production.  Often they sounded more Colombian in 
this regard than the Colombians themselves.  One could obviously expect that the 
Foundation’s officers in Colombia would take such a stance when addressing the 
Colombian public or in meetings with governmental representatives or producers 
associations or heads of agronomy departments.  But private correspondence and diary 
notes shared only within the Foundation itself are replete with such references as well.  
And more importantly, they often took this stance when directing comments toward 
various US audiences as well, including the very same Embassy, USDA and producers 
associations that were helping to advance a negative publicity campaign regarding 
Colombian wheat.   
It is in this sense that the Rockefeller Foundation became a “collaborator” of the 
Colombian Ministry of Agriculture.  To return to the central theme of this chapter: in 
many accounts of the Rockefeller Foundation in Latin America, the various individuals 
in Latin America connected with one of the Foundation’s programs are often portrayed 
as the Foundation’s “collaborators,” – individuals who worked with the Foundation to 
help it achieve its goals.  What is overlooked in this formulation is the way that the 
Foundation became a “collaborator” of sorts for Latin Americans attempting to achieve 
their own goals that were independent of the Foundation’s.   
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This certainly seems to be the case with the CAP.  As the following pages will 
show, in the Ministry of Agriculture’s battle with the millers for control over the 
domestic wheat market, the RF became an important ally, with a great deal of firepower 
to direct toward the millers’ own collaborators – the U.S. Embassy, USDA and U.S. 
wheat producers associations.  That firepower was often directed with great results in 
the court of public opinion in Colombia in general.  That this was the case will be 
demonstrated in the following pages by first briefly examining the relationship between 
the RF and other representatives of the US in Colombia, as well as the RF and the 
Colombians with which it worked.  Then, several examples of the Foundation’s defense 
of Colombia’s wheat-growing capabilities will be explored.  Finally, some examples of 
the use of the Rockefeller Foundation within Colombia will be discussed.   
 
 It is not clear that Colombian agronomists knew that the Rockefeller Foundation 
officers held other U.S. actors in such low regard. Surely, they would have taken great 
delight in such knowledge, if they had it. The RF repeatedly criticized STACA, for 
example, on a number of points regarding its personnel, including their insufficient 
numbers, their lack of training, and their minimal experience in Colombia.  An excerpt 
from the diary of Ulysses J. Grant regarding a meeting between he, Guy Baird, another 
RF agronomist in Colombia, and representatives of STACA subtly demonstrates this.  
According to Grant, the meeting was designed to develop ideas for greater 
collaboration between the RF-sponsored agronomists and the STACA extension agents.  
Several of the agents in attendance at the meeting, which also included the U.S. 
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Embassy’s new chief agricultural officer, Mr. Lyall Peterson, were new to the country, 
and so the STACA director asked Grant to begin the meeting by first explaining what 
the Rockefeller Foundation was doing in Colombia.  Grant and Baird did so and then 
launched into a discussion of ways to ensure greater collaboration between research 
and extension.  Grant’s comments, however, make it clear that he believed that he and 
Baird were just wasting their time at the meeting: 
We discussed various ways and means of getting more coordination 
between research and extension. We mentioned a number of projects 
which would lend themselves to a good extension program. One of them 
would be in the production of virus free potatoes. Another would be in 
setting up a rotation of wheat and potatoes and pastures. This experiment 
is especially promising for a large farmer. A number of others could be 
done on management of livestock, etc., but it is fairly well apparent that 
STACA will not be able to do too much of this type of work by project 
because they do not have enough people to go at extension on a project 
basis. It was pointed out that the real answer to this problem was to have 
extension people work with the research sections so that they could learn 
first hand what is going on, and then they would be in a much better 
position to do some extension work.28  
 
Grant’s criticisms tended to be diplomatic and subtle.  In this excerpt, he was 
both, but also clearly expressed his ongoing frustration, which, on close inspection, can 
read like a laundry list: 1) the existence of yet another new agricultural officer with no 
knowledge of the RF program or its activities in Colombia; 2) lack of knowledge on the 
part of STACA program staff regarding Colombia’s agricultural needs or situation; 3) 
insufficient staff to effectively conduct any extension programs at all; and 4) lack of 
training or knowledge on the part of the staff regarding the connection between 
research and extension.  One can imagine how exasperated he must have felt, when he 
                                                 
28 RAC, RAF, RG 12.3, S Diaries, Box 21: Diary notes of Ulysses J. Grant from August 31, 1959. 
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eventually was forced to politely suggest that the STACA team get up to speed on the 
basics of Colombian agricultural production and research before they work on any 
collaborative programs. Grant’s diary is quite extensive and provides a variety of other 
examples similar to this, with criticisms of staff ranging from STACA extension agents, 
as the above example illustrates, all the way up to the U.S. Agricultural Attaché 
himself.29  The undertone of frustration is palpable in all of them, although few reached 
the extreme bluntness of his criticism of a representative of the UN: “Appointment 
again with Mr. Boothby, the sheep specialist from the FAO. This gentleman is 
completely lost.”30  
For the Ministry of Agriculture, the fact that the RF had similar problems 
working with the foreign missions and representatives of the U.S. Embassy created a 
natural alliance between them.  It probably helped to cement the RF’s interest in helping 
the Colombians achieve their goals.  And it certainly may have contributed to its 
continual insistence that wheat was perfectly adapted to Colombia’s growing 
conditions and that the grain produced there was perfectly suitable for use in all types 
of milling and baking processes. 
 
Recall the defense of wheat grown in tropical areas that the Rice Growers 
Federation had issued in response to the attack on Colombian wheat by Roy Durhan 
and Edward Seeborg in March 1960.  That same month, Grant had a meeting with Dr. 
Canuto Cardona, Dr. Eduardo Chavarriaga and Gustavo Restrepo from the Caja Agaria.  
                                                 
29 RAC, RF 12.3, Diaries, Box 21, Diary notes from UJG on 7/15/1959; 2/5/60; 2/18/60; 3/7/60. 
30 RAC, RF 12.3, Diaries, Box 21, UJG diary notes from 11/26/1960. 
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The meeting was ostensibly about the various seed campaigns going on at the time, but 
at one point, the discussion turned toward the “possibility of growing wheat at low 
elevations,” the very same proposal put forward by the Rice Growers Federation.  The 
Caja Agraria had developed a research program for “tropical wheat” but was unable to 
carry it out due to a lack of personnel.  In what was clearly an attempt to get the RF on 
board, Restrepo assured Grant that they would be able to “obtain all the financial 
support necessary,” presumably from the Ministry of Agriculture, while Cardona 
believed that they would be able to find enough agronomists to carry out the program.  
Grant’s assessment of this project was that, “this is not as simple as it sounds because of 
the disease and insect problem but I think that some research should be done on this 
problem.” While this may sound like an evasive response, characteristic of Grant’s 
diplomacy and subtlety, the fact that he did not dismiss it out of hand, as he did many 
other projects proposed to him and the RF is suggestive of his potential willingness to 
consider it.  Moreover, a related observation at the close of his diary entry that day 
supports this contention, and hints at the direction the RF was beginning to take in 
regards to imported wheat vs. domestic production in Colombia:    
There is a tremendous amount of propaganda in the newspapers at the 
present time concerning the importation of wheat from the United States. 
There is a strong feeling that the importation of wheat from the States is 
going to damage the price structure of wheat produced in this country. 
This may be right.”31 
 
Several years later, the RF’s transformation to full-blown supporters of domestic 
wheat over imported was in full view in its response to an article published by Robert 
                                                 
31 RAC, RF 12.3, Diaries, Box 21, UJG diary notes from 3/25/1960. 
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Adcock, the US Agricultural Attaché in Colombia.  Adcock’s article was published in 
the USDA sponsored journal, Foreign Agriculture, and claimed that wheat was not 
“adapted” to the tropics and criticized the country’s leaders for attempting to achieve 
self-sufficiency in the grain, as well as the Rockefeller Foundation for wasting its time, 
money, and efforts trying to help them.  To an uninformed reader, Adcock appeared 
well-informed about wheat production and experimentation in Colombia.  He wrote of 
researcher’s plans to extend their experiments for wheat varieties adapted for the “vast 
tropical plains where the average temperature is 78o F. and the rainy season lasts six 
months,” as well as a significant portion of the funding for this research, which came 
from a “tax” on imported wheat – for every ton of imported wheat purchased by 
Colombian millers, the equivalent of $6.50 was contributed to a special fund dedicated 
to supporting research on wheat expansion throughout the country, utilizing new 
varieties.  
Adcock acknowledged that great gains had been made – experimentally.  
Research stations had developed high quality strains of wheat capable of producing 90 
bushels per acre, and those research gains ignited the hopes for “consistent and 
dependable results,” and encouraged research to continue.  But that rosy picture was 
only applied to research. Far from the experimental fields, millers were paying “as high 
as $5.50 a bushel for local wheat, most of which would be called ‘sample grade’ in the 
United States and would go into livestock feed rather than flour.”  As if that wasn’t bad 
enough, Adcock attributed advanced soil erosion throughout Colombia to the attempt 
to cultivate wheat in places where it wasn’t “adapted,” and claimed that only “in the 
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limited, relatively level land of the Savannah [was] erosion no problem, but here wheat 
competes sharply with malting barley, dairying, vegetables, as well as with industrial 
and recreational uses.”32   
After the article’s appearance in Foreign Agriculture, a flurry of letters flew back 
and forth between Ulysses J. Grant, Lewis M. Roberts, then director of the RF’s 
agricultural programs in New York City, and Charles F. Krull, another RF wheat 
breeder.  In them, they picked apart the scientific basis of his arguments, his logic, and 
his motivations. They also debated how to respond.  In their assessment of his 
motivations, the deep division between these two different groups of North Americans 
– representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation on the one hand and representatives of 
various branches of the U.S. government on the other – is readily apparent, and 
suggests the ease with which various representatives of Colombian agriculture could 
enlist the RF in their struggle to fend off the “dumping” of surplus grain from the 
United States. As Krull saw it:  
Bob [Adcock] feels that his principal job as Agricultural Attaché in Bogotá 
is to sell U.S. surplus products, particularly wheat. Therefore, he considers 
it his duty to discourage local production in any way that he can, and he 
has been quite critical of the Foundation on numerous occasions.”33  
 
Roberts, who had worked in both the RF’s Mexican and Colombian Agricultural 
Programs, assisted in a smaller Chilean program, and had had numerous exchanges 
with agronomists and government leaders throughout Latin America – and was thus in 
a position to speak authoritatively, echoed Krull’s assessment: 
                                                 
32 Robert E. Adcock, “Colombian Wheat Needs Outstrip Country’s Capacity to Produce,” FA (August 9, 1965): 8-9. 
33 RAC, RF 1.2, 311, Box 4, Folder 23, Letter from Charles Krull to Lewis Roberts, dated 9/17/65. All subsequent 
references to this letter will be cited as “Krull to Roberts.” 
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Your comments on Bob Adcock’s article are very interesting and to the 
point. Bob is no exception among the many agricultural attachés, whom I 
have known throughout Latin America over the years, in feeling that one 
of his main responsibilities is to sell U.S. surplus agricultural products. He 
is entitled, of course, to his own viewpoint which clearly reflects the policy 
line handed down from Washington. What I do object to, as you do, are 
his misstatements of fact, half-truths, and many insinuations that are 
poorly based.34 
 
What were these misstatements and half-truths?  Of all the letters, Krull’s was 
the most thorough and relentless in picking them apart.  A key argument in Adcock’s 
article centered on the concept of a “tropical crop of recognized adaptability.” He did 
not include wheat in this category.  Krull analyzed this concept at length, questioning 
what exactly Adcock meant by the term.  He pointed out that Adcock had excluded 
wheat but included barley, despite the fact that “wheat [had] higher yields per hectare 
in Colombia and it is only because of an aggressive extension program and a 
guaranteed, well-regulated market that barley can compete.”35 He marveled at the fact 
that, in Adcock’s conception, corn did not appear to be a crop suited to the tropics – an 
absurd idea, Krull indicated, considering that it had originated in the “tropical 
Americas.” Examining the list of adapted and unadapted crops, Krull could only 
conclude that “the definition of ‘not adapted’ crops seem to be influenced as to whether 
the U.S. has large surpluses of the crop or not.”36 
A short list of the misstatements and half-truths Krull identified in Adcock’s 
article is quite long: most farmers using CAP seeds were producing 30 tons per acre, not 
                                                 
34 RAC, RF 1.2, 311, Box 4, Folder 23, Letter from Lewis Roberts to Charles Krull dated October 14, 1965. All 
subsequent references to this letter will be cited as “Roberts to Krull.”  
35 Krull to Roberts, op. cit. 
36 Ibid. 
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the 13 Adcock claimed; it was farmers who had produced 90 tons per hectare in the 
Sabana de Bogotá, not just the researchers at experiment stations; the money collected 
through the surcharge on imported wheat did go to a government fund, but none of it 
was ever made available to conduct research on wheat; very little of the domestic wheat 
purchased by millers was ‘sample grade,’ but because of Colombia’s humid conditions 
and poor storage facilities, it did often arrive damaged; while soil erosion was a 
problem, in no stretch of the imagination did it equal the gravity of the problem in 
much of the wheat areas of the U.S., “particularly the ‘dust bowl’ of Mr. Adcock’s native 
Oklahoma;” wheat did compete for land with other crops and industries on the 
Savannah, but that in itself did not make it unsuitable for tropical conditions.   
While the thoroughness with which Krull and others criticized Adock’s 
assertions may seem excessive, they were also practically inevitable.  He was, after all, 
both directly and indirectly criticizing the RF’s work in Colombia, work to which it had 
dedicated almost twenty years by that point.  Numerous individuals at the Foundation 
were deeply committed to the program’s success, and apparently sloppy, and certainly 
damaging critiques such as Adcock’s would have been taken very seriously and 
perhaps personally.  Thus, it would have been surprising if the Foundation had not 
reacted in such a way.  More significant than the criticisms of Adcock’s main points was 
the discussion of a potential response and the Colombian reaction to the article.  
Roberts, for example, wrote that 
If I were a Colombian, especially a government official in agriculture, I 
wouldn’t like to have a U.S. diplomatic representative try to tutor me in 
public print about how to manage the agricultural affairs and policies of 
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Colombia. If Bob has such viewpoints as he expressed in his article, I think 
he should try to get these across to the appropriate Colombian officials in 
face-to-face conversations with them. By putting these in print as he has 
done, he has provided a good example of how not to win friends.37 
 
Roberts’ sensitivity to the Colombian point of view is in keeping with the tenor 
of RF relations with Colombians in general, but also hints at a different understanding 
of the relationship between Americans and Colombians than that expressed by Adcock.  
“Tutoring,” after all, implies an unequal relationship, while “face-to-face conversations” 
suggests a relationship of equals, of peers and of colleagues.  The respect with which 
the Rockefeller Foundation treated its Colombian colleagues was rewarded by the great 
esteem in which the Foundation was held in Colombian agricultural research circles.   
That the RF was sympathetic to the Colombian point of view was expressed by 
Krull’s suggestions for the appropriate response on the part of the RF and of the 
Colombians themselves.  He did not believe that anyone at the Foundation should 
respond directly to Adcock, as they had already had several conversations with him 
about these issues in the past. Moreover, many of the same points had been made by 
the Minister of Agriculture at the Colombian National Wheat Congress in November, 
1964, and Krull suggested that Adcock would have been familiar with this speech – and 
apparently had paid no attention. The tone of Krull’s letter suggests that the RF had 
worn out its usefulness as a “collaborator” for the Ministry of Agriculture in its struggle 
to reduce wheat imports, as the RF’s power to influence the representatives of the US 
embassy seemed quite limited. Only drastic action – taken on the part of the 
                                                 
37 Roberts to Krull, op. cit. 
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Colombians – seemed likely to have any potential results, and Krull had a good 
suggestion: 
I have known Colombians to become quite angry at the type of material 
presented in the Foreign Agriculture article. Perhaps some day someone of 
high enough rank will get concerned enough to close wheat importation 
out of spite and regulate the market situation to encourage wheat 
production. This would be one of the most valuable things that has been 
done for the agriculture of Colombia.38 
 
 However, while in some respects the RF may have appeared to be a weak ally in 
the struggle against imported wheat, Roberts, having lived in Colombia for a decade, 
understood all too well the difficult position of the Colombians and the obstacles they 
faced in directly confronting the US. Reiterating Krull’s assessment of Adcock’s willful 
deafness, he lamented that the latter had not “…allowed himself to be properly oriented 
on the subject of his article” and asserted that Grant, Gibler and Krull had all attempted 
to “get the story across to him,” without luck. Roberts was also certain that Grant would 
continue his efforts to educate Adcock. The most effective and persuasive words would 
come from representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Caja Agraria, but 
Roberts succinctly expressed the difficulties for them in doing so:  
There are some very good reasons why the Colombians can’t make a great 
issue of this – one of which is the fact that ICA has a request pending with 
AID for support for a technical assistance program with the University of 
Nebraska. They cannot very well afford to let themselves get into an open 
squabble with AID and the U.S. Embassy at this particular time.39 
 
With this we can more fully understand the role of the RF in Colombia.  
Although their power to influence Washington was limited, they played a crucial role 
                                                 
38 Krull to Roberts, op. cit. 
39 Roberts to Krull, op. cit. 
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in arguing on behalf of the Colombians when doing so for themselves carried 
difficulties.  More importantly, the RF expressed awareness of this role and seemed to 
embrace it, albeit with some reluctance.   
 
Conclusion 
At the conclusion of Roberts’ letter to Krull regarding the Adcock debacle, 
Roberts wrote that “an increasing number of knowledgeable and responsible 
individuals here in the States are becoming greatly concerned about the U.S. food 
policy, especially as this relates to the disposal of surpluses abroad.” He told Krull 
about a national seminar on the subject that had been held at Estes Park the summer 
before. The proceedings of the meeting had just been published and Roberts intended to 
circulate them widely within the RF.  As he indicated,  
I think you will find the results of this seminar quite interesting, and I 
hope it will have an influence on setting a new course for the U.S. to 
dispose of its agricultural surplus production. I do not believe that Adcock 
and the other agricultural attaches will change very much until they 
receive a new policy line handed down from above. It is high time that 
this change comes about.40  
 
A clearer statement that the RF was “on the side” of the Colombian agronomists 
could not be found.  This in turn leads us to question the notion that entities such as the 
Rockefeller Foundation could truly be considered “agents of empire” on behalf of the 
U.S. Clearly, the United States was (and is) not a monolithic empire – a wide variety of 
opinions proliferate, even within the state itself. But the characterization of the 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
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Rockefeller Foundation as one part of a singular U.S. effort to spread Western science 
and dominate the agricultural production of developing nations cannot be sustained in 
light of the Foundation’s collaborative efforts with Colombian wheat promoters. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In 1945, Dr. W.E. Dunn, the Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs at the 
U.S. Embassy in Colombia took a trip down the Magdalena River with his wife, Linda 
T. Dunn. The first part of their journey mirrored that of many other travelers from 
Colombia’s highland interior to the Atlantic Coast: a trek across the Sabana de Bogotá to 
the slopes of the eastern cordillera, where they began their descent toward the 
Magdalena River. Unlike in previous decades and centuries, however, in which mules 
or human carriers were the most common modes of transportation, the Dunns traveled 
by train from Bogotá to Puerto Salgar, one of the main ports on the Magdalena River. 
This 125-mile trip afforded them the opportunity to pleasantly gaze out of their train car 
window at the surrounding countryside. Their observations on this part of their journey 
are worth noting: 
Leaving Bogotá in the morning, the train runs westward across the Sabana 
of Bogotá, through broad level pastures of natural grasses and fields of corn 
and wheat. The air is clear and bracing at that altitude, and the landscape 
reminds one of some parts of the Middle West in the United States. Shortly 
beyond the town of Facatativá, the railroad leaves the sabana and starts its 
long descent of the slopes of the Eastern Cordillera. The air gradually 
becomes warmer, and pastures and wheatfields give way to steep 
mountain slopes covered with forests, coffee fincas, and then to patches of 
sugarcane, corn, and yuca.1  
 
Many Colombians who traveled through the Sabana between the 1940s and 
1960s – and even into the 1970s – recall similarly striking fields of wheat and commonly 
noted its preponderance. But many only remember this if they are prompted. The more 
                                                 
1 W.E. Dunn and Linda T. Dunn, “Down the Magdalena,” Agriculture in the Americas 5 (August 1945): 143-146, 143. 
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current uses of this land – cattle and cut flowers primarily – seem to have become 
projected onto the past and few people readily identify the Sabana as Colombia’s 
breadbasket of yore. That the country once almost achieved self-sufficiency in this grain 
seems unfathomable to most of its citizens today. 
This dissertation has traced some of the economic, political, social, and cultural 
reasons for the decline of this staple crop in Colombia. Despite the intense efforts of 
Colombia’s agronomists, assisted by the Rockefeller Foundation, wheat production, 
which steadily increased between the 1930s and the 1950s, declined precipitiously 
beginning in the early 1960s, until it essentially became, as Eduardo Caballero Calderón 
had predicted in 1959, a crop mainly grown in people’s “backyard gardens, as a 
remembrance of past times.”2  
A variety of other economic interests, some of them aligned, others not, 
nevertheless worked together to ensure that wheat production in Colombia would not 
only decline, but would ultimately come to be considered a crop that was completely 
unsuitable for the country’s climate and growing conditions. Millers prefererred grain 
grown in the U.S.; the Bavaria Beer Consortium promoted barley production on the 
same sabana lands used at the time for growing wheat; that same consortium also 
supported the development of Colombia’s fertilizer industry through P.L. 480 funding, 
which required continued and increased importation of U.S. grain; bakers constantly 
shifted alliances – sometimes supporting national wheat production, other times not – 
depending on political conditions; the Ministry of Agriculture paid lip service to self-
                                                 
2 RAC, RF, 12.3, Diaries, Box 21, Eduardo Caballero Calderón, “Trigo y cebada,” El Tiempo, August 11, 1959. 
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sufficiency, but undermined many of its own initiatives by providing more consistent 
support and funding for programs to expand the production of crops required for 
industrial purposes. At the same time, powerful wheat interests from the U.S. Midwest 
and the USDA worked to disaparage Colombian wheat as inferior and propagate the 
idea that wheat was a temperate crop, unsuitable for production in tropical regions 
such as Colombia – an idea of Colombia that ignored the temperate-like climate in its 
highland regions. In other words, a whole host of interests, aligned and unaligned, 
worked together to damage national production and reduce it to a few thousand tons a 
year.  
But this story of a failed attempt to achieve self-sufficiency in agricultural 
production of an important staple crop involves more than merely the uncovering and 
re-telling of who, when, when, and where. This unfulfilled promise of import 
substitution agriculture tells us crucial things about Colombia’s mid-century economic, 
political, and social development overall. In some crucial ways, this nuanced portrait of 
the failure of wheat production to mature in Colombia reflects what is generally 
accepted as Colombian history: although coffee production always remained the 
backbone of the Colombian economy, the importance of agricultural interests overall 
declined over the course of the twentieth century. Industrial interests, on the other 
hand, grew in prominence, collectively becoming the voices that had the power to 
shape public policy. This power, however, was wielded by a small group of wealthy 
industrialists, in ways that were often inimical to the general welfare of the nation, and 
the poorer and working classes more specificially.  
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Clearly, the ability of the Bavaria Beer Consortium to shape public policy to favor 
the production of barley instead of wheat – in other words, an industrial crop rather 
than an alimentary one – reflects a shift in the concentration of power in Colombia from 
the countryside to the city. Similarly, the efforts of the primary bakers’ organization to 
first associate itself with the “gentlemen industrialists” in order to shape public policy, 
and then later to resort to the rhetoric of class conflict as the nation’s mood shifted in 
the early 1960s provides a strong example of the power of a reduced group of industrial 
elites to shape public policy. 
But, looking at this story solely in those terms obscures the things that it reveals 
about Colombian nation-, state-, and class formation. Yes, Colombia’s agronomists and 
wheat breeders tried and failed to promote wheat production throughout the Sabana de 
Bogotá. But, in the process, they developed a discourse of the nation focused on the 
productivity of its soil and climate, and the agricultural scientists who worked to make 
that soil and climate help the country achieve self-sufficiency. Moreover, they did so by 
challenging the imperial claims from northern climes, that disparaged both Colombia’s 
soil and weather, as well as the work of its agronomists.  
Similarly, while it is true that the artisan-bakers were unable to challenge the 
economic might of the nation’s more powerful industrial interests, they infused their 
attempts to do so in a discourse of the state that consistently defined what the proper 
relationship between a state and its citizenry should be. This relationship was one in 
which the state balanced all of the country’s economic interests, considering players 
large and small, rather than just a small wealthy handful. It was one in which the voices 
 426 
of the weak were given equal weight and where democracy worked for everyone and 
not just a few special interests. In the process of articulating their vision of the state and 
the citizenry, they engaged in processes of popular state-formation, processes that have 
been little studied in Colombia.  
The same is true for the coalition of Colombian agronomists, sympathetic 
members of the Ministry of Agriculture, and representatives of the Rockefeller 
Foundation in Colombia. Although they did not succeed in pushing public policy to 
favor the production of alimentary crops instead of industrial ones (at least for wheat), 
their attempts to shape public discourse about wheat production also demonstrate 
active efforts to construct a state, one in which the needs of the many are not 
subordinated to the desires of the few (at least as they defined them). Their careful, 
considered, and successful attempts to place editorials, press releases, interviews, and 
reports on the activities of the nation’s wheat-focused agricultural experiment stations 
in the country’s primary newspapers show processes of state-formation in action. 
Moreover, their discursive constructions, like that of the bakers, show their attempts to 
define the state as an entity that should focus directly on the welfare of the general 
population through food production and the achievement of agricultural self-
sufficiency rather than dependency on foreign imports for the nation’s food supply. 
Thus, this dissertation does double-duty: it uncovers a (purposely) forgotten 
episode in Colombian history while also demonstrating how those forgotten episodes 
describe crucial elements of Colombian nation- and state-formation. In the process, it 
illustrates the importance of looking at economic development policies such as import 
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substitution industrialization through a lens focused on society, culture, and politics, 
rather than one focused merely on marco-economic projections and/or economic 
explanations of why those polices “failed.” Examining those policies in these ways 
reveals them to be far more productive processes than is currently allowed. 
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